MNEMOSYNE

BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA BATAVA

COLLEGERUNT

J.M. BREMER · L.F. JANSSEN · H. PINKSTER

H.W. PLEKET · C.J. RUIJGH · P.H. SCHRIJVERS

BIBLIOTHECAE FASCICULOS EDENDOS CURAVIT

C.J. RUIJGH, KLASSIEK SEMINARIUM, OUDE TURFMARKT 129, AMSTERDAM

SUPPLEMENTUM CENTESIMUM SEPTUAGESIMUM QUARTUM

GERALD SANDY

THE GREEK WORLD OF APULEIUS

TUTA SUB AEGIDE PALLAS · 1683 ·

THE GREEK WORLD OF APULEIUS

APULEIUS AND THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

BY

GERALD SANDY

BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1997

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 90 04 10821 1

© Copyright 1997 by Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced,
translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without prior written permission
from the publisher.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ix

Chapter One: Propaedeutics: the Formation of a Latin Sophist . . 1
- Time and Place 1
- Religious Background 8
- Utraque Lingua Eruditus 9
- Adaptations of Greek Models 12
- Studiis Ornata Carthago 16
- Eloquent Philosophy 20
- Philosophus Platonicus 22
- Philosophical Studies in Athens 27
- Publications Record 36

Chapter Two: Literature and Learning in the Second Century . . 42
- Sources 43
- Pre-eminence of Greek 48
- Cult of the Past 49
  - Authorized Language 50
  - Stylistic Canons 54
  - Bibliomania 60
  - Cultural Canons 64
  - Literary Mimesis 69
  - Translation 71
  - Compendia 73
  - Miscellanies 77
  - Moralizing Anecdotes 84
  - Scientific Compendia 87
- Conclusions 88

Chapter Three: Sophistic Discourse 92
- Favorinus of Arles 93
- Maximus of Tyre 94
  - The Shape of Sophistic Discourse 103
  - The Locus Communis 110
  - Pulpit Oratory 113
  - Rhetorical Conditioning 119

Progressio Interrupta 125
Conclusions 130

Chapter Four: Orator Sophisticus Latinus 131
The Apology 131
Conclusions 145
The Florida 148
Forensic and Epideictic Oratory 148
Epideictic Oratory 150
The Epideictic Stage 150
Declamation 152
Didacticism 154
Narrative 156
Mediation 160
The "Talk" 162
Squabbles among Sophists 164
Mock-encomia 169
Word-pictures 169
On Listening to Lectures 171
Conclusions 173

Chapter Five: Philosophus Sophisticus Latinus 176
Philosophy and Rhetoric 176
The Self-portrait of the Philosopher 178
Eloquent Philosophers 180
Philosophy on Stage 183
Authorship 188
Philosophical Education in the Second Century 190
The *On the God of Socrates* 191
The "False" Prefaces 192
The Discourse 196
The *On Plato and His Doctrine* 213
Scripted Philosophy 214
Genesis 215
Book 3? 216
Scholastic Résumé 217
The *Peri Hermeneias* 222
The *On the Universe* 224
Genesis 224
Alterations to the Model 226

Accuracy of Translation 230
Conclusions 231

Chapter Six: Fabulator Latinus 233
Greek Sources 233
Adaptation of the Greek Model 237
The Ancient Novel 242
Conclusions 255

Bibliography 257

General Index 265

Index of Passages 268

PREFACE

A native of one of the most westerly Latin-speaking regions of the Roman Empire, Apuleius was fully bilingual in Greek and Latin and the beneficiary of post-graduate studies in Athens. He can most profitably be viewed as a transmitter of the Greek intellectual achievements of the East to the Latin West. Most of his extant writings and, to judge by their titles, now lost works are Latin adaptations or translations of Greek works.

This book focuses narrowly on the place of Apuleius in the intellectual movement known since the time of Philostratus as the (Greek) Second Sophistic. It also paints a larger picture of the character of belles-lettres, rhetoric, Middle Platonism, education, bilingualism and translation in the second century. The goal of the first three chapters is to examine the evidence for the bilingual educational opportunities available in Apuleius' native North Africa and to characterize major Greek and Latin intellectual trends during the second century. The scholastic aims and methods of both classical cultures led to the "Cult of the Past" and its disruptive effect on the systematic development and expression of original thought. Subsequent chapters focus closely on the complete Apuleian corpus under the general headings of Apuleius in the roles of orator, philosopher and novelist.

In the first of these subsequent chapters I isolate the qualities of Apuleius' extant orations that were shaped by the principally Greek intellectual forces of the period. The chapter on his philosophical works emphasizes their derivation from Greek models and the commitment to philosophy fused with belles-lettres that he shared with his Greek contemporaries. Two of the philosophical works afford an unparalleled opportunity to analyse the methods of creative translation employed by the major Latin writer of the second half of the second century. The final chapter exploits these findings in assessing Apuleius' novel the *Golden Ass* as an adaptation of a Greek work.

The only previously published extensive study of Apuleius' relationship to the Greek Second Sophistic is Paul Vallette's *L'Apologie d'Apulée* (1908). It is a masterly work; but as its title suggests, Vallette restricted himself to Apuleius' *Apology*. Even within its limited scope it is now outdated because of subsequent advances in

the study of Greek and Latin cultural interchange during the second century and because of papyrological additions to our body of knowledge such as Favorinus of Arles' *On Exile* and the Greek picaresque novels that have emerged from the sands of Egypt in the past twenty-five years.

I have tried to make this book accessible to a readership that ranges from advanced undergraduates to specialists. I have provided translations of all Greek and Latin passages, and I have quoted copiously from authors such as Favorinus of Arles and Maximus of Tyre who are not easily accessible except to classicists served by major research libraries. I hope that it is beneficial to readers within this range who are interested in cultural interchange, second-century belles-lettres, ancient methods of translation and adaptation, educational practices in the second century, the study of rhetoric, the history of Middle Platonism and the development of the novel.

I am indebted to Dr B. L. Hijmans Jr. for his constructive criticisms of an early version of this book and especially for his patient tutoring in philosophical matters; and to the Rockefeller Foundation for awarding me a fellowship that allowed me to work on the book in the lovely and tranquil setting of the Bellagio Study and Conference Center.

CHAPTER ONE

PROPAEDEUTICS: THE FORMATION OF A LATIN SOPHIST

Time and Place

The extant version of Apuleius' account of his defence of himself against charges of practising magic provides the chronological framework for arranging many of the known events of his life. The trial was conducted before Claudius Maximus, the proconsul of Africa, in the coastal town of Sabrata, some sixty kilometres from Oea (modern Tripoli in Libya), where the events for which he was tried were alleged to have occurred. There is now general agreement that Maximus held the proconsulship of Africa during the one-year period 158/159; thus Apuleius' trial took place at that time as Maximus was conducting the assizes there.[1]

The only other datable events recorded in Apuleius' writings are consistent with this date. In the *Apology* (85.2), he reproaches one of the plaintiffs for arranging to have read into the court record a distorted version of one of his wife's letters in the presence of the statues of the reigning emperor Antoninus Pius (138-161).[2] *Florida* 9, part of a speech presented by Apuleius in Carthage, bids farewell to Severianus at the end of his proconsulate of Africa in 164.[3] This is in fact the latest attested date for the life of Apuleius.[4]

Other, less precise dates can be gleaned by a process of inference from, and reference to, the fixed dates. Apuleius states that at the time

---

[1] Syme 1959: 316-7; for slightly different interpretations and additional details see Carratello 1963: 97-110 and Guey 1951: 307-17. Sabrata: *Apol.* 59. 2; for the proconsul's assizes in Africa cf. *Fl.* 9. 37.

[2] With one exception all citations of Apuleius are based on the divisions used in the Budé series; the exception is Moreschini's recent (1991) Teubner edition of the philosophical treatises on which I base citations of the Apuleian work *Peri Hermeneias*.

[3] Syme 1959: 318. The same proconsul is eulogized in *Fl.* 17.

[4] Carratello 1963.

of his trial three years have elapsed since he had addressed the people of Oea on the subject of Aesculapius (*Apol.* 255. 10).[5] "This very well known speech," as Apuleius calls it in the next sentence, is probably the one that was greeted by the people of Oea with such enthusiasm that it prompted Pontianus to acknowledge for the first time his desire that Apuleius should marry his widowed mother (*Apol.*. 73. 2-3). They married each other approximately a year later. At the time of the trial she "is not much past her fortieth year" (*Apol.* 89. 5). Apuleius was a young man when he married her (*Apol.* 70. 3); and although the plaintiffs exaggerated the disparity of their ages, it is clear that he was substantially younger than his December bride who "did not reject a man much her junior" (*Apol.* 89 and 27. 9). Her son Pontianus was old enough to be married and close enough in age to Apuleius to have become his friend and to have shared accommodation with him in Athens a few years before Apuleius' arrival in Oea in 155 but young enough to treat Apuleius with the respect that is due to his senior and to have received guidance from him.[6] In view of these considerations a date of birth between 120 and 125 for Apuleius seems most likely. Finally, Aemilianus Strabo, who is addressed by Apuleius as his former classmate in *Florida* 16. 36-7, was *consul suffectus* in 156.[7] Since the minimum age for holders of that office was thirty three, his date of birth can be safely assumed to have been close to 120, which must also be close to the date of birth of his classmate Apuleius.

It is of limited value to know that Alexander Severus' accusation that Albinus wasted his time reading Apuleius' *Golden Ass* establishes a date of composition of the novel before Albinus' death in 197.[8] Other, internal references to apparently datable events prove to be open to a variety of interpretations. The statement in the *Golden Ass* (1. 6. 2) that the children of one of the characters have been made wards of the state by judicial decree may refer to the system of *iuridici* re-established by Hadrian around 147 and again by Marcus Aurelius

---

[5] With one exception the abbreviations used for Apuleius' works are those of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*; the exception is *Log.* = *Logic*, that is, the *Peri Hermeneias*.

[6] The references in the *Apology* are: married (73. 9 and 76-7), friendship and shared accommodation (72. 3), respect (72. 4), guidance (94. 3 and 97. 1).

[7] *CIL* VI, 2086. 67.

[8] "Life of Clodius Albinus" 12. 12 in *Historia Augusta*.

some twenty years later, but the history of this institution is too uncertain to be used for precise dating.[9] At first glance Apuleius' verbatim use in the *On the Universe* of a passage also found in Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* looks promising. Unfortunately, the date of publication of Gellius' work is uncertain, and it is not certain that Apuleius quoted the passage from Gellius rather than from another source.[10]

Consideration of datable historical events referred to in the Apuleian corpus has to this point borne the limited fruit of placing the probable date of Apuleius' birth between 120 and 125. The chronology of Apuleius' studies in Athens pays some dividends.[11] As we have seen, he arrived in Oea in 155-156, that is, three years before his trial in 158-159 (*Apol.* 55. 10). "Not many years before" his arrival in Oea, he and Pontianus, the son of his future wife Pudentilla, were introduced to each other in Athens by mutual acquaintances and soon became close friends and lodged together there (*Apol.* 52. 3). Therefore, Apuleius' "long journey" for "extended studies" in Athens probably occurred in the early 150s when he was about 30 years old (*Apol.* 23. 2). Holford-Strevens places Apuleius "in the early 150s...at Rome."[12] He bases this conclusion on *Florida* 17. 4, where Apuleius states that he has always cultivated the liberal arts and that both in Africa and in Rome he has sought to be respected by the friends of Scipio Orfitus for his character and his learning. Apuleius neither states nor implies that he has made an extended visit to Rome. The only prolonged visit to which he refers is his trip to Athens to study there; and that, on his testimony, occurred in the early 150s. It is very likely in fact that Apuleius and Aulus Gellius were students in Athens at the same time and may have had at least one teacher in common.[13] This will have considerable bearing on subsequent discussion of Apuleius' educational background.

The only means left to try to refine the chronology and circumstances of Apuleius' intellectual activity is to establish a relative

---

[9] Barnes 1971: 282, Summers 1972: 120-6 and 1973: 375-84.

[10] *Mun.* 13. 318-14. 321, Gel. 2. 22. 3-29. See Sandy 1993: 163-74 and Holford-Strevens 1977: 101-9 and 1988: 12-9.

[11] Sandy 1993: 163-74. Holford-Strevens 1977 and 1988 offers a different interpretation to which I am much indebted for several details.

[12] Holford-Strevens 1977: 103.

[13] Sandy 1993:163-74.

chronology of his surviving works. This procedure has also led to results that are open to variable interpretations.

We have Apuleius' word for it that he spent a modest portion of his inheritance on a long journey and prolonged studies (*Apol.* 23. 2). The statement about a long journey cannot refer to his youthful studies near his home town in Carthage (*Fl.* 18. 15) but must instead refer to his studies of literature, geometry, music, dialectics and philosophy in Athens (*Fl.* 20. 4; cf. 18. 15). We learn from the *Apology* (73. 2) that he was in Athens a few years before his arrival in Oea in 155/6. According to St. Augustine (*Ep.* 138. 19), certain factions in Oea opposed the erection of a statue in Apuleius' honour, and it may be that he left this hostile environment soon after the trial of 158/9 to return to Carthage; for he has spent six years in Carthage at the time of *Florida* 18. 16, and we have already seen that *Florida* 9 and 17 belong to the period 163/4.

Within this chronological framework of Apuleius' activities and travels—Athens for some unspecified but substantial period before 155/6, Oea from 155/6 to 158/9, Carthage from 159/160—scholars have attempted to situate his literary output. It would be tedious to review all the speculation. A few examples will illustrate the difficulties. As we shall see, both the *On the Universe* and the *On Plato and His Doctrine* share stylistic features that distinguish them from the other Apuleian works. Moreover, both works have the dry, plodding qualities of scholastic manuals. It is tempting to suppose that both works are the products of Apuleius' youthful reworking of lecture notes that he made while a student in Athens before he developed his distinctively flamboyant and effusive literary style. Against this attractive hypothesis it has been argued that all of Apuleius' other works are mannered and that the absence of literary embellishment in those two works may represent a conscious artistic decision to adopt a style that seemed to him appropriate to scholastic manuals.[14] And as Dillon has remarked, both works are addressed by the author to "my son Faustinus," which seems to presuppose a child old enough to appreciate their philosophical contents.[15]

---

[14] Redfors 1960: 116-19.

[15] Dillon 1977: 308, Hijmans 1987: 414. Another possibility is that the proud father Apuleius harboured the hope that his young son would come to appreciate his writings. Only Book 2 of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*

Like the Greek sophists of the period, Apuleius does not hesitate to parade his accomplishments. *Florida* 9, which belongs to the period 163/4, is no exception. Apuleius there boasts of having written epic and lyric poetry, comedy, tragedy, satires, riddles, historical accounts of varied topics, orations and philosophical dialogues, "these and others of this type both in Greek and Latin, writings in each language being equally popular, researched and embellished" (9. 29). His books have been read by the people of Carthage (*Fl.* 18. 14 and 16). He has drunk "the imaginative draughts of poetry, the clear draught of geometry, the sweet draught of music, the somewhat austere draught of dialectic and even the endless draught of the nectar of all philosophy. Empedocles has composed poems, Plato dialogues, Socrates hymns, Epicharmus music, Xenophon histories, Crates satires;...Apuleius undertakes all these compositions and cultivates each of the nine muses with equal diligence" (*Fl.* 20. 4-6). If he is to be believed, Apuleius has produced a large corpus of writing by the time of the *Florida*, at least some of it belonging to the middle of the 160s; and it is tempting to suppose that it, corresponding as some of its extracts do to the latest verifiable date of Apuleius' life, coincides with the maturity of his intellectual activity.[16]

Indeed, the literary accomplishments cited in the *Florida* represent a major advance over the record of publication produced some four to five years earlier in the *Apology*: a poem on dentifrice (6. 3), erotic poems (9), works in both Greek and Latin on ichthyology (36-38) and a hymn on "The Majesty of Aesculapius" (55. 10-12). In each case, however, as will be explained later, Apuleius has been forced by the charges to acknowledge the work in question in order to give a scholarly cachet to his actions or to explain away the allegedly incriminatory implications of the writings. In other words, we cannot be certain that the works acknowledged fully represent his literary accomplishments at the time of the *Apology*.

Notable by its absence from Apuleius' enumeration of his literary and other intellectual achievements is the *Golden Ass*. It is obvious that Apuleius in the course of being tried for practising magic would not

---

contains the address to Faustinus. Its absence from Book 1, where one would expect to find it, implies that the entire work was written in at least two stages.

[16] Opeku 1974: 27-33.

voluntarily have drawn attention to this story of disastrous involvement in magic and witchcraft on the part of a protagonist who at one point (11. 27. 9), in a radical departure from his earlier identity and from the Greek model of the story, is associated with Apuleius' home town of Madauros. But would not the plaintiffs have exploited this incriminating evidence of Apuleius' interest in the occult arts? After all, they had resorted to introducing as evidence for that very purpose innocuous erotic poems and a poem on the subject of dentifrice. One can only speculate. If Apuleius is to be believed, his opponents lacked culture of any sort, and it is possible to suppose that they did not know of the existence of this prejudicial evidence.[17] As Apuleius himself complains, however, his opponent Aemilianus has the advantage of obscurity while Apuleius' accomplishments are in full light for all to see (*Apol.* 16. 10-13). As usual when relying on insufficient evidence, no single conclusion can be drawn.

Most of the small amount of evidence there is for a late date of composition of the *Golden Ass* was advanced in 1904.[18] Although the reference to *iuridici* has not been accepted as a means of precise dating, the known dates of the *Apology* and some of the *Florida* in the late 150s and up to 164 provide the chronological framework for interpreting references to a single Caesar or princeps in the *Golden Ass*: a date after the termination of the joint principate of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in 169.[19] Conversely, and in addition to Dowden's strong arguments (see Chapter One, n. 18), Carratello (see Chapter One, n. 1) may be right in supposing that the *historiae variae* referred to by Apuleius in the *Florida* (9. 27-8) are the equivalent of the phrase *logoi diaphoroi* used by Photius to characterize the now lost model for Apuleius' *Golden Ass* and the equivalent of the *variae fabulae* announced by Apuleius at the beginning of the novel; if so, Apuleius wrote the *Golden Ass* before the time of *Florida* 9, that is, before 162/163.

---

[17] E. g. *Apol.* 27. 1, 16. 7 and 10.

[18] Hesky 1904: 71-80. Dowden 1994: 419-34 argues for composition in the mid-150s.

[19] *Met.* 3. 29. 2-3, 7. 6. 2, 7. 7. 4, 9. 41. 6 and 9. 42. 1. Conversely, the plural *Caesares* at *Fl.* 9. 40 is consistent with the period of their joint principate (161-69) and the verifiable dates of some of the *Florida*; cf. the statues of Antoninus Pius at *Apol.* 85.2.

Apuleius' place of birth is attested in only two ancient sources, both of doubtful value as sources of biography.[20] In the so-called *Peri Hermeneias* or *Logic*, a work assigned to Apuleius by a small, distinct branch of the late medieval manuscript tradition of the Apuleian corpus, Apuleius himself figures as the *philosophus Platonicus Madaurensis* (Platonic philosopher of Madauros) in one of the syllogisms.[21] In a similar "in joke," or what a recent writer has called "[self-]referential humor," Apuleius transforms the native city of the protagonist of the *Golden Ass* from Corinth to Madauros.[22] However, in spite of some obvious affinities between the fictional protagonist and the author, it would be unwise to assume that the details of Apuleius' life can be confidently reconstructed from those of his fictional character.[23] In addition to these two questionable sources of biography, there are the fragments of a statue erected by the citizens of Madauros to a "[ph]ilosopho [Pl]atonico" who is generally taken to be Apuleius.[24]

While the actual town of Apuleius' birth is subject to some uncertainty, his North African origins are beyond doubt. In his own words, which are part of the charges against him in the *Apology*, he is half Numidian and half Gaetulian; and in his native colony he has, like his father before him, held the highest public offices (*Apol.* 24). His home town had a seat in the Council of Africa that met in Carthage, the capital of the province. In Carthage, Apuleius spent his boyhood, began his education and initiated his commitment to a philosophical school (*Fl.* 18. 15 and 36). Concrete associations with one of Apuleius' early (pre-158/159) sojourns in Carthage have been uncovered in the form of the feet of a statue bearing the "ex officina" stamp of the artisan T. Cornelius Saturninus, whom Apuleius credits

---

[20] The medieval manuscript subscriptions that attribute the *Apolology* and the *On the God of Socrates* to Apuleius Madaurensis (Apuleius of Madauros) have no independent value.

[21] 4. 192. 11, Moreschini (ed.) 1991.

[22] Cf. *Met.* 1. 22. 4 and 2. 11. 3 with 11. 27. 9. "Referential humor": R. van der Paardt, "The Unmasked 'I': Apuleius *Met.* XI 27," *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981) 96-106.

[23] Some of the obvious affinities: both studied in Athens, went from there to Rome and were initiated into mystery religions.

[24] Gsell 1922: I, No. 2115; cf. *Apol.* 10. 6 and *Fl.* 16.

with the manufacture of his small statue of the god Mercury (*Apol.* 61-3).[25]

After his early studies in Carthage, Apuleius, like his philosophical mentors Pythagoras and Plato, travelled in pursuit of specialized knowledge (*Fl.* 15. 14-21, *Pl.* 1. 3. 186-1. 4. 189). In Athens, where he nurtured his philosophical studies (*Fl.* 18. 15), he also studied literature, geometry, music and dialectics (*Fl.* 20. 4; cf. *Apol.* 72. 3). In Rome, like the Greek sophists, he appears to have put his learning on display (*Fl.* 17. 4). He may have pursued studies there as well, if it was in Rome that he and Aemilianus Strabo, who was a consul in 156, first undertook "joint service in arms to studies under the same teachers" (*Fl.* 16. 36).[26] If he is the author of the *On the Universe*, Apuleius spent time in Phrygia observing a geological phenomenon (17. 327).

Religious Background

Another aspect of Apuleius' intellectual and cultural development that has a bearing on the following chapters is his devotion to religious cult mysteries. In his earliest datable statement on the subject he asserts that he has been initiated into many religious cults in Greece and has retained the venerable tokens of initiation given to him by the priests (*Apol.* 55. 8-9). He adds that when he first arrived in Oea he gave a public address on the god Aesculapius and recounted his familiarity with sacred mysteries. This is the speech that he reads into the court record (*Apol.* 55. 11-12). By the time of his post-158/159 return to Carthage he has become one of Aesculapius' priests (*Fl.* 16. 38 and 18. 38), and according to his compatriot St. Augustine (*Ep.* 138. 19) he was *sacerdos provinciae* (priest of the province).[27]

---

[25] Charles-Picard 1959: 398, n. 54. There is a good account of Apuleius' life and "Life in Roman Tripolitania," including inscriptional evidence pertaining to Apuleius' step-son Pudens, in Birley 1988: 25-33 and 142-3. See Pavis d'Escurac 1974: 89-101 for the social milieu of the *Apology*.

[26] Dowden 1994: 424-5.

[27] The post-158/159 date is conditional on the prediction of *Fl.* 16. 40 that Aemilianus Strabo "will within a short time become proconsul" having been realized. Since he was *consul suffectus* in 156, that would have occurred around 169. On Apuleius' priesthood see Rives 1994.

Utraque Lingua Eruditus

Before we stand back and survey Apuleius' intellectual accomplishments from a broader perspective, something should be said about his bilingualism in Greek and Latin. Its existence in North Africa is somewhat surprising. Greek culture does not appear to have put down deep roots there until after Apuleius' formative years, when the emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180) set the pattern for all the Roman empire and still later when Septimius Severus (193-211) attracted Greek intellectuals to Lepcis Magna in his native North Africa.[28] Indeed, Apuleius is the earliest authority to claim extensive knowledge of Greek in Carthage during the Roman period of the city (*Fl.* 18. 16)[29]. Equally surprisingly, at a time when there appears to have been very little activity of high quality in Latin literature and Greek culture was flourishing in many parts of the Roman Empire, the natives of North Africa who were influential in one of the two classical cultures of the Mediterranean world were committed Latinists. They include Fronto, whose pupil Marcus Aurelius eventually turned his back on the Latin culture championed by his mentor, the grammarian Sulpicius Apollinaris and the orator Salvius Julianus.[30] As one writer has put it, "La culture africaine est donc entièrement classique et latine."[31] To judge by St. Augustine's experiences, Latin would continue to be the dominant classical language for at least another two centuries. Like Apuleius, presumably, he began his study of Greek in Madauros (*Conf.* 1. 13. 2 and 1. 14. 23). From there, also like Apuleius, he went to Carthage to continue his studies and remained there as a student for close to four years, from his seventeenth into his twentieth year (*Conf.* 2. 3. 5-6, 3. 1. 1, 3. 4. 7, 4.16. 28). He may be exaggerating when he regrets his ignorance of Greek, "I studied Greek very little, in fact scarcely at all" (*Contra Litteras Petiliani* 2. 38. 91). He remarks that his compatriots for whom he was writing did not know enough Greek to read Greek books on the subject of the holy Trinity (*De Trin.* 3, proemium 1).[32]

---

28 MacMullen 1966: 12-3, Millar 1968: 126-34.

29 Vössing 1993: 777.

30 Horsfall 1979: 79-95, Barnes 1971: 187-90, Kotula 1969: 386-92.

31 Charles-Picard 1959: 297.

32 I have gleaned most of the information cited above from what remains the most useful study of the classical cultures in North Africa: Audollent

The evidence from Apuleius shows that at least some of his compatriots in the provincial capital were versed in Greek but that knowledge of it in Oea was exceptional, although it is from just such a port city as this that the few Greek inscriptions of North Africa tend to come.[33] The people of Carthage, now gathered in great numbers at the theatre to hear Apuleius speak, have listened to his speeches in both Greek and Latin over a period of six years, and he announces to them that they are about to hear him recite in both languages a hymn celebrating the god Aesculapius; the hymn is to be preceded by a dialogue in which two Carthaginians will debate, the one in Greek and the other in Latin, which one of them venerates the city more (*Fl.* 18). For our immediate purposes it makes no difference whether any or all of the fragments of the so-called prefaces to the *On the God of Socrates* deserve that designation or are instead, as most scholars now believe, fragments of the *Florida* mistakenly joined in the manuscript tradition to the former work.[34] Whatever their rightful place in the Apuleian corpus, the fifth one of them conveys Apuleius' assurances that the time has come to move from Greece to Rome, in fulfilment of his promise at the beginning of the speech that each of the two groups of his listeners will have the opportunity to hear his speech in its preferred language. Unfortunately, the place at which Apuleius spoke these words cannot be identified with certainty. Since all the (extracts of) speeches in the *Florida* that can be linked to a specific place were presented in Carthage, it is highly probable that his bilingual audience on this occasion was also Carthaginian.

In the exordium to the *Apology* Apuleius summarizes the charges that have been brought against him:

> "We accuse him before you [viz. the judge Claudius Maximus] of being a handsome philosopher most eloquent,"—what shame!—"both in Greek and Latin" (4. 1).

1901: 691-706; see, too, Gsell 1920: 171-220.

[33] These can be traced most conveniently in J. M. Reynolds and J. B. W. Perkins (ed.), *The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania* (published for the British School at Rome, no date). Most of the Greek inscriptions are religious or funerary. Plautus' Phoenician Hanno, a native of Carthage, "knows all languages" (*Poenulus* 112).

[34] Discussion and bibliography in Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 161-68.

that have been brought against him:

> "We accuse him before you [viz. the judge Claudius Maximus] of being a handsome philosopher most eloquent,"—what shame!—"both in Greek and Latin" (4. 1).

Just as his handsome appearance is not in fact one of the charges brought against him by the plaintiffs, as is clear from Apuleius' subsequent rebuttals of the individual accusations, so too is his bilingualism not one of the alleged transgressions that launched the court proceedings. Rather, in a blatant reductio ad absurdum, Apuleius has trivialized his opponents' small-minded resentment of his cosmopolitan sophistication and his extensive learning based firmly on the two classical cultures. He patronizingly taunts them with the maxim that the ignorant customarily oppose philosophers, the two implications being that they are ignorant and he is wise (*Apol.* 27. 1); and sarcastically feigns embarrassment that, unlike his opponent Aemilianus, he has not had the good fortune to have been born in Zarath, that bastion of Athenian culture (*Atticum Zarath*) in the hinterland of Oea (*Apol* 24. 10).[35] The implication of all this sarcasm that bears most directly on the state of Greek studies in Oea is that even a fabricated charge of knowing Greek could not have have carried any force unless ignorance of it was the accepted norm.

In the course of maintaining that he is the innocent victim of his opponents' lack of culture, Apuleius ridicules their advocate for his ignorance of Greek:

> "I would have recalled for you similar passages from Theocritus and still more from Homer and Orpheus and I would have recited many passages from the Greek comic and tragic playwrights and Greek historians, if I had not realized some time ago that you were unable to read Pudentilla's letter written in Greek" (*Apol.* 30. 11).

Later in the speech, when Apuleius anticipates that the same man will ignorantly interpret the Greek names of fish in one of Apuleius' works

---

[35] In his play *The Jumpers* Tom Stoppard achieves the same effect at the expense of Edinburgh, "the Athens of the North," by referring to Reykjavik as "the Edinburgh of the North."

on ichthyology as Egyptian and Babylonian incantations, the implication is that he would not recognize Greek words (*Apol.* 38. 7-8).

Additional glimpses of the variable knowledge of Greek that existed in North Africa near the middle of the second century can be gleaned from elsewhere in the *Apology*. Apuleius' opponents have apparently introduced as evidence in his trial a forged letter in Greek allegedly written by Apuleius to his wife. Apuleius retorts, "'Why would I, who they claim am not at all unversed in Greek, have composed a letter containing such errors in diction and such barbarisms?'" (*Apol.* 87. 4). Whoever in Oea wrote the letter had an imperfect knowledge of Greek. Of Apuleius' two step-sons, the elder's pursuit of studies in Athens implies a knowledge of Greek. The younger boy, however, has ceased to attend school where, presumably, he would have learned Greek and Latin and now he "'speaks nothing but Punic except for the few Greek words that he has picked up from his mother'" (*Apol.* 98. 6 and 8). At the other extreme is Pudentilla, their mother by a previous marriage and now Apuleius' wife. We have just seen that her younger son's minimal Greek vocabulary was acquired from her and previously that Apuleius' unschooled opponents were unable to read her letter written in Greek (*Apol.* 98. 8 and 30. 11). Elsewhere he describes it as written in superior Greek (*Apol.* 87. 5) and quotes two passages in Greek from it (*Apol.* 82. 2 and 83. 1).

Adaptations of Greek Models

The following chapters will consider Apuleius' works against the backdrop of their Greek models or equivalents. The next few pages will survey statements made by Apuleius in his native North African setting about his Greek accomplishments.

In the *Apology*, which is the earliest datable work of his extant compositions, he repeatedly parades his knowledge of Greek. For example, he quotes Crates' pastiche of Homer (*Apol.* 22. 5) and he makes a show of quoting at length from memory a passage of Plato that, he adds, the proconsul presiding over the court will also remember (*Apol.* 25. 10-11). In this way he creates a bond of shared intellectual endeavour between himself and the judge to the exclusion

of his unschooled accusers.[36]

For the purposes of the subsequent chapters his most important statements on the subject of his Greek activities contain the bonus of providing insight into his methods of adaptation that lead to the patchwork qualities of all his revisions of Greek models. Because of their importance, they will be emphasized here.

Apuleius' accusers have charged that he procured various kinds of fish for magical purposes. As he regularly does in his defence, he enlists the example of respected Greek philosophers to dignify his actions:

> "Let him [viz. the plaintiff Aemilianus] read the works of ancient philosophers so that he will come to understand at last that I am not the first to have investigated these matters but that long ago my mentors, that is, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Lyco and the rest of Plato's successors, did so and have left many books on the subjects of the generation of animals, their mode of living, their parts and their varied individual characteristics. I am fortunate that the case is being tried before you, Maximus, because in the course of your erudite studies you have undoubtedly read Aristotle's many volumes on the *Generation of Animals*, the *Anatomy of Animals*, the *History of Animals* and also his countless *Problems* as well as the works of others of the same school of philosophy in which varied topics of this sort are treated. If their diligently researched writings have been a source of esteem and fame for them, why should my attempts to do the same be a source of disrepute for me, especially since I strive to write more orderly and more concise books in Greek and in Latin on the same subjects and to supply what is omitted or to correct errors in all his [viz. Aristotle's] works?....Provide one of my Greek books, which by chance my friends, who are keen students of natural history, have here, preferably the one in which many aspects of the generation of fish are treated" (*Apol.* 36. 3-8).

---

36 See also *Apol.* 30. 11 (translated p. 11) where the possibility of his accusers' comprehension of a wide range of Greek authors read by Apuleius is excluded and 36.5 where Apuleius aligns himself with the proconsul's erudition. For a thoughtful, balanced survey of Roman knowledge of classical literary Greek see Horsfall 1979: 79-95.

> "I shall want a few of my Latin works on the same subject read out. In them you will notice...that there are unfamiliar and, as far as I know, previously non-existent Latin words that my studious efforts have produced from the Greek terms so that in effect I have minted Greek words with a Latin stamp" (*Apol.* 38. 5).

Apuleius' recherché vocabulary, especially in the *Golden Ass*, is notorious. In the second of the two paragraphs quoted above we can see his overtly expressed concern to discover or to create equivalent Latin terms for Greek words. Similarly, when discussing the categories of demons in the *On the God of Socrates*, he explains, "I have discovered that in the early Latin writers this category of demon is designated 'lemur'" (15. 152). A recent writer has shown that Apuleius' choice of the adjective "Graecanica" instead of "Graeca" at the beginning of the *Golden Ass* carries the connotation "'adapted' (into Latin) 'from Greek.'"[37] In the *On Plato and His Doctrine* Apuleius, in imitation of Lucretius, Cicero and Seneca, apologizes for the neologisms necessitated by Plato's specialized vocabulary, "Please forgive me for the neologisms, for I am constrained by the obscurity of the subject" (1. 9. 200).[38] In the two works that can be compared directly with the Greek originals one can readily see that Apuleius took full advantage of his intention to make whatever changes he thought necessary for greater accuracy, orderliness and concision, although not everyone will agree that he achieved his stated objectives.

Bekker's critical edition of the pseudo-Aristotelian *On the Universe* contains 736 lines of Greek text, of which Apuleius declined to translate 136 lines, i. e., 18.5 per cent. Apuleius' version contains 862 lines, of which only 600 lines correspond to the original. Thus almost 44 per cent of the Apuleian *On the Universe* consists of accretions independent of the Greek original.[39] These take various forms, such as bringing the vague notion of demons set out in the Greek work in line with Apuleius' elsewhere expressed belief in a personal or guardian

---

[37] Mason 1978: 1.

[38] For discussion of the glossaries available for technical subjects such as entomology, zoology and medicine see Horsfall 1979: 81-2.

[39] Müller 1939: 133.

demon and with his views of a hierarchy of beings;[40] and of course there is the long-established Roman practice of substituting Roman conventions and institutions for their Greek equivalents or, for instance, of replacing Homer as *the* poet with Vergil. Perhaps the most striking "improvement" is represented by the two pages of Favorinus' postprandial discourse on winds.[41]

Detection of "improvements" made by Apuleius to the Greek version of the *Golden Ass* is admittedly more problematic because our understanding of the now lost Greek *Metamorphoses* depends on the clues in Photius' ninth-century description of it and the pseudo-Lucianic epitome of it (see p. 232). Nevertheless, it is clear that Apuleius has taken many liberties with his model. For instance, the religiously charged Book 11 and the tale of Cupid and Psyche, which comprise more than 20 per cent of the Apuleian version, are completely alien to the picaresque tone of the Greek original. Both accretions contribute to the bewildering complexity of Apuleius' "improved" version.

To judge by Apuleius' previously quoted boast in the *Apology*, he felt no compunctions about very freely adapting his Greek models. Indeed, there is no reason why he should have been reluctant to do so, for as one investigator of Latin adaptations has put it, "On se trouve rarement en face d'une véritable traduction préchretienne."[42] The usual pre-Christian practice is represented by Horace's scorn of the *fidus interpres*, the faithful translator; even in the Christian period, St. Jerome undertook to *[exprimere] non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu* ("to convey the sense rather than the literal, word-for-word meaning").[43] Russell has astutely observed that "translation was seen as an educational exercise or display of culture directed at the bilingual connoisseur, rather than as a literary achievement designed

---

[40] Cf. Apul., *Mun.* 25. 343 with the Greek *On the Universe* 397 b. 27. I owe this observation to Regen 1971: 52-4.

[41] Apul., *Mun.* 13. 318-14. 321 = Gel. 2. 22. 3-23. 9; Vergil for Homer as *the* poet: *Mun.* 36. 369; Roman conventions and institutions: e. g. *Mun.* 35. 366-68.

[42] Blatt 1938: 220. See also Russell 1990: 4-7, and Brock 1979: 69-87.

[43] Hor., *Ars* 133; St. Jerome, *Letters* 57. See also Cic., *Opt. Gen.* 14 and *Fin.* 3.15. For the many errors in Cicero's translation of Aratus' *Phaenomena* see the Budé edition of Cicero's *Aratea*, ed. J. Soubiran (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1972), p. 82.

to widen the Latin speaker's cultural horizons."[44] The surviving portions of Cicero's Latin version of Plato's *Timaeus* provide ample documentation of the same practices of "translation" as are found in Apuleius' adaptations: two or more Latin words for one Greek word, different renderings of the same Greek word, concrete language for vague abstractions and vice versa and, finally, extensive expansions.[45] Thus when Apuleius in the *Apology* announces to his North African compatriots his policy of improving on Aristotle, as when he expresses at the beginning of the *On the Universe* his intention to *explicare*, to explain, Aristotle and Theophrastus, he is undertaking to do no more or less than his Latin-speaking listeners and readers would have expected.

Studiis Ornata Carthago

Apuleius' remaining statements about the status of his Greek studies convey the impression that his early intellectual development took place in a far more substantially bilingual Carthage than one would suppose on the basis of the surviving evidence. Remarkable for the rarity of their contents are the two late-second- or early-third-century epitaphs found at Thubursicu Numidiarum in Numidia Proconsularis, some 80 km south of Hippo Regius and even closer to Apuleius' birthplace of Madauros.[46] They record the tribute of Q. Vetidius Juvenalis to his two sons, who died prematurely at the ages of 18 and 21 and each of whom was already *utraque lingua eruditus* (knowledgeable in each of the two [classical] languages). The younger son explicitly and the elder son probably had been sent to Carthage for their studies, and the younger son died there while still a student.

Like *Florida* 9, where Apuleius urges his detractors to cast their eyes over the "incredibly large crowd" assembled to hear his

---

[44] Russell 1990: 7.

[45] Müller 1939: 133-5; Poncelet 1957 provides a minutely detailed analysis of Cicero's practices of "translation."

[46] Gsell 1922: Nos. 1363 and 1364, Kotula 1969.

philosophical discourse, *Florida* 18 conveys the impression of Carthaginians thronging to experience both cultures of classical antiquity as Apuleius dispenses them:

> "You have gathered in such great numbers to hear me that I ought to congratulate Carthage for having so many friends of learning rather than to apologize for not declining to discuss philosophical matters. For the crowd that has gathered corresponds to the grandeur of the city and the place of meeting befits the size of the crowd" (18. 1-2).

He adds:

> "My state is represented in the Council of Africa along with yours, my youth was spent with you, you were my teachers, my choice of philosophical studies, although consolidated in Athens, was initiated here, my voice in both languages has been familiar to your ears for the past six years and my books can have no higher evaluation than that they should meet with your approval" (18. 15-6).

Apuleius then recounts to his Carthaginian audience two anecdotes concerning the pre-Socratic philosophers Protagoras and Thales before returning to the theme of his early studies in Carthage:

> "Wherever I go, people of Carthage, I pay instalments on my debt to you for the studies that I undertook here in my youth. Wherever I am, I present myself as an alumnus of your city. Wherever I am, I celebrate you with praise of every sort, I eagerly cultivate the studies that I began with you, I boast of your resources and I zealously venerate your gods....I shall now recite to you for this god [viz. Aesculapius] in both Greek and Latin a hymn previously dedicated by me to him...to which I have attached a preamble in both Greek and Latin. It will be recited by Sabidius Severus and Julius Perseus, ...whose only disagreement is which one of them esteems Carthage more" (18. 36-40).

I have quoted these passages at length because, in the absence of other evidence, they establish beyond any doubt that large numbers of Carthaginians were able to comprehend Apuleius' Greek oral presentations.

We turn now to consideration of the educational opportunities

We turn now to consideration of the educational opportunities available to Apuleius in and near Carthage in the second century. *Florida* 20 is the obvious starting point:

> "What nobler or more certain praise can be bestowed than a eulogy of Carthage? You who make up her entire citizen body are people of the greatest learning. Under your authority children undertake every branch of learning, young adults give displays of their learning and adults provide instruction. Carthage, the honoured teacher of our province; Carthage, the heavenly muse of Africa; Carthage, the inspirational muse of those who wear the toga" (20. 9-10).

In spite of Apuleius' effusive praise of Carthage as a major seat of learning and its later celebration as *studiis ornata magistris* ("graced with studies and teachers"), there is surprisingly little detailed evidence of the nature and extent of the educational opportunities available there.[47] There were certainly libraries. Pliny the Elder reports that the Roman senate endowed the city with them after destroying it in 146 B. C., but their contents and the languages of their books are unknown.[48] Some three hundred years later, Apuleius mentions the possibility of reading his speeches, some of which, like the *On the God of Socrates*, would have been philosophical, in a Carthaginian library:

> "Grant that I, too, may be permitted to substitute for our place of meeting here not a distant city across the sea but rather the Senate House or the Library of Carthage itself. Imagine therefore that if I say anything worthy of the Senate House, you are listening to me in the Senate House itself; that if my speech is erudite, it is being read in the library" (*Fl.* 18. 8-9).

And it is in the context of North Africa that Apuleius sarcastically suggests that his boorish accusers would be willing to remove books written by Aristotle from the libraries (*Apol.* 41. 4).

If *Florida* 5 was presented in Carthage, then it and *Florida* 18 suggest that Carthaginian students who had gone on to pursue advanced studies elsewhere were inclined to return to the site of their youthful studies in order to give displays of their learning for the

---

[47] The Latin phrase is quoted from *Poetae Latini Minores*, ed. E. Baehrens (1882; reprinted New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), IV, p. 427.

[48] Plin., *Nat.* 18. 22.

benefit of the residents.[49] Similarly, Julius Perseus, who in *Florida* 18 is to recite the preamble to Apuleius' bilingual hymn to Aesculapius, became a Carthaginian magistrate and the builder of the local baths bearing the god's name after completing his studies in Athens with Apuleius (*Fl.* 18. 42).[50] A striking, almost incredible reversal of this pattern is worth noting here, because it has some bearing on the status of Greek studies in Carthage. Clitomachus left his native Carthage, still ignorant of Greek, as a mature adult to study Platonic philosophy in Athens, where Carneades, whom he succeeded as head of the "sceptical" Academy in 129/8 B. C., taught him Greek.[51]

The severely truncated remains of *Florida* 5 convey the impression of learning being one of a variety of diversions, much as modern departments of continuing education might offer such programmes as art or music appreciation and, for example, acrylic painting or the art of the native Indian basket:

> "You have come to the theatre today with open minds because you realize that the venue does not deprive a speech of its importance but that you must consider above all what it is that you are going to encounter in the theatre. For if it is a mime, you will laugh; if it is a tightrope walker, you will be frightened; if it is a comedy, you will show your approval, if it is a philosopher, you will be instructed."

Florida 9, which was presented in Carthage, refers to a larger audience than any that had ever gathered to hear a philosopher speak.

The passages quoted and paraphrased above emphasize that philosophical presentations were one of the many kinds of entertainment that appealed to Carthaginian audiences. After

---

[49] St. Augustine and his friend Eulogius also returned to North Africa to teach (Audollent 1901: 699).

[50] On T. Julius Perseus see *CIL* 8. 997. The inscription was recorded at Hammam Lif (El), in the immediate environs of Carthage; see Rives 1994: 287, n. 29.

[51] Gsell 1929: IV, 214-5. The ancient authorities differ from one another in details. Diogenes Laërtius (4. 67. 10), for instance, states that after teaching philosophy in the Punic language in his native Carthage Clitomachus went to Athens at the age of 40 and eventually succeeded his teacher Carneades as head of the Academy. Stephanus of Byzantium is the authority for Clitomachus' ignorance of Greek.

commenting in *Florida* 9 on the great size of the audience that has gathered to hear him speak in the capacity of philosopher, Apuleius catalogues the faults in a philosophical discourse that a critical Carthaginian audience detects:

> "Who of you would overlook a solecism of mine, who would forgive just one syllable pronounced barbarously, who would permit me to babble foolishly like a mad man uttering confused and shameless words?...You carefully scrutinize my every word, you weigh it scrupulously, you test whether it has been polished, plumbed and fashioned as if on a lathe and you judge it by the standards of the elevated diction of the tragic stage" (*Fl.* 9. 7-9).

It is evident from this passage that Apuleius expected his Carthaginian audience to judge his philosophical discourses for their literary polish rather than for their philosophical content. The two qualities are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and Apuleius elsewhere expresses the view that Plato's masterly literary style contributed to the perfection of the elements of philosophical ideas that he had inherited from various predecessors:

> "By applying the sheen of his intellect and the great nobility of his majestic style of speech to the raw and unfinished thoughts that the leaders of these schools of philosophy had transmitted to their listeners, he transformed their views into something of admirable perfection" (*Pl.* 1. 3. 188).

It is worth emphasizing that Apuleius in the previously quoted extract from *Florida* 9 implicitly aligns his polished speech with the sheen attributed to Plato in the passage just cited.

Eloquent Philosophy

Although Apuleius pays lip-service to both philosophy and stylistic presentation in *Florida* 18, in practice he expects his Carthaginian audience to be concerned exclusively with style. In this respect as in others, he follows the same route as his compatriot Fronto. This contemporary man of letters also gives voice to the equal importance of content and presentation, *Dabit philosophia quod dicas, dabit eloquentia quo modo dicas* (Philosophy will give you something to say,

eloquence the means of saying it).[52] His surviving work, however, is marked by stylistic elaboration to the detriment of content. His "Laudes Fumi et Pulveris" ("Eulogy of Smoke and Dust"), for instance, written *facetiarum et voluptatis causa* (for the purpose of amusement and pleasure) and for the structure of which he contrives to find a Platonic precedent, is reminiscent of such Apuleian *jeux d'esprit* as *Florida* 12 and the condescending quotations of Plato, Theophrastus and Homer in the *Apology*. Similarly, both natives of North Africa shared a desire to achieve for Latin the pristine purity that was being imposed on Greek at the same time and that led them back beyond beyond such classical models as Cicero and Vergil to such authors as Ennius, Plautus and Lucretius. Given their shared North African heritage and their overlapping circles of friends, it is surprising that neither refers to the other in their surviving works.[53] One possible mutual acquaintance is the African Julius Aquilinus. Fronto recommends him to Q. Egrilius Plarianus, who succeeded Claudius Maximus to the proconsulship of Africa, as a master of both eloquence and philosophy, as Egrilius will agree if he listens to him discussing problems of Platonic doctrine (Fro., *Amic.* I, 4). Claudius Maximus, the proconsul of Africa before whom Apuleius defended himself, was almost certainly a mutual acquaintance. Maximus' knowledge of Stoicism earned him a position as one of Marcus Aurelius' tutors, and he would undoubtedly have come into contact with Fronto. Apuleius repeatedly acknowledges that Maximus is steeped in Plato, Aristotle and others of the *antiqui philosophores*.[54] Nevertheless, Apuleius expects him to admire a letter written by his predecessor as much for its charm and lovely and pleasing choice of words as for its philosophical *doctrina* (*Apol.* 94. 6).

Fronto was at the centre of literary activity in Rome, and it should be possible to extrapolate from his pronouncements a pattern of studies and learning valid also for the provincial capital Carthage in the West. The fusion of belles-lettres and philosophy that we have seen him promote and that, according to Apuleius, Plato was able to achieve

---

[52] Haines (ed.) 1919: II, 70; Champlin 1980: 124.

[53] On their mutual friends see Champlin 1980: 31 and 43; Sandy 1993: 165-6.

[54] *Apol.* 25. 10, 36. 5, 38. 1, 41. 4, 48. 13, 51. 1, 64. 4, 65. 8 and 91. 3; cf. 19. 2.

with "admirable perfection" (*Pl.* 1. 3. 188; see p. 20), tended during the Imperial period to blur the distinction between the rhetorical embellishment and the intellectual content of expression. The younger Seneca expresses this with characteristic "pointedness," *Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est* (And so what was philosophy has become philology) (*Ep.* 108. 23). As late as the time of Cicero it was still possible for Latin-speaking Romans to go to Athens to study living, evolving philosophical issues. Some two-hundred years later Apuleius, like Herodes Atticus, went to the same city to hear lectures on the Platonism of the distant past.[55] Rhetorical embroidery of static thought has taken the place of vital philosophical enquiry. Philostratus, who chronicled the Greek intellectual movement contemporaneous with Apuleius known as the Second Sophistic, defines the sophists' art as philosophical rhetoric.[56] Apuleius' contemporary Aulus Gellius refers to his scholarly friends and companions as students of rhetoric and philosophy (Gel. 19. 5. 1). Strabo, at the time of Augustus, describes Diodorus as an eloquent Platonist (13. 614). Maximus of Tyre, a contemporary of Apuleius, repeatedly credits his course of philosophical lectures with the ability to make philosophers, rhetoricians and poets of his young listeners.

The past few pages have been intended to put into perspective the impression created by Apuleius that his Carthaginian audiences clamoured for rigorously philosophical content. Instead, the instruction that they received at public lectures was very heavily biased in favour of rhetorical display. The North Africans of the Antonine period who achieved prominence in cultural circles did so above all on the basis of their rhetorical attainments. Fronto and Sulpicius Apollinaris are the most obvious examples of this tendency. It was partly because of this regional propensity for verbal dexterity that Juvenal labelled Africa the *nutricula causidicorum* ("the nurse of lawyers") (7. 148).

Philosophus Platonicus

Another aspect of Apuleius' educational background that should be put into perspective is the label "Platonic philosopher" attributed to him by

---

[55] Barnes 1971: 214.
[56] *VS* 480, 486 and 489.

the residents of his native Madauros (see p. 7), in the manuscript tradition (see p. 7) and repeatedly by Apuleius himself. There is no question that Apuleius was well versed in Platonism. A recent writer has found that "at least 22 [of the thirty-six Platonic titles] are alluded to by Apuleius."[57] Similarly, it requires an assured grasp of Platonism to incorporate playful pastiches of the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* into the alien environment of the *Golden Ass*.[58] However, what exactly does the title "Platonic philosopher" imply? Was Apuleius an alumnus of the Platonic Academy in Athens?

Apuleius arrived in Oea in 155 a few years after the *longa peregrinatio* ("'long journey'") that took him to Athens for *diutinis studiis* ("'prolonged studies'") (*Apol.* 72. 3 and 23. 2; see p. 4). At the time of his trial in 158/159 the only remotely philosophical work that he chose or was obliged to acknowledge consisted of completed and projected adaptations of works on ichthyology by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Lyco and other *Platonis minores* (*Apol.* 36). This negligible output of Platonist studies scarcely warrants the title "Platonic philosopher," but he already calls himself exactly that.

The context of Apuleius' early claims of Platonist credentials is critical. In chapter 10 of the *Apology* Apuleius is replying to the charge that he *ludicros et amatorios [vorsus] fecit* ("'he produced playful and erotic [verses]'") (9. 5). He paves the way for the arguments of chapter 10 by insisting that if his playful and erotic verses are reprehensible, then that is to his discredit as a poet, not in his role of philosopher. The spokesman for his accusers, he claims, is a boorish country-bumpkin who *negat id genus vorsus Platonico philosopho competere* ("'who denies that this type of verse is suitable for a Platonic philosopher'") (10. 6). He adds, *Etiamne, Aemiliane, si Platonis ipsius exemplo doceo factos*? ("'[Do you deny it] even if, Aemilianus, I demonstrate that they were produced in imitation of Plato himself?'"). He proceeds to cite Plato's only extant verses, which are erotic. The claim of Platonist credentials in these passages rests on the disingenuous argument that Apuleius is a Platonic philosopher because the philosopher Plato also wrote erotic verses.

The context of Apuleius' implied association with the *Platonica secta* ("'Platonic sect'") in chapter 22 of the *Apology* is also decisive.

---

[57] De Lacy 1974: 7. See, too, Trapp 1990: 141-73.

[58] Anderson 1982: 79. See also Trapp 1990: 141-73.

Again, Apuleius is attempting to justify his behaviour by finding precedents for it in distinguished thinkers of the past. His opponents have charged that he maintained a small household staff. He replies patronizingly:

> "You are ignorant, Aemilianus, ignorant of how to accuse a philosopher. You accuse me of maintaining a small household staff. For the sake of enhancing my reputation I ought rather to have invented false claims of a small household staff, for I know that the philosophers of whom I boast of being a follower...have earned glory for the scantiness of their household staff" (17. 6).

His step-son Pudens has accused him of being poor. This, Apuleius responds, is "'a crime admitted by a philosopher and one of which he must even boast'" (18. 1); for "'poverty has always been the attendant of philosophy'" (18. 2). He adds, "'Therefore I welcome the charge whereby you sought to defame me that my household equipment consisted of a wallet and a staff'" (22. 1). He seizes the opportunity to associate himself with these outward marks of the unworldly philosopher, *Non sunt quidem ista Platonicae sectae gestamina, sed Cynicae familiae insignia* ("'Those ornaments that you named do not belong to the Platonic sect but are rather the badges of the Cynic family of philosophers.'") (22. 7).[59] The implication is that although he is a member of the Platonic sect, he would nevertheless take pride in being associated with the badges of the Cynics that his accusers are too ignorant to recognize.

Apuleius also appropriates Platonist credentials in connection with the charge that he procured fish for magical purposes. He associates ichthyological interest with such glorious precedents as Aristotle, Theophrastus *ceterosque Platonis minores* (*Apol.* 36. 3; see p. 23). Addressing his accusers' spokesman, he adds:

> "For a philosopher like me, who am not crude and ignorant like the rash Cynics but who am mindful of being a member of the Platonic school, for such a person, do you think that it is disgraceful to know or not know these things?" (39. 1).

---

[59] On the badges of Cynic philosophers cf. Mart. 4. 53. 3; on philosophical *familiae* cf. Apul. *Apol.* 22. 7 and *Pl.* 1. 3. 188; on the *Platonica secta* cf. August. *C. D.* 8. 12, where Apuleius is included among those whom *Plato sectandus placuit* (it pleased to follow Plato).

Similarly, he bases his diagnosis of epilepsy on Plato's *Timaeus* (*Apol.* 49. 1)

The passages discussed in the previous paragraph establish a stronger claim for Apuleius' association with the Platonic Academy in Athens than did the previous pair of passages. In the last passage to be considered in this context Apuleius includes himself in the *Platonica familia* (*Apol* 64. 1). He has just denied emphatically his accusers' charge that he worshipped a relic fashioned to resemble a skeleton. In response to this slander he curses their spokesman, invoking *deus iste superum et infernum commeator ultrorumque deorum* to afflict him with all manner of evil, infernal spectres. Platonists, however, know only blissful serenity:

> "By contrast, we of the Platonist school know only the festive pleasures associated with the supremely solemn heavens. Indeed, in its desire to reach heavenly heights, that philosophical sect has pursued its investigations even beyond heaven itself and has taken up its position at the most remote edge of the world. You, Maximus, know that I am speaking the truth because you have diligently read the following phrases in [Plato's] *Phaedrus* (64. 3-4)".[60]

Another aspect of the same charge is that Apuleius applied the Greek word for king to a cult statue. He replies:

> "[The proconsul and judge] Maximus also knows very well...who that king is who was first so named by Plato rather than by me, namely,..., that is, the king who is the cause and underlying reason and original beginning of all natural existence, the supreme begetter of the soul, the eternal supporter of animate beings..." (*Apol.* 64. 5-6).

After quoting from Plato's *Laws* in support of the principle of the simple life, Apuleius concludes this intense evocation of his Platonist credentials with these playful words:

> "As is evident from the signs of approval from all those sitting on the

---

[60] The fourth-century Greek novelist Heliodorus also contrasts the hellish ravings of the superstitious with the heavenly ratiocinations of the Platonist sage; see Sandy 1982: 162-3.

> tribunal with you, Maximus, I seem to have made most timely use of Plato both as a model for my way of life and as the spokesman for my defence, and you see that I adhere to the letter of his laws" (*Apol.* 65. 8).

I believe that we can safely conclude from the passages quoted above that Apuleius deserves our signs of approval, too, for a convincing demonstration that he has absorbed a large amount of Platonic doctrine that he is capable of invoking in a timely fashion. However, the question remains: was Apuleius an alumnus of the Platonic Academy in Athens?

As part of his general thesis that the Platonic Academy in Athens ceased to exist by the first century B. C., Glucker maintains that in spite of the appearance to the contrary of the passages just discussed there is no evidence that Apuleius was an alumnus of the Academy.[61] Where Apuleius does explicitly mention his studies in Athens, he does not refer to the Academy (*Apol.* 72. 3; *Fl.* 18. 15 and 42, 20. 4). His only reference to it is indecisive. In the course of describing Pythagoras' philosophical career, he emphasizes Pythagoras' insistence that his students maintain strict silence until they have qualified for the the right to speak (*Fl.* 15. 23-5). Apuleius continues:

> "Moreover, my master Plato, who deviated not at all or only slightly from the practices of this sect, adopted a Pythagorean position on most issues. Similarly, in order to be adopted into his [viz. Plato's] name by my instructors, I also learned these two things in the course of my Academic meditations, namely, to speak forthrightly when it was necessary to speak and to be willing to maintain silence when that was necessary" (*Fl.* 15. 26).

If Glucker is right, as seems likely on the basis of the full range of evidence presented by him, then the *meditationes Academicae* refer to Apuleius' youthful studies in Carthage, under whose teachers his adherence to the Platonic sect began (*Fl.* 18. 15).

---

[61] Glucker 1978: 139-41. The little of the physical remains of the schools of philosophy in Athens during the Roman Imperial period is surveyed by Camp 1989: 50-5.

Philosophical Studies in Athens

It is most likely that Apuleius, like his slightly older contemporary Plutarch and like Herodes Atticus, pursued Platonic philosophy as well as the other subjects enumerated in *Florida* 20 with private teachers in Athens. Various candidates for the positions have been proposed. The so-called School of Gaius has long been in the forefront of speculation. Little is known of its head except that he was teaching Platonism somewhere in the first half of the second century, which appears to coincide with the time of Apuleius' studies in Athens, and that one of his pupils was Albinus, whose extant *Epitome*, like Apuleius' *On Plato and his Doctrine*, provides a scholastic summary of Platonic doctrine in the restored form that it acquired after being purged of the "sceptical" colouring with which it was tinged above all by Carneades.[62] This theory has fallen out of favour recently; and Dillon has tentatively proposed as Apuleius' Athenian teachers Sextus of Chaeroneia, to whom he pays tribute at the beginning of the *Golden Ass*, Taurus and the unknown author of the doctrines that appear in the work *De Fato* (*On Fate*).[63] The manuscript tradition of this work mistakenly attributes it to Sextus' uncle Plutarch, who is also associated with the narrator of the *Golden Ass*. Whoever Apuleius' teachers were, it is to Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* that one must turn for an impression of the philosophical instruction that was being offered in Athens at approximately the time of Apuleius' studies there.[64]

In *Attic Nights* 1. 9 the philosopher Taurus, who is proposed as one of Apuleius' teachers by Dillon, discourses on the subject: "What was the method and sequence of instruction employed by Pythagoreans and how long was the prescribed period for maintaining silence before

---

[62] The Polish scholar T. Sinko was the first to develop the theory in 1905 that both Albinus and Apuleius attended the School of Gaius. The most recent supporters of the theory include Moreschini 1978: chapter 5 (= the definitive version of his earlier views) and Hijmans 1987: 435.

[63] Dillon 1977: 338; see also Dowden 1994: 428-9.

[64] Sandy 1993: 167-73.

having the right to speak?" Apuleius discourses on the same subject (*Fl.* 15. 26; see p. 26). After describing Pythagorean methods of instruction, Taurus adds:

> "Now, however, unwashed pupils undertake the study of philosophy immediately. Although they are totally ignorant of theory, literature and geometry, they nevertheless set the conditions for the way philosophy is taught. One of them says, 'Teach me this first'; another one says, 'I want to learn this, not what you want to teach'; this one is ecstatic to begin with Plato's *Symposium* because of [the description of] Alcibiades' drunken arrival, that one [is ecstatic] to begin with the *Phaedrus* because of Lysias' speech. Good heavens! there is even one who insists on reading Plato not for the sake of improving the quality of his life but for the sake of adorning his speaking and writing style; not for the sake of becoming more temperate but for the sake of becoming more charming." This is what Taurus used to say whenever he compared the new style of students of philosophy with the old style of students of Pythagorean philosophy.

Taurus elsewhere complains that teachers must now go to the houses of their rich pupils and wait there until noon to give them time to sober up (Gel. 7. 10).[65] This lends credence to Glucker's view that philosophical instruction in Athens during the Roman Imperial period was in the hands of private tutors rather than tenured professors of the Academy. In any case, like the pupils in Athens who are accused by Taurus of focussing on Plato's literary style rather than his philosophical doctrine, Apuleius, back in his native North Africa, expects his Carthaginian audience—the largest ever gathered to hear a philosopher speak, he claims—to evaluate his philosophical discourses for their literary polish rather than their philosophical content (*Fl.* 9. 7-8).

Another vignette featuring Taurus in the *Attic Nights* raises the same issue and has important implications for the issue of Greek-to-Latin translations and the expectations that Greek teachers had of their Western pupils:

> Plato's *Symposium* was being read at the house of the philosopher Taurus. I thought so highly of these words of Pausanias as he took his turn among

---

[65] See Plu. *Cic.* 24. 6. 873 for an account of Cicero's son Marcus being taken to drinking parties by his tutor Gorgias.

> the guests who spoke in praise of Love that I committed them to memory [*Symp.* 180 e]....When these words were read, Taurus turned to me: "You, my young rhetorician" (for that is how he addressed me when I first enrolled in his course of lectures, thinking that I had come to Athens solely for the purpose of fashioning my literary style), do you see the dense, brilliant and fully rounded *façon de réfléchir*; the concise, polished rhythms, the 'period' of precise proportions? Do you have a speech so perfectly constructed to show us in your books of rhetoric? I advise you, however, to consider these rhythms only as *des chemins de traverse.* You must take the main route directly to the majestic core of Plato's authoritative substance and not turn aside towards the pleasantness of his tones and the charm of his words." Taurus' warning not only did not keep me away from Plato's rhythms, but it spurred me on to strive after the elegance of Greek style in Latin words (Gel. 17. 2).[66]

So committed to rhetoric were the philosopher Taurus' pupils that he felt obliged on one occasion to recommend the orator Demosthenes rather than a philosopher as a model for one of them:

> "You foolish, worthless man! If the authority and rational arguments of philosophy do not lead you away from your wicked ways, do you not recall the statement of your beloved Demosthenes? It is composed in pleasant and charming verbal rhythms and like a rhetorical jingle it ought the more easily to have been fixed in your mind" (Gel. 10. 19).

In all the passages quoted above "the philosopher" Taurus, as Gellius repeatedly refers to him, takes it to be a deficiency of his Western pupils in particular that they come to Athens to study Plato principally as a literary model rather than as a source of philosophical ideas. As we have seen, Apuleius anticipates that his Carthaginian audiences will concentrate on the literary style of his philosophical discourses (*Fl.* 9. 7-8). Elsewhere, Apuleius links philosophy and eloquence in the person of the orator Demosthenes, who for Taurus and for other Greek intellectuals of the second century was one of the major stylistic models, "Thus that best of orators, when he had drunk deeply of Plato's eloquence, when he had learned from Eubolus the methods of logical argument..." (*Apol.* 15. 9). Whether or not their Greek teachers

---

[66] Sandy 1993: 167-8; the French in my translation is intended to represent Gellius' retention of Taurus' Greek at the two places in the otherwise Latin rendering of Taurus' warning.

of philosophy approved, Western, Latin-speaking pupils appear to have gone to Athens to follow a general course of humanities that incidentally included philosophy along with the other cups of learning enumerated in *Florida* 20 (see p. 8).

One important aspect of Apuleius' intellectual development that will be developed more fully in the following chapter is his reliance on earlier, usually Greek authorities. A few of the vignettes featuring Taurus in the *Attic Nights* illustrate how this ossified reverence of the past came to be pervasive not only in Apuleius but in all the major intellectual figures, both Greek and Latin, of the second century.[67] Taking advantage of the opportunity provided at the end of each day's lecture, Gellius asks Taurus whether the wise man ever feels anger. He does not provide the details of Taurus' views but instead quotes these words of his master:

> "This is what I think on the subject of anger. But it will not be irrelevant for you to hear as well the thoughts of our esteemed Plutarch, a very wise and learned man" (Gel. 1. 26).

Similarly, in the course of conversation at Taurus' dinner table, Homer and Herodotus are cited as authorities on the properties of liquids (Gel. 17. 8). In each of these two instances, which could easily be multiplied, Taurus' views appear to have no value except as reiterations of the same views formulated in the past.

We can see the same process in Apuleius' *Apology*. He defends his interest in ichthyology by citing the precedent of such Greek philosophers as Aristotle and Theophrastus instead of promoting his scientific investigations on their own merits (36. 3). He also assumes that the trial judge has studied such Aristotelian works as the *Problems* (36. 5). Gellius reports the occasion on which he studied the same work with Taurus (Gel. 19. 6). These few instances, which once again could easily be multiplied, suggest that Apuleius and Gellius at approximately the same time in Athens were exposed to a standardized curriculum and to an educational stance that placed a premium on the views of the past.

Taurus appears to have had some scientific training and on one occasion corrects a medical doctor who has confused veins with

---

[67] Sandy 1993: 169-70.

arteries (Gel. 18. 10). Gellius' reaction throws light on to Apuleius' catholic pursuit of natural history, philosophy, literature and rhetoric:

> Afterwards, when I recalled the way in which the medical doctor had been rebuked, I judged that it was disgraceful not only for a medical doctor but for any freeborn person with a liberal education not to be familiar with what pertains to the human body, with knowledge that is not deeply hidden but that has been placed immediately at our disposal by nature for the sake of safeguarding our health. I also decided to use any spare time that I had to lay my hands on the medical books that seemed best suited to provide instruction.

To judge by *Florida* 20. 4 and the passage just quoted, the Athenian education experienced by Apuleius and Gellius had the positive effect of encouraging them to undertake the study of a wide range of subjects. It also motivated them to continue to search out the best available scientific writings after their school days had come to an end (e. g. *Apol.* 36).

Gellius' response to scientific learning was not always so positive as in the anecdote described above. On one unspecified occasion he seems to have heard lectures on the views held by the major schools of philosophy on the question whether or not the voice (or sound) is a solid body (Gel. 5. 15). He concludes:

> As I heard and read these and other probing remarks that brought pleasure and stimulation to my moments of leisure but [also] saw that the solution when worked out in excruciatingly minute detail did not contribute anything of substance to the rational conduct of life or to the object of any [worthwhile] investigation, I endorsed the statement made by Ennius in his play *Neoptolemus*, "A little philosophy is a good thing; too much of it cloys."

Apuleius also concedes that the study of philosophy can descend to pedantry and confirms that concession with the same passage in Ennius' play (*Apol.* 13. 1).[68]

---

[68] Cic. *Tusc.* 2.1 may have been the common source for Apuleius and Gellius of the quotation of Ennius. In Pl. *Grg.* 484 c and Tac. *Ag.* 4 the earnest study of philosophy is represented as a youthful indulgence; the elder Seneca expresses similar misgivings about the practice of declamation (see p. 150).

Gellius' other principal Greek teacher was Favorinus of Arles.[69] He is a special case because all the vignettes linked to a specified place that feature him in the *Attic Nights* are set in Italy rather than in Athens or elsewhere in Greece. However, his circle of friends included such major figures of the Greek Second Sophistic as Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom and Herodes Atticus and he launched his sophistic career in Ionia, the heartland of the second-century Greek intellectual renaissance. Thus for our purposes he can be regarded as one of at least two Greek philosophers, who had an influence on the intellectual development of Apuleius and Gellius.

Favorinus seems to have inclined more to philology and belles-lettres than Taurus did (see p. 46). This is especially evident in his judgment on Plato and the orator Lysias:

> "If you remove or alter any one word in one of Plato's orations, even if the change is most appropriate, you damage his eloquence; if you do the same to one of Lysias' orations, the damage is to his meaning" (Gel. 2. 5).

This attitude towards Plato, which emphasizes his eloquence, appears to have shaped Apuleius' expectation that his Carthaginian audience would judge his philosophical discourses by their adherence to correct Latin idiom (*Fl.* 9. 7-8; see pp. 20, 28).

The occasion on which Favorinus discourses on the wind named Iapyx casts some doubt on Apuleius' judgment as a student of science. Gellius introduces the vignette with these words:

> It was the custom at informal dinner parties at the house of Favorinus to read lyric poetry and history, sometimes in Greek, sometimes in Latin. On one occasion we were reading a Latin poem in which occurred the phrase "Iapyx wind" and we began to consider what wind this was, from what direction it blew and the explanation of its unusual name.... Favorinus was in a talkative mood and spoke as follows...(Gel. 2. 22).

Apuleius incorporates Favorinus' effusive words into his adaptation of the pseudo-Aristotelian *On the Universe* (*Mun.* 13. 318-14. 321). Thus he "improves" the Greek cosmology with what turns out to be a bit of

---

[69] Sandy 1993: 170. See Glucker 1978: 280-93 for a succinct account of Favorinus' philosophical activities and accomplishments.

philological table-talk that may have been inspired by the combined effects of congenial company and wine loosening Favorinus' tongue.

The last example of the record of Apuleius' and Gellius' school days in Athens to be drawn from the pages of the *Attic Nights* is considerably more complex than what has preceded but pays several dividends.[70] Favorinus is once again the principal actor. He provides a detailed analysis of the syllogism known in Greek as *antistrephon* and in Latin as *reciproca* (Gel. 5. 11). As we shall soon see, the Apuleian work *Peri Hermeneias* deals with syllogisms. Moreover, *Florida* 18. 19-29 recounts the same anecdote concerning the use of a related syllogism by the sophist Protagoras as Gellius recounts in the previous, thematically linked chapter of the *Attic Nights* (5. 10). For Gellius, Protagoras was *sophistarum acerrimus* ("the most astute of the sophists"); for Apuleius, he was *sophista...longe multiscius et cum primis rhetoricae repertoribus perfacundus* ("a widely knowledgeable sophist whose very high level of eloquence ranked him with the founders of the art of rhetoric"). *Florida* 18, which contains the syllogism used by Protagoras, consists of Apuleius' affirmation to his Carthaginian audience that his philosophical studies, which he began in Carthage, were consolidated in Athens (*Fl.* 18. 15). One gets the impression that the native son is putting on display in North Africa the fruits of the standardized course of philosophical studies that he and Gellius followed in Athens at approximately the same time and perhaps with the same teacher or teachers.

The Apuleian *Peri Hermeneias* begins with these words:

> There is one...[type of statement] that expresses a proposition fully; it is called "complete" because it contains a complete thought.... Sergius calls it "*effatus*," Varro "*proloquium*," Cicero "*enuntiatum*," the Greeks "*protasin*" and "*axiôma*," I in a literal translation "*protensio*" and "*rogamentum*"; less technically, however, it will be called "*propositio* (*Log*. 1. 190. 5-8).

Gellius recalls (16. 8):

> When I wanted to be introduced to, and initiated into, the study of dialectic, I first had to undertake and become familiar with what dialecticians call *eisagôgai*. Then, because it was necessary at the outset

[70] Sandy 1993: 170-2.

> to learn *peri axiômatôn*, what Varro calls *profata* and sometimes *proloquia*, I searched in earnest for the book called *De Proloquiis* by his teacher L. Aelius. I found it at the Library of Peace and read it. However, it was not clearly written or intended as a manual of instruction. Aelius seems to have written the book as an aide-mémoire for himself rather than as a source of instruction for others. Therefore I was forced to have recourse to Greek books.... Varro, however, in Book 24 of his *De Lingua Latina* ..., defined [*proloquium*] very clearly in this way: *Proloquium est sententia, in qua nihil desideratur.* Exactly what I am speaking of will be clear if I give an example...:' *Neque bonum est voluptas neque malum.*[71] Every complete statement that conveys sense, so that it is necessarily either true or false, is what dialecticians call *axiôma*, Varro, as I said, calls *proloquium* but Cicero calls *pronuntiatum.*

In *Attic Nights* 15. 26 Gellius writes, "Aristotle defines a syllogism in these words...." Gellius then introduces his translation of Aristotle's definition thus, "My translation of Aristotle's definition does not seem bad to me." Apuleius writes, "Moreover, that complete syllogism can...be defined not at all badly in this way" (*Log.* 7. 200. 9-10); and he proceeds to translate in several of the same words the same passage from Aristotle as Gellius translates.[72]

The impression that emerges from this record of Apuleius' and Gellius' school days in Athens is that of two determined students from the Latin West attempting after the completion of their classroom studies to consolidate a difficult and perplexing subject. Both men were dependent on Greek authorities for their introduction to the subject (Gel. 16. 8. 4; Apul. *Fl.* 20. 4). Apuleius singles out dialectics as the only "bitter draught" of learning that he imbibed in Athens: *dialecticae austerulam [creterram]* (*Fl.* 20. 4). Gellius more expansively emphasizes its bitter-sweet qualities and the Siren-like effect that it can have on the unwary who become addicted to its mature charms (Gel. 16. 8. 15-7). Finally, both men found it necessary to consult other authorities in their attempts to consolidate their understanding of Aristotelian logic. Apuleius resorts to multiple Aristotelian works, Theophrastus and Stoic systems of logic (see p. 38). Gellius scoured the libraries of Rome and various Greek books for help (Gel. 16. 8;

---

[71] A paragraph after the passage quoted above from Apuleius' *Peri Hermeneias* we read, *Virtus bonum est; ...voluptas non est bonum.*

[72] Sandy 1993: 172.

translated p. 34).

The role of translation in philosophical education in Athens is somewhat peripheral to the issues now being discussed but has considerable bearing on Apuleius' intellectual development and writing career.[73] The lemma of *Attic Nights* 8. 8, which is the only surviving part of the entry, suggests that translation played a role in the interpretation of Plato: "The experience that I had when I wanted to interpret and, as it were, reproduce in Latin certain passages of Plato." Gellius reports elsewhere that Taurus assigned him the task of translating a passage from Plato's *Symposium* into Latin (Gel. 17. 20). In *Attic Nights* 20. 5 he reports his ultimately successful attempt to discover in Latin a single compound word for the compound word that Aristotle applied to his acroamatic writings. Both Western students of Greek logic took self-conscious pride in their successful attempts to render the technical terms of Aristotelian logic in Latin (see p. 34). Apuleius, like Gellius, who found his long-sought compound Latin term in Ennius (Gel. 20. 5), ransacked the writings of pre-classical Latin authors to discover suitable philosophical technical terms (see p. 14). Like Gellius wanting "to interpret...certain passages of Plato" by reproducing them in Latin (Gel. 8. 8), Apuleius undertakes to interpret the pseudo-Aristotelian *On the Universe* (*explicabimus* [*Mun*. 2. 289]), pausing repeatedly to comment on the technical Greek terms that he has rendered in Latin. Apuleius' and Gellius' self-conscious efforts to translate into Latin portions of abstruse Greek philosophical works may be a direct reflection of the pedagogy of Taurus that the two Western students experienced, possibly simultaneously, in their private tutor's classroom.

Like a good education in the humanities today, the introduction to philosophy provided by private tutors in Athens near the middle of the second century appears to have developed in Apuleius and Gellius an appreciation of a complex subject and both the determination and means to seek solutions to unanswered questions. Their education did not, however, enable them to function independently as "master" philosophers capable of formulating their own systems of logic. That is probably too much to expect of any branch of learning in the second century and of private Greek tutors who assumed with some justification that their Western pupils were more interested in Plato's

---

[73] Sandy 1993: 172.

writings as a means of improving their literary style than as an evolving philosophical system for conducting their lives.

Publications Record

To complete this survey of Apuleius' intellectual development, we turn now to the works carrying his name that are no longer extant or are of doubtful authorship. They provide an illuminating chronicle of his range of interests and, in some cases, of his practice of adapting earlier Greek writings. The works no longer extant fall into two categories: (1) those referred to by Apuleius himself and (2) those cited by later writers.

In the first group are to be included the vaguely designated epic and lyric poems, comedies, tragedies, satires, riddles, historical accounts of varied topics, orations and philosophical dialogues in both Greek and Latin mentioned in *Florida* 9. *Florida* 20 is equally vague: poems, philosophical dialogue, hymns, music, histories and satires, for each of which a Greek precedent is named. In *Florida* 18, as in *Apology* 55. 11-2, Apuleius refers to a bilingual hymn to the god Aesculapius that he has composed. In the same vein is the eulogy of the Scipio Orfitus, the proconsul of Africa in 163/164: *carmen de virtutibus Orfiti* (*Fl.* 17. 18). This is an appropriate place to mention the *extant* poems quoted by Apuleius in the *Apology* from his no longer extant *Ludicra*, the one (6. 3) a versified letter addressed to a friend for which Catullus is cited as a precedent, the other two erotic poems for which such precedents as Solon, the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, the Stoic Zeno and Plato are named.[74]

In the *Apology* Apuleius provides some details of the now lost works because they have been introduced as evidence into the legal proceedings or are cited by him to account for actions that have been presented as incriminating evidence. From a lost work in which Apuleius describes a statue of Venus he is obliged to quote a sentence that his accusers have cited in connection with the names of fish

[74] Steinmetz 1982: 337-41.

studied by him (*Apol.* 33. 5-34. 3). The names, like, for instance, the maidenhair fern or the barnyard cock in English, could be construed as having sexual significance. I have already quoted *Apology* 36. 3-8 and 38. 5 (see p. 14). These two passages, which form part of his attempt to dignify his interest in fish by associating it with Aristotle's ichthyological studies, confirm that he wrote books in both Greek and Latin on the subject. They illustrate that at this early stage in his writing career he was already explaining rather than translating his Greek models and applying to them the patchwork methods of adaptation that characterize most of his work (see p. 15). His concluding remarks on the subject of his ichthyological investigations reveal that at times his scientific studies were little more than a casual hobby:

> "I am to be congratulated that my opponents did not know that I had also read Theophrastus' *Poisonous and Stinging Animals* and Nicander's *Savage Beasts*. Otherwise, they would charge me with administering poison. After all, I have found myself embroiled in this affair because of my reading of Aristotle and my desire to emulate him. Plato has also encouraged me by saying that anyone who undertakes such investigations 'will not regret having a pastime in his life'" (*Apol.* 41. 6-7).

On the basis of the descriptions of the contents or the references to titles of lost Apuleian works provided by later writers it is sometimes possible to make educated guesses about the range of his interests and his methods of adaptation. The existence as late as the time of the grammarian Nonius in the early part of the fourth century of all or part of the *Ludicra* is confirmed (1).[75] Erotic verse (cf. *Apol.* 9. 12 and 14) that suggests a combination of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* and seems to conform to Apuleius' practice of scouring earlier writings for inspiration and obscure details is also attested (21). He also wrote a verse compilation entitled *On Proverbs* in at least two books.[76] Compilation also lies behind the verse aphorisms, some of them based on sayings of Plato and Epicurus that had been translated previously by Cicero and the younger Seneca (19 a-d). Scientific compilation reminiscent of Apuleius' interest in ichthyology (*Apol.* 36-8) and

---

[75] The parenthetical numbers are those assigned to the citations by Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 171-80.

[76] Steinmetz 1982: 336 questions whether the work was in verse.

consistent with his interest in astronomy (e. g. *Mun.*) is also evident (22-25). The *Epitome of Histories* was certainly the result of compilation (11-12), as, probably, were the technical treatises *On Medical Questions* (14), *On Agriculture* (15) and *On Trees* (16). Translations are also represented: Plato's *Phaedo* (9-10) and (presumably Plato's) *Republic* (13). According to Sidonius Apollinaris, *Epistles* 2. 9. 5, Apuleius' translation of the *Phaedo*, like Cicero's translation of Demosthenes' *Ctesiphon*, was less literal *ad verbum sententiamque translatus* (translated [less literally] word-for-word and and in accordance with the sense) than Rufinus' Latin rendering of Origen.[77] Too little survives of the *Hermagoras* (3-8) to warrant Perry's arbitrary view that it was a prosimetrum novel like the *Satyricon*.[78] Finally, for the record, mention should be made of two works that no one now believes are genuinely Apuleian: *Asclepius* and the *Herbal*.[79]

In the past few pages I have dealt with material of at best marginal interest. I have done so partly to put on record certain aspects of Apuleius' intellectual development that will not figure prominently in the following chapters. A more important consideration has been to emphasize that all of Apuleius' non-oratorical output consists of adaptations of previous works and that he instinctively turns to Greek models. The same reasons apply to my decision to conclude this chapter with consideration of the work on logic known as *Peri Hermeneias*. In addition, this work epitomizes the patchwork procedures of adaptation that characterize his other works. If I am right in maintaining that it is part of the scholastic record of Apuleius' (and Gellius') student days in Athens (see p. 32), then this distinctive process of adaptation and compilation marks his intellectual activity from beginning to end. Finally, this work highlights the important issue of authenticity, which I have left unacknowledged until now.

Beaujeu has summarized the reasons for supposing that the *Peri*

---

[77] Russell 1990: 9 is misleading when he states without qualification that Apuleius' translation of the *Phaedo* was "an accurate rendering 'ad verbum sententiamque.'"

[78] Perry 1927: 263-6.

[79] On the *Asclepius* see Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: viii; and Fowden 1986: 10 and 198, n. 19. On the *Herbal* see C. Singer, "The Herbal in Antiquity and Its Transmission," *JHS* 47 (1927) 1-52.

Hermeneias is spurious: (1) its manuscript tradition remained separate from that of the other philosophical works (which themselves were contained in a manuscript tradition independent of the other Apuleian works until the fourteenth century), (2) the poverty of language and (3) the peculiarities of language.[80] None of these objections is decisive, and there are explanations for each of them.[81] In the sixth century Cassiodorus did not hesitate to ascribe it to Apuleius.[82] This ascription and the ascriptions of the work to Apuleius contained in the medieval manuscript tradition were accepted at face value until the time of Hildebrand's critical edition near the middle of the previous century.[83]

Ironically, Hildebrand's theory that a third- or fourth-century grammarian foisted the *Peri Hermeneias* on Apuleius because it satisfies his otherwise unfulfilled promise in the *On Plato and His Doctrine* to expound on the three branches of philosophy is the most compelling reason for accepting its Apuleian authorship: natural science (physics), ethics and logic (*Pl.*. 1. 4. 189). The *Peri Hermeneias* perfectly fills the gap in the *On Plato and His Doctrine* as it now exists: Book 1, *intelligendi ratio*, that is, *naturalis philosophia* (natural science); Book 2, *vivendi ratio* (ethics). But where is the promised *loquendi ratio* (dialectics)? The *Peri Hermeneias* begins:

> *Studium sapientiae, quod philosophiam vocamus, plerisque videtur tres species seu partes habere: naturalem, moralem et de qua nunc dicere proposui rationalem, qua continetur ars disserendi* (The pursuit of wisdom, which we call philosophy, is generally held to contain three types or branches: natural, moral and the branch about which I have resolved to speak now, logical, wherein is contained the art of discourse).

---

[80] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: vii-viii.

[81] Sullivan 1967, Dillon 1977: 310-1 and 336-7, Londey and Johanson 1987: 9-19, Hijmans 1987: 408-12. Lumpe 1982: 44-6 in the course of providing the most detailed rebuttals of the arguments against authenticity and of favouring a third-century date of non-Apuleian composition embraces the verdict "non liquet." See also Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: vii-viii. There is a good general account in Gersch 1986: I, 329-87.

[82] *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum* 3. 569 d = *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1865) LXX, 1174.

[83] G. F. L. Hildebrand (ed.), *Lucii Apuleii Opera Omnia* (Leipzig, 1842), I, XLIV; Lumpe 1982: 10.

In summarizing Plato's achievements near the beginning of his survey of Platonic doctrine Apuleius avers that Plato perfected the branches of philosophical enquiry initiated by others: Pythagorean *philosophia naturalis*, Eleatic *philosophia rationalis* and Socratic *philosophia moralis* (*Pl.* 1. 3. 187). Again, the *Peri Hermeneias* supplies the *philosophia rationalis*, or *pars philosophiae rationalis* as it is called in that work, now missing from the *On Plato and His Doctrine*. Further circumstantial evidence of Apuleian authorship exists in Albinus' *Epitome*. This Greek work and Apuleius' *On Plato and His Doctrine* are parallel scholastic surveys of Platonic doctrine. Chapters 5 and 6 of Albinus' work provide a summary account of dialectics and logic, a subject completely absent from Apuleius' otherwise parallel account. Its absence may imply a projected or lost third book such as the *Peri Hermeneias* or the *Peri Hermeneias* itself.

The patchwork qualities of the *Peri Hermeneias* are blatant. It is possible to detect the vague outlines of a pattern. Chapters 1-5 correspond to chapters 1-7 of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and chapters 6-14 correspond to chapters 1-8 of his *Prior Analytics*.[84] Within this loose system, however, there is very little consistency. For instance, the syllogisms that Aristotle presents as implications appear as inferences in Apuleius. This is not a simple case of misunderstanding Aristotle. Rather, Apuleius has failed to integrate the multiple sources that he consulted, sometimes preferring Aristotle to Theophrastus, sometimes vice versa; sometimes pronouncing in favour of Aristotle over *nonnulli Peripatetici* ("some Peripatetics") and Stoics, sometimes accepting a Stoic variant.

The mode of composition evident in the *Peri Hermeneias* characterizes Apuleius's other non-oratorical works and, as we shall see in the following chapter, is characteristic of second-century belles-lettres. We saw it previously in the *On the Universe* (see p. 32). The pseudo-Aristotelian mention of the wind named Iapyx sends Apuleius scurrying in search of *tout-prêt* authentication that he finds in the convivial table-talk of Favorinus that Gellius reports. Favorinus' effusive discourse adheres to the antiquarian predisposition of the second century, as he compiles a canon of literary sources ranging from Homer through the source beloved of second-century Latin word-mongers, Cato's *Origines*, to Vergil. Similarly, the obscure details of

[84] Dillon 1977: 337, Lumpe 1982: 22-6.

dialectics, a subject to which they were introduced as students in Athens, send Apuleius and Gellius on a desperate search for *tout-prêts* explanations in sometimes conflicting and inadequate Greek and Latin treatises (see p. 34).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE AND LEARNING IN THE SECOND CENTURY

What Gibbon called the "Golden Age of the Antonines" in the "Prologue" to the chapter of the same title encompasses the combined Flavian and Antonine dynasties from Nerva (96-98) through Trajan and Hadrian to the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180. Its golden qualities were for Gibbon to be found in the peace and efficient civil administration that prevailed throughout the Roman Empire. Latin literary historians have traditionally taken a dimmer view of the period, labelling it "silver"; and even its duller lustre extends as far as Apuleius only if Suetonius, whose literary activity probably continued into the reign of Antoninus Pius after Hadrian had dismissed him from his secretarial post in 121, is included within the arbitrary limits of the Silver Age. "Beyond the time of Suetonius the Silver Age does not extend," and there was to be no Bronze Age of Latin literature.[1]

The tenuous inclusion of Suetonius provides a useful springboard to the intellectual tone of the second half of the second century. As Beaujeu puts it, Suetonius was an erudite chronicler who exercised his curiosity on children's games as well as the biographies of emperors.[2] Some of the now lost works attributed to Suetonius in the Byzantine encyclopedia *Suda* (s. v. Tranquillus) and known through Byzantine summaries resemble the catholic and international range of interests found in Plutarch, Aulus Gellius and Apuleius, e. g. *On Greek Games* (written in Greek), *On Terms of Abuse and Their Origins* (written in Greek), *On Clothing and Shoes*, *On Cicero's "Republic"* and *On the Roman Year*.[3] These and other works listed in the *Suda* were almost certainly miscellanies and other types of antiquarian compilations.

Surveys of the Greek belles-lettres of the second half of the second century present an equally unpromising picture, and *obiter dicta* of the

---

[1] Quoted from Duff 1960: 521.

[2] Beaujeu (ed.) 1975: 95.

[3] Duff 1960: 504-5.

sort that follow can be found in scores of general appraisals of both classical cultures of the period, "Literature was stagnant and writers were content with imitation. In scholarship antiquarianism was very much the mode, often descending to mere pedantry."[4]

Sources

Literary imitation and antiquarianism, two aspects of the backward-looking, pre-323 B. C. orientation for which the Greek Second Sophistic is notorious, and a restless obsession with all branches of knowledge and artistic creation that took shape in the minds of Greek thinkers before the death of Alexander the Great underlie almost every intellectual endeavour of the second half of the second century. Apart from the surviving works of the individual writers themselves, the principal sources of our knowledge of the intellectual activity of the period are Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* and Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*. Neither of these is an entirely satisfactory source.

Philostratus set a limited goal for himself:

> I have written...an account in two volumes of those who were practising philosophers but did so in such a way as to be regarded as sophists and of those who are properly labelled sophists.

Even this limited goal is not fully executed. Philostratus pays minimal attention to a period of approximately 400 years, from the time of Gorgias of Leontini, who "founded the Older Sophistic," through Aeschines, the founder of the Second Sophistic in the second half of the fourth century B. C., to Nicetes of Smyrna, who belongs to the time of Nero and with whom Philostratus' account commences to become detailed.[5] Where his thumbnail sketches can be tested against the surviving works of figures of whom he takes notice it is evident that his account is idiosyncratically selective. This is particularly so in

---

[4] Yoder 1938: 281. See, too, van Groningen 1965: 45-56.

[5] Jones 1974: 12. Swain 1991: 149-55 argues that Philostratus restricts his account to those who "shared a distinctive set of cultural, social, and political values" and that his reliance on unwritten sources, that is, living memory, necessarily precludes detailed accounts of Nicetas' predecessors.

the case of Aelian (*VS* 624); and it is most likely that Philostratus omitted completely a literary figure of the stature of Lucian, whose corpus contains several works typical of other sophists of the period, because he was offended by the satirical pamphleteer's caricatures of the kinds of public speakers whom he admired. This pique pervasively undermines his biographical objectivity.[6]

Aulus Gellius deserves high marks for the relentless effort that he put into his modest objective of compiling a diverting commonplace book. As he states in the preface to the *Attic Nights*:

> For my part, I employed myself to the point of exhaustion in unrolling many scrolls and running through them whenever I was able to enjoy moments of leisure during the intervals in my duties (12).

We repeatedly encounter him at book shops, book stalls and libraries, unable to resist the urge to skim through any books that he chances upon:

> When I was returning from Greece to Italy and came to Brindisi where I disembarked..., I saw bundles of books for sale. I immediately and eagerly made my way to the books. All the books were written in Greek and filled with marvellous tales about incredible, unheard-of things, but their authors were ancient and of some degree of authority.... The volumes themselves, because of long neglect, were dirty and repellant in appearance. Nevertheless I asked the price and was induced by their unbelievable and unexpected cheapness to buy several for a small sum, all of which I skimmed through in the next two nights (9. 4. 1-5; see Chapter Two, n. 48).[7]

Some idea of his productive use of moments of leisure can be gained from the following extracts:

> As I was riding in a carriage I had a sudden whim to recollect the words for missiles, javelins and swords that are used in ancient historical accounts and likewise the kinds and names of boats so that ther harmful trifles would not exert control over my idle and dull thoughts (10. 25. 1);

---

[6] Reardon 1971: 115-19 and 190; on Lucian as a sophist see Anderson 1982a.

[7] Book shops, book stalls and libraries: Gel. 5. 4, 9. 4, 9. 14, 11. 17, 13. 20.

and:

> When I have a respite from my legal activities and go for a walk or take a ride for the sake of exercise, it is often my practice to recollect to myself details that are of little consequence and indeed despicable in the eyes of those who are not well educated but are of pre-eminent importance for a deep understanding of ancient works and a knowledge of the Latin language (11. 3. 1).

The fruits of Gellius' obsessive antiquarian labours found their way into a randomly arranged miscellany:

> I have compiled the contents in the random order in which I had previously excerpted the material. For whatever I heard worthy of recording or read in any Greek or Latin book that came into my hands, regardless of the subject and as my fancy dictated, I would write down indiscriminately and haphazardly. I would put up a stock of this material for myself as a kind of literary storehouse to replenish my memory so that whenever I wanted to make use of a subject or a word that I had chanced suddenly to forget and the books from which I had excerpted them were not to hand I could easily find and extract them. There is therefore is these notes the same disparity of contents as there was in my original annotations, which I made in unmethodical and disorderly haste as I studied and read a variety of subjects (Preface 2-3).

The professed randomness of the contents is borne out by the following selective listing of the chapter headings that Gellius provides for the material contained in Book 1:

> What system of proportions and comparisons Plutarch said the philosopher Pythagoras used in computing the height that Hercules had when he was a mortal.
>
> The ex-consul Herodes Atticus' timely employment against a certain boastful and vain young man who was a student of philosophy only in appearance of the words of the Stoic Epicurus with which he jokingly distinguished from a true Stoic the mob of prattling air-heads who called themselves Stoics.
>
> How finely and carefully Antonius Julianus investigated Cicero's shrewd substitution of one word for another in a speech.
>
> A story found in the works of the philosopher Sotis about the prostitute

Laïs and Demosthenes.

What was the method and sequence of the Pythagorean rules of conduct and for how long a period of time the injunction to learn and to remain silent was observed.

With what words the philosopher Favorinus chastised a young man who spoke in an excessively old-fashioned and antiquated way.

With what equanimity Socrates tolerated the intractable disposition of his wife; and in that regard what Varro in a certain satire wrote about a husband's duties.

That Julius Hyginus maintained most emphatically that he had read a manuscript from the household of Vergil in which was written "...sensus torquebit amaror" instead of the vulgate reading "sensu torquebit amaro."

How the philosopher Taurus replied when I asked whether the wise man feels anger.

Thus each of the two principal synoptic accounts of the intellectual activity of the second century suffers from its own type of myopia. Philostratus could not or would not look beyond the dazzling, impromptu oratorical displays that he admired. Gellius was unwilling to overlook anything that came within his range of vision. The two writers' representations of Favorinus of Arles will serve as an object lesson.

Philostratus' biographical sketch begins, "His eloquence proclaimed Favorinus, like Dio [Chrysostom], to be in the number of sophists" (*VS* 489). His place of birth (Arles), his congenital distinctiveness (hermaphroditism) and his quarrel with Hadrian provide the kind of anecdote that Philostratus cannot resist:

He pronounced that there were the following three paradoxes in his life: though a Gaul, he was Hellenized; though a eunuch, he was accused of adultery; though he disagreed with an emperor, he lived (*VS* 489).

To judge by the prominence given to them by Philostratus, quarrels played a prominent role in the professional lives of Greek sophists.[8] Of the bitter rivalry between the sophists Polemo and Favorinus,

---

[8] Anderson 1993: 35-9.

Philostratus remarks, "The very fact that he quarrelled with a sophist is sufficient proof for those who labelled Favorinus a sophist" (*VS* 491). Philostratus concludes his sketch with an assessment of Favorinus' stylistic qualities (careless but learned and agreeable) and a tribute to his best speeches and philosophical works. He also comments on Favorinus' ability to command great enthusiasm from Roman listeners to his speeches, even from those who did not understand Greek.

I have already sketched some of the philosophical activities of Favorinus as they are represented in Gellius' *Attic Nights* (see pp. 33, 80, 83). They are in accord with the biographical notice in the Byzantine encyclopedia the *Suda*, "Favorinus, ...a man learned in all branches of knowledge,...steeped in philosophy but more devoted to rhetoric." The vignettes that show him wearing his philosopher's hat are limited in number. On one occasion he arbitrates in a debate between a Stoic and a Peripatetic (18. 1); on another he analyses a faulty "either-or" syllogism (5. 11). His important work on *Pyrrhonian Principles* is cited (11. 5. 1). He expounds on Epictetus' moral philosophy (17. 19) and offers his own advice on ethical issues (1. 3. 27, 2. 12. 5-6, 9. 8 and 19. 3). Scientific theorizing was a traditional area of philosophical enquiry; and we meet Favorinus recounting the theory that fasting diminishes the appetite for food (16. 3), discoursing on meteorology (2. 22) and expanding on the advantages of mother's milk rather than that of a wet nurse (12. 1). This "most diligent investigator of ancient records" might have found a place for the Pythagorean Archytas' flying wooden model of a dove (Gel. 10. 12. 9-10) in any of his attested or fragmentary works such as *On Philosophers' Ways of Life*, *Varied History* or *Memorabile Events*.[9] It is only a short step from the investigator of the previous sentence to Favorinus the antiquarian citing the legal authority of Marcus Cato (14. 2) and reflecting on Rome's XII Tables. (20. 1).

Man of letters and philologist are the roles that Favorinus plays most frequently in Gellius' vignettes: discoursing on Cicero (13. 25; cf. 2. 26. 7 and 21-3) and Sallust (3. 1); comparing Vergil and Pindar (17. 10), and Plato and Lysias (2. 5); explaining the fine points of Vergil's imitation of Lucretius (1. 21); interpreting Euripides (1. 15.

[9] Favorinus' extant and fragmentary works and references to now lost works can be found in Barigazzi (ed.) 1966 and Mensching (ed.) 1963.

17-8); indulging in the kind of mock eulogy known as "things without honour";[10] distinguishing between obsolete words and a pristine style of life (1. 10); pursuing points of vocabulary (18. 7); conducting a sardonic Socratic-type enquiry into the genus and species of the word "penus" (4. 1); adding to Gellius' store of foreign words naturalized into Latin (8. 2); debating tongue-in-cheek with a persistent chatterer on words of double meaning (8. 14); and responding emotionally to a vividly written account of a battle (9. 13. 5).

Our major sources for the literary and intellectual endeavours of the second century screen information through the filtering perspective of their own avowed interests. The dazzling verbal jousts of card-carrying members of his guild on the main stage and the sensational details of their private lives constitute the nucleus of Philostratus' record. Gellius undertook to record everything of potential interest, even those things "that are of little consequence and indeed despicable in the eyes of those who are not well educated" or that he found repellent and alien to the task of enriching life (9. 4. 12). The result is not altogether misleading, to judge by what has survived of Favorinus' work, but it is limited.

Pre-eminence of Greek

Philostratus and Gellius convey the unmistakable impression of heightened intellectual activity during the second half of the second century. As will become evident, it was principally Greek, for creative Latin literature was virtually moribund. To cite two extreme examples, Arrian, a Bithynian of a prominent Romanized family, after climbing to the top of the bureaucratic ladder of the Roman civil service under Hadrian, retired to Athens and thereafter never referred to Rome in his writings. He immersed himself instead in modelling his way of life and literary activities on Xenophon and Herodotus. Aelian, who was born in Italy and took pride in never having set foot out of it, published works only in Greek and used only Greek sources for his extant compilations. Even Fronto, the erstwhile champion of Latin eloquence and an influential adviser to those who aspired to practise it, was to a surprising degree an intermediary between the Greek and Latin cultural

---

[10] Pease 1926: 27-42.

worlds and we find him conceding first place to the Greek language for its rich vocabulary (Gel. 2. 26. 7).[11] As for Latin literature, Apuleius is the only major extant writer of the second century after the time of Suetonius, the latter of whom must have died at about the time Apuleius was reaching early literary maturity.[12]

Cult of the Past

The institutionalized teaching of rhetoric that enjoyed the official support of the Roman government both in Rome itself and in the educational centres of the Greek East decisively shaped all literary and other intellectual activity of the second century. In Lucian's *Dream* the Craft of Sculpture and Education appear to him in a dream and each tries to persuade him to follow her vocation. Education makes her appeal in these words:

> "If you comply with me, first I will show you the many works of earlier generations, relate their marvellous deeds and words and acquaint you with almost everything" (10).

What a contemporary of Lucian would have immediately assumed soon becomes evident: Education is Rhetorical Education. If he were *not* to follow her, he would be rejecting "such great men [as Demosthenes, Aeschines and Socrates], illustrious deeds, majestic works, handsome appearance, honour, reputation, approval, precedence, power, authority, high esteem for [his] words and satisfaction in [his] intelligence" (13). Most of these desirable goals are the customary rewards pursued by, and accorded to, the virtuoso public speakers of the period chronicled by Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*.

It would be out of place to review here in detail all or many of the educational practices and goals of advanced learning in the second century. Instead, I shall survey a small selection of them in so far as they account for distinctive features of Apuleius' methods of

[11] Champlin 1980: 29-44.

[12] Q.Curtius Rufus' account of Alexander the Great enjoyed great popularity but has no value as a critical historical source; the *Pervigilium Veneris*, a poem of fewer than 100 lines that is often attributed to Florus, was also popular, but its authorship and time of composition are uncertain.

composition. Not surprisingly, given the retrogressive outlook of the intellectual activity of the time, these can be grouped under some such general heading as "The Cult of the Past" or "The Importance of Models," as Lucian's Rhetorical Education acknowledges when she commends the "earlier generations."

Authorized Language

This cult of the past expressed itself most fundamentally in the academic attempt to revive a literary language that; in the case of Greek, had not been practised for half a millennium. It is best exemplified in the lexicons of authorized Attic diction that are known from the period.[13] The authors of two of them had close ties to Rome. Pollux compiled his extant *Onomasticon* for the Roman emperor Commodus. The sophist lexicographer Pausanias used Rome as the base of his activities in his later years and died there while the incumbent professor of Greek rhetoric.[14]

Two definitions of "artificiality" apply to the attempts at linguistic reclamation during the second century. First, in the sense of John Donne's "scholastique and artificiall men": Philostratus is uncertain whether to label Pollux ignorant or learned, for in spite of his lexicographical research his declamations reveal little appreciation of authorized Attic diction (*VS* 592). This is artifice in the sense that "academic" is often used now: impractical and having no bearing on "real" life. Artifice in the sense of "contrived" is the butt of two of Lucian's squibs, *Lexiphanes* and the *Professor of Rhetoric*, which may have been directed against Pollux. According to Lucian's satirical prescription the aspiring orator had only to master a list of some fifteen to twenty authorized Attic words and grammatical forms in order to follow in the "footsteps of Demosthenes and Plato..., whose imprints are much larger than those of today's [public speakers]." The craze for reviving a dead language attains its most extreme realization in Athenaeus' compilation of learned table-talk, where the whimsically named Keitoukeitos questions whether the name of each item of food

---

[13] Cf. Suet. *Gram.* 30. 3, Brugnoli (ed.): *...ne usque quaque scholasticus existimaretur.*

[14] I have assumed that the sophist Pausanias chronicled by Philostratus at *VS* 594 is the lexicographer Pausanias mentioned by Photius (Henry [ed.] 1959-67: II, 113-4).

as it is being served "is or is not to be found [i. e., Keitoukeitos] [in the canonical Atticizing writers]." Similarly, Plutarch in his *On Listening to Lectures* likens the student who concentrates on the Attic diction of a lecture to the exclusion of its subject to a person who will not wear a cloak unless it is made of pure Attic wool, a thin cloak of Lysias' language.

This linguistic "retro-occupation" on the part of Greek writers and orators can be parallelled during the second century in the Latin West. After criticizing Marcus Aurelius for lapses in diction, Fronto advises:

> Return instead to words that are suitable, appropriate and imbued with their own vigour....Pursue the old currency. Lead and all sorts of debased currencies are more often found among recent coins than among the ancient ones stamped during the consulship of Perperna or Trebanius" (II, 112-3).[15]

The search for words can take on the thoroughness and urgency of military conscription:

> Just as in war when it is necessary to enroll a legion we select not only volunteers but seek out the slackers of military age, just so when we need a garrison of words from the population of all words, so to speak, we will make use not only of the volunteer words that present themselves without any effort on our part but will also call forth and search out for military service the words that lie in hiding (II, 52-3, cf. I, 4.).

Fronto compliments Marcus Aurelius, *Scis verba quaerere* ("You know how to search out words") (II, 78).

What were Fronto, Marcus Aurelius and others of their Roman contemporaries searching for and for what purpose? The answer is provided a few words after the short passage just quoted, "You know how to imbue words with the authentic patina of antiquity." The result is a list of approved stylistic models that is peculiar by any standards other than those of the second century: Marcus Cato, Sallust, Plautus, Ennius, L. Coelius, Naevius, Lucretius, Accius, Caecilius and Laberius (I, 4; cf. II, 4). It will seem no less peculiar to most people that Fronto's pupil Marcus Aurelius should have spent time making

---

[15] All references to Fronto's *Letters* are to the volume and page number of the Loeb edition of Haines 1919.

extracts, presumably lexical, from Atellan farces; and that he should have declared that as far as he was concerned Horace was dead and buried and not to be mentioned again.[16]

Fronto's protegé Gellius practised the cult of rare, old-fashioned words no less than did his mentor, whose knowledge of recherché vocabulary impressed the younger man.[17] Although Gellius' more conventional attitude is evident in his high regard for Cicero and Vergil (e. g. 10. 3 and 5. 12), he nevertheless turns repeatedly to preclassical authors for their lexical and grammatical diversity: to Pomponius' Atellan farces, Laberius' mimes, the histories of Claudius Quadrigarius and Sallust and Lucretius' verse. In these and other writers such as Plautus, Ennius and Naevius, Gellius found "as it were the contrasting glitter and darkness of faint antiquity," "the venerable flavour of antiquity" and a description marked by the "simple and unadorned charm of the ancient literary style."[18]

Gellius' account of a day spent in the company of Julius Celsinus at the house of their mutual friend Julius Paulus provides a lively picture of second-century word-hunting (19. 7). Their day together includes a reading of the erotic poetry of the pre-classical writer Laevius. As Gellius and Celsinus are returning to Rome at the end of the day, they discuss novel and notable figures of speech and lexical practice that they have observed in Laevius and commit them to memory for later recall (cf. Gel. Preface 2-3; see p. 44). Only the most determined archaizers would be concerned to store away for future use such deviations from classical Latin idiom as *obesus* in its "proper" sense rather than its customary sense, as a synonym for *exilis* or *gracilentus*; "for the masses *akurôs* (without authority) and *kata antiphrasin* (by contrarieties) use the word *obesus* in conversation for *uber* and *pinguis*." To their credit, they reject as too poetic such Laevian monstrosities as *subductisupercilicarptores* ("eyebrow-raising supercilious carpers").

The quest for the purity of antique Latin is what led Hadrian to prefer Cato to Cicero and Ennius to Vergil. It accounts for Gellius'

[16] I, 138. Horace is the only classical poet mentioned by Fronto in the extant *Letters* (I, 122). Gellius (6. 4) represents Fronto quoting Vergil.

[17] Gel. 2. 26, 13. 29, 19. 8 and 19. 10.

[18] The quoted phrases: Gel 10. 3. 15, 12. 4. 3, 9. 13. 4; the preclassical writers: e. g. 10. 24. 5, 6. 9. 3, 9. 1, 10. 21, 16. 5. 7.

preference for the Atellan farces of Pomponius and the mimes of Laberius rather than, for instance, the colloquial eloquence that Cicero and Horace admired in Terence. "The simple and unadorned charm of the ancient literary style" and the "studied creation of new words" repeatedly take Gellius to the historical works of Claudius Quadrigarius and Sallust (9. 13 and 4. 15). Similarly, Lucretius' bold, innovative eloquence appeals to Gellius and his contemporaries.[19]

A substantially reduced list of references to such idiosyncratic preclassical and unclassical writers as Sallust and Lucretius could easily be compiled for Apuleius.[20] It would be misleading, however; for unlike Fronto and Gellius, Apuleius has subtly and often whimsically woven his literary preferences into the texture of his varied works instead of making *ex cathedra* pronouncements of literary propriety (see p. 247). Nevertheless, the second-century pattern of looking back beyond Cicero and Vergil for validation is as pronounced in him as in his contemporaries. As Marache has observed, he commends such orators and writers as Marcus Cato, C. Gracchus and Sallust, all of whom are highly regarded by the linguistic archaists Fronto and Gellius (*Apol.* 95.5).[21] Similarly, like Gellius, he ignores Terence and finds *sententiae* instead in Afranius (*Apol.* 12. 6); he excludes Horace and cites in his place Lucilius (*Fl.* 21. 4); and while for Apuleius as for Gellius Vergil is the greatest Latin poet, nevertheless the archaistic sensibilities of Apuleius' contemporaries would have appreciated that the longest quotation in the *Apology* comes from Ennius instead of Ovid's ichthyological *Halieutica* (39. 12; cf. 13. 1). Marache appears to be justified in maintaining that Apuleius received from Rome "tout prêt" the literary Pantheon constructed by Fronto and Gellius.

Equally importantly, Apuleius, like Fronto and Gellius, focuses on individual words. Indeed, so did the audiences for his speeches (*Fl.* 9. 7-8; see pp. 20, 29). Fronto is equally sensitive to the need to choose words scrupulously, an obligation felt by those who have bound themselves "slavishly to serve the ears of the learned" (I, 7).

---

[19] E. g. 1. 21. 5 and 10. 26. 9. Cf. Suet. *Gram.* 10. 7, Brugnoli (ed.): *Sallustii...audaciam in translationibus.*

[20] The critical editions of Apuleius' philosophical works by Thomas (ed.) 1908 and Moreschini (ed.) 1991 provide a running record of Apuleius' literary borrowings. See also Thomas 1900: 499-512, Barra 1961-2: 77-8, Marache 1952: 321-34 and below, nn. 29 and 32.

[21] Marache 1952: 321-34.

Apuleius also takes delighted pride in coining technical terms (*Apol.* 38. 5; see p. 14). Like both Fronto and Gellius, he scours earlier works for the precise technical term (*Soc.* 15. 152). His self-consciousness about choice of words is also evident in his apology for the neologisms that a technical subject has necessitated (*Pl.* 1. 9. 200; see p. 14). Verbal fabrication and lexical validation regularly take Apuleius back to early writers, especially Plautus. The contrived, scholastic nature of this process is patent in most of his extant works. Even in the *Golden Ass*, where he performs the exercise whimsically, it is not out of place to describe the process as having a "tonalité artificielle," albeit with "le sourire complice du narrateur," what in English could be called the professors' game.[22]

Stylistic Canons

At a time of state chairs of literature and learning and a perceived need to turn to earlier writers to authenticate words and even thought, "la littérature est une littérature de professeurs," "la lecture est ici encore l'instrument de culture" and "l'enseignement antique repose sur le livre, parfois simplement sur le manuel ou le code."[23] The process of Greek stylistic codification that was to become the pervasive influence on second-century belles-lettres actually began in Rome at the time of Augustus in the various Greek treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Caecilius of Sicilian Caleacte. Though himself a native of the region that he blames for the demise of Atticism, Dionysius devotes himself to counteracting the insidious invasion of "Asianism," the stylistic excesses of the oratory of "Mysia or Phrygia or some Carian miasma."[24]

However, "time is the best healer not only of just men, as Pindar says, but also of cultural endeavours and every other type of worthy pursuit as is proved by our age..., which has restored to the ancient and learned art of rhetoric the honour that is its due."[25] Dionysius attributes the "healing" of literary taste to the pre-eminence of Rome, whose officials are educated and who in turn reward the educated of

---

[22] Callebat 1968: 549-50; cf. Suet. *Gram.* 30. 3, quoted above, n. 13.
[23] Bompaire 1958: 107, 37 and 39.
[24] *Orat. Vett.* 1. 1. 7. See also the Glossary compiled by Roberts (ed.) 1910 s. v. *pinos*.
[25] D. H. praef. *Orat. Vett.*

the various cities of the Roman Empire and force the ignorant to behave sensibly. He sees his mission as the endeavour to consolidate the sound literary taste and judgment that have just reasserted themselves. To this end he considers which ancient, i. e., classical orators and prose writers are worthy of imitation: the orators Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus followed by Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines; and the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus. Aspiring orators and writers achieve stylistic perfection by imitating these Atticist orators and prose writers of classical Greece down to the time of Alexander the Great.

Dionysius has described his objective precisely:

> ...so that for those who choose to be good writers and speakers there will be good, approved, canonical models on which they can base their exercises (*Th.* 1).

Also:

> This I have done in the essays...on the subject of imitation. The first of these contains an abstract enquiry into the nature of imitation. The second asks which particular poets and philosophers, historians and orators, should be imitated....In the second I write as follows concerning Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus, these being the writers whom I select as most suitable for imitation.[26]

The same canonizing tendency is to be supposed in the case of the now lost Greek work of Dionysius' contemporary Caecilius of Sicilian Caleacte, *On the Ten Attic Orators*. He, too, was active in Rome.

Two generations later the Roman educational authority Quintilian acknowledges canons of ten orators (10. 1. 75), ten painters (12. 10. 4-6) and ten sculptors (12. 10. 7-9). He refers to other canons as well: the canon of epic poets established by the Hellenistic literary critics Aristarchus and Aristophanes (10. 1. 54) and canons of elegists (10. 1. 58), of writers of iambics (10. 1. 59) and of models of language either included in or excluded from canons established by teachers of grammar (1. 4. 3). During the same generation but slightly earlier at the time of Nero, Encolpius, the first-person narrator of the *Satyricon*, charges that the professor in his ivory tower (*umbraticus doctor*) had

---

[26] Translated by Roberts (ed.) 1901: 105.

not yet destroyed the natural talent of pupils at the time of "Pindar and the [other] nine lyric poets." He refers to the formulaic pairing of Plato and Demosthenes as models of prose and criticizes an audacious Egyptian manual designed, apparently, to teach a paint-by-numbers method of replicating paintings (2. 4-5 and 9). It is probably not coincidental that Volcatius Sedigitus near the end of the second century B. C. compiled a canon of ten Latin comic playwrights (Gel. 15. 24).

Lucian is on record as despising formulaic short cuts to the acquisition of authorized Attic diction (see p. 49). However, even this inveterate enemy of artifice takes it for granted that successful writers must imitate the ancient, i. e., classical models (*How to Write History* 34). Similarly, he takes it for granted that the butt of his satire in the *Ignorant Book Collector* will possess copies of such canonical authors as the philosophers Plato and Antisthenes, the orator Aeschines, "the orators," the comic playwrights Aristophanes and Eupolis and the iambic poet Archilochus (27).[27] When Lucian turns for a moment from castigating Lexiphanes' search for easy methods of mastering Attic diction, he recommends the conventional prose models Thucydides and Plato (*Lexiphanes* 22). In the *Professor of Rhetoric* predictable recommendations of prose models include Isocrates, Plato and "some of the others" (9 and 17). As Bompaire has remarked, vague formulas such as "some of the others" and "the best of poets" (*Lex.* 22) imply canons.[28] In any case, we can be certain that when Petronius and Lucian hold a practice up to ridicule, it has become a pretentious fad.

It is appropriate but not altogether valid to compare Apuleius' recourse to ancient Latin writers with the practices of his contemporaries Fronto and Gellius (see p. 52). His literary preferences are embedded in a variety of literary productions ranging from a seemingly comical baroque novel to philosophical manuals and extracts of speeches, and there is only rarely the occasion for him to expound professorially on questions of literary propriety and preference. In the little that survives of Fronto's once vast literary output and in the case of Gellius we encounter pronouncement rather than practice.

Apuleius' use of literary allusion is complex, usually whimsical and often intentionally humorous, therefore defying simple statistical

---

[27] Cf. e. g. D. H. *Th.* 51, *Dem.* 55-7 and Quint. *Decl.* 12. 10. 19, 23 and 65 and 10. 1. 59.

[28] Bompaire 1958: 144; see also 86-91 and 136-47.

analysis.[29] As Helm recognized, Apuleius' wry display of erudition in the assizes courtroom in Sabrata is typical of the Greek literary and intellectual tone of the Greek Second Sophistic.[30] The Latin archaists held Ennius in high regard. Apuleius shares this estimation. The longest literary passage quoted in the *Apology* is from Ennius (39. 12). Just as Plato is summoned in support of the defence (*Apol.* 65. 8), so Ennius is invoked to aid the respondent (*Apol.* 39). In an earlier instance of turning to Plato's support Apuleius seems to recognize that he is trying the judge's and his opponents' patience by digressing on Platonic love (*has quoque appendices defensionis meae*) and calls upon Ennius in support of Plato:

> Therefore, pardon the philosopher Plato for his erotic verse so that I do not feel it necessary to philosophize at great length in violation of the sentiment expressed by Ennius' character Neoptolemus (13. 3).

To judge by Aulus Gellius (5. 15 and 16), Ennius' character's disdain of fruitless, "academic" philosophizing became proverbial (see p. 31). As on this occasion, Apuleius next invokes Ennius as an orthodox predecessor in the pursuit of seemingly unorthodox knowledge (*Apol.* 39).[31] He also manages to find precedents in Vergil, Theocritus, Homer, Orpheus and Laevius as authorities on aphrodisiacs (*Apol.* 30).

Already near the end of the first century Tacitus regrets that many of his contemporaries read Lucilius instead of Horace and Lucretius instead of Vergil (*Dial.* 2. 32). Apuleius' many citations of Lucretius in the philosophical *opuscula*, especially the *On the God of Socrates*, are consistent both with the archaizing tendencies of the second century and with Lucretius' authority as a philosopher. Two pages chosen at random in Thomas' critical edition of the philosophical works contain citations of Vergil, Lucretius and Sallust, the last two of whom were

---

[29] Gatscha 1898: 140-58; for the *Apology* see Helm 1955: 100-5; for the *Golden Ass* see Chapter Six; for the philosophical opuscula see Thomas (ed.) 1908 and Moreschini (ed.) 1991.

[30] Helm 1955.

[31] At *Soc.* 3. 121 and 5. 131 and *Mun.* 33. 363 Ennian verse is cited as ornate but integral parts of the arguments. In the *Golden Ass* (10. 33. 4) Apuleius makes a similar, self-imposed retreat from philosophizing, this time with a parting wave of recognition to Plautus' play *Pseudolus*.

favourites of the Latin archaizers.[32] A recent writer has drawn attention to Apuleius' complex combination of Lucretian and Vergilian evocation near the beginning of the tale of Cupid and Psyche in the *Golden Ass*. As he puts it, "Apuleius, like Nabokov, believes in keeping his readers busy."[33]

A single extract from Fronto will underscore his and Apuleius' similar archaizing literary preferences:

> Wherefore few indeed of our old writers have surrendered themselves to the toil, pursuit, and hazard of seeking outwards with special diligence. M. Porcius [Cato] alone of the orators of all time, and his constant imitator C. Sallustius, are among these; of poets Plautus especially, and most especially Q. Ennius and his zealous rival L. Coelius, not to omit Naevius and Lucretius, Accius, too, and Caecilius, also Laberius.[34]

It is even more evident in Gellius that the Latin archaizers were on occasion engaged in a pedantic enterprise. He concedes that Fronto's discourse on a point of lexical propriety was "undoubtedly on a trivial matter" but insists that it "was not in any case unrelated to the serious study of the Latin language" (19. 8. 2). The blinkered pedant is evident in his perusal of several old manuscripts of Quintus Claudius to verify a minor point of grammar (9. 14. 2-4). The rest of the essay is a gallery of the antique Latin writers venerated by the archaists of the second century: Ennius, Marcus Cato, Lucilius, Sisenna, Pacuvius, Gaius Gracchus and Sallust. Similarly, he explains a point of lexical preference in Cicero by referring to Marcus Cato, Sallust and Varro (10. 21). The pedantic nature of Gellius' lexical enquiries surfaces again when he concedes that the meaning of the word that he is discussing would be unknown to most of his contemporaries (9. 12. 4). This is underscored by the very fact of his repeatedly commending the lexical innovation of Sallust, who was criticised as early as the first century B. C. for being archaic.[35]

---

[32] Thomas (ed.) 1908: 150 and 160. This is not to deny that Apuleius cites Vergil almost as many times as he cites all other poets quoted or named in his works; see Gatscha 1898: 142-7. In general see Mattiaci 1986: 159-200.

[33] Horsfall 1982: 41.

[34] I have quoted the translation of Haines (ed.) 1919: I, 5.

[35] E. g. Gel. 1. 15. 18 and 4. 15; Sallust criticised as archaic: Suet. *Gram* 10, Brugnoli (ed.). In general see Marache 1952: 203-45 and Jocelyn 1988:

Fronto, Aulus Gellius and Apuleius had a shared educational and intellectual background. It consisted in part of an obsessive devotion to a select group of authorized earlier writers who, with the exceptions of Vergil and Cicero, had already come to be judged by others as outdated. In addition to the positive evidence presented above, there is the equally telling omission from their registers of such canonical literary figures as Horace, who in the words of Fronto's pupil Marcus Aurelius "is as dead as Pollio."[36]

To turn to the Greek world for a moment, Householder's statistics show that the major Greek writers of the second century regularly rely on a very narrowly circumscribed canon of authorities when quoting or paraphrasing earlier writers.[37] His tables encompass the practices of Lucian and, individually, fourteen other major Greek writers and writings of the period such as Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch and material contained in the three volumes of *Rhetores Graeci* edited by Spengel (1853-56). In spite of great differences of genre and subject among the fifteen compared groups, the range of earlier authorities is remarkably consistent. Lucian turns to Homer 488 times, representing a first-place score of 55 per cent of all the sources quoted or paraphrased by him. Lucian's fourteen contemporaries also turn most frequently to Homer, quoting or paraphrasing him to the extent that he represents 48 per cent of all their quotations or allusions. The same "top" fourteen classical authorities comprise 85.72 per cent in Lucian and 81.35 per cent of the total in the other fourteen writers and writings of the period.

Citations of, or allusions to, Homer common to both Apuleius and second-century Greek belles-lettres underscore the cultural uniformity of the Latin West and the Greek East that I have been trying to delineate. At *Apology* 22. 5 Apuleius quotes *Odyssey* 19. 172 in the slightly altered form contrived by the Cynic philosopher Crates. The same (unaltered) passage is quoted in illustration of a stylistic feature discussed in the anonymous Greek work *On Style*, and Aelius Aristides

---

57-72.

[36] Haines (ed.) 1919: I, 5. Most of the allusions to Horace in Apuleius claimed by Gatscha 1898: 149-50 are not convincing.

[37] Householder 1941. See also Anderson 1993: 69-85.

quotes it.[38] Still in the *Apology* (31. 5-9), there is a nexus of Homeric quotations and allusions that turn up in a number of Greek authors of the second century: *Odyssey* 4. 220 ff. = Lucian, *Alex.* 5; *Odyssey* 4. 220 ff., 22. 19 ff. and 22. 234 ff. = Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.*, 1. 164, Athenaeus 5. 190-91 and (in the first century B. C.) Diodorus Siculus 1. 97. 7; both Apuleius (*Apol.* 31. 7) and Maximus of Tyre (1. 1 c) illustrate a point by referring to *Odyssey* 4. 455 ff.; the passage quoted from the *Iliad* (3. 65-6) at *Apology* 4. 4 is also cited by Dio Chrysostom (30. 8). In the philosophical works, the reference to Homer, *Iliad* 1. 245 ff., in the *On the God of Socrates* also turns up in an anonymous Greek rhetorical treatise, Dio Chrysostom (2. 20 and 57. 18) and Aelius Aristides (30. 19).[39] Apuleius (*Soc.* 11. 145), Maximus of Tyre (4. 8 d), Aelius Aristides (30. 19) and Dio Chrysostom (21. 17) all quote or paraphrase the passage in the *Iliad* (1. 193-214) where Athena intervenes to check Achilles' anger. Finally, there is the quotation of the *Odyssey* (6. 425) in the *On the Universe* (33. 362-3) that also appears in two Greek rhetorical treatises.[40]

Both Trapp and De Lacy have explained that Plato held a place similar to that of Homer in what Trapp calls "the 'cultural syllabus' of Hellenic *paideia*."[41] An appreciation of this kind of uniformity of conditioned thought in both the Greek East and the Latin West helps to understand Apuleius within the cultural context of the second century.

Bibliomania

A corollary of scholastically conditioned reliance on earlier authorities is the creation of canons, which in turn lead to provision of compendia and commonplace books. As Bompaire has explained, "La lecture est ici encore l'instrument de culture," and, "On voit que...l'enseignement antique repose sur le livre, parfois simplement sur le manuel ou le

---

[38] Spengel (ed.) 1853-56: III, 287. 10-11, Aristid. 27. 8. In tracking down the citations of Homer in Dio Chrysostom, Maximus of Tyre and Aelius Aristides I have benefitted greatly from the tables of Kindstrand 1973.

[39] Spengel (ed.) 1853-56: III, 153. 3.

[40] Spengel (ed.) 1853-56: III, 98. 5 and 169. 5.

[41] Trapp 1990: 141, De Lacy 1974: 4-10. See p. 22.

code" (see p. 53).[42] Thus the Greek sophist Philemon advised that the budding sophist should read prose authors by the armful and verse writers by the wagonful; the sophist Proclus of Naucratis set himself up in Athens as a book agent; and Favorinus bequeathed his collection of books to Herodes Atticus, who was the kind of man who "had everything."[43] Towards the end of his *Ignorant Book Collector* (26) Lucian's attitude softens towards the previous butt of his sarcasm, "'You have become really learned and deeply educated through your large collection of books.'" At a time when scarcely a word could be uttered without someone else's authority, it comes as no surprise that there was an authority on which books should be acquired, Philo of Byblos' twelve-volume *The Acquisition and Choice of Books*.[44]

Bibliomania was no less feverish in the Latin West during the second century. The reliance of even creative writers on books is evident as early as the times of Catullus and Ovid.[45] Cicero prepared for his philosophical writings by reading in the private libraries of friends.[46] Rome, too, had an ignorant book collector. Strabo reports that Neleus of Scepsis inherited Theophrastus' library, which included that of the latter's mentor Aristotle, who is reputed to have been the first collector of books in the classical world.[47] Neleus' heirs were ignorant people and stored them carelessly. They were bought in their damaged condition by Apellicon of Teos, "a bibliophile rather than a philosopher," who restored them inexpertly. Sulla seized them when he captured Athens and in this way they became available to the grammarian Tyrannion, who helped Cicero procure and consult Greek books.

The pages of Gellius' *Attic Nights* present vivid descriptions of fervent Roman bibliomania at the time of Apuleius. I have already described the frantic obsession that compelled Gellius to purchase

---

[42] Bompaire 1958: 37 and 39.

[43] Philostr. *VS* 539, 604 and 490. I owe the references to Bompaire 1958: 106.

[44] Bompaire 1958: 106.

[45] Catul. 68. 31-2; Ov. *Tr.* 1. 1. 105-6, 1. 17. 19-20, 3. 14. 37-8, *Pont.* 4. 2. 29-30.

[46] Cic. *de Orat.* 1. 44. 195, *Tusc.* 2. 2. 6, *Fam.* 7. 28. 2. I owe these references and the ones in the following note to Marshall 1976: 252-64.

[47] Str. 13. 1. 54; see, too, Ath. 1. 3 a-b and 5. 214 d-e, Plu. *Sull.* 26. 1 and Cic. *Att.* 4. 4 a and *Q. fr.* 3. 4. 5.

against his will and better judgment a number of cheap, neglected Greek books that were distasteful to him in appearance, the equally distasteful contents of which he compulsively skimmed during the next two nights (9. 4. 1-5).[48] Gellius also frequented second-hand book shops, sought second-hand books "of venerable antiquity" in the company of learned friends and was a regular visitor to Rome's public libraries where he searched out books of greatly advanced age.[49]

Apuleius refers only twice to libraries. He insists on the possibility of his books being read in one of the libraries of Carthage, which was endowed with public libraries by the Roman Senate soon after its destruction in 146 B. C. (*Fl.* 18. 8-9; Plin. *Nat.* 18. 22-3).[50] On the other occasion and again in the context of his native North Africa Apuleius implies that his boorish opponents would be willing to seize copies of Aristotle's works from libraries and from students' hands (*Apol.* 41. 4; see p. 18).

In spite of his minimal acknowledgement of libraries all of Apuleius' literary output has the air of deriving from erudite studies. Even his one fictional work, the *Golden Ass*, is an at least partial adaptation of a previously published Greek work (see chapter 6). One would expect his *Apology* to adhere to the constraints of the court room and the overriding objective of self-preservation. Even on this occasion, however, when his life was at stake, "Apulée voit la réalité à travers les livres."[51] He tries to minimize the damage to his case contained in his wife's written statement that he was a magician by citing the legendary example of Phaedra that women disguise their true feelings, "Was Phaedra the only woman to have written a false *billet doux*?" (79. 1). However unflattering the association would be to his wife, Apuleius cannot resist resorting to the scholastically sanctioned

---

[48] I believe that Jocelyn 1988: 66 is mistaken in claiming that "one look at Pliny, *Nat.* 7. 9-12 (actually 7. 2. 9-12) shows Gellius' story of a find of old Greek books in a Brindisi market...to have been a complete invention." Pliny does not mention finding books at Brindisi, and the only point of contact between the two passages is that they describe the same Scythian mirabilia.

[49] Second-hand book shops and books: 2. 3. 5, 5. 4. 1, 16. 11. 3 and 18. 5. 11; public libraries: 9. 14. 3, 11. 17. 1, 13. 20. 1 and 16. 8. 2.

[50] The passage in Pliny's *Natural History* is the only extant literary evidence of libraries in Carthage during the Hellenistic period (323-30 B. C.); see Krings 1991: 653-4.

[51] Vallette 1908: 161.

example par excellence.

Bompaire has effectively demonstrated the compelling force that scholastic tradition had on Lucian:

> *Solon et Diogène, l'Hyperboreen et le Brahmane s'y rencontrent plus souvent que les sénateurs romains. Si un sophiste ou un philosophe rival apparaît, on lui trouvera plus de traits de Protagoras ou de Pythagore que de substance contemporaine....En outre, dans sa totalité, le monde dont Lucien pose les problèmes et peint les passions est un univers de bibliothèque.*[52]

In Apuleius, Diogenes is twice called to the stand in a court room presided over by a Roman proconsul in one of the most westerly regions of the Roman Empire and was on at least one occasion the subject of one of Apuleius' public orations in the distant Latin West; both Pythagoras and the Brahmins appear together in another of Apuleius' public addresses, where the verb *comperio* savours of the "univers de bibliothèque."[53] Bompaire is concerned to situate Lucian within the Greek scholastic traditions of the second century and therefore rarely takes account of what Latin writers of the same period were up to. Thus it is all the more significant that Apuleius resorts to the same ossified conventions as Bompaire is able to isolate in Lucian and such contemporary Greek writers as Dio Chrysostom, Aelian and Maximus of Tyre.

Bompaire's conclusion that the Greek writers of the time were slavishly adhering to the lessons of writing and speech manuals is well documented and can be extended to include Apuleius as well.[54] Indeed, Stock claims that Apuleius "Graecorum exempla secutus declamationum artem in praefationibus accurate imitatus est." ("[Apuleius] used Greek declamations as his models and in the introductory speeches closely imitated their methods.")[55] One type of introductory speech went under the name lalia or prolalia, that is, a somewhat informal talk, a kind of lead-in or warm-up to the main

---

[52] Bompaire 1958: 161.

[53] *Apol.* 9. 11 and 22. 7-8, *Fl.* 14 and 15; *comperio*: *Fl.* 15. 13.

[54] Bompaire 1958: 163. For the rigid conformity to a prescribed range of topics on the part of both Greek and Roman declaimers see Russell 1983: 106-7.

[55] Stock 1911: 68.

speech.[56] A Greek rhetorical treatise of the third or fourth century attributed, probably falsely, to Menander Rhetor (to distinguish him from the writer of Greek New Comedy) includes among its precepts on epideictic ("display") speeches a section dealing with the lalia.[57] Recommended topics for this type of speech include famous lyre and flute players, prophets, artists (possibly actors), mountains and streams. In their commentary on the passage Reynolds and Wilson remark that "M[enander] here recommends the use of what is really primary grammatical knowledge...: lists of musicians, artists, prophets, mountains, rivers, and so on. Handbooks of such things were universal."[58] These scholastically sanctioned themes turn up in Apuleius' *Florida*. He dutifully cites Orpheus and Arion as traditional examples of lyre players (*Fl.* 17. 17). Greek flute players step forth in two of the *Florida* (3 and 4). *Florida* 3 provides an extended account of the Pythagorean fable of the victory of Apollo's lyre over the ill-bred Marsyas' flute. According to Philostratus, this was a hackneyed subject (*VS* 574). Famous artists receive their due in *Florida* 4 and 16. Both *Florida* 4, in praise of India, including the Ganges River, and *Florida* 15, which celebrates the island of Samos, are geographical excursuses in the tradition of praise of mountains and rivers. In the passage cited above Philostratus implies that this kind of discourse was also hackneyed. Pythagoras' instruction in astrology corresponds to Menander Rhetor's recommendation that prophets be mentioned in certain types of informal speeches (*Fl.* 15. 17).

Cultural Canons

Bompaire also observes that the same heroic figures are met in Lucian, Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, Maximus of Tyre and Aelian and that this is an unmistakable sign that Greek writers of the second century were relying on manuals and handbooks.[59] No one even only slightly familiar with the retrograde literary tendencies of Greek writers of the period will be surprised that Alexander the Great and his

---

[56] The use in classical antiquity of the technical terms "lalia" and "prolalia" is uncertain; see Nesselrath 1990: 111-2.

[57] Available most conveniently now in Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981; on the date of the treatise see pp. xxxix-xl. See also Bompaire 1958: 162-3.

[58] Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 392.

[59] Bompaire 1958: 163.

famous Greek predecessors appear frequently in the authors just named. Dio Chrysostom's apology for discussing Nero and other "modern" and unfashionable topics, unlike the intelligentsia, who "even now" focus on Cyrus and Alcibiades, serves only to underscore the tendency (D.Chr. 21. 11). Even in the Latin educational system Alexander forms part of the cultural syllabus studied by orators in training as early as the first half of the first century. He opens the elder Seneca's collection of *Suasoriae* (*On Speeches of Persuasion*): "Alexander Considers Whether to Sail the Ocean," and appears in the fourth model speech of the collection: "Alexander the Great...Considers Whether to Enter Babylon." Also in the Latin tradition and of approximately the same period as Seneca's rhetorical reminiscences is Valerius Maximus' *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, a kind of compendium compiled to the end that "the toil of long research will be eliminated for those wishing to consult records." Alexander repeatedly finds a place in the Index Nominum et Rerum prepared by the editor T. Kempf (1888). Some twenty-five of the known Greek declamations on historical subjects deal with Alexander. A rhetorical exercise preserved on papyrus and belonging to the third century B. C. takes up a deliberative stance against Alexander. At the other end of the chronological spectrum, in the sixth century, Choricus of Gaza develops a *dialexis*, an informal preliminary speech having much in common with the *lalia* with which we began, on Alexander's refusal to allow himself to be portrayed except by artists authorized by him to do so.[60] Under the heading "How Great Is the Influence of the Arts" Valerius Maximus records the same tradition for Latin orators in search of short cuts to illustrative anecdotes (8. 11. 2). One such orator was Apuleius. His *Florida* 7 recounts the story in a garbled, chronologically impossible version, which in itself suggests that he consulted a compendium rather than one of the fuller, authoritative historical sources.

Of the heroic intellectual figures in Lucian, Pythagoras plays a particularly dominant role.[61] Bompaire, astutely remarking that the Peripatetic school produced both the *On the Pythagoreans* and the *Rhetoric*, also isolates the rhetorical elements that became regular components of the legend of Pythagoras: his quarrel with the tyrant

---

[60] Russell 1983: 4, 78 and 107.

[61] Bompaire 1958: 174-80.

Polycrates, his travels to Egypt and Persia in search of arcane knowledge, his studies with the Brahmins, Gymnosophists and Chaldeans (astrologers) of India and the injunction to maintain silence. Plato's apocryphal journey to Egypt in pursuit of the knowledge that Pythagoras had acquired there, his trip to Italy to study with Pythagoreans and his pursuit of Indian and Egyptian lore regularly become adjuncts to the Pythagorean legend. A similar sequence of personalities and events appears in Valerius Maximus' vade mecum for aspiring orators (8. 7. 2-3). Again, one such orator is Apuleius. Part of his *Florida* 15 in conjunction with his *On Plato and His Doctrine* (1. 3. 186-7) retraces these commonplace details.

Alexander the Great and heroic intellectual figures merge in the person of Diogenes the Cynic and his associate Crates. Diogenes' aggressive asceticism and his contempt of Alexander's status became the stuff of countless diatribes. Juvenal *declamans* was confident that his readers would recognize their celebrated confrontation in the allusive statement:

> Alexander realized this when he saw residing in that famous jar the great inhabitant who desired nothing and was so much more blessed than he who sought the entire world for himself and was about to undergo dangers the equal of the deeds that he had already accomplished (14. 311-4).

Valerius Maximus' handbook of oratorical themes makes the point succinctly: "Alexander, who had acquired the cognomen 'Undefeated,' was unable to defeat the asceticism of Diogenes the Cynic" (4. 2. 4). Dio Chrysostom uses their encounter as the lead-in to his "Fourth Discourse on Kingship" and speaks of "many writers on the subject" (1). In one of his moralizing diatribes Maximus of Tyre also pronounces Diogenes to be more noble than Alexander (36. 6).

These references could easily be multiplied.[62] The paradigm of Diogenes' contempt of riches and of conventional respect for status became a familiar component of the standardized curriculum of Greco-Roman culture. Diogenes' outward badges of his philosophical stand—his *pera* (purse), staff and "residential" jar— were invoked by graduates of this curriculum as instinctively as Gray's *Elegy in a Country Church Yard* has been cited during the last two centuries of

---

[62] See for instance the commentary of J. E. B. Mayor (London, 1886) on Juv. 14. 311-4 and, on Lucian, Bompaire 1958: 183-5.

pulpit oratory. Because of his training in public speaking and his Athenian education, Apuleius, when answering charges that he was an impoverished gold-digger, produces time-worn examples of ennobling poverty (*Apol.* 17-23). In boasting that he can produce a *controversia* (imaginary debate) on the subject, he acknowledges their scholastic derivation (*Apol.* 20. 1). Inevitably, Diogenes and Crates figure among them, which seems to cause Apuleius some embarrassment since he aligns himself with Platonists elsewhere in his defence. (*Apol.* 22. 7).

It is particularly significant for our immediate purposes that Apuleius' commonplaces span both classical cultures. Before elaborating on the examples of Diogenes and Crates he itemizes a few well known paradigms of impoverished national heroes from both the Greek and the Roman worlds. Like Valerius Maximus, he begins his list with the familiar proverb that the man who desires nothing has enough (*Apol.* 20. 2, V. Max. 4. 4). Their catalogues overlap in the persons of Valerius Publicola, Atilus Regulus, Cn. Scipio and Fabricius. Seneca structures his list of the familiar national embodiments of enriching poverty in the two cultures in the same way (*Consolatio ad Helviam* 11. 4-7). In the same passage he takes down from the shelf of *tout-prêts* lists the record of the insignificant number of slaves possessed by Homer, Plato and Zeno. Apuleius is equally adept at this routine strategy (*Apol.* 17). He has constructed his arguments from the speech-by-number manuals of the Greek and Latin rhetorical schools. The procedures that he employs are included in Valerius Maximus' rhetorical manual, Seneca's *Consolatio ad Helviam*, a genre that is notorious for its reliance on rhetorical *loci communes*, and, finally, Cicero's observation that conventional consolations for poverty include the formulaic examples of Socrates, Fabricius and Diogenes.[63]

I noted at the outset of this discussion of the appearance of the same heroic figures in the Greek speeches and prose writings of the second century Bompaire's conclusion that this standardization is a sign of scholasticism and the use of manuals. This is confirmed for the Latin West by the conjunction of the same figures of the distant Roman past in Apuleius' *Apology* and Valerius Maximus' rhetorical vade mecum. Apuleius' grounding in Greek culture also induces him to incorporate the heroic figures of Greece's classical period that are encountered

---

[63] Vallette 1908: 148.

repeatedly in such Greek literary figures as Lucian, Dio Chrysostom and Maximus of Tyre. The theme of poverty generated as much effusiveness among second-century Greek writers as the associated theme of Diogenes' disdain of Alexander the Great's power and possessions.[64] Philostratus cites the manipulation of this theme as one of the essential qualities of the Second Sophistic (*VS* 481). Petronius' ridicule of the theme and its practitioner, the Greek rhetorician Agamemnon, suggests that it has become hackneyed as early as the time of Nero (48. 5). Apuleius seems to have his tongue firmly in his cheek when he begins his declamatory excursus by responding to the accusation of poverty as though he were delivering a cliché-ridden set-piece on the subject in a rhetorical classroom:

> "Indeed, I can produce for you a *controversia* (an imaginary debate) on the very word 'poverty,' to the effect that none of us is poor who does not want what is superfluous, who is in possession of the very fewest things decreed by nature to be necessary. He will have the most who desires the least, for the man who wants the least will have as much as he wants" (20. 1-2).

Bibliomania, which has its roots in post-classical Greece, dominates the intellectual affairs of life during the Second Sophistic. Scholastically sanctioned figures such as Solon, Diogenes and Brahmins appear in Lucian far more frequently than Roman public officials, and a contemporary sophist or a rival philosopher appearing in Lucian's works is far more likely to display traits of Protagoras or Pythagoras than contemporary substance (see p. 62). A glance at the Index Nominum of Helm's Teubner edition of the *Florida* reveals that the same bias prevails in Apuleius' speeches delivered in the Latin West. He addresses a Roman political figure in Carthage, one of the most westerly cities of the Roman Empire; but most of the speech is devoted to Philemon, a writer of Greek New Comedy, who is cited to authenticate an accident that happened to Apuleius as he was about to be honoured with a statue, an event that for a Greek sophist was the culmination of his career (*Fl.* 17).[65] So life imitates art. Similarly, the

---

[64] Russell 1983: 19 and 27-30, Vallette 1908: 129-57.

[65] See for instance [Dio Chrysostom], *Orations* 37 (actually a speech of Favorinus of Arles). The bookish derivation of the account of Philemon's death is confirmed in fragment 11 of Aelian's *On Providence*, ed. R. Hercher

world of books impinges on the court room at Sabrata, as Apuleius calls upon Alexander the Great, Diogenes, Crates and a host of other long-dead Greeks and Romans as character witnesses and acknowledges the Roman proconsul presiding over the trial principally as a fellow reader of Plato and Aristotle (see p. 21).

Literary Mimesis

The most striking ancient expression of the doctrine of literary *mimesis* (the imitation of classical models) is Horace's famous dictum:

> ....*Vos exemplaria Graeca/nocturna versate manu, versate diurna* (*Ars* 268-9) (Turn the pages of Greek models night and day).

The leading Greek educational and literary theorists of the Roman Imperial period promote literary imitation as the basis of the educational process. For Dionysius of Halicarnassus, at the very beginning of the period, the practical goal of his stylistic analysis of Thucydides is straightforward:

> ...so that for those who choose to be good writers and speakers there will be good, approved, canonical models on which they can base their exercises.[66]

Dionysius also devoted a more theoretical work of three volumes to the subject of literary imitation. This is now lost, but from references to it scattered in his surviving works and from a later epitome its doctrine can easily be inferred. He summarizes the second volume thus:

> The second volume deals with the question of which poets, philosophers, historians and orators one ought to imitate.[67]

A quotation from volume 1 introduces what can be called competitive imitation, "Imitation is an activity of the soul when it is inspired by

---

(Leipzig, 1858).

[66] *Th.* 1; see also 25 and *Din.* 8.

[67] *Pomp.* 3; see also *Th.* 1.

contemplation of apparent beauty".[68]

Quintilian, the major educational theorist in the Latin West, sometime in the last decade of the first century is equally confident of the importance of literary *mimesis* in the educational process, "It cannot be doubted that a great part of artistic creation resides in the imitation [of literary models]" (10. 2. 1). He, too, endorses competitive imitation, "I do not want the paraphrase to be only an interpretation but [rather] to rival and compete with the same sentiments" (10. 5. 5).

Quintilian's pupil, the younger Pliny, expresses what can be called the practitioner's rather than the theorist's view of literary *mimesis*, encapsulating for his friend Fuscus the methods of study to be followed in his retirement (*Ep*. 7. 9). In the first place and as many others have advised, he writes, it is useful to translate from Greek into Latin and vice versa. This exercise develops an appreciation of the inherent qualities and lustre of words and provides an abundance of figures of speech and forceful expressions; and in the course of imitating the best writers one acquires the faculty of imaginative approximation. Moreover, Pliny assures Fuscus, it does no harm to compare one's translation with the model in a spirit of competition. Many writers, he adds, have earned praise for undertaking this sort of rivalry; indeed, some, wishing only to equal their models, have surpassed them. Finally:

> The exercise is difficult and tedious, but the difficulty itself is the source of the reward that derives from a fresh rewarming, from resuming a stage of argument that has been broken or omitted and, finally, from incorporating new limbs, as it were, on to a completed body without disturbing the ones already in place.

Quintilian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus endorse the notion of imaginative approximation to and improvement of literary models. Like Pliny, Quintilian recommends the exercise of translating from Greek into Latin and of reworking Latin models in order to improve verbal expression in Latin. He observes that one can add oratorical strength to previously expressed sentiments, supply what has been

---

[68] Usener and Radermacher (ed.) 1904-29: 200; cf. *ibid*. 202, "The soul of the reader assimilates through repeated observation the character [of the models]."

omitted and eliminate what is superfluous (10. 5. 4). He adds:

> This is the mark of merit: to expand on what is naturally contracted, to augment what is jejune, to give variety to what is monotonous and charm to what is hackneyed and to speak effectively and at length about a few topics (10. 5. 11).

The well known story recounted by Dionysius in his *On Imitation* that the painter Zeuxis used the best qualities of five models to represent the perfect Helen is a clear indication that he recommended creative approximation to and improvement of literary models.[69]

I have already described the practitioner Apuleius' avowed and free-handed efforts to improve on such models as Aristotle and Theophrastus (see p. 13). At this point I want to emphasize Apuleius in the role of rhetorical theorist endorsing the principle of creative improvement promoted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian in the passages referred to in the previous paragraph:

> It is the mark of the outstanding orator to expand on restricted themes and to restrict expansive themes; [to present] vulgar themes decorously; new themes as though they were familiar, familiar themes as though they were new; to scale down great themes and to magnify what is of least consequence and to be able to accomplish many other things of this sort.[70]

Thus on both the practical and theoretical levels Apuleius works within the originally late-Greek and subsequently Latin tradition of culling, reworking and improving the "patrimoine littéraire représenté par les grands chefs-d'oeuvre."[71]

Translation

In this context, where we are considering a limited number of ancient educational goals and practices that have a direct bearing on the nature of Apuleius' literary output, it will not be out of place to add a few

---

[69] Usener and Radermacher (ed.) 1904-29: 203.

[70] *Log*. 1. 189. 9-190. 1. My translation is based on Goldbacher's widely accepted emendation of a patently corrupt portion of the passage. However, the absence of a contrasting complement of *vulgata decenter* ("vulgar themes decorously") suggests that the lacuna in the transmitted text is larger than accounted for in Goldbacher's correction.

[71] Bompaire 1958: 63.

details concerning the role of translation in the educational system to the comments made in the previous chapter (see p. 15). It is evident from some of Cicero's statements that translation from Greek to Latin played a major role in Roman rhetorical education.[72] In a fragment of his *On Rhetoricians* Suetonius confirms that at the time of Cicero teachers of rhetoric taught translation by example.[73] Apuleius' contemporary and compatriot Fronto, disappointed that his former pupil Marcus Aurelius is about to abandon the study of eloquence for that of philosophy, cautions the emperor that if he gives up his rhetorical studies he will also be giving up his exercises in translation; for *philosophia* is a subject *ubi...nihil de Graeca in nostram linguam pariter vertendum* ("where...nothing is to be translated accurately into our language").[74] Like his mentor Fronto, Gellius agrees that translating the philosophers Plato and Aristotle into Latin is very difficult if not impossible.[75] Free adaptation rather than translation of classical literary works and technical treatises was the standard practice in the schools during the Roman Imperial period, and consequently it comes as no surprise that Latin "translators" took great liberties with their Greek models.[76] Seneca encapsulates the practice of what can be called agglutinative adaptation:

> We ought to imitate bees and with the care and resources of our native intelligence blend together into a single flavour the various sips that we have taken from our diverse and distinct reading (for the components keep better when they are kept separate) so that even if the source of each individual sip is evident it will nevertheless [in combination] appear to be different from its source.[77]

---

[72] *De Orat.* 1. 155. See further D'Alton 1931: 429-37.

[73] Suet. *Gram.* 26. 1, Brugnoli (ed.).

[74] Haines (ed.) 1919: II, 82.

[75] 8. 8, 17. 20, 20. 5. 13. Cf. 11. 16 and his sensationalized retelling of Herodotus' tale of Arion and the dolphin (Gel. 16. 19 and Hdt. 1. 23).

[76] Greek "translators" also took liberties with their Latin models; see Fisher 1982: 173-215. Similarly, Arrian's *Encheiridion*, his résumé of his own *Discourses of Epictetus*, is a very free adaptation that would repay close study.

[77] *Ep.* 84. 5; repeated almost verbatim in Macr. praef. 5.

Compendia

This "sipping" takes place most readily if there is a concentration of "flowers," that is, anthologies. Indeed, there seems in the second century to have been a passion for all kinds of books, to judge by Philo of Byblos' twelve-volume work *The Choice and Acquisition of Books*, Lucian's squib the *Ignorant Book Collector* and Gellius' obsessive purchase and perusal of derelict, distasteful books (see pp. 47, 60). However, it is the compendium that lies at the centre of the *paideia* of the period. Even Lucian, the declared enemy of short cuts to specious learning, expresses his admiration for the compendium of Epicurus' philosophical doctrines, the *kuriai doxai*, "his magisterial opinions" (*Alex*. 47). Among the various works of Herodes Atticus known to Philostratus are "handbooks and epitomes containing in small compass the plucked flowers of classical learning" (*VS* 565). From the pen of Plutarch the so-called catalogue of Lamprias records some dozen doxographical *aide-mémoires*: two books of philosophical abstracts, a five-volume epitome of the physical doctrines of the various philosophical schools, a collection of Stoic contradictions, another of Stoic maxims, still another of Epicurean contradictions, extracts of the philosophical views of Epicureans and Stoics and so on.[78] Apuleius' summary of Platonic philosophy, the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, belongs to this tradition of compendia. His avowed intention to render Aristotle's zoological works more concise would have resulted in scientific compendia (*Apol*. 36. 6) (see Chapter One, p. 13). He wrote a now lost *Epitome of Histories*, and some of his no longer extant scientific works appear to have been epitomes (see p. 37).

The impulse to compose volumes of abstracts is described by a number of writers. In the Roman world, as early as the last quarter of the first century, the elder Pliny made extracts from close to 500 authorities, almost twice as many of them Greek as Latin, in compiling the thirty-seven volumes of his *Natural History*, which he equipped with an exhaustive table of contents to facilitate consultation by the

---

[78] Bompaire 1958: 350.

busy reader. In the preface he states that he has perused 2 000 volumes, most of them highly specialized and, because of their abstruseness, rarely consulted even by the *studiosi* (praef. 17). He adds that other "modern" writers have copied the earlier authorities word-for-word without the candour of Cicero or in the spirit of Vergil's brave attempt to rival his models (praef. 22). His nephew provides a famous description of his uncle's feverish activity as an excerptor, summarizing it thus, "He did not fail to take excerpts from anything that he read, and he used to say that no book is so bad that it cannot provide something of value," and adding that his uncle bequeathed to him a highly prized 160-volume commonplace book of excerpts (*Ep.* 3. 5). Macrobius, at the other end of the chronological spectrum, advertises his *Saturnalia* as a compendium of all that he has read in Greek and Latin and claims that having recourse to a compendium is to be preferred to wandering about in long-winded imbrogli (praef. 2).

Gellius' preface is instructive. From it we learn that commonplace books were not rare. This at any rate is the implication of his statement that he will be satisfied if the subjects of which he writes have not been recited repeatedly in schools or become hackneyed through publication in monographs. He is no less forthright about the shallowness of his enquiries. He has, he writes, provided only a taste of the subjects of which no respectable person can decently be ignorant whether or not they are useful. His trifling notices, however petty and frigid, are nevertheless capable of nurturing the zeal to study further and of delighting and warming the spirit. They contain the seeds from which ingrained intelligence will mature and thrive; memory will be better supported, discourse more skilled, speech purer and the pleasures of leisure and relaxation more humane. He has undertaken only to point out the path to learning that others must follow with the aid of books or teachers. As for the information that he has extracted and compiled, it is no better or worse than the authorities from whom he took it.

It should not be supposed from the last statement that the enterprise of producing compendia was altogether mindless and disreputable. Some of the great names of classical antiquity are associated with it. Aristotle's *Topics* has the avowed aim of providing a repertoire of dialectics. Cicero produced a Roman-based *Topics* and, in his youth, a compilation of formal logic, the *De Inventione*, that he was later to regret. While not one of the great names of classical antiquity, Menander Rhetor, of the late Roman Imperial period, is not out of

place here. His manual incorporates selected passages of canonical authors that orators are urged to include in their "paint-by-numbers" speeches. Similarly, there was during the second century a demand for "potted" Atticist diction and authorized anecdote (see pp. 54 and 64).

Aelian's *On the Characteristics of Animals* is typical of the enterprise of producing compendia that provide diversion as well as instruction.[79] Its avowed premise can be summarized thus, "Animals have feelings, too." His method of compilation is simple and undiscriminating, "I have collected as much material as I could and dressed it in everyday language." This approach was shared by Apuleius (see p. 13). He boasts in the *Apology* of adapting Greek authorities in comprehensible language (36. 6 and 38. 5). Both compilers express concern that they will not receive credit for studies for which earlier writers have been honoured.[80] Perhaps the most broadly pertinent feature of the Italian-born Aelian who boasted of never having set foot out of Italy and whose publications are written exclusively in Greek is that all his named authorities are Greek. Thus he represents to an extreme degree the privileged place of Hellenic culture in the Latin West during the second half of the second century. He also embodies the patchwork method of composition characteristic of Apuleius and found elsewhere in such writers as Aulus Gellius. Like Gellius, Aelian affirms and applauds the randomness of his compilation:

> I know that some people will find fault with my decision not to devote a separate entry to each animal or to group together everything that is to be written of each animal. Instead, I have mingled the various animals indiscriminately....To provide variety of subject and because of the attractiveness of animals and in order to avoid the monotony of uniform contents, I have judged it necessary to weave into my narrative a pattern of animals, as it were, in place of flowers, like a eadow or a garland picked out with flowers of many colours (Epilogue).

Gellius must have had both Greek and Latin compilers of the type represented by Aelian in mind when he complained of their tendency indiscriminately to include everything that happened to catch their

[79] So Gellius: *delectatiunculas* (praef. 23); cf. Reardon 1971: 226 on Aelian: "Il n'est pas sérieux."

[80] Aelian, praef.; on Apul. see p. 13.

attention in compilations that bore such titles as the *Meadow* (praef. 6 and 11). Pamphilus of Alexandria, who compiled in one volume extracts from a number of the lexical and grammatical treatises of Didymus, called his work by that title, which the *Suda* describes as a miscellany. Gellius also lists *Silva* (*Woods*) among the titles commonly given to miscellanies. Suetonius links it to the Greek word "woods," which he represents by the 800 volumes composed or compiled in the time of Cicero by the freedman Praetextatus, whom he aptly labels a man of *multiplici variaque doctrina* (wide and varied learning) (*Gram.* 10). Quintilian associates the title *Silva* with hurried, superficial compositions (10. 3. 17).

Like Aelian, Athenaeus, whose *floruit* belongs to approximately 200 A. D., published a loosely connected series of excerpts from a variety of literary and technical sources that centre on a single theme, food in his case rather than Aelian's preference for animals. The epitomizer of the early books describes its contents and arrangement in this way:

> The subject is a banquet given by a wealthy Roman named Larensis, who has summoned as guests the men of his time most learned in their several branches of knowledge. Not one of their excellent sayings has Athenaeus failed to mention....The plan of the discourse reflects the rich bounty of a east, and the arrangement of the book the courses of the dinner.[81]

While generations of modern scholars have rejoiced in Athenaeus' incidental citations of Greek works that would otherwise have been lost, the guest Cynulcus (the "petty-minded Cynic") dismisses the table-talk of Ulpian as mere word-mongering and incidentally characterizes the modus operandi of the entire contrived banquet: without reasoned, coherent discourse (3. 97 c).

Aelian's and Athenaeus' works have as little thematic coherence as a dictionary and lack its alphabetical organizing principle. Given their major sources of information, this is inevitable; for they relied on grammarians and word-mongers rather than, for instance, Aristotle's zoological works.[82] These two compilations lack any unifying principle that would suit them for any instructional purpose other than that for which their writers quote short passages from various canonical zoological and gastronomic authorities such as Homer: authenticating

---

[81] 1. 1 a-b, trans. Gulick (ed.) 1927: I, 3.

[82] Scholfield (ed.) 1958: I, xv-xxv.

decor for shallow word- and trivia-mongering. One can readily sympathize with the younger Seneca's assessment of the Greek scholar Didymus, roughly a contemporary of Cicero, whose many grammatical and lexicographical publications number among the ultimate sources of Aelian and Athenaeus, providing the latter, for instance, with a wealth of the authorized names of drinking cups:

> The grammarian Didymus wrote 4 000 books. I would feel sorry for him if he had read only that number of superfluous books. In these books he investigates Homer's birthplace, Aeneas' real mother, whether Anacreon was more a lecher or more a drunkard, whether Sappho was a whore and other matters that you should unlearn if you knew them (*Ep*. 88. 37; cf. Quint. *Inst*. 1. 8. 18-21).

Miscellanies

In considering together Aelian and Athenaeus I have applied the admittedly artificial criterion of avowed thematic unity. The result is anything but unity. The *historia omnigena*, or varied history, to which we now turn, lacks even alleged cohesiveness. For our purposes it is best represented by Favorinus of Arles' *Varied History* and his kindred *Notebooks* or *Memorabilia*. Known now only through quotations and descriptions by later writers, in their time they embodied the fruits of earlier, post-classical Greek compilations and served as source books for several later compilers of compendia and miscellanies.[83]

At least one of Favorinus' sources was the random commonplace book of Pamphila, an Egyptian woman of the time of Nero. We shall soon turn to the evidence for Favorinus' indebtedness to one of her works; but first Photius, the late ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, will be allowed to describe her miscellany and, indirectly, his:

> Read: the eight books of Pamphila's *Miscellaneous Historical Notebooks*. This woman was married, as she herself remarks at the beginning of her notebooks. She says that she began the composition of her notebooks after

[83] Edited and with introductions and commentaries by Barigazzi (ed.) 1966 and Mensching (ed.) 1963. For the eight *apophthegmata* of Favorinus overlooked by Barigazzi that report the *bon mots*, mainly of philosophers, see Callanan and Bertini Malgarini 1986. There is an up-to-date survey of modern scholarship on Favorinus'corpus in Barigazzi 1993.

> living with her husband for thirty years from the time of her youth, that she wrote down what she learned from her husband..., what she happened to hear from any of the many famous learned men who regularly visited him and what she herself read in books. All of this, whatever seemed to be worthy of recording and recollection, she collected in her notebooks without arrangement by type or subject. Instead, she recorded each item in the sequence in which she encountered it, not, she says, because it would be difficult to arrange the items by type but because she considers that the absence of arrangement and variety of subject are more enjoyable and elegant than uniformity. Her book is a useful aid to learning. One would find [in it] not a few of the requirements of historical studies and especially some items pertaining to aphorisms, rhetorical study, philosophical theory, poetic form and any other such random item.[84]

Photius provides more, incidental information about both Pamphila and Favorinus in his notice of the fourth-century compiler Sopater.[85] He describes his compilation as a twelve-volume collection of varied extracts from many miscellaneous histories and other kinds of compositions. Its second volume includes extracts from the ten books of Pamphila's *Epitomes*. The third volume consists of material copied from "volume 20 and, seriatim, volumes 14-24 except for volume 19 of Favorinus' *Miscellaneous Notebooks*."[86] This antiquarian work, Photius adds, deals with various accounts and explanations of the names of institutions. From Aulus Gellius we learn that volume 29 of Pamphila's *Notebooks* (*Commentarius*) explains why Athenians gave up playing the pipes and that in volume 11 of an unnamed work she gives the ages of Hellanicus, Herodotus and Thucydides at the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Gel. 15. 17 and 15. 23). The link between Pamphila and Favorinus derives from an incomplete statement in the epitome of Stephanus' Byzantine gazetteer: "The

---

[84] Henry (ed.) 1959-67: II, 170-1.

[85] Henry (ed.) 1959-67: II, 123-8.

[86] Photius' use of letters here to designate volumes, which was the standard Greek practice, has led some to suppose, mistakenly, I believe, that the contents of Favorinus' miscellany were arranged alphabetically; see Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 208. On the title of Favorinus' work, called here by Photius *Varied Woods*, see p. 74. In other ancient sources the work is called variously *Woods* and *History*; see Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 207-8 and Mensching (ed.) 1963: 29.

Rhopenses, a people mentioned by Favorinus in the fourth volume of his epitome of Pamphila."[87]

These descriptions of Favorinus' *Varied History* and *Notebooks* give the distinct impression that they purveyed recycled and recyclable anecdotes and trivia. Diogenes Laërtius, probably of the early part of the third century, cites Favorinus' two miscellanies on a number of occasions; and the material that he recycles from them suggests that to think of them as a combination of the *Guinness Book of Records* and the board game Trivial Pursuit would not be misleading, as the following extracts from Laërtius' *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* illustrate:

> According to Favorinus in his *Varied History*, [Anaxagoras] seems to be the first to have stated that Homer's poetry...(2. 11);
>
> For, as Favorinus in his *Varied History* states, he [viz. Socrates] along with his pupil Aeschines was he first to teach rhetoric (2. 20);
>
> As Favorinus in volume 8 of his *Varied History* states, he [viz. Plato] was the first to advance arguments by means of question and answer (3. 24);
>
> Favorinus in his *Varied History* states that he [viz. Aristotle] was the first person to write a forensic speech in defence of himself (5. 9);
>
> Eratosthenes states, as Favorinus in volume 8 of his *Varied History* ventures to affirm, that this person [viz. Pythagoras] in the forty-eighth Olympiad was the first to box systematically (8. 47);
>
> [Alcmaeon] seems to be the first to have written a work on natural history, as Favorinus states in his *Varied History* (8. 83);
>
> [Parmenides] is said also to have been the first to use the "Achilles" syllogism, according to Favorinus in his *Varied History* (9. 23).

Other examples of "firsts" could easily be cited from Favorinus in support of the analogy of the *Guinness Book of Records*.[88] Another

[87] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 241-2, Mensching (ed.) 1963: 154.

[88] E. g., from the *Notebooks*: D. L. 2. 1, 3. 48, 8. 12 and 9. 23; from an unspecified work: Mensching (ed.) 1963: 151, *testimonium* F 58 and 15; cf. Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 208-9 and 215 on line 10 of Gel. 14. 16. See also *prôtos/prôton* as indexed in Barigazzi (ed.) 1966 and Mensching (ed.) 1963. For another example of a retailer of "firsts" see Ath. 2. 48 d, "According to

"first" will illustrate the earlier comparison with the board game Trivial Pursuit:

> He [viz. Pythagoras] is said to have been also the first to train athletes on a diet of meat, the first of them being Eurymenes, as Favorinus states in volume 3 of his *Notebooks* (D. L. 8. 12).

The Pythagorean connection leads naturally to Aulus Gellius' bemused description of an unnamed, well-meaning friend who is thought by some to be Gellius' much-admired mentor Favorinus.[89] Whether or not Gellius' unnamed friend is Favorinus, his description of the man's offending miscellany is so vivid and corresponds so closely with what is known of Favorinus' comparable works that it repays quoting at length:

> A friend of mine, who is not without distinction in the cultivation of literature and who has spent a great part of his life in erudite matters, said, "I want to support and ornament your *Attic Nights*." He immediately gave me an enormous book overflowing, as he put it, with learning of all kinds. He had, he said, expended much labour and care on compiling it from his wide reading in varied and obscure works. I was free, he said, to take from it as much as I wished of material worth recordng. I eagerly and gladly accepted it as though I had taken possession of a cornucopia and hid myself away to read it without anyone peering over my shoulder. What a collection of unadulterated monstrosities was written down there! What the name of the first grammarian was; how many famous men named Pythagoras and Hippocrates there have been...; whether Odysseus wandered about on the Inner [i. e., Mediterranean] Sea as Aristarchus says or on the Outer Sea [i. e., Atlantic Ocean] as Crates says...; what cities and regions have undergne changes of name, Aonia becoming Boeotia, Aeria becoming Egypt, Aeria likewise becoming Crete, Acte becoming Attica.... As I hastened to return it to him, I said, "Je te fais tous mes compliments de ton érudition, my most learned friend, but take back this book because its wealth of contents does not at all suit my humble bill of fare."[90]

Heracleides, the Persians were the first...."

[89] Mensching (ed.) 1963: 29-30 and Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 214-6, the former denying the link to Favorinus on essentially the same grounds as the latter and I opt for it.

[90] Gel. 14. 6. The French clause in my translation is intended to convey the tone of Gellius' shift from Latin to Greek.

Favorinus in both his *Varied History* and *Notebooks* enumerated famous people bearing the name Pythagoras.[91] Favorinus is also known to have researched the Outer Sea in his *Varied History*.[92] Such investigations, which were dear to word-mongers, grammarians and the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, to judge by Seneca, were regarded in some circles, including that of Aulus Gellius, as useless pedantry.[93] Indeed, Gellius reports an encounter in which a notoriously prickly grammarian charges that philosophers like Favorinus have become word-mongers, assembling glossaries and lexica—"odious, foolish and frivolous things"—while he, a grammarian, studies the conduct and ethics of life, the traditional concerns of philosophers (18. 7). That the investigation of the name of a sea was a grammarians' game is evident from a scholion on the *Iliad* (21. 195-6). It quotes from volume 2 of the *Homeric Studies* of Crates of Mallus, an intellectual of the second century B. C. His treatise *On the Attic Dialect* signals his linguistic concerns, as does Strabo's judgment that he was second only to Aristarchus as a grammarian. In commenting on Homer's *Oceanus*, Crates uses phrases that found their way either directly or through an intermediate compiler into Favorinus' *Varied History* and that took account of the Outer Sea of interest to Gellius' unnamed, over zealous, would-be contributor.[94] Gellius elsewhere links Favorinus to grammarians debating the meaning of a phrase in Homer (3. 16. 17-7).[95] Finally, Gellius' account and Favorinus' attested antiquarian research overlap in the tradition that the name "Acte," supposedly the early name of what later became Attica, derived from that of the early ruler Actaeus.[96]

Whether or not Gellius' unnamed friend is Favorinus, Apuleius' published works frequently run parallel to the known publications of the Greek intellectual in the areas of varied, popularized didacticism that we have been considering for the past few pages. The "qui-primus" ("who-first") formula that I likened earlier to the *Guinness*

---

[91] D. L. 8. 12 and 8. 47, quoted p. 78.

[92] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 236, Mensching (ed.) 1963: 141.

[93] Sen. *Ep*. 88. 5-8 and, on Diogenes the Cynic philosopher, D. L. 6. 27.

[94] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 236, Mensching (ed.) 1963: 141-2.

[95] See also Diogenes Laërtius 2. 11, partially quoted p. 78. See also Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 169-70 on Favorinus' putative *On Homer's Philosophy*.

[96] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 237, Mensching (ed.) 1963: 152.

Book of Records is an obvious starting point (see p. 78). Chapter 4 of Apuleius' *Apology* exemplifies the tradition:

> Pythagoras, who was the first to label himself "philosopher";

and:

> Zeno..., who was the first to employ a very skilful method of double refutation to dissolve [his opponents' arguments].[97]

The same chapter suggests that this kind of material was the stuff of handbooks, recycled information that would lodge in the memory of any casual researcher: *memoriae prodi* ("it is part of the collective tradition"). Similarly, when discoursing on Samos and one of its most famous natives, the philosopher Pythagoras, Apuleius uses the verb "comperio" ("I have determined through my reading"), which underscores the "bookishness" of the wide-ranging information contained in the discourse (*Fl.* 15. 13). The verb "aiant" ("[there are those who] say") emphasizes its anecdotal, commonplace status (*Fl.* 15. 14), as it does at *Florida* 18. 20, where Apuleius is again presenting potted intellectual history to a mass audience:

> Protagoras, who was a sophist of varied erudition and one of the most eloquent discoverers of the art of rhetoric, a compatriot and contemporary of Democritus,...—this Protagoras, it is said....

Similarly:

> Many writers who have judged that Pythagoras was a follower of Zoroasterism and skilled in magical practices have nevertheless recorded that... (*Apol.* 31. 2),

and:

> [Pythagoras] is said to have studied natural phenomena under the direction of Anaximander of Miletus (*Fl.* 15. 20).

---

[97] Cf. Diogenes Laërtius 3. 24 and 9. 23, quoted p. 78 and p. 78.

A pattern emerges:

> [Pythagoras], the first to name and found philosophy (*Fl.* 15. 16); Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (*Apol.* 9. 11); the art of dialectics...discovered by Parmenides and Zeno (*Pl.* 1. 3. 187); Aristippus, the famous founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy;[98] who it was who was called "king" first by Plato (*Apol.* 64.5); ...that he [viz. Plato] became the first to join the three branches of philosophy (*Pl.* 1. 3. 187); Thales of Miletus, easily the most famous of the well known Seven Wise Men in view of his being regarded by the Greeks as the first discoverer of geometry (*Fl.* 18. 30); Archimedes of Syracuse, a man admired much above all others for his skill at geometry (*Apol.* 16. 6); Asclepiades, the famous physician second only to Hippocrates, was the first to discover... (*Fl.* 19. 1); Pherecydes..., who was the first to dare to reject the bonds of verse and to write in prose (*Fl.* 15. 19).

The younger Seneca confirms that these kinds of anecdotes (*chreiai*) are intended for novices. They are, he says, offered to children as a way to learn the rudiments of philosophy.[99] He adds that it is disgraceful for mature adults "to acquire wisdom from learning aids: 'Zeno says this'; what do you [have to] say? 'Cleanthes [says] this'; what do you [have to] say?" He goes on to vilify "never-to-be initiators [of ideas but] always-to-be-imitators [of others' ideas]" who "remain hidden in the shadows of others."[100]

Apuleius clearly intends his remarks for general audiences that require basic orientation and relish the kinds of highlights that might appear in a Guinness Book of Cultural Records. This can easily be inferred from the remedial nature of the information and on a few occasions from the settings at which the information is conveyed. *Florida* 18, for instance, which serves as the vehicle of potted *aperçus* of the places of Protagoras and Thales in the cultural history of Greece, is presented to a multitude assembled at the theatre where on other occasions it has been entertained by mimes, comedies, tragedies, tight-rope walkers and jugglers. This kind of audience requires basic,

---

[98] Fragment 2 of the so-called prologue to *Soc.*

[99] See p. 29 on Taurus' mnemonic jingle.

[100] Sen. *Ep.* 33. 7: *numquam auctores, semper interpretes*; cf. Quint. *Inst.* 1. 9. 3 and Epict. 2. 19. 5. See Hock and O'Neil (ed.) 1986 for the *chreia* in ancient rhetorical theory at the "progymnasmatic" level.

even commonplace information, for instance, "This Philemon was a creative writer, a playwright who wrote Middle Comedy" (*Fl.* 16. 6); and sensationalism that would capture and hold its attention: Pythagoras' mentor Pherecydes, who set his writing free from the constraints of verse (*soluto locutu*), was "'freed'" (*solutum*) by a festering fatal disease accompanied by pruritus and maggots (*Fl.* 15. 19).

Moralizing Anecdotes

Apuleius' range of intellectual interests and his practice of popularizing them for mass audiences find other parallels in Favorinus. The *Suda* attributes the following works to Favorinus: *On Homer's Philosophy*, *On Socrates and His Theory of the Art of Love*, *On Plato*, *On the Ways of Life of Philosophers* and a collection of aphorisms.[101]

The last titled work in the list has not survived. However, Gellius has preserved part of a discourse by Favorinus that probably captures the flavour of the published work (Gel. 17. 19).[102] On the occasion recorded by Gellius, Favorinus denounces false philosophers, hypocrites who do not practise what they preach. A substantial part of what remains of Apuleius' *Florida* 7 is devoted to this theme:

> Would that the same sort of edict [as Alexander the Great applied to representations of himself] be applied to philosophy so that only a few good practitioners would represent it, truly learned men who think deeply about every aspect of wisdom instead of the crude, filthy and ignorant men who imitate philosophers only in their mode of dress.

"...only in their mode of dress" (*pallio tenus*): this corresponds to the Greek phrase used by Favorinus, which he has taken from Epictetus, ("not in actions but only in speech"), translated by Gellius as *factis procul, verbis tenus*.

Apuleius undoubtedly presented *Florida* 9 to a mass audience, the largest ever assembled to hear a philosopher speak, if he is to be believed (9. 3). In any large gathering there are bound to be detractors, those who affect a dislike (*simulatem*) of those whose likeness (*similitudinem*) they cannot hope to achieve (9. 2). These

---

[101] *Suda*, s. v. "Favorinus," IV, p. 690, lines 16-26, ed. Adler.
[102] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 170.

detractors are false philosophers:

> May such scanty (*parva*) and scabrous (*prava*) likenesses not deceive you since, as I have often said, there are some beggars walking about in philosophers' dress (9. 9).

Apuleius goes on to liken his own many and varied accomplishments to those of Hippias, who was "one of the sophists, ahead of all in the number of skills, second to no one in eloquence" (9. 15).

This kind of anecdotal, moralising philosophy was part of the rhetorical tradition of the Roman Imperial period, recycled in handbooks such as that of Valerius Maximus and by writers of diatribes such as the younger Seneca, Epictetus, Maximus of Tyre and Favorinus. Commonplace anecdotes about well known figures such as Alexander the Great and Hippias trigger a response of recognition even in a mass audience and serve as vehicles of moralising diatribes.

Cliché-ridden, moralising diatribes lead naturally to aphorisms that attempt to reduce complex systems of thought to simplified, memorable statements of the sort, "The Peripatetic philosopher Bion said, 'Wealth has not been given but lent to the rich.'"[103] In addition to the *apophthegmata* assigned by Barigazzi with varying degrees of assurance to Favorinus, there are the eight recently published *bons mots*, mainly of philosophers, compiled by Favorinus; and others of the same sort abound in other popularizers and compilers of the Roman Imperial period such as the younger Seneca, Diogenes Laërtius and Athenaeus.[104] In Apuleius the form is represented by the four versified *apophthegmata* derived ultimately from Plato and Epicurus that had previously been reproduced by Cicero and the younger Seneca, of the sort, "[True] living begins with meditation on dying."[105]

Clichés of this sort were a systematic part of rhetorical education during the Roman Imperial period. Thus when Apuleius is accused of both wealthy extravagance and exiguous meanness, he chooses to address the latter charge, probably because it affords the opportunity to produce a string of commonplaces from the rhetorical storehouse of clichés (*Apol.* 17-22). Names guaranteed to evoke predictable

---

[103] Favorinus, frag. 115, n. 538, ed. Barigazzi (ed.) 1966; cf. Sen. *Ep*. 33. 7-11.

[104] Callanan and Bertini Malgarini 1986.

[105] Fragments 19 a-d, p. 176, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.

associations are produced, enshrined examples of dignified poverty from Rome's illustrious past such as Marcus Antonius, Marcus Cato and Atilius Regulus; and, from the Greek world, the Cynic philosophers Antisthenes, Crates and Diogenes, the last two of whom are placed in the context of the frequently retold anecdotes that exemplify their contempt of conventional estimations of wealth and status (see p. 67).[106] Apuleius acknowledges the derivation of his material from the rhetorical curriculum: *controversiam* (imaginary debate) (*Apol.* 20. 1); and he goes on to string together several hackneyed aphorisms on the subject of poverty (see p.67).

This is instruction for a mass audience reduced to the level of familiar aphorisms. The object of this procedure and the desired response are captured in a vignette featuring Favorinus reported by Gellius (9. 8). He heads the chapter:

> He who has much is bound [to feel himself] to be in need of much; an aphorism of the philosopher Favorinus [expressed] with succinct eloquence on the subject.

Gellius retails a string of aphorisms on the subject, including Favorinus' reworking of the theme, which he introduces thus:

> I remember this aphorism (*sententiam*) from Favorinus, which was honed down and expressed in the fewest possible words amid the loud applause of all the listeners.[107]

Sententious, familiar anecdotes and succinctly expressed clichés win the applause of the mass audience as well rather than detailed, carefully elaborated explanations of complex intellectual and ethical systems. Commonplace books and aphorisms constitute in the opinion of Photius a legitimate method of instruction (see p. 77). Earlier, during the Roman Imperial period, other popularizers such as Apuleius and Favorinus thought so as well; for they became purveyors of what they had been taught in the rhetorically based educational system of the time.

---

[106] Cf. *Fl.* 14 and 22.
[107] Cf. Gel. 13. 24.

Scientific Compendia

Other than the few words quoted exclusively as grammatical illustrations, no trace of Apuleius' *Epitome of Histories* has survived.[108] In *Florida* 9 he includes *historias varias rerum* (varied enquiries) among his intellectual accomplishments. Epitomization, extraction and variation: these are the outstanding qualities of scholarly endeavour during the Roman Imperial period, which continued and synthesized a tradition that began with Aristotle's zoological research and Alexander the Great's conquests in exotic foreign lands. Aelian's *On the Characteristics of Animals* is the most notable surviving example of compilation of zoological oddities and trivia presented as scholarly research. Apuleius' *Florida* 6 is cast in this mould. The emphasis is on *miracula*, which I translated as "monstrosities" in the case of the unsolicited extracts offered, possibly by Favorinus, to Aulus Gellius (see p. 79).[109] Apuleius accords perfunctory attention to the natural wonders of India but prefers human marvels, "I prefer to discourse on the wonders (*miraculis*) of mankind rather than those of nature" (*Fl.* 6. 6). Thus Apuleius differs from Aelian only in kind. Both men convey sensationalized anecdote in the guise of knowledge.

A final example, although it does not directly involve Apuleius, will underscore the tendency during the Roman Imperial to recycle mishmashes of scientific anecdote. Stephanus' Byzantine gazetteer states that according to the research of Theopompus and Favorinus all the hares captured near the town of Bisaltia have two livers. This claim is combined elsewhere with Theophrastus' finding that partridges in Paphlagonia have two hearts.[110] Versions of these zoological *mirabilia* are reported in Aulus Gellius (16. 15), Aelian's *On the Characteristics of Animals* (5. 27) and Athenaeus (9. 390 c). All these second-century writers specialize in extracting bizarre anecdotes for their potted surveys of miscellaneous information. In this case their information

---

[108] Fragments 11 and 12, p. 174, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.

[109] Gel. 14. 6. *Miracula* in *Fl.* 6: *miror* and *admiror* at 7. 2 and 8, *miraculis* at 7. 6.

[110] Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: fragment 86, p. 238; Mensching (ed.) 1963: 52-3.

seems to derive ultimately from Aristotle's and his Peripatetic successors' zoological writings. Aristotle's *History of Animals* (2. 507 a. 16-20), the pseudo-Aristotelian *On Marvellous Things Heard* (842 a. 15-6) and Theophrastus report the same information. To Apuleius' credit none of his extant works deals with two-livered hares or two-hearted partridges. However, there is evidence of his tireless search in Peripatetic writings for the wonders of the zoological world. He, too, has been studying livers, of fish, empirically and in Aristotle's publications, "Do you accuse me of the very thing [viz. anatomical research on fish] that Maximus and I marvel at (*miramur*) in Aristotle?"[111] He repeatedly expresses his intention to emulate the zoological research of the Peripatetic school that served second-century purveyors of bizarre anecdotes so well.[112] A phrase that he applies to a particular quality of a fish may serve as the keynote of the anecdotes sought by popularizing compilers of the second century: *rarissima et hercule memoranda* ("rarest of all and truly noteworthy") (*Apol.* 40. 9).

Conclusions

Most of the material presented on the previous pages has focussed on a selection of the practices and goals of advanced education in the second century that account for characteristic qualities of Apuleius' writings. The Greek sophists of the period shaped these practices and goals, which in turn left a deep mark on Apuleius. They derive from the Greek sophists' notorious "retro-occupation" with the past, the so-called Cult of the Past, which placed the highest premium on ancient, i. e., classical authorities. In Apuleius' case, whether contemporary reality was situated in a courtroom presided over by a Roman magistrate or on a podium from which he addressed Roman officials and Latin-speaking listeners in one of the most westerly provinces of the Roman West or a biological laboratory devoted to ichthyology or the study of epilepsy, again in the distant West, this reality became a principally Greek "univers de bibliothèque" and was viewed "à travers les livres [grecs]" (see p. 62).

---

[111] *Apol.* 40. 6 and 10 and 41. 4.

[112] E. g. *Apol.* 36. 3-5, 40. 5, 9 and 11 and 41. 6-7.

The Cult of the Past manifests itself in many ways in Apuleius. It is seen in his recycling of the canonical Greek heroic figures of legend and the intellectual giants of the Greek past (see p. 64); in his unwillingness to advance an opinion or fact in a courtroom in the western provincial town of Sabrata without citing the authority of earlier, usually Greek authorities;[113] in his tendency to quote early Latin poets such as Ennius who were highly valued by second-century Latin archaists (see p. 56); in his practice of quoting the same works and even passages of the narrowly defined canon of Greek authorities cited by such Greek contemporaries as Lucian and Dio Chrysostom to authenticate and ornament his often derivative views (see p. 58); and finally in his reliance on bookish precedents for his most mundane daily activities (see p. 67) and the topics of his Latin public addresses (see p. 63).

If, as Bompaire maintains, "l'enseignement repose sur le livre," then there will have been an impetus to provide efficient reference books; hence, compendia and compilations acquired great importance (see p. 72). These short cuts to culture and learning have an inevitable homogenizing effect, as creative research and original thought give way to regurgitation. In his best alliterative style the younger Seneca succinctly summarizes the prevalent intellectual weakness of his own time, some two to three generations before that of Apuleius, *Itaque quae philosophia fuit, facta philologia est* ("Thus what was the pursuit of wisdom has become the pursuit of words") (*Ep.* 108. 23). We have seen that this charge was directed against Apuleius' coeval and like-minded popularizer, the philosopher Favorinus, as Gellius repeatedly labels him (see p. 80).

Indeed, substantial parts of Seneca's letter function as a kind of compendium of some of the issues that I have been considering in this chapter. We have seen, for instance, that rhetorical set-pieces on hackneyed themes tend to assert themselves and to take on a life of their own independent of the occasion on which they are uttered or written (see p. 61). Seneca readily fills a page with sententious aphorisms on the theme: "He who desires least lacks least" (*Ep.* 108. 8-11). Apuleius acknowledges that this theme is a set-piece of the rhetorical schools (*Apol.* 20. 1) (see p. ?). We have also seen that Apuleius develops the theme: "Philosophers should practise what they

---

113 Marache 1952: 321-34.

preach" (see p. 83). As Seneca expresses it:

> In my view, no one is worse than those who have learned philosophy as though it were a profitable occupation and live differently from how they pronounce that one ought to live (*Ep*. 108. 36).

Seneca connects this proposition with his view that the study of philosophy ought to be concerned with the goal of leading a happy life rather than with the search for archaic and contrived words and far-fetched figures of speech. Pedantic scholars and word-mongers will waste their time on these last considerations and overlook the ethical point of Vergil's statement that time flees and cannot be recaptured. The same types of people when reading Cicero's *De Republica* will be troubled that they cannot find recorded the names of the parents of two Roman kings, be concerned that the official known in Seneca's time as *dictator* was originally called *magister populi*, be preoccupied with such lexical curiosities as the archaic use of *reapse* for *re ipsa* and *calx* for *creta* and be delighted to have traced a striking Vergilian phrase back through Ennius to Homer. The philosopher, however, will be concerned with the ethical and philosophical implication of the same passages. Apuleius, as we have seen, anticipates that his Carthaginian listeners will be more likely to pay critical attention to the stylistic qualities of his philosophical discourses (see pp. 20, 28); and I have mentioned more than once that a grammarian accused the "philosopher" Favorinus of losing sight of the thought in a forest of words (see p. 89). Apuleius' contemporary Aelius Aristides' comparison of his teacher Alexander of Cotiaeum with other Greek intellectuals of the time is informative:

> Some were trained in encyclopedic knowledge, but by this very fact were blinded to the more important things....Indeed, although he was so eloquent, yet he did not retire to compose histories and such kinds of writings.[114]

I have allowed Aristides to shift the focus from philosophical myopia to cultural blind spots, but this shift from word-mongering resumes another theme of this chapter: fact-mongering. Aristides does not specify the subject of the "histories and such kinds of writings" that he

---

[114] *Orat*. 32. 9-10, trans. Behr 1981: 159-60.

denigrates. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he has in mind the kinds of *historiae omnigenae*, miscellanies and compendia that are characteristic of the period.[115]

115 The noun translated by Behr as "histories" is *suggraphas*.

CHAPTER THREE

SOPHISTIC DISCOURSE

"L'univers" and "la réalité," to use the words of Bompaire and Vallette, of the contemporary Latin West were viewed by Apuleius principally through Greek books. But it is the very act of filtered viewing, whether or not the bookish intermediaries were Greek, that associates Apuleius most closely with the Greek sophists. Like them, he is above all a popularizer, systematizing, epitomizing and supplementing earlier works of creative research and thought for mass consumption. As Vallette has remarked, this combination of popularization and erudition cannot be parallelled in the Latin West except for Apuleius.[1] He considers two other possible exceptions only to dismiss them: Fronto and the elder Seneca. He dismisses Fronto because of his affected pedantry, because he felt bound "slavishly to serve the ears of the learned" (I, 7); Seneca because he explicitly wrote for a small circle of friends.

To Vallette's list of candidates *manqués* I would add Suetonius. He, too, worked within the Greek scholastic tradition that took shape during the Hellenistic period. Wallace-Hadrill characterizes the society to which Suetonius belonged as one in which "many carried from their schooldays a taste for the professors' game."[2] His surviving and documented lost works belong to three broad categories: (1) lexicographical, (2) antiquarian and (3) biographical. This range of interests is parallelled in the Greek "professors' game" played by, for instance, Favorinus and Athenaeus, the latter of whom wrote an account of the kings of Syria and a monograph on a passage in Archippus' play the *Fishes* in addition to his extant antiquarian miscellany the *Deipnosophistae*.[3] Suetonius' ready alternation between

---

[1] Vallette 1908: 182-4.

[2] Wallace-Hadrill 1983: 41.

[3] For Favorinus see *PW* VI, 6, pp. 2081-4; Mensching (ed.) 1963; Barigazzi (ed.) 1966 and Wallace-Hadrill 1983: 79-92. For an unusually sympathetic assessment of Athenaeus as a product of the Second Sophistic see Baldwin 1976.

Greek and Latin composition is reminiscent of Favorinus' and Apuleius' deep immersion in the two classical literary cultures.[4] His lost monograph on the *Names of Winds* recalls the discourse of Favorinus on the same topic that found its way into Apuleius' *On the Universe* (see p. 15). A lexicographical approach to natural science is likely for his lost treatise *On Weather Signs*.[5] Ultimately, however, Suetonius, too, must be discarded as a perfect Latin parallel to the Greek sophists and Apuleius. The element of speaking performance, of epideictic oratory, is completely absent from his range of activities. This is one Greek "professors' game" that he did not join Apuleius in playing.

Favorinus of Arles

Vallette long ago concluded that Apuleius had more in common with the Greek sophists and with one in particular, Favorinus of Arles, than with any contemporary Latin writer whose works have survived sufficiently to enable comparisons to be made.[6] I concur completely with this conclusion. However, because Vallette was concerned principally with Apuleius' *Apology* and to a lesser degree his *Florida*, that is, his two works most patently intended for spoken presentation, he based this conclusion on the so-called "Corinthian Discourse," which had come to be associated with the manuscript tradition of Dio Chrysostom but is almost universally regarded to be a speech of Favorinus.[7] In other words, Vallette's conclusion is valid as far as the limited evidence that he considered takes it, but it is possible to take it further.

The picture of Favorinus that emerges from the preserved portions of his other works and from various ancient accounts of his intellectual activities is that of a polymath. The *Suda* describes him as exactly that, "A learned man versed in all branches of knowledge."[8] The *Suda* adds

---

sympathetic assessment of Athenaeus as a product of the Second Sophistic see Baldwin 1976.

[4] On Suetonius' Greek compositions see pp. 41, 49.

[5] Cf. Apul. *Astronomica* and *On Trees*. See p. 37.

[6] Vallette 1908: 185-208.

[7] [Dio Chrysostom] *Oration* 37.

[8] S. v. "Favorinus," IV, p. 690, lines 16-26, ed. Adler.

that he was "steeped in philosophy but more devoted to rhetoric" and that he wrote many scholarly monographs (see pp. 33, 80, 83). The writer of the "Life of Hadrian" in the *Historia Augusta* also relegates Favorinus the philosopher to a secondary place vis-à-vis Favorinus the polymath, excluding him from the list of prominent philosophers of the time. Instead, he declares that he is pre-eminent among the grammarians, rhetoricians, musicians, geometricians, painters and astrologers of Hadrian's reign (16. 10). In spite of Gellius' repeated and awe-filled references to "the philosopher Favorinus," the object of his reverence emerges from the hagiographer's pages as a kind of Dr Johnson pronouncing extemporaneously to his acolytes on grammar, literature, history, antiquarianism, philosophy, jurisprudence, medicine, meteorology, astronomy and even mother's milk.[9] For his own part, Gellius cannot always decide whether Favorinus engages in a kind of Socratic dialectics out of a desire to flaunt his genius or to arrive at the truth.[10]

Maximus of Tyre

Whether or not, as Vallette tentatively proposes, Apuleius modelled himself directly on Favorinus, it is clear that he combined oratory and popularized, anecdotal didacticism in a way that can be parallelled only among contemporary Greek sophists such as Favorinus and Maximus of Tyre.[11]

In my opinion, Maximus of Tyre provides one of the best contemporary Greek models of the blending of second-hand erudition with popular presentation that characterizes most of the Apuleian corpus. Others have commented on the common ground occupied by these two writers. Dillon, for instance, avers, "Maximus of Tyre, like Apuleius, was a sophist rather than a philosopher"; and:

> Maximus considers himself a philosopher, which for him means using all

---

[9] The index s. v. "Favorinus" to the Loeb edition of Gellius' *Attic Nights*, ed. Rolfe 1927-8, is a convenient way to trace Gellius' record of Favorinus' many areas of expertise. I owe the comparison of Favorinus with Dr Johnson to Baldwin 1975.

[10] E. g. 14. 1. 2 and 17. 12. 1 and cf. 4. 1. 19.

[11] Vallette 1908: 193-5 and 206-7.

> the resources of contemporary rhetoric to adorn traditional philosophical themes, very much as Apuleius was doing at the same time. Further, he is a Platonic philosopher,...and, like Apuleius, professes great reverence for the personality of Socrates, as well as for Plato and Pythagoras.[12]

Other commentators, such as Vallette and Kennedy, have observed that some of Apuleius' works have affinities to the essays of his contemporary Maximus of Tyre.[13] Of both writers, selectively in the case of Apuleius, it can be said, with Kennedy, "The form is that of the diatribe, the manner that of a sophist, the material is Platonism and Cynicism."[14]

The translation of Maximus of Tyre's *dialexis* (essay) 1 that follows will serve as a sample of the blend of scholasticism and rhetoric that characterizes the Greek Second Sophistic and that left indelible marks on substantial parts of Apuleius' writings.[15] It will also serve as the frame of reference for subsequent discussion of the shape of sophistic discourse.

That a philosopher's discourse suits every issue.[16]

> Surely, actors in performances in the theatre of Dionysus who at one time speak the part of Agamemnon, at another that of Achilles, or at still another change parts for that of Telephon or that of Palamedes or any other part that the play requires are not thought to be doing anything discordant or unusual because they appear at different times as different characters while remaining themselves. But if someone relegates play-acting to Dionysus and his theatre and regards the drama of social interaction as an end in itself rather than as an occasion for iambic verse composed by a skilful playwright for performance at a festival or as an occasion for a choral performance of crafted lyric verse, a drama

---

[12] Dillon 1977: 399.

[13] Vallette 1908: 188-9, Kennedy 1972: 606-7.

[14] Kennedy 1972: 590.

[15] There are good, modern discussions of Maximus of Tyre in Koniaris 1982 and 1983 and Szarmach 1985.

[16] My translation is based on the critical edition of Hobein (ed.) 1910. The numbers in the left margin have been added by me to facilitate cross reference. Since completing my translation a new Teubner critical edition has appeared: M. Trapp (ed.), *Maximus Tyrius: Dissertationes* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1994).

concerned with the business of life, which is the business of the philosopher, one that is truer in its hypothesis, chronologically continuous and produced and conceived by god; if, then, this person played a role in this drama, appointing himself as the lead actor of the troupe, he would preserve what is worthy of creative performances and in his spoken role match himself to the character of the events produced by god the playwright—would anyone consider this person to be discordant and variable like Homer's man of the sea Proteus, a quick-change artist unstable at the core?

Or, if it seemed to people that musical skill and ability were necessary for happiness, there would be no esteem for the man well suited to the Dorian musical mode but who fell short of adapting to the Ionic or the Aeolic mode of music and became voiceless in the face of polyphonic musical techniques.

But since mankind has little need of song and the enticement of the lyric strains of music but instead has need of some other, more manly muse, whether that whom Homer likes to call Calliope, or that whom Pythagoras likes to call Philosophy or some such other muse, surely, the man subjected to this muse and her speech should not, should he, be less adept at polyphony and multiple modes of music than those other performers if he is to preserve for all time the beauty of creative accomplishment and never be struck dumb? For if in the long, unbroken span of life there were a period of time that did not stand in need of philosophical discourse, there would be no need of this multi-faceted, versatile muse and of harmony; nor would there be a need of them if human affairs were arranged in a single pattern and advanced in the same way instead of alternating from pleasure to pain and from pain to pleasure, instead of exchanging one experience for another and instead of turning and throwing everyone's thoughts up and down and this way and that way. "For the thoughts of mortals are like the varied days that the father of men and gods brings forth" (Homer, *Od.* 18. 136-7).

For divine power wills changes in human affairs, and they are inherently ephemeral. Just as there is one name for each of the rivers that ever-flowing springs send forth, whether it be the Sperchius or the Alpheus or a river of some other name, but the product of the springs as it flows from source to end deceives sight by the continuity of its flow, as though it were a single, continuous and unified river; just so do the production and resources of human affairs flow quickly and uncontrollably with unperceived movement as though from an ever-flowing spring.

Just as perception is deceived in the case of a river, just so the powers of reason are deceived and identify life as a single and uniform thing when it is in fact a variable thing that is quick to change, altered by a myriad of adventitious circumstances and occasions.

Philosophical discourse presides over life and always adapts to circumstances, just as the art of the physician does not preside over a static body but over one that is vulnerable to ups and downs, seethes with evacuations and infusions and regulates its periods of deficiency and surfeit. The discourse of philosophers has equal power in the life of mankind, as it adapts to circumstances by mollifying sullenness and uttering words of cheer in times of bright joy.

If life were arranged in one way and had a single aspect, there would be need of only one type of philosophical discourse. As things are now, there is a single time for a bard to sing to the accompaniment of a cithara, when the tables are laden "with bread and meat and the wine steward draws wine from the bowl and pours it forth" (Homer, *Od.* 9. 9-10); and a single time for the orator, when the juries are assembled; and a time for the poet at the festivals of Dionysus when a choral performance is required. But no special occasion has been segmented, as it were, for philosophical discourse, which has amalgamated and become completely intermingled with life as light is with eyes. For who would imagine the eye functioning without light? But vision ventures out even at night, seeing dimly but guessing uncertainly at the direction in which it is being led. But if you should take away philosophical discourse from the life of mankind, it will perish on the difficult, dangerous and rough byways of events, byways such as those travelled by the kind of barbarians who do not have anything to do with philosophical discourse, some of whom plunder, some of whom wait in ambush, some of whom serve as mercenaries and some of whom wander about aimlessly.

If you take a goatherd away from his flock and take away his pipes, you cause the flock to scatter. If, however, you take away from the flock of mankind this leadership and direction afforded by philosophical discourse, how will you do otherwise? For you maltreat and scatter a flock that is instinctively tame but has become intractable because of its harsh treatment and needs a shepherd who plays music instead of one who punishes its disobedience with a whip and goad.

For whoever thinks it appropriate for the philosopher to neglect an opportunity for philosophical discourse seems to me to be acting in the same way as a person who isolates from all the difficulties and fortunes of war, which is an unstable and inconsistent affair, a single moment and chooses for it a mighty warrior who is good as a troop soldier and as an archer both while mounted on a horse and while in a chariot.

The athlete who participates in the Olympian games may neglect the Isthmian games, but even in this case slackness is reprehensible. The soul desirous of honour does not forbear to undergo anything because of a desire for ease, and it partakes not only of the wild olive of the Olympian games but also of the Isthmian pine, the Argolic parsley and the Pythian

apples. The soul endures this not for the sake of the contest but co-habits in unison with the body and shares in its victory and recognition.

When the effort and the feats and the victory belong to the soul alone, when the prize is neither apples nor wild olives, but instead of these is something more appropriate to the pursuit of honour, something more effective in aiding the spectators and something more successful at providing the speaker with confidence in his way of life, will the soul then overlook an opportunity to contend or willingly hold back?

The opportunities and the various venues of this contest are announced unexpectedly and host all the Greek peoples from everywhere, who attend without prompting and of their own accord; they assemble not for the pleasure of their eyes but in the hope of acquiring virtue, which in my opinion is more natural to the human soul than is the pursuit of pleasure. One may see among the spectacles of bodily strength and skill none that spectators attend eagerly in order to emulate or imitate the spectacle. Instead, we get there vicarious pleasures for our eyes at the cost of others' toils, and of the thousands of spectators not one except perhaps a person base at heart would express a wish to be one of the chalk-covered combatants in the middle of the arena or one of the runners or wrestlers or boxers. I believe that the competition in which the soul participates is so much more honourable than the other competitions, its efforts so much more successful than the other efforts and its spectators so much more responsive than the other spectators that no sensible person among those present would express the wish to lay aside the role of spectator and to become a contestant.

What, then, is the reason for this? It is because not all bodies are capable of the physical skills and can withstand the stresses associated with them. This is something that does not occur by simple choice but occurs naturally of its own accord and only to a few people. Such a person would have to have the size of Titolmus, the endurance of Milo, the strength of Polydamas or the speed of Lasthenes. But if someone weaker than Epeus, more deformed than Thersites, smaller than Tydeus, slower than Ajax and having an accumulation of all physical handicaps should strive to take part in a competition, he is certainly yearning for empty and unattainable desires.

The competitions in which the soul participates are, however, the opposite of those. For those of the human race not naturally equipped are few and limited in number since the feats of the soul are not a matter of simple choice or occur of their own accord. Nature does some of the work in advance to the [same] extent as a small foundation is provided for a great, man-made work or a small keel is laid for a towering cargo ship. God planted the twin seeds of love and hope in human reason, the former light and soaring as though plumed, raising and elevating the soul and

providing for it a route to the fulfilment of its desires. (Philosophers call the plumage human impulse.) Hope is the other twin seed planted in the soul. It is a stimulant to everyone's impulse, not blind as the Athenian playwright [Aeschylus] says, but always sharp-sighted and not allowing the soul to relinquish its toil until it has attained the object of its love.

For if hope did not exist, the businessman would long ago have ceased conducting business, the mercenary taking part in battle, the merchant sailing, the pirate plundering and the licentious man committing adultery. But their hopes do not allow them to desist and compel them to engage in fruitless, ineffectual toil, the businessman in his quest for wealth, the soldier in his quest for victory, the merchant in his quest for a safe voyage, the pirate in his quest for gain and the adulterer in his quest to escape detection. Then some unexpected occurrence will catch each of them unawares, as the businessman is bankrupted, the mercenary killed, the merchant drowned, the pirate captured and the adulterer detected; and their desires die along with their hopes.

For god has not limited in space or time any of wealth or pleasure or any of the other objects of men's desires; rather, their defining quality is to be limitless. Thus those who pursue them become filled instead with a thirst for them because an object that has been attained is of less value than when it is being pursued. But whenever the soul acts as regards something that is stable and suitable and defined, something that is intrinsically beautiful, attainable by effort, apprehended by reason, pursued by love and achieved by hope, then the competition in which the soul participates becomes successful, efficacious and victorious. This is the very reason why those who philosophize assemble an audience.

I must again employ the image of athletes. Anyone of them would express the wish that no other contestant would arrive at the arena but that he would win the competition without a struggle. For only one of many may necessarily win. In the contest of which I speak, however, the contestant who is especially victorious would be the one who summons many contestants to the competition. Heaven above!, if a member of my audience should become my fellow contestant and strive with me in the dust of this setting, then I would be crowned as an illustrious victor and be proclaimed to all the Greek peoples the winner. I acknowledge that until now I have been uncrowned and unproclaimed even though you would applaud me. What advantage have I derived from my many speeches and my repeated participation in competitions? Praise? I have enough of it; I have a good reputation; I am saturated with it. In a word, who publicly praises speeches but does not speak, although he has the ability to speak and to listen? Who publicly praises philosophy but does not undertake it, although he has a soul and a teacher? The situation has come to resemble that of the flute or the lyre or some other form of music performed in

tragedies or comedies at the festivals of Dionysus: everyone offers praise but not duplication.

Or this may be a case of praise differing completely from pleasure. For all listeners derive pleasure, but the one who actually offers praise will be the one who imitates; as long as one does not emulate, he has not offered praise. It is not unknown for a person without musical training to be influenced by the music of flutes and as the flute music persists to sound in his ears for him to hum to himself. May one of you strive to experience this, for perhaps he would then love the flutes themselves.

A man fond of raising birds had some that at day-break chirped sweetly but haphazardly as birds do. His neighbour was a flautist. The birds listened to the flautist practising, and as on a daily basis they chirped in response to him and as they fashioned their sound to that of the flute they ended up chirping like a chorus in response to the key note whenever the flautist began to play. Will people join in song with me and, unlike the birds that hear inarticulate flutes, listen to philosophical discourses that are thoughtful, articulate, fruitful and fashioned to produce emulation?

With regard to my accomplishments I have until now maintained silence towards all people without saying anything haughty or boastful either privately or publicly; on your behalf it now seems best for me to speak very haughtily and boastfully. Young men, there comes before you a copious, manifold and fruitful course of lectures, one perfected for all ears and dispositions and all occasions of striving after philosophical discourse, all forms of education, one that is not withheld but is offered freely and unbegrudgingly and is readily available to those capable of seizing it. If one is passionately attracted to rhetoric, here is a course of lectures ready for him, one that is helpful and resourceful, one that is lofty and astounding, solid, strong and ever-fresh. If one is passionately attracted to poetry, once he has acquired understanding of metre elsewhere, let him come here for the complete apprehension of poetry: its flow, clarity, richness, inspired qualities, economy, dramatic qualities, unlimited powers of expression and unfailing rhythm. Do you come in need of understanding politics and a plan for dealing with the citizen body and its assembly of elected representatives? You have discovered their realization. You see the citizen body, you see its assembly of elected representatives, the speaker, the power of persuasion and mastery. But is there someone who despises these things but welcomes philosophy and honours the truth? I withdraw what I have said and moderate my boastfulness, becoming a different person. They are a great thing and do not need an earthly public patron to step forth, by Zeus !, or one dependent on the ways of the masses.

If one supposes that philosophy consists of verbs and nouns, or of the art of speaking, or of syllogisms, disputation and sophistic tricks and this

sort of time-wasting exercises, it is not difficult to find a teacher. Every nook and cranny is filled with sophists of this type. They are readily available and appear quickly. Indeed, I would venture to say that teachers of this type of philosophy are more numerous than the pupils. If these things are only a small part of philosophy and that part is such that it is a disgrace not to know it but no great thing to know it, let us avoid disgrace by knowing it but not take pride in it. Otherwise, school teachers would be highly valued for dealing with syllables and babbling in classes of very ignorant children.

The goal of philosophy and the road to it require a teacher who elevates the souls of young people, guides them to their goals and aims at nothing short of moderating their impulse by means of punishment and pleasure. Horse trainers do some such thing by neither quenching the spirit of colts nor by allowing them freely to indulge their high spirits. The bit and reins and the skill of the rider holding the reins control the spirit of a foal. Philosophical discourse, however, controls the soul of man, philosophical discourse that is not idle or slovenly or careless but instead thoroughly imbued with character and experience and that allows its listeners no leisurely opportunity to indulge in the pleasure of enquiring closely into words; instead, it forces them to rise and be inspired, like a war trumpet sounding the call now to attack, now to retreat.

If those striving for philosophy need such discourse, they must search for, scrutinize and choose someone who possesses it, whether he be old or young, poor or rich, or held in high esteem. I believe that old age is inferior to youth, poverty to wealth and obscurity to celebrity. However, men readily join those who are at a disadvantage and the results of chance have become the entrée to philosophy. Because Socrates was poor, the poor man will directly imitate Socrates. Let us be thankful that the snub-nosed and the pot-bellied do not lay claim to philosophy. No one remembers that Socrates used to impose himself not on just the poor but also on the wealthy, the famous and the most aristocratic. For Socrates, I believe, held that the people of Athens derived little benefit from the philosophizing of Aeschines and Antisthenes; or, rather, that no one did so then as we would do so at a later date [from] the transmissions of their philosophical discourses.

If Alcibiades had philosophized, or Critias, or Critoboulos, or Callias, none of the disasters that befell the Athenians of that time would have occurred. For a purse and a staff do not constitute emulation of Diogenes and it is possible for one in possession of these to be more unfortunate than Sardanapalus. The illustrious Aristippus, who wore purple clothing and was anointed with perfumes, was no less restrained than Diogenes. For just as a person endowed with fire-resistant bodily strength would, I believe, venture to expose his body to Mt. Aetna, just so would

one well equipped to withstand pleasure not be burned or inflamed or melted by it.

One must not scrutinize a philosopher's body or age or outward circumstances but rather his views and philosophical discourse and the preparation of his soul; by these alone is he appointed philosopher. These other things, as adventitious qualities, are like actors' costumes at the theatre of Dionysus. For the beauty of the verse is one and the same whether the person uttering it is a ruler or a slave. The requirements of the plot produce changes in appearance. Agamemnon carries a sceptre, the herdsman wears leather clothing, Achilles is armed and Telephon is dressed in rags and carries a purse. The spectators, however, pay no less attention to Telephus than to Agamemnon, for the mind is directed towards the poetry of the play rather than towards the adventitious circumstances of the spoken roles. Acknowledge that the beauty of philosophers' discourse is neither variable not fractured but unified and cohesive.

The protagonists who are sent on to the stage of life remain the same, though each is clothed by fortune for a different role. Pythagoras was equipped with royal purple clothing, Socrates with a threadbare cloak, Xenophon with a breastplate and shield, the protagonist from Sinope [i. e., Diogenes], like the famous Telephus, with a staff and pouch. The character of their roles also contributed to their performances. Accordingly, Pythagoras produced amazing argument, Socrates critical argument, Xenophon persuasive argument and Diogenes contemptuous argument.

O blessed actors of the dramas, o blessed spectators of the spoken performances! Who even now in our time would become our performing protagonist, one not devoid of presence or voice but worthy of appearing in the theatres of the Greek people? We must search out the man. Perhaps he will appear. If he does so, he will not be unesteemed.

Maximus concludes this diatribe by reverting to the hackneyed metaphor with which he began: the theatre of life. It will not be amiss for me to repeat the stated purpose of including my translation of his first *dialexis*: to provide a sample of the blend of rhetoric and recycled didacticism that characterizes the Greek Second Sophistic and defines substantial parts of Apuleius' corpus of extant writings.[17] In other words, to rephrase Kennedy's statement as a question: What is the

---

[17] An unstated secondary consideration has been that only those with access to major university libraries are likely to be able to consult a printed edition of Maximus' works.

manner of a sophist? (see p. 93). The answer, as we shall see, has more to do with the shape of expression than its content.

The Shape of Sophistic Discourse

One cannot ignore the circumstances of oral presentation as a determining factor in the shape of a discourse, whether it be one of Maximus' *dialexeis* (essays) or one of Apuleius' public or forensic speeches. Koniaris has fully discussed the question whether or not Maximus' *dialexeis* were impromptu, a mode of discourse greatly valued by Greek sophists and their audiences.[18] What is certain is that they convey the impression of being so, either through contrivance or because of the actual circumstances of presentation, as when Maximus interrupts himself, "What I have just said leads me abruptly to a better illustration that I have long wanted to expound to you."[19] There is the impression of a teacher responding to the puzzled looks on his pupils' faces. It is worth emphasizing at this point that Maximus saw himself as a teacher and presented his lectures accordingly, with the combination of premeditation and opportunism characteristic of a classroom setting.[20]

Parts of Apuleius' philosophical discourses have the ring of spontaneous didacticism, as when he acknowledges that a certain point of view does not enjoy universal acceptance and adds:

> It will be better to discourse in Latin on the various kinds of demons that philosophers have enumerated so that you will have a clearer and fuller understanding of Socrates' clairvoyance and his divine benefactor (*Soc.* 14. 150).

He, too, must have faced the blank, restive looks of incomprehension, "If you would show a little patience, I will recite the Greek verse in

---

[18] Koniaris 1982: 111-3. For a recent discussion of *ostensible* sophistic improvisation see Branham 1985.

[19] *Dialexis* 7. 6, Hobein (ed.) 1910.

[20] Koniaris 1982: 113-4; cf. fragment 5 of the so-called preface to Apul. *Soc.*, p. 168, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.

Latin" (*Soc.* 11. 145). Finally, the teacher recognizes his inability to communicate an abstruse subject to his listeners:

> I shall, therefore, dismiss this topic, the scope of which neither my words nor even those of my master Plato can satisfy. Since the subject far surpasses my modest ability, I shall sound the signal for retreat and at last call down my discourse from celestial considerations to earthly matters (*Soc.* 3. 125).

As Vallette and de'Conno have recognized, Apuleius can be likened to a Greek sophist who wants to teach, who wants his eloquence to serve a didactic purpose, "If a philosopher [appears in the theatre before you], you will learn" (*Fl.* 5. 2).[21] As is often the case in a teaching setting, the lecturer responds to the expressed and unvoiced desires of the listeners and to the pleasure that he derives from the sound of his own voice as it carries him on a wave of irrelevance. Eventually, the lecturer may realize that he is being carried far from the firm footing of his subject, but the listeners meanwhile are adrift in a flood tide of prolix, discursive and uneven progression:

> There is another category of gods that nature has denied to our senses but that we can comprehend by close intellectual scrutiny as we contemplate them more keenly with the keenness of our minds. Among them are the twelve gods arranged by name by Ennius in two lines of verse: Juno.../...Apollo, and others of this sort, whose names have long been familiar to our ears but whose powers are known to our intellects by conjecture as in the cours of our lives their various benefits are observed in those matters in which they individually take an interest.
>
> For the rest, the profane mob of those who are ignorant of philosophy, the mob devoid of sanctity, deprived of true reason, indigent of religion, incapable of truth—one part of this mob, out of a sense of timidity and in the grip of superstition, slights the gods despite the most scrupulous worship; the other part, out of a sense of temerity and in a state of defiance, slights the gods as objects of contempt. All these gods, who are located at the highest point of the ether and are separated from contamination by humans, are worshipped by most people, albeit without correct ritual; they are feared by all people, albeit out of ignorance; their existence is viewed by a few people, albeit impiously....But the subject of

[21] Vallette 1908: 188-9, de'Conno 1958-59: 64; cf. *Fl.* 9. 1-29 and 20. 9-10.

my discourse is not a debate about [human] error but apportionment within nature (*Soc.* 2. 121-3, 126).

The subject of this extract, the invisible presence of demons, is central to Apuleius' discourse. Although I am here more concerned with the shape of didactic expression than with its subject, it bears emphasizing that the notion of demons' indirect involvement in human affairs expressed in this passage contradicts the thesis of the rest of the discourse.[22] Apuleius seems to have been blinded to the logical development of his theme by the glitter of his own rhetoric. Within this short extract one can easily isolate the verbal mannerisms that characterize most of Apuleius' writing, such as the play on *acie* and *acrius* ("with keenness" and "more keenly") and *timida* and *tumida* ("out of a sense of timidity" and "out of a sense of temerity") or contrived parallelism:

nomina (1)...*auribus* (2)...*cognita* (3)
potentiae (1)...*animis* (2)...*coniectatae* (3),

where the numbered words correspond syntactically to their numerical equivalents, and:

plurimi sed non rite venerantur,
omnes sed inscie metuunt,
pauci sed impie diffitentur,

where the same type of contrived parallelism occurs. Add an extremely rare word or two (e. g. *rimabundi*) and superfluous literary erudition (Ennius' enumeration of twelve deities) and the result is verbal virtuosity that leads to...nothing: "But the subject of my discourse is not a debate about [human] error but apportionment within nature."

More germane but not without disruptive effects is the tendency to stud a discourse with comparisons and examples. In the course of explaining Plato's view that demons mediate between gods and humans, Apuleius employs a number of familiar examples from Roman history: dreams warned Hannibal that he would lose an eye, examination of entrails foretold a military disaster to Flaminius, augury

[22] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 210.

granted to Att(i)us Navius the miracle of the flint and various kinds of omens and prophesies foretold kingships for Tarquin Priscus and Servius Tullius—"All of that, as I said, [is evidence of] intermediate powers circulating between humans and the gods" (*Soc.* 7. 135-6). The resumptive phrase "as I said" (*ut dixi*) acknowledges the disruptive effect of the historical examples. Apuleius goes on to describe demons as subject to passions in the same way as humans are. This quality accounts for the diversity of religious expression among various peoples. Some deities delight in diurnal rites, others in nocturnal rites; some in freely accessible rites, others in secret rites; some in joyful sacrifices, ceremonies and rites, others in morose sacrifices, ceremonies and rites:

> ...so that Egyptian deities generally delight in vociferous lamentation, Greek deities for the most part in choral dances, barbarian deities, however, in the din of cymbalists, drummers and flautists. Likewise, there is a wide variety of regional differences in rites: the massed ranks of processions, the silence of the mystery rites, the duties of the priests, the compliance of the sacrificers; similarly, the effigies and the clothing of the gods, the religious regulations and the orientation of temples, the slaughter and the colour of sacrificial victims (*Soc.* 14. 149-50).

This enumeration of the varieties of religious experience continues until Apuleius acknowledges that it could be prolonged indefinitely:

> An abundant supply of this type of examples lies at my disposal but they are so celebrated and have been used so frequently that no one has undertaken to review them without omitting more of them than he has enumerated. Therefore, I shall for the time being forebear to fill my discourse with these matters..., which enjoy widespread familiarity among all peoples. It will be better to discourse in Latin on the subject of the various kinds of demons classified by philosophers (*Soc.* 14. 150).

This passage serves the strategic purpose of underscoring the importance of such knowledge and of marking the transition to the next stage of his discourse. However, it also contains the implication that the material that he has just elaborated is familiar and superfluous. Once again, therefore, he highlights the disruptiveness and unevenness of his didactic discourse.

The ostensibly didactic portions of the *Apology* abound in intentionally short-circuited misdirections. Apuleius concludes a two-

page *jeu d'esprit* on the philosophical importance of dentifrice: *Mitto haec* ("Enough of this") (9. 1; cf. 40. 1). After arguing ingenuously for some length that he is a Platonic philosopher because he, like Plato, has written erotic verse (10. 6-7) and after stating that he will not speak of the lofty and divine thoughts of Plato that are kept from the profane but doing exactly that for the rest of the chapter (12. 1), Apuleius acknowledges that he may have violated the injunction put into the mouth of Neoptolemus by the playwright Ennius that philosophizing is not to everyone's taste (13. 1) and begs the indulgence of the proconsul Claudius Maximus:

> I readily thank you, Maximus, for listening so intently to these parenthetical appendages to my defence of myself....And I therefore ask also that you listen willingly and carefully, as you have to this point, to what remains for me to say before [I turn] to the accusations themselves (13. 3-4).

The charge that Apuleius has dissected a fish leads to another short-circuited *reductio ad absurdum* that he concludes, "I have probably said more than I should have on this subject" (41. 4). Rapturous praise of the prolific advantages of a rural wedding concludes, "I now restrain myself in the midst of this excessively prolix set-piece" (88. 7).

The pattern is clear: Whatever the avowed subject, Apuleius deviates from it; he knows where he is going, but he chooses intentionally indirect routes that include vantage points for the viewing of his erudition. Indeed, he boasts of his lateral progress, "I am capable of disputing at even greater length, but I shall resume what I set out to do" (*Apol.* 55. 1-2).

From his analysis of Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* 16 Reardon has extrapolated seven rules of "indirect discourse," all of which apply to embellishing a topic while simultaneously avoiding it.[23] Koniaris has provided a detailed analysis of what he calls "The Thought Movement of Speech 25" of Maximus of Tyre, concluding:

> We have thus seen that speech 25 consists of a continuous drift of thought from motif to motif. The sections pertinent to each motif are per se coherent, but the transitions from motif to motif are incoherent....This

---

[23] Reardon 1971: 200-5.

tension in relevancy becomes all the stranger when we consider the title of the speech.[24]

Dialexeis 1, a translation of which is provided above, exemplifies another source of discontinuity that not only obscures the subject but threatens to obliterate it. The spoken essay professes to address the topic, "That a philosopher's discourse suits every issue." It proceeds to raise a myriad of issues while skirting the topic, as it lurches from one metaphor to another, from one historical or legendary example to another and from one infusion of literary texture to another; from the hackneyed metaphor of the drama of life and god the dramaturge to the multiple modes of music and of human thought, from the metaphor of humans behaving like a flock of sheep without a shepherd to that of a person failing to respond to the unpredictable variability of battle, from the metaphor of the soul contesting in athletic events to nature functioning like a shipwright, from the ponderously elaborated metaphor of hope motivating vocational choices back to another athletic metaphor. Into the bargain we get analogies between philosophy and music, bird song and flute music, the training of horses and the teaching of philosophy. Quotation of, and references to, Homer and Aeschylus are included, as are capsular digests of Pythagorean, Socratic and Cynic thought, emblematic metaphors of the social status of various Athenian philosophers and the physical prowess of certain mythical figures. By the time, if not before, Maximus recites his platitudinous credo, "I believe that old age is inferior to youth, poverty to wealth and obscurity to celebrity," one has the right to ask: What is the subject of this amorphous amalgam?

Koniaris suggests that Maximus "preach[es] as if in a trance."[25] Apuleius never gives that impression, but he frequently fails to focus on his topic. Although the apparent absence of the original beginning of *Florida* 2 precludes a definitive assessment of its thematic cohesiveness, it is clear from what survives that Apuleius on occasion, like Maximus, tends to lurch from one topic to another. The discourse ranges from the incongruously contrasted views of Socrates and Plautus to the equally incongruous pairing of the keen eyesight of eagles and the views expressed by Homer. It is likely that the complete

---

[24] Koniaris 1982: 120.

[25] Koniaris 1982: 120.

discourse dealt with the issue of the epistemological reliability of the various senses. However, this topic is left to plunge to the ground when Apuleius devotes all his descriptive powers to the soaring quest of the eagle. As Vallette puts it, the subject, whatever it is, is lost sight of; and the discourse becomes one more example of Apuleius' notorious *desultoria scientia* (the art of jumping from one horse to another).[26]

The possibility of incompleteness cannot come to the aid of *Florida* 9. The paraphrase that follows is intended to simulate its progression. The discourse ranges over Apuleius' defence of himself as a philosopher speaking to the Carthaginians assembled in unprecedented numbers to hear his discourse, a crowd critically attuned to his every word and conditioned by his past performances to expect perfection, a perfection capable of creating envy among some listeners, a perfection to be distinguished from that of those whose achievements as philosophers are limited to the outward badges of philosophers that they wear, just as the proconsul's herald delivers announcements from the tribunal and while wearing the toga, the one a public official, the other a public servant; like the proconsul whose words constitute a judgment and immediately become part of the public record, Apuleius' words are recorded immediately, words that have been crafted in more domains of the muses than the handicrafts that the sophist Hippias was able to master: "If you pay close attention, I will explain more thoroughly and precisely what I mean. Hippias was one of the sophists." For approximately the next 1½ pages, some 25 per cent of the discourse, Apuleius sketches Hippias' career and enumerates the articles of dress, ornament and toiletry crafted by the self-sufficient sophist, whose multifaceted ingenuity Apuleius admires but whose own varied talents find their outlet in a wide range of bilingual, exclusively literary and intellectual endeavours. When at last Apuleius reaches the putative theme of his address, a laudatory speech bidding farewell to the departing proconsul Severianus, the proconsul would be justified in wondering whether he was the recipient of a "send-off" or the victim of a "send-up" as Apuleius confers praise on himself instead of on the departing dignitary:

O best of proconsuls, would that I could offer you in their entirety and

[26] Vallette 1908: 165-6.

> completeness instead of in the form of single extracts [my all-encompassing range of writings] so that you could bear laudatory witness to the full range of my worship of the muses.[27]

Even in the midst of the convention-bound valediction Apuleius, like Maximus of Tyre, includes a kind of credo:

> But philosophy has taught me to love not only acts of beneficence but also those of evil intent, to trust in judgment rather than to pay attention to expediency and to prefer what benefits the common good rather than what benefits me.

In the forced paraphrase immediately preceding the two quotations above, I have tried to give an impression of the links that Apuleius contrives between one topic and the next, between, for instance, his own frequently attained perfection and the envy that it has created in others, between Hippias' banausic fabrication and his own intellectual creativity. Vallette observes astutely that such artificial links, which are intended to mask the discontinuity, serve only to underscore it and that in a more general and significant sense such discontinuity is an inevitable consequence of the practices taught in the rhetorical schools of the Roman Imperial period.[28]

The Locus Communis

The topic of the moment, the *locus communis* that is elaborated, the phrase that is balanced—these become the ends rather than the means to an end; the result is a disruption of focus. In the *Apology*, in spite of ridiculing the plaintiff Aemilianus from beginning to end as a country bumpkin, Apuleius cannot resist a prescribed eulogy of the bounty of the countryside when the opportunity presents itself. The eulogy is replete with sanctioned examples from the past and Greek literary precedent in the approved manner of the rhetorical schools. It is also replete with traditional images of sexual fecundity. These would have served a strategic purpose since any offspring produced by Apuleius and Pudentilla in the fertile countryside would be a threat to

---

[27] For the rules of the conventional valedictory speech see Menander Rhetor in Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 127-35.

[28] Vallette 1908: 159-60.

the plaintiffs' claim to the entire family fortune (*Apol.* 91. 8).[29] This implied threat comes at a cost, however. The eulogy contradicts the thrust of Apuleius' self-defence, and the barbed implication of future heirs risks damaging his case:

> "I now restrain myself in the midst of this excessively prolix set-piece in order not to gratify you [viz. Aemilianus] by eulogizing life in the countryside" (88. 7).

Apuleius is capable of matter-of-factly demolishing both the charge of being a desperately impoverished gold-digger (*Apol.* 92-3) and the accusation of attempting to avoid public scrutiny of his marriage by arranging to have it take place on Pudentilla's country estate instead of in town (*Apol.* 87-8). However, his rhetorical training and the conditioned expectations of his audience in the courtroom in Sabrata have predisposed them to savour disruptively flamboyant displays of erudition both for their own sake and for the strategic purpose of discrediting the plaintiffs.

Neither Apuleius nor Maximus of Tyre could resist the set-piece of Diogenes the Cynic and his jar, pouch and staff. I have already considered this ensemble in the context of the cultural heroes of the standardized curriculum of the second century and noted that the "rich man/poor man" theme was a conventional part of this nexus of the moralizing platitudes of the same syllabus (see p. 66). This is glaringly evident when Apuleius declares, "Indeed, I can produce for you a *controversia* (imaginary debate) on the word 'poverty'" and proceeds to produce the commonplaces of the rhetorical classroom (*Apol.* 20. 1-2) (see p. 66).

Again, it does not matter that Diogenes and his staff and pouch contradict Apuleius' earlier line of defence, "You [viz Aemilianus] may say that they are not the accoutrements of the Platonic sect but rather the badges of the Cynic family" (*Apol.* 22. 7). The entire assemblage—rich man/poor man, Diogenes'/Crates' contempt of wealth and their symbolic resonance that wealth does not guarantee virtue— far surpasses the immediate needs of rebuttal. It is the most declamatory passage in the *Apology* and is a striking example of one of the *loci communes* (commonplaces) of the rhetorical schools taking

---

[29] I am grateful to Dr B. L. Hijmans Jr. for this observation.

control of the internal logic of a work composed for a specific, immediate occasion, as the *Apology* was.[30]

One can appreciate how ingrained Diogenes' symbolic accoutrements had become in the thinking of second-century intellectuals from Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* 32. Diogenes' aggressive asceticism functions here as a kind of refrain. "Diogenes," Maximus declaims, "injected pleasure into that famous jar," and he proceeds to enumerate other badges of wilful self-deprivation so inextricably linked by centuries of scholastic tradition to the Cynic gadfly that neither they nor their opposites, equally familiar through centuries of sanctioned use, are thought to require any explanation beyond their mere mention:

> Diogenes delighted in his jar as Xerxes did in Babylon; Diogenes delighted in barley cake as Smindyrides did in rich, red sauces; he delighted indiscriminately in spring water as did Cambyses in the water of the Choaspe River alone; he delighted in sunshine as Sardanapalus did in cloth of royal purple; he delighted in his pouch as Croesus did in chests of treasures.[31]

Behind each of these "buzz-words" and their personalized opposites lies the syllabus of the rhetorical schools of the Roman Imperial period. In his critical edition of Maximus of Tyre, Hobein names some of the authors who recount or refer to the same commonplace components. Not surprisingly, moralizing compilers predominate, such second-century retailers of scholastically sanctioned anecdotes as Diogenes Laërtius, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch and Athenaeus.

Similarly, in *Dialexeis* 26, Maximus of Tyre reduces complex philosophical and ethical systems to single, representative words: Epicurus' atoms, Heraclitus' fire, Thales' water, Anaximenes' air, Empedocles' strife and Diogenes' jar.[32] The conditioned responses and referends are equally evident in *Dialexeis* 1. On this occasion they are in harmony with the stated theme and predominant metaphor, albeit

---

[30] Vallette 1908: 129-57.

[31] *Dialexis* 32. 9 a, Hobein (ed.) 1910. Cf. D. Chr. 64. 18, where Dio disclaims the practice of using laconically succinct phrases, e. g. "the good fortune of Anaxarchus" to convey the idea of misfortune, but within a few lines of this statement refers to Diogenes' staff and pouch.

[32] *Dialexis* 26. 2 f, Hobein (ed.) 1910.

somewhat obscured by being embedded in a catalogue of the heads of the major schools of Greek philosophy. The inevitable reference there to Diogenes' pouch and staff is followed immediately and equally inevitably by the reference to Sardanapalus, the symbol of excessive luxury also cited in the passage quoted above from *Dialexeis* 32. As in that *dialexis*, Maximus in *Dialexeis* 1 provides a catalogue of philosophers whose one- or two-word emblems are supposed to be representative of their philosophical positions (see p.102, line 289).

Apuleius concedes the irrelevance, even misappropriation of the badges of the Cynic philosophical sect. His scholastic conditioning continues to assert itself, however, and the result is the kind of catalogue of sanctioned contrasts that we have just seen in Maximus of Tyre:

> The pouch and the staff were nevertheless to Diogenes and Antisthenes what the crown is to kings, what the cloak is to commanders, what the cowl is to priests and what the trumpet is to augurs (*Apol.* 22. 7).

The invocation of Diogenes' time-honoured debate with Alexander the Great on the true nature of kingship and Diogenes' assertion of the authority of his staff over Alexander's sceptre follow in Apuleius, capped by his wry appropriation to himself of the god Hercules' staff (club) and animal-skin clothing (*Apol.* 22. 8-10). Even Apuleius seems to sense that he has gone too far in appropriating the achievements of "the traverser of Earth, the exterminator of wild beasts, the conqueror of peoples, that...god": "But if you despise these examples..." (*Apol.* 28. 1).

Apuleius may go beyond the bonds of decorum, but he remains firmly within the confines of the second-century rhetorical curriculum that has conditioned both him and Maximus of Tyre instinctively to invoke the same, habitual paradigms of moral authority from the past. The schooled, textbook declamation of the Greek East and the Latin West persistently asserts itself in the two second-century men of letters and contributes greatly to the shape of their discourses, as the force of tradition of their uniform rhetorical schooling repeatedly impedes the orderly, progressive development of their avowed themes.

Pulpit Oratory

A consideration of what can loosely be called pulpit oratory as a factor in the shape of second-century discourse arises naturally from my

discussion of the irresistible and intrusive power of the *locus communis* of Diogenes' aggressive asceticism. Intrusive, disruptive moralizing has a long literary tradition that can be traced from the time of Diogenes in the fourth century B. C. and Bion of Borysthenes at the end of the same century and the early part of the third century B. C. through Lucilius in the second half of the second century B. C. to the time of Horace and beyond. Indeed, Horace was to look back at his *Satires* (*Sermones*) and characterize their sometimes mordant wit as *Bionei sermones* ("Bionian diatribes") (*Ep*. 2. 2. 60). The disruptive force of moralizing is evident even in this accomplished writer. His first satire has generated much scholarly debate on its apparent lack of thematic cohesiveness. Whether or not it is possible to join its two thematic threads of human discontent and greed, the fact remains, as Fraenkel puts it, that "Horace himself seems to point to a 'suture'" when he states at line 108, 'I return to the point at which I deviated.'"[33]

Maximus of Tyre is no less the heir of some five-hundred years of sermonizing. In *Dialexeis* 1 a string of comparisons likening philosophical discourse to various activities eventually comes to rest on the notion of the soul, like an athlete, engaging in competition (see p. 97, line 94). At this point, in what Koniaris labels "an obscure passage," Maximus speaks of god implanting in mankind the twin seeds of love and hope (see p. 97, line 140).[34] Love is "light and soaring..., elevating the soul and providing for it a route to the fulfilment of its desires." Parenthetically, he equates the lifting power of the soul to what philosophers call impulse and adds that hope serves as the driving force of human impulse. Hope, he continues, stimulates people to undertake a variety of inevitably fruitless quests for gain. The tenuous link between the soul engaging in competitions and mankind being driven to undertake fruitless quests seems to be that nature (god) equips some souls better than others for successful competition since god has provided mankind with the needed psychological stimulus (hope) to persist until it succeeds in attaining the object of its quest: love/virtue. Unfortunately, god has not placed any limits on human desires (hopes), and thus those who pursue them become filled with a thirst for them that cannot be satisfied (see p. 99,

---

[33] Fraenkel 1957: 90.
[34] Koniaris 1983: 227.

line 159). The soul, however, pursues what is attainable, intrinsically beautiful, accompanied by love and achieved by hope and therefore participates in a successful competition (see p. 99, line 165). The business of the philosopher, Maximus concludes, is to teach others to pursue intrinsically beautiful, attainable goals rather than such unattainable objects of desire as wealth and pleasure.

As in Horace's first satire, even if one manages with some effort to make a case for thematic cohesiveness, the fact remains that Maximus, like Horace, is conscious of a suture; for Maximus reverts immediately to the interrupted metaphor: "I must again employ the image of athletes" (see p. 99, line 168). As well, both Horace and Maximus of Tyre enumerate a series of sometimes overlapping greed- or (vain) hope-driven occupations and pursuits; and in *Dialexeis* 15 Maximus' similar enumeration leads to the same conclusion as Horace formulates and is expressed with the same dramatic metaphor: If god, like a stage director, permitted the actors to change their roles, they would choose to play the same parts.[35] Both Rudd and Fraenkel have compiled lists of parallel "sermons" delivered by vagabond preachers whose philosophical point of view may loosely be labelled Cynic.[36] Similarly, Koniaris is able to assemble a multitude of passages of Cynic origin that parallel the dominant metaphor of *Dialexeis* 1: that human activity is part of a cosmic drama in which philosophers, like actors, are to be judged by how well they play their parts rather than by the outward appearance of their characters.[37]

For my purposes, which have to do with the shape of sophistic discourse, the loosely defined Cynic contents are less consequential than the pattern of the inexorable progression from a single word or idea overlaid with centuries of moralizing platitudes to disruptive, full-scale accounts and catalogues of sanctioned exempla that disrupt the flow of the avowed subject. When this occurs in the diatribes (*Satires*) of a consummate writer like Horace, we should not be surprised that the greatly heightened tendency fostered by the rhetorical schools of the second century to employ standardized exempla should occur in Maximus of Tyre and Apuleius.

Beaujeu remarks on the last third (21. 167 *ad finem*) of Apuleius'

---

35 Hor. *S.* 1. 1. 19; Max. Tyr. 1. 5 e-i and 15. 1 a-e, Hobein (ed.) 1910.

36 Rudd 1966: 20-1, Fraenkel 1957: 92-3.

37 Koniaris 1983: 220-3.

On the God of Socrates:

> *On a constaté depuis longtemps que la dernière partie du traité ne s'accorde pas exactement avec les deux premières et qu'elle a tous les charactères d'une diatribe.... C'est une mosaïque de lieux communs, empruntés à la prédication stoïco-cynique et présentés dans la forme propre au genre parénétique.*[38]

What begins as a systematic demonology and an enquiry into the nature of Socrates' personal demon eventually becomes instead an exhortation to Apuleius' sceptical audience ("I believe that most of you are reluctant to believe what I have just said" [20. 166]) to cultivate the soul.

This topic provides an entrée to an area of concern trodden by many moralists. The *Moral Letters* of the younger Seneca range over a wide variety of moral and ethical topics and often run parallel to moral issues addressed by Apuleius. The latter's homily begins:

> Nothing amazes me so much as the fact that although all people desire to live in the best way possible and know that this can be achieved only by living a spiritual life and that you must cultivate your mind in order to live well, nevertheless they do not cultivate their souls. Yet, if a person wants to see well, he must care for his eyes, which are the instruments of vision; if you want to run quickly, you must care for your feet, which are the instruments of running; likewise, if you want to box effectively, you must strengthen your arms, which are the instruments of boxing (*Soc*. 21. 168).

A day spent at a kind of boxing match inspires similar reflections in Seneca:

> I meditate on the fact that so many exercise their bodies, so few their minds; that so great a crowd throngs to a mock sporting contest, so much absence attends the liberal arts; that they whose minds are weak are those whose upper arms and shoulders we admire. This above all I ponder to myself: if the body can be conditioned by exercise to endure simultaneously both punches and kicks from more than one person; and if a person [can be conditioned] to spend a day enduring the blazing sun in

[38] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 244.

hot dust while dripping blood, how much easier can the soul be strengthened (*Ep.* 80. 2-3).[39]

To varying degrees, the material of the past few pages, which took its impetus from the routine use of Diogenes the Cynic as a symbol of contempt of material wealth in the second-century scholastic tradition, has centred on the theme of inner worth. Predictably, the theme of neglect of one's spiritual and intellectual development while in the midst of material opulence frequently asserts itself. It appears in the "diatribes" of three writers whom I have repeatedly cited in the past half-dozen pages: Horace, the younger Seneca and Apuleius.

Seneca, in a letter that ostensibly addresses the subject of erudite garnering, begins: "They say that we ought to imitate bees, which flit about and cull nectar from flowers suitable for making honey" (*Ep.* 84. 3; see p.71). Seneca's own practice of culling from earlier authorities then leads to disruptive speculation on the process of making honey, which he eventually recognizes as a digression, "But not to be led from the topic at issue, we ought to imitate bees," and we are back at the starting point. Seneca then adheres to the subject for almost two pages before answering the imaginary question: how is the mind to be equipped with a multitude of arts, precepts and paradigms that are all blended into a unified pattern of life. Again, the floodgates of countless moralizing diatribes are thrown open and the reader is soon invited to be disgusted by the spectacle (*intueris*) of the opulence that does moral harm to the wealthy and humiliates their hangers-on.

Apuleius, too, in his paeon of the life of the mind, which functions as a kind of adjunct to the professed demonology of the work *On the God of Socrates*, invites the reader to witness (*spectes*) the soul-destroying extravagance of the wealthy man who, like Horace's *quidam sordidus ac dives*, is morally bankrupt in the midst of great material wealth, ...*qui solus Tantali vice in suis divitiis inops* ("...who like Tantalus is needy in the midst of his own wealth") (*Soc.* 22. 171; cf. Hor. *S.* 1. 1. 68).

Apuleius concludes, "For [the rich man] does not understand that

---

[39] Like Max. Tyr. 1. 4. a-c, Hobein (ed.) 1910 (line 94 in my translation; see p. 97), Sen. *Ep.* 78. 16 develops the analogy of the trials of athletes and philosophers and distinguishes between the prizes for which the two groups contest, e. g. the apples of the Pythian games as opposed to virtue, strength of mind and everlasting tranquility.

rich people ought to be regarded in the same way as we [value and] purchase horses" (*Soc.* 22. 172). Predictably, he insists that the purchaser look beyond the various equine trappings to the horse itself. Equally predictably, he enjoins, "In considering people, do not value what is adventitious, but consider the intrinsic worth of the person himself" (*Soc.* 23. 173-4).

I wrote "equally predictably" because through repeated exposure to this kind of diatribe one can instinctively predict the course that it is going to follow. Consider Seneca's subsequent development of the initial theme, "...how many people exercise their bodies, how few their minds": "When you are going to buy a horse, you insist that its blanket be removed so that its physical defects will not be hidden" (*Ep.* 80. 9). Maximus of Tyre develops the theme of "inner worth as opposed to external trappings" with a different, albeit no less routine image (see p.102, line 273)

Seneca himself admits just before recycling the previously quoted example of the person buying a horse:

> I am too frequently compelled to use this analogy, which is nevertheless effective in expressing human life as a drama [literally, mime] that assigns to us parts that we play badly. The person who struts expansively on the stage and with his head raised back and utters these words, "Behold! I lord over Argos...," is a slave....You may say the same of all those elegant people whom sedan chairs transport above the heads of the masses of mankind. The good fortune of all these people is a mask that they wear. If you tear it away, you will despise them (*Ep.* 80. 7-8) (see p. 113).

Immediately after insisting that one must scrutinize the philosopher's inner worth rather than his external trappings (see p., 102, line 273), Maximus of Tyre rehearses his version of the familiar pattern of moralizing just quoted from Seneca: the outer, adventitious qualities of the philosopher are like actors' costumes disguising alike ruler and slave (see p.102, line 277).

The writers whom I have been considering, whether like Horace they are held in high esteem or like Maximus of Tyre are generally relegated to the lower ranks, tend to express the clichés in habitual analogies, as though a computer prompt had provided only one optional response. The result for the reader is that he can instinctively sense where he is being taken by the writer within any "block" of text, to maintain the computer analogy; but the blocked text becomes the

"document," as the reader is unable to retrieve the original document and cannot predict whether another coded command word or theme such as "Diogenes the Cynic—Shift—Enter" will lead to another string of inappropriate options. I have attempted to use the "Reveal Codes" command, to penetrate behind the cluttered monitor in order to see what commands have been entered. They cannot now be deleted, but the reader can now see why his progress has been governed by commands prompted more by centuries of convention than by the dictates of internal logic.

Rhetorical Conditioning

Of course, convention did not programme itself in the commands. Influential teachers and manuals of rhetoric were responsible for this. The chapters on the "talk" in the so-called *Treatise II* that is associated with Menander Rhetor are particularly instructive.[40] On the subject of structure the treatise advises:

> A "talk" does not aim to preserve a regular order as other speeches do....The best arrangement in a "talk" is to avoid proceeding always on the same track, but to display continuous disorder;

and again:

> We should note as a general rule about the "talk" that we are able to express any subject we choose in this medium, without observing any technical rules of order.[41]

Topics that Menander Rhetor recommends for the free-form "talk" include:

> The cicada mimics the singing birds;

and:

> Outstanding lyre-players—Orpheus, Arion, Amphion—and notable flute-

---

[40] The references and quotations that follow are from Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981.

[41] Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 121.

> players and prophets, and indeed the successes of famous artists generally.[42]

I have already emphasized the discontinuity (Menander's "continuous disorder") of Greek writers of the Roman Imperial period and of Apuleius. As explained below, the sanctioned practice of discursive discourse conforms to contemporary taste and expectation (see p. 122). Quintilian recognizes that Cicero's mythological excursus on the rape of Proserpina in his speech in the prosecution of Verres was spoken "not in order to instruct but in order to embellish" (*Inst.* 9. 4. 127). The discussion that follows highlights Maximus of Tyre's and Apuleius' manipulation of some of Menander's recommended themes, which they tenuously link to the theme of intrinsic worth.

Maximus is conscious of a "suture" in his *Dialexeis* 1 (see p. 112). The athletic metaphor that he felt compelled to resume at that point soon gives way to the analogy of a musician whose efforts are admired but not imitated. This is turn leads to an anecdote about a keeper of birds, whose birds chirp haphazardly at dawn each day until they begin to mimic a neighbouring flautist and eventually respond to his first notes like a chorus responding to the down beat of the director. Maximus then invites others to join him in song. His song, unlike that of the birds, is articulate and thoughtful, because, unlike them, his teaching relies on philosophical discourse rather than superficial mimicry. Thus his line of argument, which at first glance appears to lack any cohesion, turns out to be based on ancient rhetorical theory. His rivals, philosophers only in their ability to mimic the appearance of philosophers, are like cicadas mimicking the song of birds.

The full context of Apuleius *Florida* 4 cannot be recovered. However, the line of argument can easily be inferred from other discourses of the period and from the two recommended topics quoted above from Menander Rhetor. Apuleius recounts the story of Antigenidas, the most skilful flautist of his time, who resented the fact that horn players who performed at funerals were awarded the elevated title of flautist. What survives of the speech concludes, "He [viz. Antigenidas] would observe that [in our time] both corpses and philosophers are draped in the philosophers' gown."

It is very likely that the complete speech, in the fashion of the Greek sophists, issued a warning to Apuleius' audience to guard

---

[42] Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1991: 119 and 123.

against being influenced by false philosophers, that is, by those whose only claim to philosophical status depended on their mimicry of the outer badges of philosophers. We can see this line of argument in a discourse of Apuleius' near contemporary Dio Chrysostom. He explains to his audience that when he refers to philosophers he is not speaking of those who are so labelled only on the basis of external appearance and the title that they adopt. "For," he adds, "intelligent people do not judge...a man to be educated from his external appearance" (*Or*. 49. 11). He then relates the same anecdote as Apuleius about a "not insignificant" flautist, Ismenias by name instead of Antigenidas, who, according to an unnamed recent philosopher, "was especially annoyed that horn players at funerals were called flautists."[43]

In the propempticon that he delivers to mark the proconsul Severianus' completion of his term of office in Carthage Apuleius uses the occasion to defend himself as a philosopher. He distinguishes himself from those who, he says, and as he has repeatedly stated, go about begging while dressed in the philosophers' gown (*Fl*. 9. 9). In this discourse, which appears to be complete, it is possible to see that Apuleius' preoccupation with his own role and his concern to distinguish between himself and those who only mimic that role have allowed a scholastic platitude to intrude in the admittedly malleable structure of the propemptic "talk."

Florida 13 is patently incomplete, but even in its incompleteness shows distinct affinities to Maximus of Tyre' use of the theme that at best birds can only mimic trained human musicians. What remains of Apuleius' truncated discourse begins abruptly:

> For philosophy has not bestowed discourse on me in the same way as nature has provided certain birds with song that is fleeting and occurs at limited and specified times.

The discourse concludes with the claim made by Maximus of Tyre that his philosophical discourses are suitable for all times:

> But the reasoned discourse of philosophy, you see, is timeless, admirable

---

[43] D.Chr. 32. 61 includes Ismenias in the company of Menander Rhetor's "outstanding lyre-players—Orpheus, Arion, Amphion" in the context of an attack against destructive, lyre-playing Cynic philosophers.

> to hear, useful to understanding and capable of producing music of every measure.

The musical analogy also recalls Maximus' insistence that philosophy is "polyphonic" (see p.96, line 33).

The final example of scholastic imperatives shaping the broad heading "Intrinsic Worth versus Appearance" involves the sanctioned use of anecdotes. Once again, Menander Rhetor provides an instance of theoretical underpinning. He recommends that Plutarch's *Lives* be used for "talks" as a source of "stories, apothegms, proverbs and anecdotes."[44]

Florida 7 presents the frequently recited anecdote about Alexander the Great issuing an injunction against all but authorized artists producing his likeness. This famous anecdote serves as Apuleius' springboard for a hypothetical injunction issued by philosophy:

> Would that the same sort of edict be applied to philosophy so that only a few good practitioners would represent it, truly learned men who think deeply about every aspect of wisdom instead of the crude, filthy and ignorant men who imitate philosophers only in their mode of dress (see p. 83).

As in Plutarch, anecdotes abound in Maximus of Tyre.[45] *Dialexeis* 25 (Hobein [ed.] 1910), for instance, opens with the familiar anecdote about the quest of the sixth-century Scythian sage Anacharsis for wisdom. He found it not in Athens or any other major Greek cultural centre but instead in Chenae, "a small, poor municipality," in the person of Myson. He was skilled in managing his household, land, married life and child; he was, in short, a paradigm of well ordered private life. Maximus draws the conventional moral: abundance of actual accomplishments surpasses vainglorious display. The moral of this familiar anecdote serves as a springboard for other, less and less directly related anecdotes, as Maximus gradually shifts towards the

---

[44] Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 122-3. See, too, Sen. *Ep.* 33. 7, "Therefore we give pupils aphorisms and what the Greeks call *chreiai* to learn by heart."

[45] Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 301.

notion: inner worth versus outward display.[46]

Dialexeis 13 (Hobein [ed.] 1910), headed "If Divination Exists, What Power Do We Humans Possess?," begins with anecdotes from Athenian history and proceeds by a series of analogies: god as the manufacturer of a musical instrument imposing, like a choral master, the principle of harmony; god as a tool maker; "if you must have a sharper image of god, imagine god as a general, existence his army, mankind his infantry, destiny as his standard" and so on. Historical anecdotes follow: Pherecydes, Hippocrates and Timesius of Clazomenae and their inspired interventions on behalf of their compatriots.[47] These are followed by quotations from Euripides and Homer that give way to an extended anecdote about Croesus' disastrously wilful misinterpretation of an oracle, of which Cicero wrote, "Who does not know what Pythian Apollo said to Croesus?" (*Div.* 1. 19. 37); then, "You see that the life of mankind is [like] a polity." Maximus concludes this collection of anecdotes and *exempla* with the admission, "This material dealing with divination creates confusion in my mind."

Towards the end of the *On the Universe* (24. 341 *ad finem*), where he treats what he calls the principal subject of his treatise— god as the ruler of the universe—, Apuleius likewise proceeds by a series of analogies, although they are embedded in firmer substance than is the case in Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* 13.[48] From the general proposition that god, like military, political, civic and domestic leaders, does not apply his own hands to everything that must be done Apuleius proceeds to familiar and detailed anecdotes about the delegated authority of all-powerful Persian satraps (25. 345-26. 349). To illustrate the underlying order of the universe, he again resorts to

[46] See the detailed analysis of Koniaris 1982: 114-20. See also Apuleius' anecdotal account of the self-sufficient sophist Hippias in *Fl.* 9 and his account in *Fl.* 15 of Pythagoras as a man of few words but many accomplishments, which accords with Maximus of Tyre's second *exemplum* in *Dialexis* 25.

[47] On Pherecydes see p. 82.

[48] The complex details of the authorship of the Latin *On The Universe* will be discussed in Chapter Four. Apuleius has derived the substance of his analogies from a pseudo-Aristotelian work of the same title, but given his tendency to adapt freely and the fact that he found them congenial they are no less characteristic features of his adaptation.

an analogy, "This must be viewed by an opposite analogy" (28. 352). He then, like Maximus of Tyre, compares imposing harmony on the universe with the way a choral master achieves a harmonious blend of low-pitched and high-pitched voices (29. 355). Similarly, "One may compare what I am speaking of with the situation in a battle" (30. 357); and, "We may draw analogies from a conception of lower order" (31. 359). The familiar anecdote about the sculptor Phidias incorporating his own likeness into the shield of the statue of Athena that protects the Athenian acropolis serves as an analogy for god providing for the well-being of the universe by infusing it with the power of his godhead (32. 361):

> Finally, what the steersman is aboard a ship, the driver is on his chariot, the conductor is in a chorus, law is in a city, the general is in an army, this is what god is in the universe (35. 365)

As well as constructing his treatise around a series of anecdotes and analogies in the fashion of Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius also makes use of his Greek counterpart's practice of incorporating literary quotations and paraphrases into the texture of his treatise, sometimes to the detriment of the development of his theme.[49]

It has not been my intention to suggest that Maximus of Tyre and Apuleius were incapable of writing direct, coherent expository prose or expressing lucid thoughts in spoken form. In comparing the two men, I have tried to illustrate that they and other Greek and Latin men of letters worked within a literary tradition that was shaped by discontinuity or what Menander calls "continuous disorder." The rhetorical heritage that they all share is the tendency to engage a topic obliquely. The time-tested rhetorical goal to *amplificare rem ornando* ("to enhance a subject by embellishing it") relies above all on *loci communes*, as the writers and speakers move from the particular to the general.[50] Their anecdotal generalisations were the common heritage of all who were educated in the post-classical rhetorical tradition of the Greek and Roman cultures. The danger of this approach to developing a theme, as I have tried to illustrate, is that the generalizing *loci communes* can take on a life of their own. In other words, there is the

---

[49] E. g. see Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 356, n. 1.

[50] The quoted Latin phrase comes from Cic. *De Orat.* 3. 26. 104.

risk of failing to subordinate the parts to the whole.

Progressio Interrupta

There are several parallels between Apuleius and his contemporary philhellene Favorinus as purveyors of popularized, anecdotal intellectual history (see pp. 33, 80, 83). One of Favorinus' three substantially complete extant works, the *On Exile*, displays the same kind of interrupted progression as we have seen in Apuleius and Maximus of Tyre.[51] The work, a kind of *consolatio sui*, belongs to the 130s, when Favorinus fell out of favour with Hadrian and was exiled to the island of Chios. In spite of an unmistakable structure that progresses systematically from one category of the consequences of exile to another, the meditation abounds in intrusions of extended metaphors, literary, mythical and historical *exempla* and literary quotations. As is the case in Maximus of Tyre and Apuleius, the reader is often challenged to isolate the thread of thematic development from the patchwork of scholastic accretions.

The truncated opening chapter cites the familiar examples of Empedocles, Hercules and the Roman general Mucius having their fortitude put to the test in the face of deprivation. The lacunose second chapter, in order to illustrate that people have been strengthened by the exemplary words and deeds of others, cites the equally familiar precedents of the Cynics Diogenes and Crates, Alcibiades, Themistocles, Coriolanus and Socrates. Chapter 3 is less lacunose:

> Socrates himself always [...] maintained that actors were assigned parts in tragedies at the pleasure of the playwright, now playing the role of King Agamemnon, now that of the beggar Telephus, or that of Tydeus fleeing into exile or that of lame Philoctetes [...]. Their appearance and voices are governed by the requirements of the play, and they express no surprise at inhabiting the royal palaces of Mycene or at taking possession of the golden fleece and lording over all the Peloponnese, while in the

---

[51] The *editio princeps* of the *On Exile* appeared in 1931; I have used the text of Barigazzi (ed.) 1966. Part of the proem and the conclusion of the work are missing from the third-century papyrus containing it. The other two extant works of Favorinus, absorbed into the manuscript tradition of Dio Chrysostom (= *Orations* 37 and 64), have long been known and served as the basis of Vallett's conclusion that Apuleius had more in common with Favorinus than with any other Greek sophist.

> same theatre on the same day they dress in rags and beg at strangers' doors, thinking nothing of it that [in Euripides' play *Antigone*] "Odysseus was at first the most fortunate / and then became the most wretched of human beings."[52]
>
> They understand, I believe, that none of this is theirs, not kingdoms, or wealth, or the mansions of wealthy Aleus, not the [royal] race of Tantalus or Labdacus, not poverty or exile; but that these belong to the plot and the playwright and that they must play other parts at other times until the play ends.
>
> In the drama of life shall we be vexed at god the dramaturge of all the universe if at one time he orders us to play the part of rulers, at another the part of exiles; at one time to be wealthy, at another destitute? Will the actors accustomed to being illustrious and prosperous and in possession of authority and power suppose that the current circumstances will be constant; or will they at times of misery, misfortune, banishment and total deprivation suppose that they will not change roles and characters? [Or will they suppose], when they become rulers and leaders, that they will be the same internally as the wretched outer appearance that they have nurtured from the time of infancy in the course of making all sorts of changes in character in accordance with their roles?

The rest of chapter 3 is highly lacunose; but enough of it remains to show that the legendary figures Oenomaus and Pandion, who were the subjects of tragedies staged in Athens, are included by Favorinus in his extended dramatic metaphor.

Chapter 4 continues the theme of changed fortunes but allows the dramatic metaphor to lapse. The method of developing a subject by embellishing it with a plethora of examples from the past is evident in the first sentence that is intact enough to warrant translation:

> [....] If, heaven forbid!, you should suffer misfortune rather than good fortune, look to the wisest men of the past, who acquired no less distinction from [their unfortunate] circumstances than from success. This is the case with [the Cynic] Diogenes, whom I mentioned a short time ago. At home he had the reputation of being a poor assayer of silver; but when exiled to a new place of residence, he became, while in exile, although impoverished and utterly destitute, a person of renown not only in [his native] Sinope but throughout the world.
>
> This is the case with Hercules. At home he was regarded as the mortal son of Amphitryon; but when banished by Erystheus, he grappled

[52] Cf. Maximus of Tyre *dialexis* 1. 1 a-d, Hobein (ed.) 1910, quoted p. 93.

with all sorts of wild beasts, mingled with all sorts of people, endured the most extreme assaults on his body and as a consequence became known as the son of Zeus and acquired immortal fame.

Homer created Odysseus in [the second] half of the story as a man who became wise. Although he ruled over Ithaca and the people of Cephallenia and the neighbouring islands and had Penelope and a perfect household and appeared to be superior to all the islanders, nevertheless he acquired a reputation among the Achaeans for being cowardly because he hesitated to join them in battle against Troy. Indeed, in the battle itself he was not regarded as a good warrior, but he showed his mettle and endurance when he experienced shipwreck. He was devastated when he caused his companions to perish from hunger on the shore. He was reduced to misery and to wearing shameful rags and for this reason was neglected while remaining faithful to the authority of one woman. What Phoenician or Phaeacian trader in possession of a fast ship has as much resolve as Odysseus did in shipwreck? What Sybarite or Ionian or Sicilian delights as much in his bountiful table of all sorts of food as Odysseus did on the shore? Who has gained strength from the number and power of friends as much as he did while losing his companions? Who while in possession of authority and dynastic power has prevailed over his enemies as much as he did? What sort of person has ever been as good an adviser to another as he was to himself and to others and as in this [verse from the *Odyssey*], "'Be firm, my heart,' he said; 'you have on other occasions endured worse dog-days'"?[53]

I do not want to give up or to fail now, exhorting myself not only at times of good fortune or, like some, at times of bad fortune but rather in these circumstances especially to be wise and to show myself to be so. This is what happens to athletes as they enter the stadium. Their dear friends customarily encourage them in various ways and say to them as well that these are the eponymous games of mighty Zeus at Pisa for which they have expended so much labour, time and sweat and that they should remember that it is necessary to strive so that they will not have been squandered fruitlessly.

In the circumstances the best course for me seems to be to exhort myself and to remind myself, as one person to another:

"These are the very occurrences and changes of fortune for which you have been preparing your own soul from the time of childhood. You will learn this from the ancient deeds and words that pertain to virtue, from encounters with the notable people in our presence, indeed throughout Greece and foreign lands; from witnessing, hearing of and recalling what

[53] *Od.* 20. 18. The rest of chapter 4 is severely lacunose.

happens in and beyond each place and what contributes exclusively to this exercise of virtue. Look, the pre-ordained time is at hand, not 'the fifty months and sixteen days' of which Pindar speaks, according to a decree of Pelops or of a certain ancient Cretan priest of the goddess Cybele, a decree for all [Hellenes], one enacted not by a person but by god and Time.[54] At the appointed hour you must strip and fight singlehandedly without holding back. Many glorious and famous contestants have profited from their previous struggles.[55] You must not despise them [i. e., the struggles] but rather strive to conquer them in your mind, as if [fighting] against all human opinions, desires, [...] instincts and passions, which aggravate all circumstances and now want to make your exile itself more difficult."

It is not untimely in this situation to list and cite them [i. e., the struggles attendant on exile] by name. [A truncated list follows: longing for family and friends, loss of wealth and possession and of liberty.] They all [viz. human opinion, desires, instincts and passions] stand arrayed against the naked soul of the afflicted person and want to humiliate it by tripping it and throwing it to the ground. They all gang up and each grips it and puts a strangle hold of grief on its throat. They do not want to take turns according to the rules of contests, but they gang up and plot against a single soul. Even the assembled spectators assist them by shouting down cheers from above and offering encouragement to their familiar companions. The person being struck must not give in to their jeers and shouts. For the contest is not on the stage in the theatre of Dionysus, where the person who makes the most people weep or laugh earns victory; but it is a trial of virtue in the temple of Hercules. It is a contest of deeds rather than of words. One must scorn the noisy roar of disapproval and any sort of noisy crowd while preserving hope in himself alone and holding steadfast in his naked soul in the midst of bright sun and dry dust. For the rewards are the promise of great happiness if we do not despair of it.

As I acknowledged at the outset of my translation of approximately twenty per cent of the substantially complete *On Exile* of Favorinus,

---

[54] As Barigazzi (ed.) 1966: 426 notes, Favorinus has mistakenly assigned to Pindar a phrase that belongs to Bacchylides. It refers to the awarding of prizes to the victorious athletes on the sixteenth day of the month in which the Olympic games took place and to the fact that two Olympiads spanned ninety-nine months, the one occurring in the fiftieth month, the other in the forty-ninth month.

[55] Because of damage to the papyrus the text of the sentence just translated is uncertain.

this open-letter *consolatio sui* progresses systematically in enumerating the various losses suffered by an exiled person. Nevertheless, one would be forgiven for failing to discern its subject. In the translated extract, exile itself is referred to only twice.[56] Within the overall framework of thematic progression, movement occurs by infrequent spurts, as a welter of quotations, allusions and paradigms impedes steady advance.

Following hard on the heels of the reference to exile in the severely truncated chapter 2 comes a listing of historical figures who have braved exile. However, mention of Socrates' principled decision to face imprisonment and death rather than to seize the opportunity to escape leads in the next chapter to his observation that the social circumstances of people fluctuate like the roles assigned to actors by playwrights. From this notion it is only a short step to the metaphor of life as a drama and god as dramaturge assigning varied, temporary roles. The concept of the mutability of life and its metaphorical vehicle were popular with moralizers such as Horace, Seneca and Maximus of Tyre. Maximus' *Dialexeis* 1, in fact, begins where Favorinus' *consolatio sui* does, "Surely, actors...who at one time speak the part of Agamemnon, at another that of Achilles..." (see p. 95, line 3). Both Favorinus and Maximus hasten to include quotations of, and references to, Homer within the dramatic metaphors. In the case of Favorinus, Homer's Odysseus soon upstages the dramatic metaphor, but not before the heroic paradigms of Diogenes the Cynic and Hercules, whom we have repeatedly encountered in moralizing diatribes, have been dutifully named.

Finally, the metaphorical worlds of Dionysus' stage and the *Odyssey* give way to the test of steadfastness in the arena. We have also seen this metaphor developed in Maximus of Tyre and the younger Seneca, where, as in Favorinus, one's soul, alone and stripped of its defensive armour, grapples in the dust and under the blazing sun against moral and emotional adversaries.

---

56 According to the "Indice delle parole" of Barigazzi (ed.) 1966 cognate forms of "exile" occur seventeen times in the entire fragment.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate the blend of rhetoric and scholasticism that I believe characterizes the intellectual activity of the second century, both in the Greek East and the Latin West. This period of intellectual activity overlaps the outburst of the Greek intellectual renaissance that has been know since the time of Philostratus as the Second Sophistic.

Second-century scolasticism, which employed similar methods and had similar goals in both classical cultures, promoted a limited range of sanctioned *exempla*. They include Diogenes the Cynic and the elevation of the spiritually rich but materially poor person over the materially rich but spiritually impoverished person. For my purposes, the repeated subjects of the *exempla* are less important than their disruptive impact, as the force of tradition pre-empts the systematic development of a topic. This is to be expected when rhetorical instruction as preserved in Menander Rhetor promotes "continuous disorder." Instances of this discontinuity occur in what I have loosely called moralizing diatribes of writers as seemingly disparate as Horace, Seneca, Maximus of Tyre, Favorinus and Apuleius. Whatever the avowed subject, the opportunity to indulge in what I also called pulpit oratory could not be resisted. I have focused on one facet of this, the contrast between inner worth and outer display, which we have seen expressed in hackneyed analogies, metaphors and paradigms.

Underlying all this standardized recycling is the so-called Cult of the Past. It expressed itself in the attempt artificially to revive ossified languages, in reliance on earlier authorities, in bibliomania, in the tendency to *voir l'universe à travers des bibliothèques*, in the recycling of legendary figures of heroic prowess and intellectual heroes and in the concomitant reliance on compendia, *historiae omnigenae* and miscellanies. In short, in the words of Apuleius, *usitata nove proferre*.

CHAPTER FOUR

ORATOR SOPHISTICUS LATINUS

In the previous three chapters I considered Apuleius in the wider context of the Greek Second Sophistic. I shall now focus more narrowly on the oratorical works of Apuleius that were shaped by the intellectual and scholastic forces of the period. R. Helm, one of the modern editors of the Apuleian corpus, has maintained that the *Apology* is "ein Meisterwerk" of the Second Sophistic.[1] This assessment, as we shall see, is equally true of the *Florida*.

The Apology

The *Apology* is the extant version of Apuleius' defence of himself against charges of practising magic. The trial took place in the coastal town of Sabrata before the proconsul of Africa, Claudius Maximus, during the period spanning 158-159. We cannot be certain that the words spoken by Apuleius at his trial are identical to those of the published version.[2] On another occasion, when addressing the Senate and dignitaries of Carthage, Apuleius promises to publish in a book a fuller version of the *gratiarum actio* (speech of thanks) than he has just pronounced in gratitude to the Carthaginians for their commitment to erect a statue in his honour (*Fl.* 16. 47-8). Conversely, he states elsewhere that his words are recorded as quickly as and exactly as spoken and cannot therefore be altered (*Fl.* 9. 13). In the *Apology* itself, the "mechanics" of the courtroom are rigorously maintained,

---

[1] Helm 1955.

[2] On the practice of publishing revised versions of speeches see Lucian's *Apology* and Philostr. *VS* 579. The most famous example is Cicero's *Pro Milone*. For further details see Winter 1969: 607-12. Elsom 1985: chapter 5 entertains the possibility that the speech is a rhetorical exercise: "After Plato's *Apology*."

giving the illusion at least if not the actual substance of a real trial.[3]

Thus it is appropriate to consider the *Apology* as an example of an *orator sophisticus Latinus* engaging in forensic oratory. This branch of public speaking is one of the major Greek sophistic activities of the period, another being epideictic oratory, which is represented in the *Florida*. On at least one occasion these two branches of public speaking merge. Aelius Aristides, arguing for his immunity to having to perform public service, characterizes the situation as having "more of the air of an oratorical display than of a lawsuit."[4] This sophistic blend of application and display, of case in point and display case, informs the *Apology* and as much as any other feature aligns Apuleius with coeval Greek sophists.

Before considering the *Apology* as a virtuoso performance in the mould of the Greek sophists' oratorical road shows, however, it is as well to recognize that it also functions effectively as a defence both against specific charges that, if upheld, could have resulted in the death penalty and, more broadly, as a defence of philosophy. In Apuleius' words, "I undertake the defence not only of myself but truly that of philosophy as well" (*Apol.* 3. 5).[5] This is not to say that the two lines of defence do not cross.

Approximately the first twenty-seven chapters are devoted to developing and maintaining the implication that only the ignorant misconstrue the actions of philosophers. In this part of the work Apuleius repeatedly discredits his opponents with labels such as *durus et rusticus* (9. 1); *rusticanus, agrestis...et barbarus* (10. 6) and *incultus et agrestis* (23. 5). He expresses the contrast that he is determined to highlight in a number of pointed dichotomies, for instance:

> *Tu* [viz. Aemilianus] *rusticando obscurus et ego discendo occupatus* (16. 10) ("You are hidden in rustic obscurity and I am engaged in learning");

---

[3] E. g. evidence is read into the record at 38, 55, 70, 80, 94 and 96; and the water clock that regulated the duration of speeches in courtrooms is mentioned on more than one occasion, e. g. 96.

[4] *Or.* 50. 91, trans. Behr 1981: II, p. 336; see also Philostr. *VS* 516 and, in general, Russell 1983: 12-3.

[5] Cf. *Apol.* 1.3. See also Tatum 1979: 119 and, on the capital crime of practising magic, MacMullen 1967: 122.

and:

> ...*de finibus agrorum litiganti an de finibus bonorum et malorum docenti?* (15. 10) ("...to one quibbling about the boundaries of cultivated fields or to one counselling about the boundaries of good and evil?").[6]

The insults of this sort that are directed at the plaintiffs' spokesman Aemilianus are not the gratuitous instances of defamation of character that were widespread in the law courts of classical antiquity and of which Quintilian complains (*Inst.* 2. 1. 11). They are, rather, Apuleius claims, part of a systematic plan to eradicate the slanderous innuendo that the plaintiffs have employed to discredit him. In his own words:

> "I believe that it is necessary for the sake of preserving my reputation to rebut all the slanderous insults before I confront the actual charge" (3. 4).

Similarly, he thanks the judge for listening attentively to what he labels "necessary appendages to my defence" and urges him to attend diligently to the *ipsa crimina* ("the actual charges") (13. 3-4). This kind of "appendages" annoyed Quintilian, who remarks that they passed from the declaimers' repertoire to the law courts. He concedes, however, that they can serve the tactical function of discrediting one's opponents (*Inst.* 4. 3. 4-6). Apuleius summarizes the frivolous accusations that have necessitated the "appendages" in this way:

> "Are you not making contradictory accusations when you accuse me of austerity because of my pouch and staff, of frivolity because of my poems and mirror, of parsimony for having one slave, of profligacy for having freed three slaves, of having barbarian origins as well as Greek eloquence?" (25. 2).[7]

Most of these "appendages" follow from Apuleius' (probably intentionally distorted) representation of the the plaintiffs' charges against him:

> "We accuse him before you [viz. the judge Claudius Maximus] of being

---

[6] The phrase *de finibus bonorum et malorum* is intended, of course, to recall the title of Cicero's philosophical treatise.

[7] Instead of "austerity" (*austeritatem*) the transmitted text reports "authority" (*auctoritatem*), which does not make sense here.

> a handsome philosopher most eloquent,"—what shame!—"both in Greek and Latin" (4. 1).

Apuleius systematically deflects charges of this sort by associating the alleged offences with distinguished predecessors of the distant past, who are usually Greek philosophers. In this instance he cites the good looks of Pythagoras, "who was the first to label himself 'philosopher'" (4. 7), and of Zeno of Velia, "who was the first to employ a very skilful method of double refutation to dissolve [his · opponents' arguments]" (4. 8; see p. 80). And it does no harm to drop Plato's name (4. 8). The instruction in philosophical "firsts" and the name-dropping are intended, of course, to dignify Apuleius' actions, which his opponents, in their benighted ignorance, have misunderstood. For Apuleius' purposes it makes no difference that he is not in fact good-looking, reduced as he is to the pale, dishevelled and washed-out appearance of a book-worm by his literary lucubrations (4. 10-13). "As for my eloquence...," he says in response to being accused of it and goes on to speak of his life-long dedication to literary studies. His opponents have committed a grave tactical error, however; for the accusation of eloquence, a patently ridiculous offence, provides him with the opportunity to dazzle his dull provincial opponents with erudite splendour.

The literary manoeuvres begin with a paraphrase of the early Roman Republican playwright Caecilius Statius, "Innocence is eloquence" (5. 7). Then, in a familiar tactic, Apuleius appropriates the authority of Catullus, who, like him, composed a *jeu d'esprit* on dentifrice. He has already remarked that he laughed at his opponents' ridiculous mispronunciation of his poem and now adds:

> "I noticed a short time ago that some of you [viz. jurors or spectators] could scarcely contain your laughter when he [viz. Aemilianus] savagely 'orated' against oral hygiene and uttered the word 'dentifrice' with as much indignation as anyone has ever uttered the word 'poison'" (5. 6 and 7. 1).

The patronizing of the plaintiffs continues. Apuleius concedes with mock solemnity that versified promotion of oral hygiene is a crime to be despised by any philosopher. Quotation of a famous passage from Homer ("Speech proceeds from the barrier of the teeth") leads to a burlesque eulogy of the mouth (7. 7).

Even Apuleius seems to grow tired of the game in the course of his detailed explanation of the method of dental hygiene used by crocodiles (8. 6-7):

> "Enough of this! I come now to the other verses, which they call love poems but which they read o coarsely and uncouthly that they generated disgust" (9. 1).

Again, he represents the accusation that has been made against him so as to make it appear risible, "Am I a wizard because I am a poet?" (9. 3). Still again, he cites distinguished Greek and Latin predecessors in the composition of homo-erotic poems. In response to the imagined objection that these predecessors were not philosophers he quotes the homo-erotic poems of the "serious" philosopher Solon, Diogenes the Cynic and Zeno "the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy" (9. 9-12). The incidental accusation that he has used pseudonyms for the addressees of his homo-erotic poems unleashes another catalogue of such illustrious precursors as Catullus and Vergil (10. 1-5).

Mention of the rustic characters in Vergil's *Eclogues* provides the opportunity for Apuleius to enlarge the gap between himself and his boorish opponents that has underlain his defensive strategy to this point, "But Aemilianus, who is more the uncouth, barbarous countryman than the Vergilian shepherds and cowherds..." (10. 6). From the point of view of Apuleius *philosophus Platonicus* the differentiation of plaintiffs and defendant culminates in his alignment of himself with Plato as poet and by extension Plato the philosopher:

> "I decline to speak of those other, lofty and divine doctrines of Plato that are scarcely known to the select few of his dedicated followers and not at all to the profane" (13. 1).

After welcoming Plato as his co-defendant (*Ego me facile patiar...culpari cum Platone* [13. 2]) and in effect assigning the plaintiffs to the ranks of the profane, Apuleius professes to conclude his rebuttal of the plaintiffs' charge that he is a handsome, eloquent philosopher (13. 1). Their intention, undoubtedly, was to exploit popular hostility towards intellectuals. This tactic is at least as old as Aristophanes' play the *Clouds*, which holds Plato's mentor Socrates up to derisive proletarian prejudice. Apuleius counteracts their tactic by repeatedly enlisting himself in the ranks of the erudite trial judge

Claudius Maximus to the exclusion of the unlettered plaintiffs and in this way sabotages their strategy (see p. 12).

Although Apuleius claims to have concluded the "necessary appendages" of his defence in advance of dealing with the "actual charges" (13. 3-4), the next few chapters seem to arise as well from the charge that he is a handsome and eloquent philosopher. In other words, the first twelve chapters dealt with Apuleius' alleged eloquence. The next few chapters confront his alleged handsomeness. The intention appears to have been to discredit him as a serious, legitimate philosopher by associating him with frivolous verse and frivolous vanity.

Apuleius begins by ridiculing his opponent's misplaced eloquence:

> "That long and censorious oration about the mirror followed. Pudens almost burst because of the atrocity of my behaviour as he shouted, 'The philosopher has a mirror, the philosopher possesses a mirror!'" (13. 5).

Ridicule gives way to Apuleius' habitual tactic of enlisting the support of his distinguished predecessors of the distant past. The plaintiffs are told that they must adopt the position of either the Spartan king Agesilaüs, who refused to allow paintings or statues of himself to be made, or that of all other people, who do not spurn likenesses of themselves (15. 1-2). He adds:

> "Moreover, is not the philosopher Socrates said to have urged his followers frequently to contemplate themselves in a mirror?....So much did the wisest person of all make use of a mirror or moral discipline" (15. 4 and 7).

Demosthenes, the most pre-eminent practitioner of public speaking, we are told, always practised in front of a mirror as if before a teacher. After he had drunk deeply of the eloquence of the philosopher Plato and mastered the dialectics of the sophist Eubulides he turned at last to a mirror to perfect his delivery.

"Should a philosopher look into a mirror only for these reasons?," Apuleius asks (15. 11). He then surveys the theoretical positions of major schools of philosophy on the principles of refraction— "as Epicurus says," "as other philosophers maintain," "in Plato's opinion,"

"as Archytas thinks," "as the Stoics believe" (15. 12-15). He concludes:

> "Does it not seem to you that philosophy should investigate and enquire systematically into all kinds of mirrors, both wet and dry types?" (16. 1).

If the plaintiffs' heads were not already spinning in the face of this display of erudition, the recondite survey of refractory enigmas would surely have bewildered them (16. 2-6).[8] Archimedes of Syracuse, who "treats these issues in a huge book, a man admired far above all others because of his adroit skill in all branches of geometry," would probably be surprised to learn that he is "remembered especially because he frequently and diligently investigated mirrors" (16. 6). Apuleius adds punningly:

> "If you had come to know this book, Aemilianus, and, instead of devoting your life to farmland and clumps of earth, had devoted yourself to the sand-covered counting-table used by mathematicians for computations..., you would surely in your desire to learn abandon your plough from time to time and marvel at the furrows of wrinkles on your face" (16. 7).

As is often the case in the *Apology*, if the reader pauses to ask himself how he has come to be immersed in Archimedes' geometry and Aemilianus' wrinkled face, the answer will not be immediately clear. It will not be amiss at this point to recall that these supposedly "necessary appendages" to Apuleius' defence of himself issue from the patently ridiculous charge that he is a handsome philosopher. The plaintiffs' strategy seems to have been to discredit Apuleius as a serious philosopher by associating him with poetic and cosmetic frivolity. Apuleius counterattacks by simultaneously ridiculing the charges and appropriating prominent earlier practitioners of the activities of which he has been accused. He sabotages guilt by association with exculpation by association.

It is also worthwhile pausing at this point to consider his arguments in the context of rhetorical theory. When in almost the same breath he recounts refractory anecdotes about Socrates, Agesilaüs and Demosthenes, we can confidently conclude that he is adhering to "textbook" declamation directly out of the rhetorical schools. They are

---

[8] Helm 1955: 100-5 catalogues displays of erudition in the *Apology*.

sanctioned paradigms found in such rhetorical practitioners and theorists as the younger Seneca, Favorinus and Quintilian.[9] The intrusive moralizing imperative is underscored by the linking of the ethical significance of mirrors and of Gn. Scipio's dowerless daughters.[10]

One must probe more deeply to detect the structural and thematic basis for the inclusion of the paeon to poverty that occupies chapters 17 to 23. It is the most elaborately developed part of Apuleius' defence, and I have previously considered it as an object example of Apuleius' allegiance to the core curriculum of the Imperial schools of rhetorical training (see p. 65). The pattern of development is nevertheless that of the other "necessary appendages" that precede the alleged "actual charges": ridicule of the plaintiffs and their charges, impressive precedents and the cardinal role of Apuleius' dedicated studies in the activities that are beyond the ken of his boorish opponents.

Reading between the lines, one can infer that the plaintiffs have spread rumours of Apuleius' poverty in order to represent him as an impoverished opportunist scheming to marry a wealthy widow. However, they seem to have used a scatter-gun approach to character-assassination and to have cited a related event as an instance of profligacy (25. 2; quoted p. 131).

The contrived transition from the charge of being a handsome philosopher to the contradictory charges of profligacy and impoverished legacy-hunting takes shape in chapter 16.[11] Apuleius here contrasts Aemilianus' unknown and unknowing seclusion with his own illustrious place in the forefront of scholarly activity. The methods employed by Aemilianus are of supreme indifference to the world at large (17. 1). In contrast, the actions of Apuleius, "who happens to have taken a position in a place ablaze with light" and who conducts his business "in the open and publicly," are known to all, including Aemilianus, a man of "abject, light-shunning baseness" with nothing

---

[9] Sen. *N. Q.* 1. 17. 4 and *De Ira* 2. 36. 1; Favorinus [Dio Chrysostom], *Or.* 37. 43; Quint. *Inst.* 11. 3. 68. See also Vallette 1908: 126-8.

[10] Sen. *N. Q.* 1. 17. 9-10, Apul. *Apol.* 18. 9.

[11] Quint. *Inst.* 2. 4. 30-31 deplores the use of commonplaces such as that of Diogenes the Cynic, which, he says, rarely fit the actual case and require contrived links.

better to do with his time than peer out "from the darkness" at the highly conspicuous Apuleius. He then patronizingly declares:

> "You are ignorant, Aemilianus, ignorant of how to accuse a philosopher. You accuse me of having a paucity of slaves. It would have been to my glory to have pretended to have a paucity of slaves since I know that not only the philosophers of whom I am a disciple but even the commanders of the Roman people have gloried in their paucity of slaves" (17. 6).

Here, then, is the basis for including the question whether Apuleius is impoverished or extravagantly wealthy among the "necessary appendages" and before the "actual crimes." The plaintiffs have accused him of being a philosopher, but they do not know how to accuse a philosopher. One of their number, Pudens, has accused him of poverty; it is an "accusation that a philosopher accepts and is even duty-bound to confess freely, for poverty was once the handmaid of philosophy" (17. 1-2).

One can sense that Apuleius *declamans* is about to launch himself on to a moralizing diatribe and he does not disappoint expectations. Poverty, he declaims, has materialized as justice in Aristides, benevolence in Phocion, strength in Epaminondas, wisdom in Socrates, eloquence in Homer and dominion in the Roman state (18. 7-8). Many sanctioned examples of ennobling deprivation follow, culminating in the paradigms of the Cynic philosophers Crates, Antisthenes and above all Diogenes (22. 9).

I have already remarked on this celebration of wilful impoverishment in the context of Apuleius' conditioned adherence to the stereotyped declamatory methods of the rhetorical schools of the Roman Imperial period (see p. 65). Only a few of the earlier considerations need to be recalled here. First, as Vallette observed, the topic of Apuleius's poverty is the least substantive concern that he had to confront in the court of law; yet he has lavished more rhetorical embellishment on this marginal issue than on any other issue, whether it be one of the "necessary appendages" or an integral part of his defence (see p. 109). Second, Apuleius has patently indulged his declamatory urge of the moment, for he concedes that the *locus communis* of the rich blessings of poverty is probably irrelevant to his case (see p.66). Finally, he acknowledges that the issue of his poverty is no more than a classroom declaiming exercise, that is, a *controversia* (see p. 66).

Thus approximately the first twenty-five per cent of the *Apology* consists of marginal issues, what Apuleius calls "necessary appendages," the most extensive and embellished of which, he concedes, could be put aside. The epithet that springs to mind for this part of the *Apology* is "virtuoso." Tatum makes the point well:

> His [viz. Apuleius'] arts are fully realized only in performance....For a virtuoso's aim is to magnify and enhance his own personality through art; the performer becomes at least as important as the work he performs.

And he aptly quotes J. D. Denniston on Gorgias, the founder of the "first" sophistic movement:

> Starting with the initial advantage of having nothing in particular to say, he was able to concentrate all his energies upon saying it.[12]

Apuleius' Greek coeval Lucian provides a burlesque course of studies in the art of sophistic declaiming, "You ask, young man, how you can become a declaimer and be seen to embody the majestic and honoured role of sophist" (*Rh. Pr.* 1). The "lesson" of chapter 18 has special relevance to the *Apology*:

> If you are addressing a case of assault and battery or adultery in Athens, speak of matters that occurred in India or Ecbatana. Above all, speak of Marathon and Cynegeirus, without which nothing is accomplished. Repeatedly speak of Mt. Athos being traversed by ships and the Hellespont by infantry; of the sun being darkened by Persian arrows, of the flight of Xerxes and of the admiration bestowed on Leonidas;[13] of recognition of the message of Othryades, and make frequent references to Salamis, Artemesium and Plataea. Throughout your speeches let these few words stand front and centre and bloom like flowers, and make frequent use of the words "some" and "surely," even if they are not needed; for they are pretty words even when spoken indiscriminately.

This admittedly exaggerated lesson in public speaking promotes display to the neglect of content; for the virtuoso declaimer's purpose, as Tatum remarks, is to proclaim himself rather than his subject,

---

[12] Tatum 1979: 141.

[13] For Xerxes, India and Ecbatana see Apul. *Mun.* 340 and 348.

whatever it may be, an early example of the medium becoming the message. Lucian recognizes this, "The masses marvel at your appearance, intonation, gait, pacing to and fro, melodious delivery and that 'some' of yours" (20).

Apuleius "has the initial advantage of having nothing in particular to say" in the "necessary appendages" of approximately the first twenty-five per cent of the *Apology* and he can therefore concentrate all his energies on virtuoso display. His *reductio ad absurdum* of the plaintiff Pudens' *longa illa et censoria oratio* ("that long and censorious oration") on Apuleius' possession of a mirror is probably the most vivid example of prolonged virtuoso display in the *Apology* (13. 5-16). He unleashes a show of erudition, puns, a sustained metaphor of light versus dark and word-play. He passes with studied insouciance from the Lacedaemonian Hagesilas, who allowed himself *neque pingi neque fingi* ("neither to be painted nor sculpted") to Socrates' insistence that his pupils frequently contemplate themselves in a mirror; from Demosthenes' combination of refractory rehearsal and deep draughts of Platonic and sophistic philosophical wisdom to pun and word-play: *rhetori iurganti...philosopho obiurganti* (something like "squabbling nit-picking...philosophical wit-picking"); the nit-picking squabbler quibbling *de finibus agrorum* ("about the boundaries of cultivated fields") while the wit-picking philosopher counsels *de finibus bonorum et malorum* ("about the boundaries of good and evil"). The verbal play gives way in an instant to an erudite display of the refractory theories of the major schools of philosophy (see p. 134). This in turn is followed by punning insults based on agronomy and geometry (see p. 135). Finally, there is the patronizing contrast between Apuleius' illustrious studies and Aemilianus' dull, hidden obscurity (see p. 136).

In chapter 25. 5 Apuleius confronts the "very charge of [practising] magic," which he characterizes as "having burned itself out in a series of old wives' tales."[14] His defence of himself now becomes more focussed and systematic but not devoid of virtuoso display.

Apuleius paves the way for his habitual show of erudition by proposing to investigate the question, *Quid sit magus*? ("What is a magician?") (25. 8). The practice of reducing an argument to the

---

[14] Ironically, Septimius Severus was to dismiss the *Golden Ass* as a series of old wives' tales ("Life of Clodius Albinus" 12 in *Historia Augusta*).

definition of a word was a conventional tactic of the rhetorical training of the Roman Imperial period. Petronius' spoof of the declamatory procedure suggests that it was hackneyed to the point of being risible.[15] Apuleius announces his customary scholastic approach in the next sentence, *...ego apud plurimos lego* ("...I [have] read in many authorities"). Apuleius' authoritative sources and sanctioned precedents include Plato, of course, as well as the founder of the art of magic, Zoroaster, his master Zalmoxis and Oromazes; the philosophers who have been victims of popular misunderstanding (*more vulgari* [26. 6]) and widespread, ignorant prejudice (*communi...errore imperitorum* [27. 1]): Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Epimenides, Orpheus and Pythagoras; the ritual purifications of Empedocles, Socrates' demon and Plato's "good." Apuleius has indeed mustered an impressive roster of precedents and could, as he avers, conclude his speech at this point with little risk to his case (28. 2). However, he feels compelled to continue by two sources of motivation that no Greek sophist or Apuleius could resist: the time remaining for speechifying and a large audience assembled to listen to him (28. 1 and 3). He undertakes therefore to consider each of the charges, whether true or false, in detail:

> "Now, in accordance with my undertaking, I shall confront all the delirious charges made by Aemilianus. I shall begin with the first claim, which you [viz. the judge and jurors] undoubtedly noticed was intended to create the strongest grounds for suspicion that I paid fishermen for certain types of fish" (29. 1).

Predictably, Apuleius ridicules the charge and overwhelms his opponents with erudite display. I have already discussed this part of the *Apology* in connection with his reliance on Greek scholarship for his scientific compilations (see p. 30). Two points remain to be made. First, Apuleius acknowledges at the conclusion of his long, erudite, quotation-studded justification of his procurement of fish, "I have said more on this subject than I should have" (41. 4). Second, although the anecdote about Sophocles defending himself against the claim of senile dementia by reading out in court his *Oedipus Coloneus* has limited

---

[15] Pet. *Sat*. 48. 4-6; cf. Sen. *Cons. ad Helv*. (*Dial*. 12. 6. 1), *Quid sit exilium*?, and *Ep*. 87. 40, *Quid alius sit paupertas quam parvi possesio*?; and see Vallette 1908: 141.

relevance to Apuleius' defence (37), the pairing of Sophoclean tragedy and Apuleius' biological research is no less bizarre.[16]

"Listen," Apuleius enjoins the judge, "to another equally stupid charge," now that he has to his satisfaction demolished the charge of procuring fish for magical purposes (42. 1). "The equally stupid charge" is that Apuleius used incantations to bewitch a young male slave and a freeborn woman suffering from epilepsy. He proceeds to undermine this accusation with his habitual display of learning, adding that he has popular opinion (*vulgi opinione*) on his side as well (42. 5). As he did when addressing the question, "What is a magician?," he claims that he has consulted "many authorities" (*apud plerosque*) on the subject (25. 9 and 43. 1). They include "Varro the philosopher," Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus.

Nowhere else in the *Apology* does Apuleius reveal so clearly that his defence is designed as much to confirm his place among his lettered peers as it is to acquit him of specific charges:

> "I shall tell you, Claudius Maximus, why I investigated the symptom of a ringing sound in the ears [of the alleged victim of my magical incantations]. I do so not so much to exonerate myself in this matter, which you have ruled to be irrelevant to the accusation of an indictable crime, but so as not to pass over in silence anything worthy of your ears or congruent with your learning" (48. 11-12).

After assuring the judge that he is about to remind him of what he already knows and before acknowledging that Maximus is familiar with the biological doctrines just outlined, Apuleius adumbrates the views on epilepsy expressed by Plato in his *Timaeus* (49-50). By his own confession Apuleius' summary serves the sole purpose of enlisting Maximus in the sport of erudite one-up-manship for which their shared cultural background exclusively qualifies them.

Shared religious values serve as the basis of exclusiveness in chapters 53-6. Apuleius here ridicules the charge that he kept "certain things wrapped up in a small handkerchief among the household gods in Pontianus' house" (53. 2). The benighted Aemilianus had the misfortune to make the unsubstantiated charge before a judge of

---

[16] Vallette 1908: 124.

penetrating intelligence (53. 2-4). Once again, the expansive rodomontade is beside the point:

> "I could discourse at greater length, but I shall do what I undertook to do. I shall disclose what I am under no obligation to disclose and answer the questions asked by Aemilianus" (55. 1-2).

Apuleius' putative answers forge a community of common religious experience that includes the pious people assembled in the courtroom to the exclusion of the profane plaintiffs (55. 8). As proof of his long-standing religious commitment he recalls the discourse on the majesty of the god Aesculapius that he presented publicly in Oea at the time of his arrival there some three years earlier (55. 10). In a display of self-congratulation reminiscent of the worst excesses of Greek sophists he adds, "The pages of that discourse are most celebrated, are read by everyone and are turned over by the hands of all" (55. 11).[17] Apuleius concludes this effusion of *amour-propre* with what one must suppose would be the cherished desire of any Greek sophist unfortunate enough to be facing criminal charges in a court of law: his most celebrated speech is brought back for a second performance by being read into the court record (55. 12).

The rest of Apuleius' defence contains far fewer instances of virtuoso performance as he confronts more concrete charges in the sequence in which they were made by the plaintiffs. The "next" (*post ista*) charge addressed by Apuleius is that he performed mysterious nocturnal rites (57-60). He later states:

> "It is now time for me to turn to Pudentilla's letters, or rather to retrace in slightly more detail the sequence of events of the entire affair" (66. 1).

He adds, "There are five matters that I must dispute" (67. 2), and again:

> "While I provide a short résumé of the sequence of events of the entire affair,...please...become very carefully informed of the very fountain head and foundation of this case" (68. 1).

[17] Boasting by Greek sophists: e. g. Philostr. *VS* 535 and 578-9, Lib. *Ep.* 405.

Even at this stage of his defence Apuleius occasionally breaks free of the constraints of systematic rebuttal. As a member of the "family of Plato" (64. 3), he cannot resist expounding Platonic doctrine and congratulating himself on his well received use of Plato as a witness for the defence (*causae patrono*) (64-5). An impassioned comparison of the effeminate Rufinus with murderous females of Greek myth elicits from Apuleius an apology for digressing (78. 4-5). The most blatant use of sophistry, in the modern, generalized sense of the word, elicits another confession of irrelevance, "I could, if I wished, say more, but I cast aside sophistry" (80. 3). Apuleius checks himself in the middle of a prolix eulogy of rural fecundity when he realizes that it could be detrimental to the representation of the plaintiffs as country-bumpkins that he has previously emphasized (88. 7). Finally, possibly for strategic but no less admittedly irrelevant reasons, he expounds at greater length on the polished literary style of the proconsul Maximus' friend Lollianus Avitus than he does on the contents of the letter written by Avitus that he cites in support of his acquittal (94. 7-95. 6). Apuleius himself concedes, "I am not unaware that I should conclude my defence after [reading into the court record] Avitus' letter" (95. 1), and:

> "Your [viz. Maximus'] obliging nature has encouraged me to say a few words about him [viz. Avitus]. However, I shall not indulge your good will to the point of permitting myself to begin to speak about his qualities at this late stage in a case in which I am already tired and that is proceeding rapidly to its conclusion" (95. 7-8).

As well, one can find in the putatively systematic defence of the last two thirds of the speech examples of the kinds of sophistic virtuosity that Helm has catalogued, such as the punning juxtaposition of *veneficium* and *beneficium* (102. 3) or the potted catalogue of famous Roman orators (95. 5).[18]

Conclusions

I noted at the outset of this discussion of the *Apology* that forensic speeches were a characteristic activity of the Greek sophists (see p. 130). I did not state at that time, however, that most of the evidence

[18] Helm 1955.

for this activity is indirect and that no complete examples in Greek of the period of the Second Sophistic have survived. On the basis of Aelius Aristides (*Or*. 50. 91) one can nevertheless suppose that such speeches on some occasions would have had "more of the air of an oratorical display than of a lawsuit" and that those present in the courtroom would have "behaved entirely like an audience at a lecture."[19] In other words, in spite of ancient rhetoricians' recognition of the three distinct categories of oratory that they classified as forensic, deliberative and epideictic, the first and third types could in practice overlap. This is certainly the case in Apuleius' forensic speech when features of epideictic oratory such as a eulogy of the countryside or a diatribe on the bounty of impoverishment intrude.[20] A Greek sophistic precedent for the puns and jokes developed by Apuleius to ridicule the plaintiffs occurs in Herodes Atticus' defence of himself against the charge of murdering his own wife.[21]

The Greek sophists characteristically put their lives and most intimate personal experiences on display and expect their audiences to be interested in them. In the *Apology* Apuleius is only too happy to talk about his religious experiences. They do in fact play a role in the rebuttal of charges of possessing mysterious objects and performing mysterious rites (53-63). Naturally, Apuleius is eager to associate his activities with conventional pagan religious practices. In the course of doing so, however, he indulges the penchant of Greek sophists to provide their audiences with detailed accounts of their most personal religious experiences. After explaining that he has assiduously preserved certain talismans that were given to him by priests when he was initiated into many Greek mystery religions, Apuleius reminds the court of the hymn in honour of the god Aesculapius that he presented in a public oration some three years earlier at the time of his arrival in Oea. This Greek god of healing seems to have been a favourite of the Greek sophists. He served as a kind of personal demon for Aelius Aristides, offering him advice on all aspects of his life. Of the many references to Aesculapius in Maximus of Tyre one in *Dialexeis* 9 is

---

[19] Translation of Behr 1981: II, p. 336.

[20] On diatribe as a feature of late Greek epideictic oratory see Burgess 1902: 234-40.

[21] Philostr. *VS* 555; Quint. *Inst*. 4. 3. 4-6 discusses the possible tactical advantages of digressions in forensic speeches.

especially suggestive (9. 7 b, Hobein [ed.] 1910). The *dialexis*, like Apuleius' *On the God of Socrates*, deals with Socrates' personal demon; and in both essayists Aesculapius is cited as an example of demonic apotheosis.[22]

Tatum remarks that in the *Apology* Apuleius stages "his trial [as] a defense of the philosophical life before a court of public opinion" and that he does so on the model of Socrates' defence of philosophical ideals.[23] Like Dio Chrysostom, who in his defence of the will of the Roman people play-acted the role of Odysseus, Apuleius harnesses the authority of classical paradigm to his own defence.[24] In Apuleius' words, "I undertake not only my own defence but also that of philosophy" (3. 5).[25] One is reminded of Dio Chrysostom's assessment of Socrates, "Whatever the topic, he would turn it to philosophy" (*Or.* 60. 10). Two important features of the Greek Second Sophistic underlie his choice of model: the doctrine of literary *mimesis* and the importance of Plato in the rhetorical syllabus.[26] Dio Chrysostom's discourse on the subject of training for public speakers unites these two principles, "I shall turn now to the Socratics, who in my view are most essential to every person who aims to be an orator" (*Or.* 18. 13). Philemon, one of the most celebrated of the Greek sophists, produced at least one declamation that featured Socratic role-playing (Phil. *VS* 543). Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* 3 (Hobein [ed.] 1910) develops the theme, "Whether Socrates Acted Well in Not Defending Himself." Finally, a second-century Greek treatise on rhetoric provides a detailed analysis of Plato's *Apology*.[27]

I have emphasized in the previous discussion that for Apuleius, as for the Greek sophists of the Roman Imperial period, life imitates literature; that in Vallette's memorable phrase, "Apulée voit la réalité à travers les livres," even if, as in the *Apology*, the immediate reality comprises life-or-death urgency. Helm is undoubtedly right to characterize the *Apology* as a (Latin) *Meisterwerk* of the Second

---

22 For fuller details see Bowersock 1969: chapter 5.

23 Tatum 1979: 119.

24 Philostr. *VS* 488; I owe this parallel to Elsom 1985: 6; in chapters 1 and 5 especially she explains that Apuleius projects himself as a type of suffering hero combining the qualities of both Odysseus and Socrates.

25 See also *Apol.* 65. 8 and 103. 4.

26 De Lacy 1974: 4-10; see, too, Trapp 1990.

27 De Lacy 1974: 9, n. 19.

Sophistic. The confirmation of this, however, demands more than a *catalogue raisonné* of paraded erudition, puns and other sophistic embellishments. Rather, Apuleius must be shown to embody and enact the compelling legacy of his rhetorical and scholastic training. He not only parades precedents. He claims to live them. He likens his dedicated wife to Phaedra. The avowed enemy of the benighted inhabitants of the countryside, he cannot resist delivering a text-book eulogy of it and he celebrates his wedding in the midst of the symbols of rural fecundity. In these instances and in others as well, literature and scholasticism have pre-empted spontaneous living. In the same way, reliving the philosophical writings of the fifth and early fourth centuries became for Greek sophists and their Latin counterparts a substitute for original thought.

The Florida

In spite of its adherence to the rhetorical modes of discourse practised by the Greek sophists, the *Apology* as forensic oratory remains somewhat singular. Apuleius has managed to give fairly free rein to the declamatory set-pieces dictated by his rhetorical schooling, but the rules of procedure of the court room have imposed a framework within which he has had to function. No such constraints impede the *Florida*. They are, almost by definition, epideictic and therefore designed for virtuoso display.

Forensic and Epideictic Oratory

At the outset, in order to underscore the uniform rhetorical underpinnings of the Apuleian oratorical corpus, it will be useful to identify the common ground occupied by the *Florida* and the *Apology*. Although they represent different branches of the three main formal divisions of ancient oratory, they differ from each other only in the degree to which they make use of declamatory *loci communes*. The declamation on poverty in the *Apology* is as good an example as any. Apuleius here sarcastically thanks Aemilianus for accusing him of being the master of a household that comprises nothing more than the pouch and staff associated with Cynic philosophers (22). He then exploits this link to impugn Aemilinaus' competence to bring appropriate changes against a philosopher. He is more expansive than

absolutely necessary but not to the same degree as in *Florida* 14 and 22. These two incomplete speeches appear to have been full-scale, didactic discourses on the development of the Cynic imperative to renounce wealth. A similar pattern is evident in the inclusion of Pythagoras and his place in the development of religious ritual in *Florida* 15 and the *Apology* (27. 2 and 56. 2). In place of the reference in the *Apology* (55. 10) to his earlier speech on the god Aesculapius, a substantial part of *Florida* 18 is devoted to the circumstance of Apuleius' composition of a bilingual hymn to the same god and, presumably, its subsequent performance. The limited biographical details of Pythagoras and Zeno and the "who-was-the-first" method of outlining the history of philosophy in the *Apology* become extensive anecdotal accounts of the development of schools of philosophy in the *Florida*.[28] Finally, the ichthyological curiosities of the *Apology* find fuller expression in the biological and botanical wonders of India (*Fl.* 6) and the wondrous parrot (*Fl.* 12).

De'Conno has emphasized what he calls the central position of the *Florida* in Apuleius' literary activity.[29] This centrality is only partly chronological, in so far as, in de'Conno's view, the speeches assembled in the *Florida* belong to the period between the two works the *On the God of Socrates* and the *Apology* and the later work the *Golden Ass*. De'Conno argues for an intellectual centrality as well. One particularly intriguing example of the continuum of Apuleius' thought is the portrayal of Pythagoras as the incarnation of Apuleius' philosophical ideal.[30] Pythagoras was, Apuleius avers, "especially handsome and very much the most learned practitioner of lyric and all other forms of poetry" (*Fl.* 15. 12). As well, Apuleius has read that Pythagoras, as a prisoner of war in Egypt, had as his teachers Persian *magi* and above all Zoroaster, who was "pre-eminent as a master of all forms of arcane theosophy; or on his own accord went to Egypt in search of wisdom" (*Fl.* 15. 14-15). Apuleius as a kind of Pythagoras *renatus* is on trial in Sabrata for the very qualities and accomplishments with which he credits Pythagoras: for being a handsome philosopher (*Apol.* 4. 1), for being initiated into mysterious rites that were shaped by Pythagoras and Egyptian priests (51. 2) and

---

[28] E. g. *Fl.* 9. 15-23, 14, 15. 6-27 and 18. 18-35.
[29] De'Conno 1958-59.
[30] De'Conno 1958-59: 67-9.

for studying the teachings of Persian *magi* (25. 9) and Zoroaster (26. 5).

Epideictic Oratory

Thus the "applied" (forensic) rhetoric of the *Apology* has thematic affinities to the "pure" (unapplied) range of development in the *Florida*. This latter work, however, consists of speeches and parts of speeches that were presented on ceremonial occasions. These speeches, known technically as epideictic (display) orations, form the strongest link between Apuleius's oratorical activities and those of the Greek sophists of the Roman Imperial period. Kennedy has written of the *Florida*:

> The collection is adequate to show that Apuleius came closer than any other [Latin] writer we know to several kinds of epideictic oratory being practiced by Greek sophists.[31]

The Epideictic Stage Before comparing the *Florida* with Greek equivalents it will be useful to survey the circumstances of sophistic oratory and its theoretical underpinnings.[32]

Philostratus' account of the career of Alexander "Peloplato" ("Clay-Plato") of Cilician Seleucia includes many of the activities associated by him with the other sophists whom he chronicles (*VS* 570-76). His Oriental origin and post *ab epistulis Graecis*, that is, secretary for Greek correspondence to the emperor Antoninus Pius, constitute a career pattern shared by a substantial number of Greek sophists.[33] The lecture circuit took him to the principal Greek intellectual centres as well as to Rome and Ethiopia. On one occasion in Athens he announced his intention to declaim extemporaneously. The delayed arrival of the invited guest of honour, Herodes Atticus, provided Alexander with the opportunity to display another greatly admired

---

[31] Kennedy 1972: 607.

[32] For fuller details see the short, uncluttered survey of Kennedy 1974 and Anderson 1993: 47-68.

[33] Bowersock 1969: 50-4.

sophistic skill. As was the custom at declamations, the audience expressed its preference for a particular theme. Herodes arrived in the middle of this declamation. Alexander paused to give Herodes and the rest of the audience the opportunity to choose a different theme. They unanimously chose the original theme, and Alexander repeated what he had already declaimed but with different words and rhythms so that the original audience did not feel that it was hearing the same speech a second time. Herodes, probably the wealthiest person of his time, was so impressed by Alexander's speech that he lavished extravagant gifts on him.

This vignette includes a number of practices repeatedly associated by Philostratus with the Second Sophistic. He links improvisation to its very foundation (*VS* 509), and Lucian ridicules it as an entrenched but overrated accomplishment (*Rh.Pr.* 20). Extemporariness is also represented in the Apuleian corpus.[34] Material and honorary recognition of sophists' virtuoso accomplishments is reminiscent of the lavish rewards heaped on "pop" musical performers and professional athletes today. When Herodes Atticus offered the sophist Polemo a fee of fifteen talents for three speeches, he demanded and got twenty-five talents (Phil. *VS* 538). As Habicht notes, this amount is six times the annual salary paid to Quintilian, Rome's first publicly appointed teacher, and the equivalent of the annual salaries of 500 Roman legionnaires.[35] A statue erected at public expense was a more common form of recognition of sophistic success and one that Apuleius anticipated as the crowning reward of his speaking career (*Fl.* 16).[36]

The debating contest was another regular feature of sophistic performance (e. g. Aristid. *Or.* 51. 38), as were speeches put into the mouths of historical figures or that rehearsed historical events of the distant past. Habicht observes that of the three speeches of Polemo for which Herodes Atticus richly compensated him "the most recent...was [set] 450 years in the past—not exactly hot news."[37] The role-playing on these occasions was very much in earnest, as is evident from the tears that welled in Alexander "Peloplato's" eyes as he declaimed

---

[34] *Soc.* praef. 4 and fragments 1-4, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973. Cf. Menander Rhetor 391. 15, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981 : 118.

[35] Habicht 1985: 129. See also Philostr. *VS* 530 and 532-33.

[36] Cf. Favorinus [Dio Chrysostom] *Or.* 37.

[37] Habicht 1985: 129.

words originally uttered more than 500 years earlier at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Phil. *VS* 574).

If the negative words were replaced with their affirmative equivalents in the following quotation from Aristides' condemnation of Cynic opponents of sophists, it would in effect catalogue some of the principal outlets for the sophists' epideictic speeches:

> They have never spoken, discovered, or written a fruitful word; they have never added adornment to the national festivals, never honoured the gods, never given advice to the cities, never consoled those in grief, never reconciled those in faction, never exhorted the young, nor anyone else, never cared for decorum in their speech.[38]

Declamation

Although they might not agree, the sophists were above all speakers. We have looked at two of the three types of speeches in which they specialized: declamatory and epideictic. The third type, which is not represented by extant Greek examples, is forensic. The epideictic type is perhaps best thought of as ceremonial. Its stage was civic and religious gatherings. The declamatory type can be regarded as an essay (in the French sense of the word) or practice exercise.[39] The latter type did not enjoy universal esteem. In a moment of rueful reflection that is reminiscent of Gellius' realization that syllogisms can soon cloy (see p. 34) the elder Seneca in the preface to the tenth (and last) book of his chronicle of *controversiae* (practice forensic oratory) confesses:

> This has become tedious....I am now embarrassed, as though I have been wasting my time on trifles. Scholastic pursuits have this quality: touched lightly, they provide great pleasure; handled repeatedly and approached closely, they become repugnant.[40]

The notion that declamation was not a serious activity fit for serious adults is similar to the assessment of Mozart that persisted until

---

[38] *Or.* 3. 672, trans. Behr 1986: I, p. 275.
[39] Kennedy 1972: 93.
[40] Cf. Pet. *Sat.* 1-6.

recently in some quarters, as, for instance, in the *Oxford Companion to Music*:

> Of all the instrumental music ever written his is perhaps the most "pure" in the sense that, qua music, i. e., apart from its emotional associations and significance, it is perfect in its melodic shape, and in rhythmic interest.

The implication is that Mozart's music is precious rather than significant or serious.

It is understandable that the sophists' practice of, for instance, ringing stylistic and rhythmic changes on an often repeated speech dealing with issues from the distant past would strike some critics as a "nice" trick or pastime but one devoid of importance. For Philostratus preciousness is a distinctive feature of the Second Sophistic. This is especially clear in his notice of Dio Chrysostom. It occurs near the beginning of his work, where Philostratus is still struggling to define his subject. "I do not know how I should label Dio Chrysostom in view of his mastery of all branches of sophistic enterprises," he begins and adds:

> We must not regard his Euboean oration and his encomium of a parrot and all the other orations in which Dio seriously treated matters of no great significance as trifles but rather as sophistic accomplishments, for it is the mark of a sophist seriously to treat such matters (*VS* 486).

The absence of declamations among Dio's accomplishments does indeed set him apart from the other sophists chronicled by Philostratus. Both Dio and Apuleius actually profess to dissociate themselves from sophists, but this claim tells us more about the disrepute of sophists in some circles than it does about their public-speaking activities.[41] However, the void in Dio combined with his penchant for philosophical discourse aligns his public-speaking career with that of Apuleius, whose extant "pure" oratorical works display no traces of declamatory development.[42]

---

[41] Apul. *Fl.* 18. 18, *Pl.* 2. 8. 231 and *Log.* 14; Dio, e. g. *Or.* 12. 13.

[42] Anderson 1990: 104 sees Dio and Apuleius "as typically sophistic personalities" bridging the gap between Bowersock's historical criteria and Reardon's literary criteria.

Didacticism

Dio's oration 12 is a good example of his proclivities. Delivered in 97 in Olympia to a large Greek audience that has come to witness the Olympic Games, it deals with a serious religious issue: the representation of god and the fact that people have innate and acquired concepts of deity. This serious discourse is preceded by and studded with Homeric quotations, an Aesopic fable, a minutely detailed description of the peacock, popular bird lore and a wryly self-depreciating account of Dio's recent trip to Gaul. This mixture of topics sounds confusing and probably was, for Dio pauses on a few occasions to acknowledge and curtail digressions (e. g. 38), to recapitulate (44 and 84) and to insist that although many of his listeners may have failed to grasp the many topics of his speech, it contains in his opinion subjects suitable for both the masses and the philosophers (84).

The similarities to some of Apuleius' discourses go beyond the self-conscious pre-emptions of digression that I outlined earlier (see, e. g. p. 102). In *Florida* 18, which is a *gratiarum actio* (speech of thanks) for which there are many parallels in the Greek sophists, Apuleius declares that he will discharge his debt to the Carthaginians, whose gods he honours. One of their gods is Aesculapius, in whose honour he has composed a hymn to be presented in both Greek and Latin.[43] Dio effects a similar transition from the prefatory scene-setting to the religious theme of the main body of the speech. At the outset of their speeches both orators employ a recommended type of *captatio benevolentiae*.[44] Dio expresses surprise that a large audience has assembled to listen to him in spite of his ignorance and owl-like

[43] For what follows I have benefitted from Stock 1911: 68-85. "Hymns" composed by Greek sophists: e. g. Aristid. *Or*. 38, 41 and 42 and see Menander Rhetor's rules for composing them (333-344. 14, Russell and Wilson [ed.] 1981: 24-8). The *gratiarum actio*: e. g. Favorinus [Dio Chrysostom] *Or*. 37 and see Champlin 1980: 11; cf. Apul. *Fl* 16. 30.

[44] Menander Rhetor 391. 10-18, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 118-20. D. Chr. *Or*. 42 is a very good example of a "curtain-raising" *prolalia* designed to win the audience's goodwill.

plainness when it has the choice of listening to any of the multitude of peacock-like sophists on display (1-5). Apuleius prefaces his speech with a modest disclaimer of learning worthy of the large audience (1). Dio's contrast between his own plainness and the attractive plumage of the peacock and the lovely song of the nightingale is paralleled by Apuleius' distinction between the song of birds and the thoughtful eloquence of the philosopher (*Fl.* 13 and 17). Just as Dio exploits the proximity of a statue of Zeus sculpted by Pheidias as the basis of the religious and philosophical discourse that follows, so Apuleius takes advantage of a statue thought by some to be of Pythagoras in order to discuss Pythagorean philosophy and his own instruction in it (*Fl.* 15).

Dio obliquely disclaims philosophical competence by dissociating himself from clever, know-it-all, long-haired philosophers (*Or.* 12. 15 and 35. 1-2). Apuleius dismisses those whose claim to be philosophers is restricted to their appropriation of philosophers' dress (*Fl.* 7. 9-10 and 9. 9). The theme of false philosophers is something of a commonplace during the Second Sophistic. Herodes Atticus, Aelius Aristides and Lucian inveigh against them.[45]

Some of Dio's orations conform to the pattern of sophists functioning as touring teachers. Oration 54, undoubtedly a *prolalia* (see p. 154), begins like an encyclopedic entry, "The sophists Hippias of Elis, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus and Prodicus flourished for some time in Greece and attained marvellous fame." He contrasts them with Socrates, who, unlike them, earned no money for his teaching and whose only legacy was his wisdom. The truncated remains of Dio's oration 13 recount the circumstances of his forced exile. During this period he parroted Socratic teachings to informal gatherings of people and in that way, he says, earned a reputation as a philosopher, although initially people were uncertain whether his shabbiness was that of a tramp or a beggar or a philosopher.

In the course of promoting himself as a philosopher and of praising the proconsul Severianus, Apuleius conveys the same sort of encyclopedia-like entry on Hippias, "Hippias was one of the sophists...of the time of Socrates, a native of Elis" (*Fl.* 9. 15). He satisfies his audience's request for an explanation of a cryptic statement with an account of Protagoras, "who was a sophist of varied intellectual accomplishments and one of the most eloquent of the

---

[45] Boulanger 1923: 259-65.

founders of rhetoric" (*Fl.* 18. 19). Similarly, "Aristippus, the famous founder of the Cyrenaïcan school of philosophy...and a student of Socrates...."[46] He, too, retraces his own development as a philosopher for the benefit of his audience, relating it to the teachings of Pythagoras and their influence on Platonic philosophy (*Fl.* 15). On another occasion he relates to his audience the example of the moralizing diatribes of Crates the Cynic (*Fl.* 14). In a more general sense Apuleius' adaptations of Greek philosophical works are the equivalent of Dio parroting Socratic teachings, and his *On the God of Socrates* was intended for oral presentation.[47] Dio the teacher is at the forefront of oration 23, where he expounds on demons. This oration has obvious affinities to Apuleius' discourse *On the God of Socrates.*

Narrative

The preceding material has concentrated on unstructured and informal orations in Dio Chrysostom and Apuleius with emphasis on their didacticism. These free-form speeches stand in sharp contrast to such structured types as the encomium, birthday greeting and speech of welcome or farewell to a high-ranking government official, for which ancient rhetoricians provided rigid rules. An important component of unstructured speeches is the provision for narrative that they provide. The elementary rhetorical exercise known as the progymnasma is probably at least in part responsible for this. According to the rhetorical theorist Hermogenes, probably of the second century, story-telling was a component of speakers' training at the progymnasmatic level.[48] This elementary exercise becomes at the "professional" level the *lalia* ("talk") and *prolalia* ("prefatory talk"). Menander Rhetor devotes extensive discussion to the *lalia*, emphasizing its irregular form and high degree of usefulness to the sophist.[49] Dio Chrysostom's oration 7, the so-called "Euboean Hunters," is a good example of the type. It recounts his experiences among hunters in the woodlands of Euboea and the lesson that their way of life holds for the urban

---

[46] Fragment 2, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.
[47] See, e. g. *Soc.* 5. 129, 10. 141 and 20. 166.
[48] Hock and O'Neil (ed.) 1986.
[49] Menander Rhetor 391. 19-28, 392. 9-14 and 394. 29-31, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 120 and 124. For fuller details see Mras 1949 and Stock 1911.

proletariat. However, the principal representative of the *lalia* is Apuleius' contemporary Lucian.

Although excluded from Philostratus' chronicle of the sophists of the Roman Imperial period, probably because he ridicules them in such works as *Lexiphanes* and the *Professor of Rhetoric*, Lucian pursued a peripatetic literary career that is immediately recognizable from the activities of the orthodox sophists who found favour with Philostratus.[50] Trained in Ionia, the geographical heartland of the Second Sophistic, he "ripened," as Bompaire puts it, in the secondary sophistic centres of Athens and Rome before turning to philosophy, as Dio claims to have done.[51] His envy of the fame enjoyed by sophists prompted him to ask himself, in Bompaire's words, "Pourquoi pas moi?"[52] In spite of his claim to have renounced the disagreeable life of sophistic deceit in favour of the sheltering haven of philosophy, Lucian continued to present characteristically sophistic productions into old age.[53] As well, he provides a lively picture of the problems and rewards of trying to earn a living on the lecture circuit. These range from the humiliating quest for an influential patron to the flattering praise heaped on him by admiring members of his audiences.[54] Lucian's introductory "talks" *Dionysus* and *Heracles* both embody self-contained stories that are set in exotic lands (India and Gaul), contain *ekphraseis* (minutely detailed word-pictures) and are applied by the speaker to his own circumstances at the time of the speeches. The *ekphrasis* itself is very closely connected with the literary activity of the Second Sophistic. Indeed, the author of the *Lives of the Sophists* seems to have written at least part of an extant collection of *ekphraseis*.[55] Like the two previously mentioned "talks," Lucian's *On Dipsades* is an account of an exotic land, the Libyan desert, and its exotic fauna. To anticipate, these three "talks" have affinities to such Apuleian speeches as *Florida* 6, which recounts the herpetological and

---

[50] Anderson 1982a.

[51] *Bis Acc.* 27-8. On Dio's claims of conversion as a tool of rhetoric see Moles 1978.

[52] *Somn.* 11 and *Apol.* 15.

[53] *Herod.* 7-8, *Harm.*, *Scyt.* and *Zeux.* 1.

[54] Branhm 1985 and Nesselrath 1990. Cf. especially Luc. *Electr.* 6 with Apul. *Fl.* 5.

[55] See Anderson 1986: 291-3 on the problem of assigning the *Imagines* to the appropriate one of the three or four Philostrati.

other zoological marvels of distant India.

Lucian regularly stresses that the narrative portions of his introductory "talks" are the products of autopsy.[56] His *Herodotus or Aëtion* recounts that because Herodotus wanted instant fame rather than the gradual recognition that comes from promoting oneself at many smaller cities he accordingly presented his *Histories* at the Olympic games. The painter Aëtion did likewise with his painting, which Lucian has seen in Italy. The detailed description (*ekphrasis*) of the painting then becomes the narrative account of its subject. Similarly, in the introductory "talk" *Zeuxis or Antiochus*, Lucian recounts that his speeches have been admired for their novelty. This reminds him of the painter Zeuxis, whose painting of a female hippocentaur feeding her twin babies was likewise admired for its novelty. Lucian has seen this painting with his own eyes in Athens and describes it in great detail. The narrative account of the subject gives way to Zeuxis' response to the misguided assessment of his painting. He tells of the bewilderment experienced by the Galatians and their horses when they confronted in battle for the first time the elephants used by Antiochus Soter of Syria. Thus a single work of art once seen by Lucian has occasioned two narratives. To anticipate once again, a statue viewed by Apuleius on the island of Samos and minutely described by him serves as a springboard for his anecdotal narrative of the life and education of the philosopher Pythagoras and of his own development as a philosopher (*Fl.* 15).

Philostratus' notice of the sophist (H)adrianus of Tyre contains an especially intriguing reference to sophistic narrative. One of Herodes Atticus' favoured pupils and the holder of the chairs of rhetoric in Athens and later in Rome, he seems to have allowed his oratorical talents to be exceeded only by his pride (a not uncommon characteristic of the Greek sophists) when in the introduction to his inaugural speech he grandly announced, "Once again letters have come

---

[56] Lucian claims that the *On Dipsades* is based on a friend's visit to Libya.

from Phoenicia."[57] Near the end of his entry on (H)adrianus Philostratus writes:

> [He was] so highly esteemed that he seemed to many people to be a magician....I believe that he earned this [reputation] because he included among the subjects of his speeches marvellous tales about the practices of magicians.

The Byzantine encyclopedia the *Suda* credits him with a now lost work in seven books on the subject of metamorphoses and Menander Rhetor recommends as material for "talks" (*laliai*) the stories of metamorphoses recorded in the poet Nestor and some sophists. Finally, Quintilian cautions teachers against the excessive use of ridiculous old wives' tales in their instruction on narrative.[58]

Whether or not (H)adrianus is to be identified as the author of the now lost *Metamorphoses* that comprised one third of the triad now represented by Apuleius' *Golden Ass* and the pseudo-Lucianic *Lucius sive Asinus*, it is evident that fabulous tales numbered among the resources on which the Greek sophists could be expected and indeed were instructed to draw.[59] The theme of transformation and the scale on which it was treated in (H)adrianus' seven-volume work obviously have more direct bearing on Apuleius' *Golden Ass* than on his *Florida*. However, fabled, if not fabulous, India is the subject narrated in *Florida* 6, and the story of the physician Asclepiades' "fabulous" revival of an apparent corpse is recounted in *Florida* 19. The latter story, of *Scheintod* (apparent death) and revival and the related practice

---

[57] Philostr. *VS* 587. The quoted sentence plays on the belief that the Greek alphabet originated in (H)adrianus' birthplace, Phoenicia. Philostratus goes on to catalogue with approval other examples of (H)adrianus' ostentatious behaviour.

[58] *Suda* s. v. "Adrianus," I, p. 55, ed. Adler; Menander Rhetor 393. 3-4, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 122; Quint. *Inst.* 1. 8. 19-21. Metamorphoses were also portrayed in pantomime: Luc. *Salt.* 57.

[59] On (H)adrianus' possible authorship of the lost *Metamorphoses* that served as Apuleius' model for the *Golden Ass* see Jones 1972: 483. The issue of authorship will be dealt with more fully in chapter 6.

of necromancy are mainstays of the full-scale Greek and Latin novels.[60]

Two points remain to be made before leaving the subject of the place of narrative in the rhetorical theory and practice of the Second Sophistic. First, Anderson is undoubtedly right in relating most if not all of the Lucianic corpus to the "elementary exercises" (*progymnasmata*) that were an important part of the rhetorical training of the period.[61] They subsume such headings as fable (*mythos*), story or narrative (*diegema*) and anecdote (*chreia*). The second-century sophist Hermogenes' technical treatise *Progymnasmata* cites Aesopic fables as examples of the first type.[62] Thus it is probably not coincidental that Apuleius tells the story of what happened to the crow in Aesop's fable.[63] Second, the link between the rhetorical theory and practice of the Second Sophistic and the sophistic employment of narrative is underscored by the fact that the biographer of the sophists is also the author of the extended narrative biography of the mystic Apollonius of Tyana. This fusion of anecdotal intellectual history and narrated sacerdotal progress has its counterpart in Apuleius' account of the spiritual life of the naked sages of India and their influence on the philosopher Pythagoras (*Fl.* 6 and 15).

Mediation

Lucian regularly relates the subject of his prefatory story-telling ([*pro*]*lalia*) to his own immediate circumstances as a public speaker (see p. 155). In *Dionysus* he tells of the unorthodox military contingent that the god Dionysus led against India. "'But what,' he concludes the story, 'does this Dionysus of yours have to do with the god Dionysus?,' someone might ask." The answer: either potential audiences stay away from Lucian's speaking performances because they anticipate unorthodox, frivolous novelties; or they are unable to reconcile his serious messages with the apparently frivolous way in

---

[60] E. g. Apul. *Met.* 2. 28, Philostr. *VA* 26-7 and Hld. *Ethiopian Story* 6. 14-5.

[61] Anderson 1982a.

[62] Hermogenes belongs to the second century if he is the Hermogenes mentioned in Philostr. *VS* 577. On the treatise of Hermogenes and that of the later Aphthonius see Hock and O'Neil (ed.) 1986.

[63] Fragment 4, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973. The fragment appears to belong to the *Florida*.

which they are presented. Similarly, in *Herodotus or Aëtion* Lucian likens the occasions on which the historian and the painter chose to promote themselves to his own circumstances as a speaker trying to achieve fame in Macedonia. Finally, he relates the immediate impact that the novelty of Antiochus' military tactics and Zeuxis' painting had to his concern that his speeches will be judged only by their novelties to the disregard of their other admirable qualities (*Zeux.*).

These few examples from the many available illustrate that Lucian, like other Greek sophists, engaged in what would now be called live performance and that he was eager that his speeches be appreciated, as the last sentence of *Zeuxis or Antiochus* underscores, "My only desire is that my show be worthy of its audience."[64]

In the *Florida* Apuleius is regularly front and centre as a "live" performer concerned to "mediate between...the performing artist and his audience by highlighting important features of his art and defending them against potential criticism and misunderstanding."[65] For instance:

> You have therefore gathered together in this theatre in a display of good will because you realize that the venue itself will not deprive a speech of the value to which it is entitled but that you must consider above all what it is that you are going to view in the theatre. If it is a mime, you will laugh; a tightrope walker, you will experience fear; a comedy, you will applaud; a philosopher, you will be instructed (*Fl.* 5).

Apuleius appears to be attempting to condition his audience to be receptive to "live" philosophical discourse in a setting where it is accustomed to light, popular entertainment. In *Florida* 9 he attempts to pre-empt churlish criticism from any envious members of the vast number of people who have come to hear a philosopher speak. Philosophers, he advises, are not accustomed to being disparaged. Like Lucian blithely assuming that the members of his audience are artists who will view his artistry with professional appreciation, Apuleius insists that his speeches be scrutinized with the tools of craftsmanship.[66] On still another occasion he seems to be anxious about

---

[64] See Branham 1985 for further details.

[65] Quoted from Branham 1985: 240 on Lucian.

[66] Luc. *Zeux.* and Apul. *Fl.* 9. 9.

the reception that his philosophical discourse will receive in a setting where his audience is more accustomed to theatrical performances:

> Imagine therefore that if I say anything worthy of the Senate House, you are listening to me in the Senate House itself; that if my speech is erudite, it is being read in the library (*Fl.* 18. 9).[67]

In each of these instances Apuleius is trying to ensure that his audiences are prepared for a serious performance so that they will not be disappointed because of false expectations. In what appears in the manuscript tradition as the preface of the philosophical discourse *On the God of Socrates* but is probably a detached *(pro)lalia* like some of the other *Florida*, Apuleius tries to deflect the opposite reaction. After pleasing the audience with a serious discourse he asks it to relax its usual exacting standards for the improvised speech that it has asked him to present.[68]

Before leaving Apuleius in his role as a performer currying favour with his audiences, it is worth noting that the philosophical discourse *On the God of Socrates* was presented as a "live" performance and is analogous to the spoken discourses on Platonic philosophy presented by Aelius Aristides and Maximus of Tyre. As in the more overtly spoken *Florida*, Apuleius regularly mediates between the subject and his audience by reassuring it that he will more fully explain an abstruse philosophical issue or clarify the uncertainties caused by the Greek subject matter.[69]

The "Talk"

Stock states unequivocally, "[Apuleius] used Greek declamations as his models and in the introductory speeches closely imitated their methods."[70] This judgment is restricted to the so-called *(pro)laliai* (introductory speeches). However, since they comprise a substantial

---

[67] Cf. Branham 1985: 238 on Lucian, "If the audience comes expecting the broad humor of the mimes or erudite philosophy or florid panegyric, they will be disappointed and the performance will fail."

[68] Fragment 1, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973; see pp. 161-2 for his discussion of the assignment of the fragment.

[69] E. g. *Soc.* 6. 133, 11. 145, 14. 150, 16. 155 and 20. 166.

[70] Stock 1911: 68. I am indebted to him for some of what follows.

part of the *Florida*, they provide important evidence for Apuleius' affinities to the oratorical practices and themes of the Greek Second Sophistic.

Florida 16, which appears to be a complete speech, exemplifies a number of the Greek features. It is a *gratiarum actio*, a speech of thanks, to the people of Carthage for decreeing that a statue be erected in honour of Apuleius' many intellectual accomplishments. The introductory part of the speech recounts an anecdote about the Greek comic playwright Philemon. Apuleius likens his failure to appear in public to his own delayed appearance. Apuleius next presents a eulogy of the initiator of the decree, his former classmate the ex-consul Aemilianus Strabo. He concludes the speech with a renewed expression of gratitude and the promise of more profuse thanks once the statue is actually erected.

The introductory anecdote, which is linked directly to Apuleius' immediate circumstances, is reminiscent of some of Lucian's *(pro)laliai*, most notably *Hercules* and *Dionysus*. In these two introductory speeches Lucian apologizes in advance for any deficiencies in his main discourse. Apuleius likewise relates an anecdote about a famous figure of the past to excuse his failure to satisfy expectations. He goes on to explain, in the solipsistic fashion of the hypochondriac sophist Aelius Aristides, that he suffered a badly sprained ankle and that he underwent such vigorous physiotherapy that he sweated profusely, caught a chill and experienced intestinal pains. Only the restorative powers of the baths have enabled him to appear, albeit lamely, before his audience and present his promised speech.

Dio Chrysostom prefaces his oration 52 with an equally detailed account of his physical ailments on the day of his speaking engagement. He informs the audience of the weak state of his health, the unseasonable weather and his consequently early rising, his regimen of exercise, his massage and bath, light breakfast and reading matter. The link between his feebleness and the subject of his discourse appears to be that enforced idleness has provided him with the opportunity to reread some plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. His therapy has been to imagine himself as a judge at the dramatic festivals at which the plays were presented. His critical reading of the plays then becomes the subject of the discourse. At the beginning of his oration 12 Dio cites both his physical and especially mental deficiencies as excuses for any imperfections in his speech.

The most obvious and fundamental point of comparison between

Florida 16 and the activities of the Greek sophists lies in the occasion for the speech. Apuleius is gratefully responding to the decree of the Carthaginian Senate to erect a statue at public expense in his honour. There are many attested examples of municipalities honouring favoured Greek sophists with commemorative statues.[71] In Apuleius' case the statue has not yet been erected. In the case of Favorinus the people of Corinth have prudently removed the statue of the sophist erected at public expense because he has fallen out of favour with the emperor Hadrian.[72] Both speakers represent the statues as commemorative of their status as philosophers.[73]

Florida 17 contains a nexus of themes that bind it to other speeches in the collection and to the practices of the Greek sophists. It appears to be part of a eulogy of the African proconsul Scipio Orfitus, but in what survives of the speech Apuleius seems more concerned to stake out his claim to distinction than to recognize that of the proconsul. There is also a hint that he has offended the proconsul by failing to eulogize him earlier, "...this song of mine, late perhaps but earnest..." (17. 19).

Squabbles among Sophists

It looks in fact as though other Carthaginian sophists, to apply the term loosely to the Latin West, have embarrassed Apuleius by being first off the mark to ingratiate themselves with the proconsul. Apuleius, of course, does not commend them for their alacrity:

> "I leave it to those whose practice it is to thrust themselves on to their proconsul's moments of leisure in order to seek recognition of their talent by indulging in unrestrained speech and in order to glorify themselves by giving the false impression of being your friends. Both of these faults are alien to me, Scipio Orfitus. For my talent, such as it is,..." (17. 1-2).

In other words, we appear to be in the midst of a petty quarrel among thin-skinned Carthaginian sophists of a type encountered frequently among their Greek counterparts. Philostratus' embarrassed account of

---

[71] See, e. g. G. Richter, *The Portraits of the Greeks* (London: Phaidon, 1965), III, 282-89.

[72] [Dio Chrysostom], *Oration* 37.

[73] Apul. *Fl* 16. 29, [Dio Chrysostom] *Or*. 37. 26.

the quarrel between the Greek sophists Polemo and Favorinus will serve as an example that could easily be multiplied. Originating in regional favouritism, it intensified in Rome, as each of the two sophists found favour with different factions of consulars and their offspring. Philostratus glosses over their puerile prickliness by insisting that ambition kindles feelings of envy even in the wise and concludes that Favorinus' quarrel with a sophist is reason enough to qualify him as a sophist (*VS* 490-1). It appears that competition for consular favour informs *Florida* 17, and one must conclude that Apuleius shared this ambition with Greek sophists.

Greek sophists and their counterparts in the Latin-speaking West did not of course spend all their time attacking one another. They also devoted considerable attention to promoting themselves to the exclusion of those outside of their ranks. After chiding his Carthaginian sophistic competitors, Apuleius praises his own restrained forthrightness in his relations with the proconsul Scipio Orfitus. Menander Rhetor in his discussion of the "talk" (*lalia*) recommends that the returning native son comment on his warm feelings towards the local people during his regrettably long absence, as Apuleius does in *Florida* 17.[74] Apuleius' determination to earn the good will of the Carthaginians is even more striking in *Florida* 18, where he lavishes praise on the quality of the education that he was fortunate to have received in Carthage.

If the two speeches are conflated, the resultant amalgam adheres remarkably closely to Menander Rhetor's rules for winning the good will of the audience and for delivering an appropriate speech upon one's return to his native land. He recommends tactful restraint in the form of claiming to offer the first fruits of one's education to his native land, as Apuleius does in *Florida* 18.[75] Menander Rhetor links praise of one's native city with praise of its governor (proconsul).[76] In *Florida* 17 Apuleius represents himself to the people of Carthage as a returning native son who has benefitted from the outstanding educational opportunities available in that city and goes on to sing (*meum...carmen*, 17. 18) the praises of the proconsul. Apuleius'

---

[74] Men. Rh. 391. 29-392. 9 and 394. 13-30, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 120, 124-6.

[75] Men. Rh. 391. 13-6, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 118.

[76] Men. Rh. 394. 24-6, Russell and Wilson (ed.) 1981: 126.

eulogy of Carthage is even more pronounced in *Florida* 18.

Apuleius' apparent quarrel with Carthaginian sophists is in part represented figuratively by the distinction between the sounds of animals and human utterance (*Fl.* 17. 11-17). Needless to say, his sophistic enemies belong to the former category, bellowing, howling and neighing for the proconsul's attention; and Apuleius is to be numbered among those blessed by god with restrained, reasoned utterance "more useful to the intellect than pleasing to the ear" (17. 13).[77] Even the lovely song of birds is fit only for places uninhabited by humans. He adds:

> "But whoever is about to offer a song that will be useful to children, youth and adults should do so in the midst of thousands of people, as is true of my song about the virtues of Scipio Orfitus..., song no less pleasing than useful to the children, youth and adults of Carthage" (17. 18-19).

The apparently fragmentary *Florida* 13, which I mentioned previously in connection with Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* 1. 7, also appears to have its origins in squabbling among sophists. It begins abruptly, as *(pro)laliae* characteristically do:

> "For nature has not bestowed on me the kind of speech that it has provided for certain birds, the songs of which are of short duration and restricted to certain times of the day."

As in *Florida* 17, Apuleius enumerates a range of specific bird sounds and concludes (as does Maximus of Tyre):

> "But the thoughtful speech of the philosopher is ever-flowing, respected when it is heard, useful in forming judgments and capable of a full range of tones."

The rest of the speech would probably have contrasted the wise utterances of the philosopher Apuleius with the limited utility of his sophistic opponents' cackle. *Florida* 13 proceeds along these lines and in this respect it recalls Dio Chrysostom's oration 12 (see p.151).

---

[77] Plutarch, *On Listening to Lectures* 45 f-46 a, distinguishes between the restraint appropriate to an audience listening to philosophical discourse and the meretricious praise that should be restricted to those presenting "scholastic exercises," i. e., sophistic declamations.

Florida 12 probably comprises the truncated remains of another truculent speech against Apuleius' sophistic rivals. It begins with a detailed description of the parrot that recalls the contrast developed by Dio Chrysostom between his own owl-like plainness (and wisdom) and the meretricious splendours of the strutting peacock (and sophists) (see p. 152).[78] In spite of its attractive appearance the parrot is capable of imitating only what it has been trained to utter. In other words, it is incapable of the reasoned speech of the philosopher and will utter curses instead of rational discourse. In the metaphor of *Florida* 12, parrots are like those sophists who steal the flowers of philosophers' discourses and contaminate them with their own thistles.

Florida 9 is a curious mixture of self-defence, self-promotion, anecdotal history of philosophy and propempticon (speech of farewell) on the occasion of the departure from Carthage of the proconsul Severianus and the wish that his son Honorinus, who came to Carthage as a legate, may return to it as proconsul. It begins stridently:

> "If by chance anyone of those who are jealous of me or spiteful towards me is seated here in this splendid gathering—for in a great city people are also found who prefer to carp at rather than to imitate their betters, whom they affect to despise because they despair of achieving equal effects—if anyone of those malicious people has contaminated this illustrious audience with the blemish of his presence, I would ask him briefly to cast his eyes around this incredible gathering and consider that this crowd is larger than any other that has ever been seen before my time to hear a philosopher speak" (9. 1-3).[79]

After acknowledging that his fame has preceded him and that it creates high expectations on the part of his audience, Apuleius cautions his listeners:

> "May no slight and mistaken resemblance deceive you since, as I have often said, there are certain beggars who wander about dressed as philosophers" (9. 9).

---

[78] Cf. Philostr. *VS* 617, where Philostratus describes Hippodromus' encomium of a peacock as a weapon in his literary quarrel with Proclus of Naucratis.

[79] The play on the words "affect/effects" (*similitudinem/simultatem*) is Apuleius'.

As in the speech previously discussed (*Fl.* 12), where, apparently, philosophers *manqués* can only parrot the reasoned discourse of true philosophers, Apuleius unmasks his noisy opponents' vain attempts to disguise their mendicant baseness. Like the parrot of the previous speech and the herald in the lines that follow immediately, they are capable of mouthing only what people of superior judgment put into their mouths.

Apuleius uses a different type of vehicle in *Florida* 7 to convey criticism of his rivals' philosophical pretensions. He recounts the tradition of Alexander the Great's edict against all representations of himself except those executed by three authorized artists. He concludes the anecdote:

> "Would that the edict were equally in force on behalf of philosophy so that those who arrogantly ape the appearance of philosophers..., those coarse, filthy and ignorant people whose imitation of philosophers is limited to wearing the philosophers' robe would not corrupt this regal branch of learning....For what boor or porter or barkeep is so inarticulate that he would not hurl insults more eloquently [than false philosophers] if he were willing to put on the philosophers' robe?"

Any number of parallels from the factious squabbling of Greek sophists could be cited. Philostratus avers that cat-and-dog bickering is one of their defining characteristics (see p. 162). The early part of Dio Chrysostom's oration 6 and his oration 72 provide adequate concrete examples. Perhaps the best parallel for squabbling over proprietary philosophical rights occurs in Aelius Aristides' vitriolic attack on contemporary Cynic philosophers (*Or.* 3. 663-94; see p.149).

Before leaving Apuleius' anecdotal use of Alexander the Great for negative purposes, it should be noted that a sophist could use the same anecdote positively to promote his own declamations. As Russell explains:

> It is...at the very end of our tradition, in Choricus, that we find the most elegant examples of the declaimers' *dialexis*. In some of these the problems of declamation itself are included.[80]

---

[80] Russell 1983: 78. The terms "proagon, "dialexis" and what I have been calling "(pro)lalia" can be used interchangeably; see Nesselrath 1990: 111-2.

Russell goes on to quote Choricus' *Dialexis* 21, which begins with the anecdote about Alexander the Great and includes, in Russell's words, "history, poetry, art-history; a fanciful comparison; and a hint of the versatility expected of the declaimer." This kind of medley of self-conscious "poetics" takes us back to one of my starting points, the notion of the "live" performer mediating between his material and his audience and disarming any potential hostility towards the speaker (see p. 158). Often, when not defending his position as a philosopher, Apuleius is concerned to smooth out the way to his acceptance as a speaker, which is a characteristic feature of the sophistic *(pro)laliai*.[81]

Mock-Encomia

I previously quoted Philostratus' claim that Dio Chrysostom's serious treatment of "matters of no great significance" did not constitute trivial self-indulgence; rather, Philostratus adds, "it is the mark of a sophist seriously to treat such matters" (see p. 151). These "such matters" include Dio's "praise of a parrot" and Philostratus thus acknowledges a category of discourse that has oratorical precedents as early as the fifth century B. C. but seems to have flourished during the Second Century.[82] Notable examples during this period include Dio' encomium of hair, which inspired Synesius' fourth-century encomium of baldness, Lucian's encomium of a fly, Favorinus' encomia of Thersites and of quartan fever and Fronto's *Encomium of Smoke and Dust* and *Encomium of Neglect*. It is difficult to determine with certainty whether or not Apuleius' apparently incomplete speech on the parrot is to be included among these examples of mock-encomia (*Fl.* 12). It may have affinities to the encomium of a peacock that Hippodromus used in his quarrel with his sophistic rival Proclus of Naucratis (see Chapter Four, n. 78).

Word-pictures

Florida 12 may in fact belong to another rhetorical category, the *ekphrasis* or word-picture, a vividly detailed description of, for instance, an animal.[83] Like mock-encomia, *ekphraseis* abound during

---

[81] Fragments 1, 3 and 4, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.
[82] Burgess 1902: 158-66, Pease 1926.
[83] For further details see Bartsch 1989: chapter 1.

the Second Sophistic in writers such as Lucian and the Philostrati's *Imagines* (*Paintings*). Philostratus quotes what appear to be the opening lines of one of Alexander "Peloplato's" discourses, which Stock labels an *ekphrasis felicis Arabiae* (vivid, detailed word-picture of bountiful Arabia), "Arabia is a land of many trees, shaded plains, no barrenness, a land of plants and flowers."[84] Apuleius' *Florida* 6 begins:

> The Indians, a nation abounding in numerous peoples and extensive boundaries....I marvel not so much at the Indians' quantities of ivory, bounties of pepper, exports of cinnamon, mines of silver, rivers of gold....

This type of beginning seems to have been so hackneyed that Alexander "Peloplato's" "signature" openings provoked a contemptuous pastiche from Antiochus of Cilician Algae, "Ionias, Lydias, Marsyases, sillinesses...."[85]

Florida 15 begins, "Samos is an island of moderate size in the Ionian Sea," and continues in the same jingling, euphuistic vein as the two extracts quoted immediately above:

> A land averse to the cultivation of grain, useless for the plough, more productive for the cultivation of olives, its soil is scratched neither by the grower of vines nor the grower of vegetables. The entire rural population is devoted to the hoe and small fruit trees, the produce of which makes the island richer in fruit than in grain.[86]

Apuleius goes on to describe the famous temple of the goddess Juno (Hera) on the island and the remarkable statue of the youth Bathyllus dedicated by the tyrant Polycrates, both of which Apuleius has seen with his own eyes.

Some people, Apuleius continues, have mistakenly supposed that this statue represents the philosopher Pythagoras, who in fact fled from

---

[84] Philostr. *VS* 574, Stock 1911: 92-3.

[85] Philostr. *VS* 574. Apul. *Fl.* 3 develops the theme of the piper Marsyas and his challenge of Olympian Apollo, the theme of Alexander "Peloplato's" discourse quoted by Philostratus just before his description of *felix Arabia*.

[86] The jingling euphuism of the passage is even more pronounced than I have been able to represent, e. g. *sarculo...surculo,...fructuosa...frugifera*. Nesselrath 1990: 114 illustrates the irregular structure of *(pro)laliai* with *Fl.* 15.

Polycrates. A highly detailed description (*ekphrasis*) of the statue follows. The rest of what remains of the discourse provides a potted (*comperio*: "I [have] read," *aiant*: "some say," *fertur*: "he is said") account of Pythagoras' philosophical development and doctrines, the most fundamental of which enjoined his disciples to a probationary period of silence. Apuleius concludes the surviving portion of the discourse with the claim that, like the followers of Pythagoras and like Plato, he has learned in his philosophical studies to choose the appropriate time for silence and the appropriate time for forthright speech. He has, he says, "earned no less praise for timely silence than recognition for seasonable speech."

As is the case with *Florida* 12, the truncated remains of *Florida* 15 cannot be assigned with absolute certainty to a specific rhetorical category. A possible implication of the last approximately twenty per cent (sections 23-27) of the speech is that Apuleius is contrasting his own "timely silence" and "seasonable speech" with his sophistic rivals' rude and ill-timed importunities, as in *Florida* 12, 13 and 17.

What is beyond doubt is that *Florida* 15 contains an extended *ekphrasis* of an object that Apuleius claims to have seen with his own eyes and that serves to define his intellectual position and set him apart from his sophistic rivals. Like Lucian in his *Dionysus* and *Hercules*, Apuleius has used the object of autopsy to mediate between himself and his audience. Lucian's *De Domo* and Dio Chrysostom's oration 12. 5, in both of which word-pictures of the plumage of peacocks are used to differentiate the speakers from their opponents, are equally compelling examples of the Greek sophistic practice of employing art to arbitrate intellectual disputes.

On Listening to Lectures

Kennedy has endorsed the analogy between the classroom declamations of the Greek sophists and modern jazz performance.[87] He extends the analogy in the case of the "closet" declaimer Aelius Aristides to include "the blues as reset for full orchestra and a thousand voices by someone with the proclivities of Berlioz or Mahler." The analogy, especially in its restricted form, aptly conveys the notion of the rehearsed spontaneity and indeterminacy that preclude appreciation by all except attuned aficionados. Outside of the controlled and compliant

---

[87] Kennedy 1974: 21 endorsing the analogy of Reardon 1971: 111-4.

environment of the rhetorical classroom (or jazz club), however, the appropriate analogy may be a raucous rock concert. Dio Chrysostom's oration 32 suggests such an atmosphere.

Addressing the people of Alexandria, Dio struggles to get their attention, as he rebukes them at great length for their rowdy behaviour and low-brow taste. Their theatre, he complains, is always filled with the sound of stringed instruments, shouting, scurrility and ribaldry (4). Dio urges them to change their ways long enough to listen to his forthright and beneficial speech (5). The so-called philosophers in Alexandria who should be making such speeches do not appear in public or perform any useful service but instead confine themselves to lecture halls and there preach to the converted (8). Cynic philosophers, in spite of the nobility of their creed, behave like buskers and thus discredit all philosophy. The educated people who appear on stage do so to present stupid declamations and poetry of their own composition:

> "If they are in fact poets and orators, that would not be shocking. But if they do these things as philosophers for the sake of gain and their own reputations rather than for the improvement [of their listeners], that is indeed shocking" (10).

It is difficult to find a person who will speak forthrightly in the theatre of Alexandria and risk exposing himself to ridicule; for there is "an abundance of sycophants, mountebanks and sophists" (11), "clever people, great sophists and mountebanks" (39), while, Dio says, "my speech is simple and prosaic" (39). When the people of Alexandria enter the theatre, they go mad as though drugs were available there (41); and the speakers, sophists and philosophers all perform to musical accompaniments (68).

Plutarch's treatise *On Listening to Lectures*, written some fifty to seventy-five years before Apuleius' *floruit* and intended for readers of the age of today's undergraduate university students, deals with issues addressed and experienced by Dio Chrysostom in the theatre of Alexandria.[88] Plutarch directs his advice principally to those who will be attending lectures given by speakers who have some claim to being called philosophers. He distinguishes between them and the epideictic speakers capable of delivering convincing encomia of vomiting, fever

---

[88] In general see Hillyard 1981.

and kitchen pots (44 F). Young listeners, he says, fail to observe the conduct of so-called philosophers. Instead, they focus on the style of presentation and neither understand nor are willing to learn the difference between useful and useless, necessary and purposeless presentation. They suppose that they ought to listen to philosophers as they listen to theatrical performances. Their impression may be correct in the case of sophists, who once they have got up from the speakers' chair and put away their lecture notes become insignificant and have no advice worth offering for the conduct of life; but they should not feel that way towards true philosophers (43 F).

Conclusions

Clearly, there was a wide gulf between the ideal of reasoned discourse before a thoughtful, discriminating audience and the reality of discourse as popular entertainment designed to stir the emotions rather than the intellect. The gulf exists today, as any university lecturer will attest, and existed before the time of the Second Sophistic, as exemplified by Gorgias of Leontini. Likewise, the issue was one that troubled thoughtful people such as Socrates, Plato and Aristophanes and continues to cause concern among, for instance, critics of television. However, as a widespread and pervasive cultural phenomenon occupying the attention of the intellectual elite, the issue of the priority of substance over form in theory and its disregard in practice seems to have generated an inordinate amount of interest among the intellectuals of the Second Sophistic, whether from the point of view of the pedagogue such as Plutarch or the performers such as Apuleius and Dio Chrysostom.

This issue, the priority of substance or form, takes us back to the beginning of this chapter, where I adumbrated the broad categories of "pure" or "display" rhetoric and applied rhetoric, which, in practice, sometimes merged (see p. 130). In Apuleius' *Apology* there is tension between his virtuoso performance as *sophisticus declamans* and the compelling urgency of defending himself in a court of law against charges that could have resulted in capital punishment.

The intrusion of declamatory display into courts of law occurred in both the Greek and Latin worlds and troubled the rhetorical theorists of the time. Aelius Aristides characterizes his own trial as more like a declamation than a lawsuit (see p. 130). Quintilian traces the Greek

practice of declaiming the fictional forensic themes (*controversiae*) that eventually intruded into courts of law back to the time of Demetrius of Phalerum in the second half of the fourth century B. C. (*Inst.* 2. 4. 41). The elder Seneca links this intrusion directly to the schools of rhetoric where pupils have become accustomed to seeking approval for themselves rather than for the skill of their arguments. Once they are out of the safe confines of the classroom and enter the court of law "and applause ceases to greet their every gesture, they either fail or collapse" (*Contr.* 9. praef. 2). Less than a century later Quintilian registers some of the same reservations as the elder Seneca, who witnessed the intrusion of rhetorical exercises into real-life courts of law during their Roman infancy. Quintilian deplores the transfer of eulogies, denunciations, commonplaces and digressions from the classroom to the court room.[89]

In Quintilian's and the elder Seneca's view failure to abide by the rules of forensic oratory could be detrimental to pleaders' cases. Quintilian concedes, however, that a digression in particular can be beneficial to the successful presentation of a case provided that it coheres with, and follows from, what precedes and is not forcibly wedged between components that naturally belong together (*Inst.* 4. 3. 4-6). In other words, a skilled pleader could with impunity disregard the rules. Such a pleader is Apuleius. He exploits "necessary appendages" in order simultaneously to align himself with reputable intellectual figures of the past and to discredit the boorish plaintiffs. In this way he creates within the theoretically restrictive confines of forensic oratory the kind of virtuoso performance sanctioned for epideictic oratory and achieves a Latin "Meisterwerk" of the Greek Second Sophistic. Thus for an accomplished speaker like Apuleius the "book of rules" has become "a stepping-stone" rather than "a stumbling-block."

We have also seen that the "applied" (forensic) oratory of the *Apology* has thematic links to the unfettered "pure" (epideictic) oratory of the *Florida* (see p. 147). The speeches and parts of speeches in this collection have the most obvious affinities to the activities of the Greek Second Sophistic. I have provided only a selection of the affinities. In particular, I have emphasized the role of certain apparently introductory speeches in mediating either between Apuleius and his

---

[89] *Inst.* 2. 1. 8-11, 2. 4. 30-1, 4. 3. 2-3.

Carthaginian sophistic rivals or between the demands of his art and the possible inability of the audience to meet them. I have singled out as well in the *Florida* two technical features that seem to me to have special importance in defining Apuleius as a Latin writer shaped by the influence of the Greek Second Sophistic: the narrative element and detailed description (see p. 155).

CHAPTER FIVE

PHILOSOPHUS SOPHISTICUS LATINUS

Philosophy and Rhetoric

The distinction between the "philosophus" and the "sophisticus" of the title of this chapter is notoriously elusive.[1] "Sophisticus" is perhaps best understood as "virtuoso speaker" of the type encountered in the previous chapter; or, as the sophistic chronicler Philostratus puts it, "those rhetors who spoke with unusual art and brilliance" (*VS* 484). When in the preamble to his chronicle he describes his subjects as "those who were philosophers but were thought to be sophists," he is defining them as philosophers gifted with exceptional speaking ability. This is evident, for instance, in his sketch of Favorinus of Arles, "His eloquence proclaimed Favorinus, like Dio [Chrysostom], to be in the number of sophists" (*VS* 489).[2] Thus the two terms "philosophus" and "sophisticus" can in fact be mutually complementary, defining a person as both learned and eloquent, as when Apuleius avers that Plato perfected the rudimentary philosophical doctrines of his predecessors by means of the force of his eloquence (*Pl.* 1. 2. 185).

The term "sophisticus" has also had the long-standing meaning of "false [philosopher]," as in Dillon's assessment of Maximus of Tyre, "Maximus of Tyre, like Apuleius, was a sophist rather than a philosopher."[3] Champlin likewise highlights this dichotomy:

> Apuleius, the self-proclaimed philosopher, is the clearest example of the treachery of labels. His sophistical *Apology* purports to be a defense of

---

[1] See, for instance, Stanton 1973 and Jones 1974: 9-10; Anderson 1993: 133-43 provides a helpful discussion of the "co-existence, peaceful or otherwise, of rhetoric and philosophy" during the time of the Second Sophistic. See also Halliwell 1994.

[2] Philostratus also confers the title "sophist" on the following philosophers because of their brilliant eloquence: Eudoxus, Leon, Dias, Carneades, Philostratus of Egypt and Theomnestus.

[3] Dillon 1977: 399.

philosophy, while his treatise *On the God of Socrates* is a shallow piece of rhetoric.[4]

Similarly, Regen in the last sentence of his detailed study of Apuleius in the role of *philosophus Platonicus*, after remarking on Apuleius' simultaneous performances as theologian, Platonist, Hermes Trismegistus and magician, concludes that he is not so much the *Platonicus nobilis* admired by his compatriot St. Augustine as a rhetorician.[5]

Ancient views on the compatibility of eloquence and philosophy present an ambiguous picture. Many of the moralists such as the younger Seneca and Epictetus are suspicious of any self-proclaimed philosopher who is eloquent.[6] Even Maximus of Tyre, characterized by Dillon as "a sophist rather than a philosopher," expresses contempt for sophists and "their sophistic tricks and this sort of time-wasting exercises" (see p. 101, line 228). Apuleius' accusers in the *Apology* appear to be exploiting this prejudice when they accuse him of being an eloquent philosopher (*Apol.* 4.1).

Fronto promotes the opposite point of view. Whereas Apuleius boasts that he has drunk deeply from the cup of philosophy (*Fl.* 20. 4), Fronto endorses the widely held view that it is better to have touched philosophy only with the lips than to pretend to have drunk deeply from it (I, 2). For him philosophy has no force without eloquence, "Philosophy will give you something to say, eloquence the means of saying it" (II, 71). And he can only regret that his pupil Marcus Aurelius has opted for philosophy over words (II, 67). De Lacy has remarked that

> the person who read him [viz. Plato] only for his style, and remained utterly indifferent to the philosophical contents of his works, must have been rare indeed. Perhaps Fronto...comes as close as anyone to being such a person.[7]

He recounts as well Fronto's views that while philosophy may be

---

[4] Champlin 1980: 57.

[5] Regen 1971: 110; August. *C. D.* 8. 12.

[6] E. g. Sen. *Ep.* 108. 6, Arr. *Epict.* 3. 23. 17; see also Musonius, fragment 49 h.

[7] De Lacy 1974: 7.

divine, rhetorical education is the proper business of human beings (I, 286-8); and, to quote De Lacy, that "since philosophers *talk about* language, why can't they talk *in* the language of Plato?" (II, 66). Again as De Lacy remarks, it is extremely rare for Fronto to value anything in Plato that is not related to rhetoric. For instance, he praises Claudius Maximus' successor as proconsul in Africa, the African Q. Aegrilus Plarianus, for his
philosophical learning and eloquence, as the great throngs who attend his lectures attest (I, 289). More generally, Aulus Gellius' teacher in Athens, the philosopher Taurus, assumed, mistakenly, Gellius implies, that his Western pupil would prefer Plato's eloquence to the content of his philosophical dialogues (Gel. 18. 7). Still more generally, Suetonius' description of Aurelius Opilius' professional career, which progressed (regressed ?) from philosophy to rhetoric and finally to grammar, illustrates the not always equipoised symbiosis of philosophy and rhetoric (*Gram.* 6). The careers of Dio Chrysostom and Lucian are supposed to have advanced in the opposite direction (see p. 155). In Aulus Gellius a grammarian charges that philosophers like Favorinus waste their time on words while he, a grammarian, conducts fruitful enquiries into the philosophical basis of a happy, rewarding life (Gel. 18. 7; see p. 80).

The Self-portrait of the Philosopher

Apuleius' representation of himself in the role of philosopher is complex. He implicitly rejects the label "sophist"; but it is equally true that he explicitly appropriates the attributes of eloquence, which discredits in the eyes of some of his contemporaries the claim of being a genuine philosopher.[8] He links philosophy and eloquence in the person of Demosthenes, who was a very highly valued model of eloquence for the Greek sophists of Apuleius' time and who, according to Apuleius' assessment of his attainments, would perfectly match Philostratus' definition of the subjects of his *Lives of the Sophists*:

Thus that best of orators, when he had drunk deeply of Plato's eloquence,

[8] Hijmans 1983: 396, citing *Fl.* 18. 18 ff., *Pl.* 2. 8. 231 and *Asclepius* 14. See O'Brien 1991 for Apuleius in the role of *rhetor Platonicus*.

had learned from Eubulides the methods of logical argument... (*Apol.* 15. 9).

Elsewhere in the *Apology*, which can be characterized as applied rhetoric in defence of philosophy, Apuleius distinguishes between the "nit-picking" rhetor and the "wit-picking" philosopher but in such a way as to make it clear that he views eloquent public speaking as one of the roles of the philosopher; and the verb *disserere* that he uses of the eloquent speaker is the verb that he applies to his own public discourses.[9] The younger Seneca's use of this verb to distinguish between glib, crowd-pleasing purveyors of commonplaces and high-minded intellectual mentors is especially instructive (*Ep.* 52. 9).

Apuleius' representation of himself as a philosopher in the *Florida* is consistent with that of the *Apology*. In both works his concept of the philosopher embraces that of the man of letters. Whenever he refers to his literary activities he simultaneously emphasizes his philosophical achievements.[10] Philosophical discourse is one among the other forms of entertainment for which throngs fill the theatre at Carthage, the others being mimes, tight-rope walkers and comedies (*Fl.* 5). The same audiences are attentive to possible solecisms and barbarisms in Apuleius' philosophical discourses rather than to their philosophical content (*Fl.* 9. 7). False philosophers whose philosophical attainments are limited to aping the outward appearance of true sages disgrace the "regal science" that was invented *tam ad bene dicendum quam ad bene vivendum* ("as much for [teaching one] to speak well as for [teaching one] to live well" [i. e., wisely]) by *male dicendo et similiter vivendo* ("by their speaking badly and living likewise").[11]

Thus for Apuleius belles-lettres and philosophy are inextricably linked. They are both part of the advanced education that also comprises moral instruction, traditionally the preserve of the philosopher in classical antiquity. His step-son would not have become a moral wastrel if he had been exposed to a literary education, "You would not have [surreptitiously] touched your mother's letters if you had touched belles-lettres" (*Apol.* 86. 3). Perhaps the most striking example in Apuleius of the complete blending of philosophy and

---

[9] *Apol.* 15. 10, 55. 10 and 73. 2; see, too, Vallette 1908: 199-203.

[10] E. g. *Fl.* 9. 4 and 20. 4-6.

[11] *Fl.* 9. 9 and 7. 9-10; see also Sen. *Ep.* 52 and O'Brien 1991: 39-50.

(applied) rhetoric occurs in the *Apology*, where Plato is called as a witness for the defence:

> As is evident from the signs of approval from all those sitting on the tribunal with you, Maximus, I seem to have made most timely use of Plato both as a model for my way of life and as a supporter of my case, and you see that I adhere to the letter of his laws.[12]

Eloquent Philosophers

In combining the roles of eloquent speaker and philosopher Apuleius defies the school of thought represented by the younger Seneca and Epictetus but would meet with the approval of Aristotle and Cicero (see p. 174). The last two insist that philosophy and rhetoric are essential accomplishments of the educated person.[13] However, when the former attainment becomes excessively subservient to the latter, Seneca's alliterative stricture may legitimately be invoked:

> *Itaque quae philosophia fuit, facta philologia est* (Thus what was the pursuit of wisdom has become the pursuit of words) (*Ep*. 108. 23).

In my opinion the intellectual of the period who best combines the roles of philosopher and eloquent orator is Dio Chrysostom.[14] His oration 36 is a delightful blend of tongue-in-cheek preamble and philosophical discourse "performed live" before the people of his native city. He describes to his townsfolk the formerly important commercial centre Borysthenes, which has become ramshackle because of constant attack by neighbouring barbarian peoples. Hellenic culture and knowledge of Greek have declined along with the physical condition of the city. Nevertheless, a young man of the city who is "enthusiastic about oratory and philosophy" engages Dio in earnest discussion of Homer. In spite of the city being under constant attack

---

[12] *Apol*. 65. 8. The word "laws" is a pun on Plato's ethical instruction and his work entitled the *Laws*, which Apuleius has just quoted.

[13] Arist. *Rhet*. 1354 a and Cic. *de Orat*. 3. 15-9; at 3. 58-61 Cicero traces the split, which he labels "absurd, useless and reprehensible," between philosopy and eloquence to the time of the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.

[14] See Trapp 1990: 148-55.

by Scythians, Dio, the young man and other townsfolk, who "were such eager listeners and so truly Hellenic in this respect that almost all of them, though under arms, were present and wanted to hear me," gathered for philosophical discussion at the temple of Zeus. Dio then begins to provide an abstract definition of the Stoic concept of the nature of the city. He is interrupted by one of the assembled townsfolk, who, in spite of his very poor spoken Greek, insists that he admires both Homer and Plato and asks Dio instead to discuss divine government in words as close as possible to those of Plato. What follows is a combination of Stoic political doctrine, Platonist cosmology and Homeric myth leading up to a long Zoroastrian myth that Dio attributes to the *magi* of Persia. Dio concludes the oration by apologizing to his native townsfolk for constructing a myth that may have been too elevated and nebulous.

This oration is an instance of a highly accomplished speaker succeeding in presenting a serious, literate discourse that is simultaneously informed with wry humour. The notion of Dio presenting a Platonic-type myth on the outer fringes of the Hellenic world in a ramshackle community to a people scarcely able to speak Greek and under attack from neighbouring barbarian tribes recalls Ovid reciting Latin verse to the uncomprehending, spear-wielding inhabitants of barbarian Tomis. And the notion that the semi-Hellenic people of distant Borysthenes have insisted on a Platonic-type myth possibly too lofty for the comprehension of Dio's Hellenic listeners was surely designed for their amusement.

Dio epitomizes the masterly harmonization of serious content and erudite, entertaining embellishment. In other words the message and the medium complement each other. His pupil Favorinus does not appear to have been as successful in achieving this kind of balanced synthesis. I must add in his defence, however, that his one work that survives sufficiently to provide a basis of assessment is not wholly extant and that it is not so much a philosophical discourse or treatise as what would now probably be called a self-help manual. Usually referred to as *On Exile*, the fragmentary but substantially complete work was published in 1931 from a papyrus roll of the late-second or early-third century (see Chapter Three, n. 51).

Exiled to the island of Chios, Favorinus puts pen to paper and musters all the philosophical arguments that he can think of to make the situation bearable for himself and for anyone else in such circumstances. Thus we are not dealing with oratorical performance

before a "live" audience, as in the case of Dio, but rather with literary display on the printed page. In spite of the obstacles to assessment and the differences in genesis (written rather than presented "live on stage") and intended target (reader rather than listener), the works of Dio and Favorinus can be compared in their manipulation of the literary resources emphasized in the rhetorical training of the second century.[15]

Whereas Dio integrates the fruits of his literary and rhetorical education into the core of his oration, Favorinus allows the overlay of erudite allusion and quotation to obscure the substance of the message. A French scholar greeting the initial modern publication of the *On Exile* resorts to a military metaphor to describe Favorinus' procedure, writing of "une légion d'exemples, une phalange d'arguments, un bataillon de héros mythiques et historiques...transformés en catapultes à citations."[16] Somewhat less colourfully, we might in English speak of a shotgun approach. In chapters 7-8, for instance, where Favorinus cites longing for one's homeland as one of the "enemy attackers" to be endured by the exile, there is scarcely an original statement or an independently formulated thought. Instead, Favorinus assembles a catalogue of literary, mythological and historical paradigms, repeatedly appending "as Homer says," "as Pindar says," "as Euripides says," and "as Simonides says," ranging over the examples of Homer's Odysseus, Euripides' Philoctetes, Polycrates of Samos, Orestes, Protesilaus, Arion and other textbook models.

A number of factors has conspired to change philosophy from its earlier function of posing questions and seeking answers to its tendency in the second century to parade previous answers. Some of the cultural and intellectual trends surveyed in chapter 2—the so-called Cult of the Past, bibliomania, mimesis, compendia, *historiae omnigenae* and commonplace books —come to mind as one traces the transformation of *philosophia* into *philologia*. These in turn deeply influenced the uniform rhetorical training of the period. Finally, it precluded original

[15] I recognize that in the second century a written work is likely to have been read aloud by one person to another or to a group. This is different, however, from the "interactive" situation of an orator presenting a "reading" of his own work from a stage to a mass audience assembled to listen to him and implicity invited to become involved in the presentation.

[16] Collart 1932: 25.

thought and fostered uniformity of presentation, whether the medium was epideictic oratory, forensic oratory or philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, and inevitably, some intellectuals of the period were more accomplished than others. Thus Dio Chrysostom is capable of attractively repackaging others' ideas as an integrated whole. In the hands of Favorinus, however, others' ideas and formulations remain discrete, adding up to an impressive check-list of "works consulted" but never integrated into an overriding or consistent system of enquiry.

Philosophy on Stage

In assessing Apuleius as a philosopher one must take into account two overriding considerations. First, all the philosophical monographs ascribed to him are derivative and, second, at least some of them were prepared for "live" oral presentation. Thus it is legitimate to focus on the sophistic and artistic or "performance" qualities of his philosophical *opuscula* rather than, for instance, on analysis and exegesis of philosophical doctrine. A writer who expresses Platonic doctrine in Plautine language invites such an approach: *Hunc talem Plato lucricupidinem atque accipitrem...*(*Pl.* 2. 15. 241).

Sophistic and "performance" presentation of philosophical doctrine is, of course, most pronounced in Apuleius' *Apology* and *Florida*. A cursory examination of it in these two works will help in recognizing and appreciating this mode of presentation in the philosophical monographs and the continuity of philosophical views to be found in the entire corpus.

Both Regen and Hijmans have analysed in detail Apuleius' avowed use of Plato in responding to what he claims is the fabricated charge that he has cast spells on a boy and a woman.[17] As he does throughout the *Apology* and as in its preceding chapters, where he links the alleged employment of fish in acts of magic to the ichthyological studies of Aristotle and Theophrastus, Apuleius assimilates his activities to those of a wide range of respected Greek and Roman intellectuals, above all Plato. Regen focusses on Apuleius' reference to Plato as the authority for the view that "between gods and people there are certain divine powers intermediate both in character and in

---

[17] *Apol.* 42-51; Hijmans 1987: 418-22, Regen 1971: 1-17.

place and that these govern all acts of divination and the miraculous deeds performed by magicians" (*Apol.* 43. 2). This topic is central to Apuleius' monograph (and orally presented discourse) *On the God of Socrates*. Regen observes that in the *Apology* Apuleius compromises or at least modifies the attributes of demons formulated in the detailed philosophical treatise. He propounds in the former work a view that he dismisses as poetic exaggeration in the systematic monograph.[18] This compromise was necessitated by the immediate rhetorical demands of the *Apology*. In other words, we have here a striking instance of the interplay of rhetoric and philosophy. The presentation of the latter is shaped by rhetorical consideration such as the educational background of the intended audience and the need either to inform or to persuade.[19]

Hijmans concludes his detailed analysis of chapters 48-51 of the *Apology* thus:

> It is typical of Apuleius' working method that he condenses and simplifies his source in accordance with the needs of the moment

and finds it "particularly significant...that the selection and quotation of his sources was dictated by his rhetorical aim."[20] In Apuleius' words:

> I have recalled these facts and taken care to cite by name the specialized treatises and books of philosophers rather than those of medical doctors and poets so that the plaintiffs will cease to be surprised that philosophers have professionally investigated the causes and remedies of diseases (*Apol.* 51. 8).

In a word, forensic, i. e., rhetorical need has determined philosophical content. As well, I emphasized in Chapter One the overriding rhetorical goal of Apuleius' repeated claims in the *Apology* to be a Platonist philosopher (see p. 23).

Some of the orations in the *Florida* provide an equally revealing

---

[18] *Soc.* 12. 145, Regen 1971: 16.

[19] I cannot agree with Regen 1971: 16 that in the *Apology* Apuleius has resorted to a loose paraphrase of Plato because of the need to communicate the doctrine to Latin-speaking listeners. The *On the God of Socrates* is explicitly targeted for such an audience, e. g. 11. 145.

[20] Hijmans 1987: 421.

gauge of Apuleius *philosophus sophisticus*. Perhaps the most obvious instance of Apuleius addressing in the *Florida* a philosophical theme that appears to have been in the forefront of his thoughts occurs in the severely truncated *Florida* 10, where he again discourses on "intermediate divine powers."

The surviving portion of the speech opens with a verse quotation of the poet and playwright Accius. The citation of "intermediate divine powers" is preceded by a reference to some of the visible deities of, presumably, Plato's tripartite hierarchy of beings. These higher or celestial deities are to be distinguished from the lower, intermediate deities (demons), who can be sensed but not seen and whose powers the human mind can comprehend. Amor, the god of love, serves as an example of demonic force. The same pattern of development is evident in the philosophical treatise devoted to the subject of demons, the *On the God of Socrates*. Plato's tripartite classification accounts for the spatial ascendancy of the celestial deities. Those that are visible, like the planetary and astral deities of *Florida* 10, are introduced by a verse quotation, of Vergil, that emphasizes their luminous qualities.[21] In both works Apuleius catalogues the deities and, probably inevitably, there is substantial overlap. Both catalogues are prone to the parallelism of expression that characterizes much of Apuleius' writing and both catalogues of demons cite Amor as an example of demonic force (*Fl.* 10. 3 and *Soc.* 16. 155). As de' Conno observes, the *providentiae ratio* and *mediae potestates* of *Florida* 10 underlie the philosophical doctrine of the *On the God of Socrates*.[22] Whether presenting an epideictic oration (*Fl.* 10) or an overtly didactic philosophical discourse (*Soc.*) Apuleius sees himself above all as a teacher expounding and explaining Platonic doctrine. As he himself says to a fair-minded audience gathered at a theatre to hear him speak, "If a philosopher [discourses], you will learn" (*Fl.* 5).[23]

Apuleius *philosophus Platonicus* seems acutely concerned with the wide gulf between the highest (celestial) and the lowest (mortal) ranks

---

[21] E. g. *clarissima...lumina* (*Soc.* 1. 116) and *candentem...flammam* (*Fl.* 10. 1).

[22] De' Conno 1958-59: 64.

[23] What I have paraphrased as fair-minded (*bono animo*) may have been wishful thinking or a denunciation of his audience's low-brow predilection for mimes and circus acts.

of Plato's tripartite hierarchy. He expresses rueful recognition of this gap in the *On the God of Socrates* and elsewhere derives comfort from the faith of the *Platonica familia* in the bridging function of demons, the *mediae potestates*.[24]

Another concern that spans the overt didacticism of the philosophical treatise *On the God of Socrates* and the overtly epideictic *Florida* is Apuleius' claim to the title of philosopher against false claimants to the title. We have already seen something of this attempted positioning in my earlier discussion of sophistic squabbling (see p. 162). In the *Florida* Apuleius repeats his frequently expressed (*ut saepe dixi*) warning to his audience not to be deceived by false philosophers (9. 9). In the *On the God of Socrates*—in a passage remarkable even by Apuleian standards for its parallelism of expression, enumeration, jingle, alliteration and word play—Apuleius denounces the "profane mob ignorant of philosophy, devoid of a sense of sanctity, deprived of true reasoning, destitute of religion,...either [devoted to] superstition or either fearfully or arrogantly in contempt [of the gods]" (3. 122).

We have also seen that this kind of pulpit oratory prevails elsewhere in the Apuleian corpus. I previously classified an example of it as the consequence of the second-century scholastic tendency to resort to sanctioned, often intrusive moral paradigms such as the equation between intrinsic human worth and Diogenes the Cynic's contempt of outer displays of wealth and power. In the *On the God of Socrates* the initially systematic enquiry into demonology and Socrates' personal demon in particular becomes eventually an exhortation to assess inner worth instead of outward qualities (see p. 113).[25] The *Florida* contains several examples of this kind of exhortation, the most immediately relevant being *Florida* 2, where Socrates is said to have evaluated a person's intrinsic worth with his mind's eye and his perception of the person's soul.[26]

The African Socrates defending philosophy in a court room in Sabrata on some occasions saw himself as Pythagoras (see p. 147).[27] Indeed, the two philosophical mentors seem to merge in the person of

---

[24] *Apol* 43. 2 and 64. 3; *Fl.* 10; *Soc.* 4. 127 and 6. 133.
[25] *Soc.* 21. 167 ad finem.
[26] *Fl.* 2. 2; see also *Fl.* 22 and 23.
[27] De' Conno 1958-59: 67-9.

Apuleius in that court room. The combination of physical beauty and intellectual acuity attributed to Pythagoras at *Florida* 15. 12 is the very combination that Apuleius is compelled to defend in Sabrata, "We accuse...him of being a handsome philosopher" (*Apol.* 4. 1). Pythagoras travelled extensively in search of wisdom.[28] He studied with the *magi* of Persia, most notably with Zoroaster (see p. 147). Apuleius has bookish knowledge of their doctrines and has himself travelled in pursuit of knowledge (*Apol.* 25. 9-26 and *Fl.* 17. 4). His admiration of Egyptian wisdom is matched by Pythagoras' quest for it (*Fl.* 6. 1). Pythagoras also learned geometry from the Egyptians, a subject that took Apuleius to Athens (*Fl.* 20. 4). Pythagoras' initiation into Egyptian mystery religions recalls Apuleius' initiation into Greek mystery religions (*Apol.* 55. 8-9). The next stop in Pythagoras' travels in search of knowledge was among the sages of India for whom Apuleius expresses admiration (*Fl.* 6). Pythagoras also learned the arts of healing; acquisition of this knowledge, for which others have paid large sums of money, has come to Apuleius through his study of Greek authorities (*Apol.* 48-52). Like Apuleius, Pythagoras drank from many cups of wisdom (*Fl.* 20. 4). Plato deviated scarcely at all from Pythagorean doctrine and if circumstances had allowed, he would have sought first-hand contact with Eastern wisdom.[29] In order to be judged a Platonist by his teachers, Apuleius took a vow of silence, the first thing taught to his followers by Pythagoras, "the first person to be called a philosopher and the inventor of the term 'philosophy'"; for "to meditate is to learn, to speak is to unlearn" (*Fl.* 15. 22-6).

My intention in these past few pages has been to reaffirm my earlier claim that Apuleius *philosophus* and Apuleius *sophisticus* are not mutually exclusive. To focus exclusively on philosophical doctrine in the overtly philosophical treatises is as misleading as to ignore their sophistic, that is, rhetorical qualities. From Regen's graphic representation of the distinctively Apuleian hierarchy of beings it is strikingly obvious that Apuleian philosophical doctrine manifests itself across the full range of the works analysed by him in spite of their

---

[28] Unless otherwise noted all the paraphrases and quotations relating to Pythagoras are based on *Fl.* 15.

[29] *Pl.* 1. 3. 186-7 as well as *Fl.* 15. 26.

disparate forms and objectives.[30]

Authorship

In the discussion of the philosophical treatises that follows I shall consider them in the order of degree authenticity: *On the God of Socrates* (the only unquestionably authentic Apuleian treatise), *On Plato and His Doctrine*, *Peri Hermeneias* and *On the Universe*. The order of the last two works could just as readily be reversed, but the possibility that the *Peri Hermeneias* is a continuation of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* has determined the sequence that I have adopted.

> Present day scholarship on the whole agrees that "Apology," "Florida," "De deo Socratis," "De Platone" I and II and "Metamorphoses" were in fact written by Apuleius.[31]

Hijmans, whom I have just quoted, adds that there is some doubt about the authenticity of the *On the Universe* and the *Peri Hermeneias*, although the weight of modern scholarship inclines towards accepting the former as authentic, and that the *Asclepius* and the work generally known as the *Herbal* are usually dismissed as spurious. In view of the recent, detailed and reliable surveys of the issue by Hijmans and Gersh it would be otiose to rehearse all the arguments in support of the authenticity or spuriousness of the works that are not incontestably Apuleian.[32] Hijmans has successfully discredited the arguments mounted against accepting the *Peri Hermeneias* as genuinely Apuleian and he has cast doubt on the methods employed to deny Apuleian authorship of the *Asclepius*. Whether genuinely Apuleian or not, the *Asclepius*, which belongs to the domain of revealed religion rather than

---

[30] Regen 1971: 90 and the pull-out chart at the end of the book. Regen's analysis omits the *Golden Ass* and the *Peri Hermeneias*.

[31] Hijmans 1987: 408. St. Augustine refers to the *On the Universe* (*C. D.* 4. 2) and the *On the God of Socrates* (*C. D.* 8. 14-18 and 9. 3-13) as Apuleian.

[32] Gersh 1986: I, 217-9.

philosophy, will have no role in the discussion of the philosophical works.[33]

A few points need to be made about the authenticity of the philosophical works before dealing directly with Apuleius *philosophus*. First, the manuscript tradition that segregated the literary works from the philosophical treatises until the fourteenth century has provided a considerable amount of the impetus for doubting Apuleian authorship of the latter group other than the *On the God of Socrates*, which is otherwise reliably attested as Apuleian.[34] This in itself is not unparalleled for other classical authors such as the younger Seneca and therefore is not a compelling argument against Apuleian authorship.[35]

Second, the major line of attack against the Apuleian authorship of the philosophical treatises of unsecured authenticity has proceeded along meticulously detailed technical analyses of lexical and stylistic differences among the various clusters of works. Redfors, for instance, has scrupulously amassed a large amount of data but one is left wondering whether they are infallible criteria.[36] To cite only one example, chosen almost at random, the use of the preposition *ob* to denote cause occurs in all of Apuleius' major philosophical and non-philosophical works except the *On Plato and His Doctrine* and the *On the Universe*; however, *propter* to denote cause is absent only in the *On the God of Socrates*, the only philosophical treatise of unquestionably Apuleian authorship. In a more general sense, such lexical and stylistic variation occurs across the range of undisputedly genuine works of other classical authors and even in different parts of the same work of a single writer.[37] Redfors and before him Axelson devote considerable attention to the use of *clausulae* (rhythmic sentence endings) in the two major clusters of works. Again, the analysis is admirably detailed and precise, but the conclusions to be drawn from the undeniable differences in the two clusters of works remain less decisive. Indeed, Axelson concedes that current understanding of

---

33 Gersh 1986: I, 329-87 provides a detailed analysis. Fowden 1986: 10 and 198 does not provide reasons for dismissing the *Asclepius* as Apuleian but states, p. 199, that "Apuleius...well represents the sort of milieu in which Hermetic ideas most easily took root."

34 The *Peri Hermeneias* remained outside of either manuscript filiation until a still later date.

35 Hijmans 1987: 409.

36 Redfors 1960. The example that follows is taken from p. 33.

37 Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: XVI.

clausulae is inadequate and Redfors pronounces a *non liquet*.[38]

An equally technical analysis of stressed (as opposed to quantitative) *clausulae*, the so-called *cursus mixtus*, has been used to cast doubt on the Apuleian authorship of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* and the *On the Universe*, since this stylistic feature is not otherwise attested before the time of Minucius Felix in the first half of the third century.[39] Once again, however, a caveat is in order. Preservation of Latin literature of the second half of the second century and later is notoriously spotty and the sample base may therefore be flawed.

In spite of all the undeniable stylistic differences in the literary and the non-literary, that is, philosophical works, there is an unmistakable thematic consistency. The most obvious example of this is the four-fold hierarchy of beings that is found not only in the philosophical treatises, even to the point that the Greek model of the *On the Universe* has been adapted to conform to this doctrine, but, in varying degrees, in the oratorical works as well.[40]

Philosophical Education in the Second Century

A few last general remarks are in order before we turn to the individual philosophical treatises. We saw earlier that in spite of Apuleius' repeated claims to be a Platonist philosopher it is by no means certain or even likely that he pursued his philosophical studies in Athens at the Academy (see p. 26). It had probably ceased to exist long before the time of Apuleius' *longa peregrinatio* to Athens for *diutinis studiis* a few years before his arrival in Oea in 156.[41] Instead, he would have studied philosophy along with the other subjects enumerated in *Florida* 20 with private tutors. They appear to have expected their Western pupils to be more interested in Plato's style of expression than in his doctrines. This expectation and the reality that underlies it are pithily summarized in the previously quoted assessment of contemporary philosophy by the younger Seneca, *Itaque quae*

---

[38] Redfors 1960: 114-7; Axelson 1952: 18-9.

[39] Oberhalman and Hall 1984; cf. Steinmetz 1982: 224.

[40] See especially the pull-out chart at the end of Regen 1971 and Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: XXV-VI.

[41] Glucker 1978: 142-3 argues against the commonly expressed view that Taurus was a scholarch in the Academy.

philosophia fuit facta philologia est; and are reflected in Apuleius' anticipation that his Carthaginian audience will focus on the style of his philosophical presentation and in his linking of the verbs *disserere* and *dissertare* with philosophical discourse.[42] I tried earlier to reconstruct the curriculum from Aulus Gellius' vignettes of his own studies in Athens at approximately the same time as Apuleius' studies there (see p. 27). They may have had at least one tutor in common, as their similar accounts of the study of dialectics suggest (see p. 32).[43] Whether or not Apuleius was a pupil in the so-called School of Gaius has been the focus of attention for most of this century. This hypothesis at most would account for the substantially parallel surveys of Platonism in Apuleius' *On Plato and His Doctrine* and the *Epitome* (*Didascalius*) attributed to Gaius' only known pupil, Albinus (see p. 27). Finally, what must be emphasized above all about Apuleius *philosophus* is that his expressly philosophical output is derivative, ranging from now lost translations to adaptations and surveys of earlier, usually Greek works (see p. 37).

The On the God of Socrates

The *On the God of Socrates* is the clearest example in the Apuleian corpus of the complete fusion of oratory and philosophy. Apuleius refers to himself as an orator and to the work as an oration.[44] There is the unmistakable impression that he is addressing a "live" audience, as he responds to his listeners' apparent incomprehension or scepticism (14. 150 and 20. 166). The closest analogy among Apuleius' Greek contemporaries is the *dialexeis* of Maximus of Tyre, two of which also deal with Socrates' demon (8 and 9, Hobein [ed.] 1910). Moreover, Apuleius proudly wears the hat of orator, singling out Nestor as the paradigm of wise eloquence.[45]

The version of the speech that has survived is addressed to a Latin-

---

[42] *Apol.* 15. 10, 55. 10, 73. 2; *Fl.* 9. 7-8, 18. 1; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 52. 9. Sandy 1993: 169.

[43] See too Gersh 1986: I, 222-7.

[44] *Soc.* 3. 125, 5. 129, 14. 150; cf. 6. 132: Plato will respond in *mea* [viz. *Apulei*] *voce*.

[45] *Soc.* 17. 158; Hijmans 1987: 425-6.

speaking audience. He assures his listeners that he will "discourse in Latin" on the views of (Greek) philosophers regarding demons and that of Socrates in particular (14. 150). He also assures them that their patience will be rewarded by a Latin translation of the Homeric passage that he has just cited and he take pains to specify that certain terms are Greek (11. 145 and 6. 133). Likewise, he provides copious examples from Roman history and regularly quotes Latin poets, especially Lucretius and Vergil, perhaps in response to the impatience of his audience that I have just noted. One perhaps misjudged concession to his Latin-speaking listeners is the misleading attempt to provide certain categories of demons with Latin nomenclature (15. 151-4). Finally, Apuleius makes an effort to find (and explain) Latin equivalents of Greek technical terms, as in the passage just cited.[46]

The "False" Prefaces

In the preceding paragraph I used the safeguard "the version of the speech that has survived." There are in fact some uncertainties about the genesis of the discourse and even a hint in the body of the discourse that it was presented extemporaneously. To deal with the second issue first, genuine or rehearsed spontaneity is implied by the apparent influence of the "live" audience over the development of the discourse, "If you will be patient for a short time, I shall recite the Greek verse in Latin—all right, here it is" (11. 145). The major problem is that there are five fragments associated in the manuscript tradition in various ways with the *On the God of Socrates*. The first four of them are labelled the conclusion of the discourse and the fifth of them is headed variously as either the beginning of the discourse itself or the beginning or the end of its prologue.[47] Fragments 1, 3 and 4 have to do with improvisation. In numbers 1 and 3 the orator asks his audience to apply to his improvised speeches the tolerant standards appropriate to extemporaneous discourse. Fragment 2, in a way wholly consistent with Apuleius' practice of compiling philosophical "firsts," reports a saying of Aristippus, "the famous founder of the Cyrenaïcan school of philosophy...and a student of Socrates" (see p. 78); the *bon mot* itself, in response to Aristippus being asked by a "certain tyrant"

[46] He is equally painstaking to account for his choice of Latin equivalents in *Pl.* (e. g. 2. 7. 229) and *Mun.* (e. g. 13. 319).

[47] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 6-7 and 161-8.

what benefit he has derived from his long and dedicated study of philosophy, has the earmarks of the the set-piece on Diogenes the Cynic's contempt of wealth and power, "...so that I can feel secure and fearless while in conversation with anyone [i. e., even with tyrants]." None of these topics and issues is incompatible with "live" Greek sophistic discourse. Dio Chrysostom's oration 12, for instance, is an apparently serious philosophical discourse preceded by an Aesopic fable and self-depreciatory remarks (see p. 151 and p. 157).[48] The encyclopedic-like entry on famous philosophers contained in fragment 2 is also consistent with Greek sophistic discourse. The appeals to apply relaxed standards to extemporaneous discourse are compatible with Apuleius' concerns expressed elsewhere with misguided critics of philosophers (*Apol.* 17-8).[49] The *On the God of Socrates* itself shows traces of the orator Apuleius engaged directly with his "live" audience. In chapter 5 one of the listeners is imagined to interject, "' What, then, speaker, someone might object,...?'". At the beginning of chapter 3 Apuleius disarms his potential ignorant critics. Likewise, the end of chapter 14 confronts potential opposition by omitting to develop further the contentious topic under discussion.

Modern scholarship has firmly rejected the five fragments as parts of the original preface to the *On the God of Socrates*, judging them to be instead misplaced extracts of speeches that belong with the other such extracts assembled in the *Florida*, which in the manuscript tradition immediately precedes the *On the God of Socrates*.[50] However, the burden of proof lies with those who undertake to discount the manuscript authority that assigns them to Apuleius' philosophical enquiry. I have suggested in the preceding paragraphs that the apparently extraneous topics of the so-called false prefaces would not in fact be out of place in a "live" sophistic philosophical performance. I rest my case on Dio Chrysostom.

The prefaces to Dio's orations 12 and 36 combine some of the

---

48 Cf. Apul., fragment 4, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973.

49 Philostratus, *VS* 509, links the origins of the Second Sophistic to extemporaneous speech.

50 Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 161-2 succinctly surveys *l'état de la question*. Barra 1961-2: 118-9 believes that he has found traces of the lost preface in August. *C. D.* 8. 13, where St. Augustine, who undertakes systematically to refute the doctrines of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, warns his Christian readers against Platonists in general and his compatriot Apuleius in particular.

features of the so-called false prefaces to the *On the God of Socrates* (see p. 151 and p. 177). The fused *captatio benevolentiae* and implication of extemporaneousness of these two orations are consistent with fragments 1, 3 and 4. The anecdote about Aristippus (fragment 2), in addition to having the sophistic parallels noted above, would serve to convey to the audience an impression of the high esteem in which distinguished philosophers of the past have held Socrates; needless to say, that would be appropriate in a discourse on Socrates' demon. The Aesopic fable in fragment 4 about a crow being outwitted because of its vain delusion that its cawing constituted song worthy of Apollo could represent the kind of squabbling among sophistic philosophers that we have already seen. The clever fox (= Apuleius?) would be more than a match for the vain, deluded crow in a pointed metaphor reminiscent of Dio's feigning to be a plain (wise) owl overshadowed by strutting, peacock-like sophists in oration 12. The intentionally deceptive association of the crow with Apollo, the god of reason and culture, strengthens the possibility that the fable is part of a preface or a kind of *(pro)lalia* designed to discredit would-be critics.[51] Most importantly, perhaps, Apollo is closely associated with two of Apuleius' cultural heroes. As Apuleius himself reports, the god recognized Socrates' wisdom (*Soc.* 17. 157); he also recounts the tradition that an incarnation or likeness of Apollo fathered Plato and the philosopher was born on the same day as the god while Socrates was born the day before (*Soc.* 17. 157 and *Pl.* 1. 1. 180-2). As well, Plato and Apollo's bird the swan are linked prophetically by Socrates to Plato's founding of the Academy (*Pl.* 1. 1. 182-3). Thus from the Aesopic fable Apuleius, a master of contrived links and transitions, could easily have passed to the moral: the carping of his philosophical critics is only vain, deluded carping; or to put it differently, more in line with the moral expressed at the conclusion of the fable: his critics reveal their ignorant delusions as soon as they open their mouths.

Only if the *On the God of Socrates* is analysed as though it were intended to be read rather than heard by a large, popular audience in a public setting do the fragmentary prefaces seem discordant with the serious philosophical discourse. It is not to be judged as a written

---

[51] For the purposes of the fable the link to Apollo is a kind of boomerang joke, but in fact the crow in its oracular role is associated with Apollo; see Beaujeu 1973: 167, n. 3.

document intended for painstaking study in municipal libraries, like the technical treatises of Aristotle and other illustrious authorities consulted in public libraries by Apuleius or the works consulted by Gellius in the public libraries of Rome (*Apol.* 41. 4 and 91. 2). *Florida* 18 vividly recaptures the conditions of a self-proclaimed philosopher's "live" performance before a mass audience assembled in a theatre that also serves as the setting for comedies, jugglers, tight-rope walkers and mimes. All these forms of popular amusement (*ludiones*) must be put out of mind, Apuleius tells his audience. Rather, "nothing more should be considered than the reason for the gathering and the speaker's subject" (*Fl.* 18. 4-5). Just as playwrights are able to substitute the place of the action of their plays for the place of the performance, just so should the audience of Apuleius *philosophus* imagine that his erudite speeches are "being read in the library" of Carthage (*Fl.* 18. 9). The philosopher's utterances, Apuleius claims, are worthy of a library but are presented in a venue more accustomed to popular distractions than to philosophical discourse. In such a setting a speaker with a serious message must struggle to get the attention of the audience, as we saw in the case of Dio Chrysostom (see p. 169). The prefaces, which are a type of *captatio benevolentiae*, are designed to do exactly that. Apuleius' role is to provide optimal conditions for Plato to speak in his (Apuleius') words (*Soc.* 6. 132).

The fifth (and last) of the prefaces raises different issues that are germane to this study. It bears quoting in full:

> I have long known that your gestures are intended to indicate to me that the rest of my speech should be in Latin. I remember that I promised at the outset as you expressed your divergent preferences that neither group of you, neither those of you who wanted Latin nor those of you who wanted Greek, would leave here without having heard the language of your choice. Therefore, if it seems best to you, enough of my speech has been in Greek. It is time to migrate from Greece to Latium. We are almost half way through this enquiry, and in my opinion at least the second half is not weaker in its arguments, less rich in its ideas, more devoid of examples or more defective in expression than the Greek part that preceded it.

The manuscript tradition separates this preface from the previous four fragmentary prefaces by labelling it as either the beginning of the argument of the *On the God of Socrates* or the exordium of the same work. On at least one other occasion Apuleius prepared a bilingual speech. Speaking in the theatre of Carthage to listeners whom he urged

earlier to transform this site of popular entertainment into a setting worthy of philosophical discourse, he announces that he will present a hymn that he has composed both in Greek and in Latin in honour of the god Aesculapius. He has prefixed to it an introductory, bilingual prologue that will function as a dialogue introduced by one of his Athenian classmates, whose role, as in a Platonic dialogue such as the *Symposium*, will be to ask what the subject was of Apuleius' declamation the previous day in the temple of Aesculapius (*Fl.* 18).

In spite of the manuscript authority and the Apuleian precedent of presenting bilingually matter derived from or fashioned after Plato the fifth so-called false preface has met substantial scholarly resistance.[52] This reluctance to accept it as a genuine preface to the lost Greek version of the *On the God of Socrates* seems arbitrary. As Beaujeu notes, Apuleius twice refers to previous discussions that do not appear in the extant Latin version, one of which involves an explanation of the Greek word *eudaimonas* (good demons) (*Soc.* 15. 150).[53] Until there is evidence to the contrary I believe that the manuscript authority and Apuleian precedent should weigh more heavily than instinctive resistance.

The Discourse

In his *City of God* Apuleius' compatriot St. Augustine begins his detailed critique of the Platonic (pagan) concept of three kinds of rational soul with a prefatory exhortation that shows that he has read the *Golden Ass* as well: *Attente igitur audiamus*. He then provides a short survey of the Platonist position before turning to Apuleius in particular. He adds that the ideas described in his outline of the Platonist position can be found in many writers but that Apuleius has devoted an entire book to the subject. Two important inferences can be drawn from Augustine's preliminary remarks: (1) demonology is viewed as Platonist doctrine and (2) Apuleius is the only writer known to Augustine to have provided a detailed monograph on the subject. Like Augustine, I begin my discussion of the *On the God of Socrates* with a few words about its background. I should emphasize first, however, that, as in the previous chapter on Apuleius in the role of orator, my overriding concern is to restrict analysis to the aspects of

---

[52] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 5-7 surveys scholarly views.
[53] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 7.

this and the other philosophical treatises that highlight Apuleius *sophisticus*.[54]

Apuleius shares with other Middle Platonists certain basic tenets that derive from their belief in a transcendant divinity. Festugière has shown that the definition of the divine being—which appears in Apuleius' *On Plato and His Doctrine*, *On the God of Socrates* and *Apology*—is to be traced to Plato's *Timaeus* 28 c 3.[55] The supreme being cannot be localized, has no needs and transcends the material world; and it is incomprehensible, ineffable and insensible.[56]

The remoteness and distinctness of the supreme being urge the postulation of "certain intermediate divine powers" that bridge the otherwise unbridgeable gap between it and other gods on the one hand and earth-bound mortals on the other (*Soc.* 6. 132). The compelling logic that leads to this postulation is worth quoting in full. In response to Apuleius' translation of Plato's dictum that "no god participates in human affairs" a member of the audience is imagined to object:

> "What, then, speaker," someone will object, "am I to do in view of this pronouncement of yours, which is doubtlessly celestial but scarcely reassuring to humans? Are humans to be repelled completely and kept distant from the immortal gods and to be confined to this hell on earth? Has it come so to pass that all involvement with the celestial gods has been forbidden?....No god, you say, participates in human affairs. To whom, then, shall I address my prayers? To whom shall I pledge a vow? To whom shall I offer a sacrificial victim? Whom shall I call upon in the course of my life to succour those who are afflicted, show favour towards those who are good, oppose those who are wicked? Whom, finally, shall I invoke in my most frequent need to witness an oath?[57]

Apuleius replies in accordance with Plato's doctrine but in his own

---

[54] The following modern publications provide valuable assessments of Apuleius in the role of philosopher: Barra 1961-62, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973, Dillon 1977, Gersch 1986, Hijmans 1983, Moreschini 1978 and Portogalli 1963.

[55] Festugière 1944-54: IV, 103-9. Portogalli 1963: 227-41 adds *Met.* 11. 25 to Festugière's triad of Apuleian works; Hijmans 1987: 436-9 adds *Mun.* and, in passing, *Log.*

[56] Portogalli 1963: 229-32. Mortley 1972 argues that the ineffability of the supreme being at *Apol.* 64. 8 is consistent with Middle Platonism.

[57] *Soc.* 4. 128-9, 5. 120-30 and Pl. *Symp.* 203 a 2.

voice (*pro sententia sua mea voce*) that he has not said that the gods are so alienated from humans that not even prayers reach them. He has not removed the gods from concern for human affairs but rather only from their conduct. He continues:

> There are, moreover, certain intermediate divine powers that occupy the space in the atmosphere between the uppermost heights of heaven and the very depths of earth.[58] It is through this agency that our desires and the reports of our good deeds travel to the gods. These the Greeks call demons. Conveyors of earthly requests and heavenly bequests between the inhabitants of earth and those of heaven, they travel back and forth transporting petitions from here and aid from there, acting on the one hand as agents of request, on the other hand as agents of aid. As Plato affirms in the *Symposium*, all sorts of miracles performed by magicians and all varieties of prophecies are regulated by them also.[59]

As Beaujeu and others have recognized and as Apuleius himself acknowledges, the origin of the passage quoted above is Socrates' celebrated account of his discussion with Diotima on the nature of Love (Eros) as reported in Plato's *Symposium*.[60] The same passage in Plato underlies Maximus of Tyre's *dialexis* on Socrates' demon (14. 8, Hobein [ed.] 1910), Plutarch's discussion of demons and is the starting point for all Greco-Roman demonology.

Plato himself did not present a systematic demonology. His various successors developed his scattered remarks into a system. The author of the *Epinomis*, who is generally thought to have been Phillip of Opunta, and Xenocrates, who succeeded to the headship of the Academy after Plato's nephew Speusippus, tried to bridge the gap in Plato's rigidly dualistic scheme between the intellectual remoteness of the heavenly deities and the supreme being on the one hand and the sensual world of mortals on the other. To Plato's vague "intermediate" position Phillip added the concrete sub-stellar ether and air (*aër*) and invested the demons with human emotions. Xenocrates classified divine beings, including demons, along the lines of the cosmology of Plato's *Timaeus*. Accordingly, the demons occupy a sub-lunar position below Zeus and the astral deities. He also postulated good demons and evil

---

[58] Cf. *Fl.* 10. 3 and *Apol.* 43. 1.
[59] *Soc.* 6. 132-3; cf. *Apol.* 43. 1.
[60] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 215-6.

demons. As Beaujeu observes, "If the texts of Plato ultimately constitute the Bible of demonology, one can say that those of Xenocrates were its catechism."[61] By the time of Apuleius and, slightly earlier, Plutarch, demons came as well to be identified with the human soul. This probably represents a natural development of the widespread belief in the cult of the soul and such related notions as a guardian spirit, scattered reflections of which are found in Platonic texts and were developed above all by Stoic philosophers such as Posidonius.[62]

These developments appear in the demonologies of Apuleius' near contemporaries Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre. Plutarch, a probable source for some of Apuleius' demonology as it applies to Socrates in particular, sets out his demonology in three works, *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, *On Isis and Osiris* and *On the Guardian Spirit of Socrates*.[63] In the first of the three works he is concerned to show that the divinities are not responsible for the obsolence of oracles. There is a tendency, one of the speakers argues, to attribute everything or nothing to the gods. Those who postulate intermediate demons have, he continues, resolved this dilemma. This notion, as we have seen, derives from the passage in the *Symposium* quoted above and is echoed in the second of Plutarch's works. In this work demons are represented as supervising religious ceremonies and mystery rites on behalf of the remote Olympian deities. In the treatise devoted to Socrates' guiding spirit Plutarch bases part of his argument on Homer, as does Apuleius. Just as Athena aids Odysseus in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, just so does god seem to have provided Socrates with a guiding light and voice at times of uncertainty. In Apuleius Minerva (Athena) intervenes on behalf of Achilles and is both visible and audible to him alone, just as Socrates' demon is to him alone (*Soc.* 11. 145 and 20. 166). There appears to have been considerable interest among Apuleius' near contemporaries in the "certain voice" audible to Socrates alone; for Plutarch, Apuleius and Philo "Judaeus" focus their enquiries on it as proof that Socrates was the beneficiary of divine ("demonic") guidance.[64]

---

[61] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 192.

[62] For further details see Portogalli 1963: 234-6.

[63] Soury 1923.

[64] Soury 1923: 127-8; Ph. *De Decalogo* 32-6 and *De Abrahamo* 127.

Maximus of Tyre also uses the passage in Plato's *Symposium* as a point of departure in his two *dialexeis* dealing with Socrates' demon (8 and 9, Hobein [ed.] 1910). Like Plutarch in the *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, his lead-in to the announced topic is oracles: Why should one be surprised that a demon became associated with a man as just and pious as Socrates since ordinary people such as the priestess of Delphi spend every day with a divinity? An imaginary interlocutor then asks Maximus to be precise about the nature of Socrates' demon; but before doing so, Maximus addresses the more general question: Are there or are there not demons? Needless to say, Maximus answers affirmatively, basing his case initially, as do Plutarch and Apuleius, on the instances of Homeric deities such as Athena intervening on behalf of Homeric heroes like Achilles. Drawing on the *Symposium*, he goes on to explain the compelling necessity of the intermediate position of demons: without their existence as intermediaries, the gulf between the heavenly deities and earth-bound mortals would be unbridgeable. *Dialexis* 9 begins where *dialexis* 8 stopped: the nature of demons. Maximus emphasizes that like the deities they are immortal and that like humans they are subject to immediate, ephemeral passions such as hatred and compassion, which are necessarily alien to the serene aloofness of the heavenly gods. Apuleius also posits demons as a kind of buffer between all the emotional disturbances and tempests (*omnes turbelae tempestatesque*) of the human soul and the serenity of the heavenly gods (*procul a deorum caelestium tranquilitate*) (*Soc.* 12. 146-13. 148). Plutarch credits Plato and Pythagoras with the view that passions unworthy of the dignity of the heavenly gods are instead experienced by demons. Plato makes no such statement in any of his extant works. It seems more likely, as Beaujeu argues, that Xenocrates, whom Plutarch also names, and the pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis* ("of the School of Plato") are responsible for it.[65] From Plato (*Ti.* 90 d), by way of Xenocrates, Maximus derives the notion, which also appears in Apuleius (*Soc.* 16. 154), that some demons were once human souls that resided in human bodies; and both Maximus and Apuleius express the view that demons perform specific functions that usually correspond, in Maximus, to functions that they performed while still united to mortal bodies before, in Apuleius' words, they were freed from the fetters and bonds

---

[65] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 225-8; Plu. *On Isis and Osiris* 25. 360 d.

of the (human) body.[66]

It is clear from this survey of demonology in the second century that the subject was one of great interest when Apuleius presented his public discourse on the topic.[67] Like him, Greek contemporaries were offering to their listeners or readers Platonic demonology as it had been enriched by Plato's Academic successors, Pythagoreans and Stoic philosophers during the intervening centuries. Unlike in the *Apology*, where Apuleius presents himself, probably for tactical reasons, as a full-fledged Platonist, he adopts in the *On the God of Socrates* the subservient role of interpreter of Plato. He defers to him from the very first word of the speech, *Plato omnem naturam rerum...trifariam divisit*, and is unwilling to attempt to go beyond the limits of Plato's heavenly eloquence.[68] The opening chapters of Apuleius' discourse insist on the ineffability of the supreme god, the division of gods into astral and celestial categories and, finally, the depths to which even the supreme but vitiated animal, *praecipuum animal*, humans, has been condemned to live. As Barra observes, Apuleius presents here the Platonic catechism that also informs his vision of the universe in the *On Plato and His Doctrine*.[69] In the discourse on demonology, however, he gives added emphasis to the great spatial and qualitative distance between gods and humans in order to highlight the logical necessity of positing the *mediae potestates*.

The gods, of whom there are two categories, the visible and the invisible, the latter, according to Plato, being eternal, have no direct contact with humans because it would be beneath their dignity to do so:

> For even among humans a person who has been elevated by the enriching gift of fortune all the way up to the tottering platform, the uncertain

---

[66] Apul. *Soc.* 6. 133-4; the passage paraphrased from Apuleius (*Soc.* 16. 154) actually refers to the superior class of demons that have always been free of such bonds.

[67] Demons were also the subject of declamations and Dio Chrysostom's oration 25; see Szarmach 1985: 33.

[68] Hijmans 1987: 525-7. See e. g. *ut idem Plato ait* (4. 128), *Plato existimat* (3. 123), *responderit enim Plato pro sententia sua mea voce* (6. 132) and *ut Plato in Symposio autumat* (6. 133); Plato's heavenly eloquence: 3. 124.

[69] *Pl.* 1. 11-2; Barra 1961-2: 94-7.

> tribunal, is rarely approached, living instead far from observation in some sanctuary of his own dignity. For familiarity breeds contempt; remoteness causes admiration (4. 128-9; cf. 7. 137).

An imaginary interlocutor then expresses practical religious concerns about the inability to communicate with the gods through worship and prayer. Apuleius reassures him that "certain intermediate powers," viz. demons, provide a link between the remote, self-sufficient deities and the human inhabitants of Earth. Theology then gives way to physics and biology as Apuleius turns from Plato to Aristotle for a second argument based on logical necessity. Since earth and water and, according to Aristotle, fire host living beings proper to themselves, "why should the fourth element, air (*aër*), which occupies such a large intervening space, be devoid of all living beings?" (8. 138). Those who assign birds to the air are guilty of a serious mistake; for birds do not fly above Mt. Olympus, which geometricians have determined does not attain more than ten stadia of height and falls far short of the lowest trajectory of the moon. Since birds are in fact terrestrial creatures, it follows that the vast aerial space between the summit of Mt. Olympus and the lowest reaches of the moon must have its own living beings.

I have described in some detail chapter eight because the material up to this point is conventional Platonism and could have been mouthed with ease by any competent public speaker versed in the rudiments of the Academy. Every serious student of the *On the God of Socrates* agrees that chapter 8 represents a departure from mainstream thought.[70] I do not intend to rehearse the *Quellenforschung* of this accretion to orthodox Platonic doctrine.[71] I shall note only that when Apuleius attempts here to branch out on his own without the guidance of Plato his argumentation becomes uncharacteristically ponderous and even bathetic:

> If reason patently demands that appropriate living beings must be deduced to be in the air also, it remains for us to discourse on their nature and qualities. Well, then, nothing at all of earth, for they would sink because of its weight; and nothing of fire, for they would be taken too high by its heat. We must therefore posit that their nature is intermediate in

---

[70] See, e. g. Barra 1961-2: 95-7 and Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 219-23.

[71] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 219-23 surveys the scholarship.

> accordance with their intermediate position. Therefore, we must prescribe an intermediate nature that conforms to their intermediate position in such a way that the character of the region is a part of the natural character of its inhabitants (9. 140).

This *horror vacui* and its attendant complement of Peripatetic and Stoic components leads to the only surviving detailed description of the physical characteristics of demons. Paradoxically, the excogitated visualization (*cedo igitur mente formemus et gignamus animo* [9. 140]), which is intended to pre-empt the suspicion that Apuleius is fabricating incredible stories in poetic fashion, combines illustrative and decorative material from the Epicurean poet Lucretius and the Epicurean notion of equilibrium with the Stoic view of conformity of inhabitant to habitation to reach the Platonic position enunciated originally by the Platonist Phillip of Opunta that demons are composed of rarefied air.

Chapter 11, which is preceded by a disavowal of poetic fabrication, has a dense poetic texture. Apuleius here progresses from Homer to Vergil and, incongruously, Plautus. The Homeric citation of *Iliad* 1. 198, where the goddess Minerva (Athena) intervenes to check Achilles' brooding wrath, is a *locus classicus* of Greco-Roman demonology. Both Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre assimilate this celebrated instance of divine intervention to the guidance provided by Socrates' personal demon, as does Apuleius (20. 166).[72]

The next chapter begins with another disclaimer of poetic exaggeration. Apuleius here avers that poets customarily model their false depictions of divine intervention on behalf of mortal favourites or in opposition to the mortal objects of their hatred on the literary paradigm of direct but invisible divine involvement in human affairs. Thus he blatantly disregards his earlier citation of the literary precedents of Homer, Vergil and Plautus. This false notion that the Olympian gods hate or love (*procul a veritate osores et amatores*

---

[72] Plu. *On the Genius of Socrates* 580 c; Max. Tyr. 8. 5, Hobein (ed.) 1910. Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 224-5 notes that Apuleius is inconsistent in equating Minerva with a demon at this point but with abstract *prudentia* at the end of the discourse (24. 177-8); quod contra, Hijmans 1987: 441. Beaujeu also observes that the Vergilian verse applied by Apuleius explicitly to Jaturna is applied in fact to Aeneas in the *Aeneid* (1. 140).

quorundam hominum deos fingere [12. 145]) extracts Apuleius from the imbroglio of multiple schools of philosophical thought in which he has become entangled by his attempt to give concrete definition to Plato's vague "intermediate space."

Back on the firm ground of the *Symposium* and subsequent Platonist exegesis and expansion Apuleius posits the familiar notion that demons act as buffers between the disturbing effects of the emotional turbulence experienced by mortals and the dignified serenity proper to the celestial deities (see p. 197).[73] He concludes this part of his discourse with an efficient summary:

> To conclude finally, demons belong to the class of living beings, are rational, are subject to passions, have a form that is aerial and are immortal. Of these five qualities that I have enumerated they share the first three with us humans, the fourth is unique to them and they share the last one with the immortal gods (13. 148).

Apuleius also shows that the practical implications of the question posed earlier in response to Plato's bald assertion that "no god participates in human affairs" have remained firmly in his mind (5. 129-32) (see p. 194). It follows, he says, in view of the varieties of religious experience and the varied forms of worship and ritual that are universally practised that one may be confident that one god or another will take delight in whatever form of religious observation national character dictates. As Beaujeu observes:

> *C'est tout l'édifice du polythéisme, miné par la critique philosophique, qui est consolidé et rajeuni grâce à la démonologie.*[74]

I would add that this polytheistic catechism echoes Plato's *Symposium* and that Plato's immediate successors underlie Plutarch's statement that the gods take an interest both in oracles and the sometimes bloody rites

[73] There are differences, however. Maximus of Tyre, unlike Apuleius, distinguishes between the Homeric deities who intervene on behalf of more than one person and Socrates' personal demon. Ultimately, both orators base their arguments on the perceived unlikelihood that their audiences will judge Socrates unworthy of his own demon (Max. Tyr. 8. 6, Hobein [ed.] 1910; Apul. *Soc.* 20-1. 167).

[74] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 228.

of mystery religions.[75]

In effect the summary quoted above and the insistence on the efficacy of religious ritual appear to function as integral preliminaries to the stated subject of the discourse:

> It will be better to discourse in Latin on the various kinds of demons that philosophers have enumerated so that you will have a clearer and fuller understanding of Socrates' clairvoyance and his divine benefactor (14. 150).

In fact, however, the next two chapters describe the moral gradations of demons and thus complement the previous discussion of their intermediate location and physical characteristics.

These two chapters (15 and 16) provide a striking instance of Apuleius' habitual and pervasive practice of labouring to reconcile and consolidate divergent sources and languages. He begins by equating demons with the human soul:

> For in a certain sense the human soul, even when lodged in the body, is called a demon....Thus a good desire on the part of the soul is a good god (15. 150).

Platonic doctrine in the form elaborated by subsequent Platonists provides a precedent for this equation of demon with human soul; and Plato himself makes scattered references to the demon-soul, the demon of Socrates and the semi-divine demon that is intermediate between the heavenly gods and humans without consolidating the different types of demons into a unified system of demonology.[76] Apuleius now begins to lose his grip on the subject as he addresses the issue of vocabulary. A good demon, "that is, a soul of perfected virtue," may be called, he says, a *genius*:

> In our language, according to my interpretation, which may not be good but for which I take full responsibility, you may call it [viz. a good demon] a *genius* (15. 150).

---

[75] Plut., *On the Obsolence of Oracles* 417 a; he credits Xenocrates with the notion (*On Isis and Osiris* 361 b); cf. Pl. *Epin.* 984-5.

[76] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 230; Gersch 1986: I, 315-8.

He then makes a fanciful attempt to connect the word "genius" with the Latin word for "knees" (*genua*), thereby accounting for the spiritual and physical union between the human species and good demons/souls.[77]

More importantly for our purposes, Apuleius introduces the alien and ultimately confusing notion of the Roman cult of the dead. In a second sense, he says, there is a species of demons that consists of human souls that have retired from corporal duties (*emeritis stipendiis vitae corpore suo*). "I have found in the course of my research," he continues, "that this [demon] is called 'Lemur' in Old Latin." One category of Lemures, called Lar familiaris, looks after those in whose bodies they formerly resided. The evil class of Lemures is called Larva. In cases of uncertainty, when one cannot decide whether a Lemur is a Lar familiaris or a Larva, the term "Manem deum" is used. However, Apuleius hastens to add, the epithet "deum" is only an honorific (*honoris causa*); for the term "deum" is actually restricted to those demons that have led blameless lives and are recognized universally as divine and thus worshipped. The formulaic phrases "Manem deum" and "honoris causa" appear in countless Roman epitaphs. Apuleius causes needless confusion by referring to this convention in his discussion of the unrelated subject of the demon-soul.[78] As in some of his other works, he has allowed the extraneous subject of the moment to lead him into an impasse of self-imposed confusion from which his only escape is to say in effect, "I didn't really mean that."[79] The last few lines of chapter 15 confirm this. He

---

[77] Dr. B. L. Hijmans Jr. has reminded me that equally imaginative etymologies abound in classical antiquity and continued to do so until the subject was put on a firm theoretical foundation at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the systematic study of Indo-European languages; see also Beaujeu 1973: 232, n. 1.

[78] I am indebted to Dr. B. L. Hijmans Jr. for help in interpreting this passage.

[79] I cannot agree with Barra 1961-2: 98-9 that Apuleius has successfully harmonized the language of Greek demonology with the Roman cult of the dead. He observes usefully that Cicero, when faced with the same problem, opts for "lares" and that Varro indiscriminately uses the terms "heroas," "lares" and "genios." Cf. Apul. *Pl.* 1. 12. 206: *Demonas vero, quos Genios et Lares possumus nuncupare....* This passage is sometimes used to argue that the fuller details of the comparable material are indicative of later

surveys some half dozen examples of international varieties of demon worship, taking us back to the subject of the previous chapter. One gets the impression that when Apuleius consulted his notes on the Latin equivalent of "demon" (*Eum nostra lingua, ut ego interpretor...*), he reviewed at the same time his notes under the heading "demons = soul, after death" (*Hunc vetere Latina lingua reperio...*) and could not resist including the fruits of this research.

A second category of demons consists of those that are not inferior in number but are greatly superior in worth. These have always been free of corporal bonds. Both Apuleius and Plutarch assign Socrates' guardian spirit to this category. Thus both writers combine the Orphic-Pythagorean notion that the body is a kind of prison of the soul and the Stoic conception of the human soul as divine with Plato's doctrine that each person has a guardian spirit. The demons of this category have certain prescribed functions, act as advocates on Judgment Day and as conscience and aides in daily life. This type of demon, which both Plutarch and Apuleius equate with the human soul, is to be cultivated as Socrates cultivated his guardian spirit; for to cultivate the human soul is to attain likeness to the divine.[80]

Thus in principle Apuleius, like Plutarch, assigns Socrates' guardian spirit to the higher order of demons, but in practice both writers confound the guardian spirit with the human soul.[81] In Apuleius' case this leads to the injunction of the last four chapters, often felt to be a gratuitous adjunct, to cultivate the soul:

> But if the ability to contemplate a divine likeness can happen to anybody at any time, why should it not have happened above all to Socrates, the worth of whose wisdom is equal to the greatest divinity?....Why are we not also compelled by the example and recollection of Socrates to commit ourselves to the safe care of the study of philosophy, which is comparable

---

composition. It seems to me that the opposite inference is equally plausible: that at the time of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* Apuleius abandoned his earlier, unsuccessful attempt to harmonize divergent ideas.

[80] *Hic...privus custos,... si rite animadvertatur, sedulo cognascatur, religiose colatur, ita ut a Socrate iustitia et innocentia cultus est...* (16. 156); *nihil est enim deo similius et gratius quam vir animo perfecte bonus* (20. 167). Portogalli 1963: 240.

[81] Plu. *On the Guardian Spirit of Socrates* 593 d.

to [Socrates seeing] a likeness of the divine? (20-21. 167).[82]

This injunction leads to the concluding diatribe that many analysts have judged to be discordant.[83] I cited this part of the *On the God of Socrates* previously as an example of what I called pulpit oratory (see p. 183 and p. 113). It is only a short step from the second-century scholastic imperative of equating intrinsic human worth with Diogenes the Cynic's contempt of the outward marks of illusory importance to the sanctioned analogy of Socrates, whose cultivation of his inner self, his divine soul, is an example to be followed by all. I cited as parallels for the development of the theme of inner worth passages from such moralists as Maximus of Tyre, the younger Seneca and Horace, whose *Satires* were shaped in part by the tradition of Bion's moralizing diatribes. For the immediate purpose of placing Apuleius within the context of the Greek Second Sophistic it will be most instructive to compare the shape of Apuleius' discourse with Maximus of Tyre's two discourses on Socrates' *genius*.

Both orators present their views in spoken discourses. A pretended, i. e., "rhetorical," or actual question expressing surprise as to the existence or form of Socrates' personal demon serves as the springboard of subsequent explanation.[84] Whether or not the interlocutor is real or imaginary is less important than the fact that both orators give the impression of "live" performance, of shaping their oral discourses to the immediate concerns of their audiences. In other words the discourses are represented as taking shape at the moment of their presentation. The appeal for relaxed standards of evaluation implied in the first four of the so-called false prefaces to

---

[82] The sense of the phrase "pari similitudine numinum" ("which is...the divine," in my translation) seems clear, but the manuscript tradition contains "similium" and in neither case is the syntax reliable. I have been influenced by the clause "numini sapientiae dignitas coaequarat" of the previous translated passage, where Socrates' contemplation of the divine is equated to his pre-eminent wisdom. Similarly, at 17. 158, *divinatio* and *sapientia* are presented as mirror-images of each other. Various editors resort to various emendations, with Beaujeu (ed.) 1973 opting, correctly, I believe, for *similitudini*.

[83] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 244.

[84] Max. Tyr. 8. 1, Hobein (ed.) 1910; Apul. *Soc.* 20. 166.

Apuleius' discourse would be in order in these circumstance of (rehearsed) spontaneity, and one is reminded of the premium that Philostratus places on the ability of Greek sophists to discourse extemporaneously. The actual or imaginary questions posed by members of their audiences stimulate both orators to respond with catalogues of wide-spread religious practices. Apuleius enumerates instances of divine prophesy through intermediaries in Roman history, and Maximus of Tyre catalogues the universal belief in oracles. As well, the disruptive effects of their catalogues are part and parcel of the practice of the time of embellishing a topic while skirting it.[85]

Given the uniformity of the philosophical curriculum of the time and the pre-eminent place of Homer in the educational experience of literate Greeks and Romans throughout classical antiquity it is inevitable that he should be invoked to embellish spoken discourses and written treatises. The same passage in Homer, *Iliad* 1. 198, serves as the principal basis of support for the notion of divine intervention in the works of Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre and Apuleius on the subject of Socrates' personal demon (see Chapter Five, n. 72). This reliance on earlier authority is a distinctive feature of second-century belles-lettres. We saw earlier that an accomplished orator like Dio Chrysostom was capable of repackaging others' ideas into a harmonious blend of content and embellishment; Favorinus, his less talented pupil, appeared to be unable to integrate the *philologia* and *philosophia* of the younger Seneca's aphorism. Neither Maximus of Tyre nor Apuleius is guilty in this instance of Favorinus' shortcomings. However, Apuleius' determination to embellish his discourse and to rely on the authority of Homer has trapped him in the contradiction of equating the Athena/Minerva of the Homeric passage both with what Beaujeu calls a "démon réel" and later with the abstract quality of Wisdom (see Chapter Five, n. 72). More importantly in this discussion of a "live," sophistic philosophical discourse, the appeal to Homer's (or Vergil's or Plautus') authority is irrelevant. Both orators, after assimilating Athena's intervention to Socrates' personal demon, ultimately rest their case on an act of faith: that their audiences will be unwilling to judge Socrates unworthy of a personal demon and that the gods help those who are worthy of their aid (Max. Tyr. 8. 7, Hobein

---

[85] In the second of his two *dialexeis* on the *genius* of Socrates (no. 9, Hobein [ed.] 1910) Maximus of Tyre does not even mention Socrates' name.

[ed.] 1910, and *Soc.* 17. 157; see Chapter Five, n. 73).

Apuleius and Maximus of Tyre assign only a minor portion of their discourses to the announced subject of Socrates' personal demon.[86] Maximus uses Homer's *Odyssey* as the entrée to the second of his two *dialexeis* on the announced theme of Socrates' *genius* and does not thereafter refer to either. Apuleius concludes his discourse with the injunction to *bene vivere* like Socrates, Plato and Pythagoras. At this point the philosophical discourse takes on the character of some of Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*, especially in the imaginary staccato dialogue of chapter 23, e. g.:

> "He is of noble birth"; you praise his parents. "He is rich"; I do not put my trust in chance.

In other words, the *On the God of Socrates* is not so much a philosophical treatise as a moral diatribe in the tradition of the pulpit oratory discussed earlier.[87] Apuleius has substituted Socrates' cultivation of his soul for Diogenes the Cynic's cultivation of intrinsic worth. This becomes especially clear as Apuleius' imaginary interlocutor advances beyond the praise of such adventitious qualities as noble parentage and wealth:

> "He is learned and especially knowledgeable in the art of living virtuously and is as wise and experienced in virtue as a person can be." At last you are praising the man himself. For this is not patrimony or dependent on chance or renewed each year at election polls or subject to physical infirmities or changeable with age. All these qualities my revered Socrates had and therefore despised the possession of any other qualities (23. 175).

It is appropriate that the distinction between intrinsic worth and adventitious qualities, which was an integral part above all of Stoic ethics, should lead to the concluding eulogy of Odysseus. In the *poëtico ritu* of Homer, he is equated with wisdom, as he and Socrates had long been by Stoics, who held them up as the pre-eminent examples of *homines sapientes*.

In the *On the God of Socrates* Apuleius refers to himself as an

---

[86] Barra 1961-2: 113-6.

[87] Barra 1961-2: 113-6 astutely labels the last four chapters soteriology rather than demonology.

orator acting as Plato's mouthpiece in what I have labelled a "live" performance before a gathering of listeners. Unlike the *Golden Ass*, for instance, which, to judge by Apuleius' frequent addresses to the reader (*lector*), is intended for reflective perusal, the philosophical discourse takes shape on stage before a popular audience probably very much like the one pictured in *Florida* 18. That gathering has assembled to hear him *dissertare*: to hear him present a public discourse. For such an audience, popular by definition, the orator must periodically bring his "oration (*orationem*) down from heaven to earth" and present a "middle-brow" (*mediocritatem*) discourse (3. 125). For even Plato, who was "blessed with heavenly eloquence and the ability equal to that of the immortal gods to communicate in spoken discourse (*disserens*)," was incapable of expressing the ineffable nature of the supreme being (3. 124). For his part Apuleius will present a public discourse (*disserimus*) that is suited to the occasion, his middling speaking ability and, by implication, his audience's middle-brow expectations.

In these circumstances of "live" performance it is misleading to distinguish between rhetorical presentation and content, between medium and message, as though Apuleius became blinded by the glitter of his own rhetoric and lost sight of the philosophical message of his public oration. The concluding "moral" of the discourse, to cultivate the soul as Socrates cultivated his personal demon/divine soul, while perhaps out of place in a technical philosophical treatise intended for quiet study in a library, is consistent with the role of spiritual adviser that the orators of the Second Sophistic regularly play. Whatever the professed subjects of their public addresses, they frequently seize the opportunity to exhort their listeners to improve their spiritual lives. Apuleius has a message to communicate and its medium is a public address to a mass audience accustomed to and expecting popular entertainment. Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom and Taurus all address and, in the case of the latter two, directly experience the difficulty inherent in presenting a serious message in a popular medium (see p. 28 and p. 169).

For Apuleius belles-lettres and philosophy are mutually complementary. In his view Demosthenes, the supreme stylistic model of the Greek sophists, personifies both eloquence and philosophy and thus satisfies the criteria of inclusion in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (see p. 173). Likewise, Plato perfected and unified the rudimentary philosophical doctrines of his predecessors with the force of his eloquence (*Pl.* 1. 3. 187-8) (see p. 78).

Judged by Helms' criteria, the *On the God of Socrates* has as much right to the label *Meisterwerk* of the Second Sophistic as the *Apology* and, as I tried to show in Chapter Four, the *Florida*.[88] One could as readily provide a *catalogue raisonné* of the sophistic embellishments in it as Helm has for the oratorical work. For instance, the literary texture of the philosophical discourse is as rich as that of the *Apology*. On a page chosen almost at random paraphrases or quotations of Homer, Vergil and Plautus appear. Admittedly, this denseness exceeds the norm, as Apuleius himself recognizes, and is something of an exception to the otherwise valid point made by Hijmans that the literary texture forms "an integrated part of the argument."[89]

As in the *Apology*, Apuleius parades his erudition in the philosophical discourse. He refers to the astrological theories of the Chaldeans (1. 117), instances of indirect divine intervention recorded in Roman history (7. 135-7), comparative religion (14. 149-50), world-wide examples of demon worship (15. 153-4), Old-Latin terms for various kinds of demons (15. 152-3) and divergent views of Aristotle and the Pythagoreans (20. 166-7). Sometimes, as in the *Apology*, the paraded erudition undercuts an argument or leads him in a direction that he realizes too late he did not want to go (e. g. 3. 126). In the *Apology* Apuleius speaks with pride of his success in searching out unusual terms and coining new words (see p. 14). His enthusiasm is no less evident in the *On the God of Socrates*. He stresses his research in Old-Latin writers for the Latin equivalents of Greek specialized terms and his carefully judged use of the word "genius" (15. 152-3 and 151). As one has come to expect of the author of the *Apology* and the *Golden Ass*, some of the recherché vocabulary is more akin to the passion of the age for searching out rare words or creating new terms as a form of amusement than to linguistic scholarship and at times sinks to the level of word-play.[90]

---

[88] Helm 1955.

[89] P. 31, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973; *Soc.* 12. 146; Hijmans 1987: 426-7 and 441, n. 188. The critical editions of the philosophical works by Thomas (ed.) 1908 and Moreschini (ed.) 1991 provide running records of quotations, paraphrases and allusions. On the especially rich Lucretian texture see Thomas 1900 and Barra 1961.

[90] E. g. *glebulenta* at *Soc.* 8. 138, an otherwise unattested word, is reminiscent of *gleba*, *glaebosus* and *glaebula* in *Met.* and *pulvisculum* in *Apol.*, the last word, an "earthy" diminutive like the others, being part of the

There is scarcely a page of the *On the God of Socrates* that does not exhibit Apuleius' predilection for enumeration, usually in syntactically parallel clauses and often with rhyming and alliterative or assonant effects, as in this randomly chosen example:

> *Igitur homines ratione gaudentes, oratione pollentes, inmortalibus animis, moribundis membris, levibus et anxiis mentibus, brutis et obnoxiis corporibus, dissimillimis moribus, similibus erroribus, pervicaci audacia, pertinaci spe,*

and so the passage continues for another four lines (4. 127-8). The verbal exuberance is matched by the profuse lists of exempla and anecdotes.[91]

This kind of exhaustive concentration on verbal minutiae accords with Helm's criteria for a *Meisterwerk* of the Second Sophistic, but it is also a symptom of what prompted Seneca to characterize *philosophia* of the Roman Imperial period as *philologia* and the grammarian in Aulus Gellius to complain that philosophers have become word-mongers (see p. 80). Concentration on the medium of expression rather than the expression of meaning is a symptom of the rhetorical curriculum of the age, when the topic of the moment or the sanctioned commonplace is developed for its own sake and a balanced phrase becomes more important than the balanced presentation of coherently argued ideas. This brings me back to my original point about the *On the God of Socrates*: it is the most extensive example in the Apuleian corpus of Apuleius in the combined roles of orator and *philosophus Platonicus* (see p. 188).

The On Plato and His Doctrine

Apuleius' other major work of Platonic philosophy, the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, exhibits another intellectual trend of the time of the Greek Second Sophistic: the consolidation and presentation of others' ideas. Much of Chapter Two dealt with various aspects of this practice under such headings as "The Cult of the Past," "Bibliomania,"

"campo-glebis-abaco-pulvisculo" pun at *Apol.* 16. 7. Word-play: e. g. *genium et genua* (*Soc.* 15. 151), *cognatos* and *cognitos* (*Soc.* 5. 130).

[91] E. g. 7. 135-7, 11. 145, 14. 148-9 and 15. 154.

"Literary Mimesis" and "Compendia." Accordingly, the following discussion of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* will be relatively short, concentrating principally on Apuleius as compiler and adapter. The same will be true of the *On the Universe* and the *Peri Hermeneias*, both of which in varying degrees are Latin adaptations of earlier Greek treatises.

Scripted Philosophy

The *On Plato and His Doctrine* raises a number of "genetic" questions, some of which have already been addressed and will be only outlined here (see p. 27). Unlike the *On the God of Socrates*, it gives every indication of being intended for readers rather than for "live" performance before a mass audience. As Hijmans observes, its purpose is to convey information rather than to persuade and the author all but disappears except as a translator of Greek technical terms.[92] Thus Apuleius conceived the work as a scholastic résumé and it belongs to the category of thematic summaries that were discussed previously (see p. 73).

Some of the scholastic résumés of the period seem to have been written as personal works of reference, as is certainly the case with the work of L. Aelius consulted by Gellius at the Library of Peace in Rome:

> It was not clearly written or intended as a manual of instruction. Aelius seems to have written the book as an aide-mémoire for himself rather than as a source of instruction for others (Gel. 16. 8).

The *On Plato and His Doctrine*, however, or at least its second book, was intended for at least one reader, Apuleius' son Faustinus (*Faustine fili*) (2. 1. 219). Whether or not the addressee is a tactical invention, the result is the same: a scholastic résumé intended to convey information

> so that you will know by what means one can achieve a happy life. So that you will reflect on the fact that happiness derives above all from the definition of what is good I shall set out [for you] Plato's thoughts on the subject (2. 1. 219).

---

[92] Hijmans 1987: 427-8.

Both books of the work convey the impression of summarizing Platonic doctrine. Infinitives of indirect discourse are regularly used as though the force of *arbitratur Plato* ("Plato believes") (1. 5. 190) and *Plato senserit* ("Plato thought") (2. 1. 219) remained in effect throughout the two books; and jejune summary, reduced almost to the level of point-outline form, is repeatedly encountered (e. g. 1. 8. 196 and 1. 9. 199).

Genesis

If, as is the case, the *On Plato and His Doctrine* "reads" like notes taken by a student at lectures given in an introductory course on Plato, the question "Whose course of lectures?" naturally arises. The philosopher Gaius has been in the forefront of speculation since the early part of this century but his candidacy for the position has been increasingly challenged in recent years (see p. 27). The principal reason for supposing that Gaius was Apuleius' teacher is that Gaius' only attested pupil, Apuleius' contemporary Albinus, who is known to have published a now lost nine-volume summary of Gaius' lectures on Plato, appears to be the author of an extant summary of Platonism that has many affinities to Apuleius' summary.[93] Of recent writers on the subject Moreschini is probably the most determined proponent of the view that Apuleius attended the School of Gaius and that his *On Plato and His Doctrine* comprises the lecture notes taken at the school.[94] According to Moreschini, Apuleius popularized Gaius' lectures for a Latin readership as Albinus did for Greek readers. The differences in the two epitomes he explains as the result of Gaius' two attested alternative methods of interpreting Platonic texts: *epistêmonikôs* (more or less: "literally") or *eikotolikôs* (more or less: "figuratively" or "symbolically"). These two different methods of interpretation could, Moreschini argues, lead to diverse interpretations of the same Platonic doctrine.

---

[93] The manuscript tradition is unanimous in crediting an Alcinous with the summary, but modern scholarship has come down firmly on the side of Albinus; see Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 51, n. 1. "Albinus'" work is now available in translation: Reedy (trans.) 1991.

[94] Moreschini 1978: 18-20; see also Hijmans 1987: 435 and Gersh 1986: I, 222-7. It is not known where Gaius taught, but the usual assumption is that Apuleius attended his lectures while a student in Athens.

Dillon, to whose views I subscribe, maintains that the scholastic résumés of Apuleius and Albinus have no more in common than is to be expected of two contemporary (Middle) Platonists who by definition share certain basic tenets and who by virtue of the time at which they lived lean towards the Peripatetic school of philosophy.[95] Dillon proposes the philosopher Taurus as one of Apuleius' Athenian teachers and I previously advanced some arguments for supposing that Apuleius and Aulus Gellius might have been classmates in Taurus' "school."[96] On a subject as basic as matter Apuleius' "account could hardly be more different from that of Albinus."[97] In Book 2, where Platonic ethics is outlined, a subject that more readily than physics admits of variable interpretations, selection and emphasis, Apuleius' account is not only different from that of Albinus but radically so.[98]

Book 3?

The final "genetic" issue to be reviewed is whether the *Peri Hermeneias* is actually Book 3 of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* (see p. 33). The abrupt conclusion of the latter work implies a continuation. Whether or not it was "une troisième partie qu'il n'a jamais écrite, sur la logique" is something of a moot point.[99] A few manuscripts designate the *Peri Hermeneias* as Book 3 of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, and Apuleius at the beginning of the latter work twice emphasizes that Plato was the first to combine and perfect the three separate and previously inchoate branches of philosophy: natural philosophy (physics), i. e., Book 1; moral philosophy (ethics), i. e., Book 2; and "rational" philosophy (logic).[100] Apuleius announces that he will discuss each of these topics, beginning with natural philosophy (1. 3. 187 and 1. 4. 189). The *philosophia rationalis* or *loquendi ratio* (logic), which Albinus outlines first in his comparable scholastic résumé of Platonic philosophy, is completely absent from the first two

---

[95] Dillon 1977: 312.

[96] I have given "school" the implied qualification of inverted commas because philosophical education in Athens at the time of Apuleius was probably in the hands of private tutors; see Sandy 1993: 166-8.

[97] *Pl.* 1. 5. 191-2; Dillon 1977: 313.

[98] Dillon 1977: 328-30 and 333.

[99] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 107; cf. Dillon 1977: 336.

[100] See the apparatus criticus of Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 107.

books of the *On Plato and His Doctrine.* All these considerations imply a projected or lost book such as the *Peri Hermeneias* or the *Peri Hermeneias* itself, the declared subject of which is the *pars philosophiae rationalis* (logic) and which corresponds precisely to Apuleius' stated intention at the beginning of the *On Plato and His Doctrine.*

Scholastic Résumé

The closest that Apuleius comes to treating the subject of logic in the transmitted version of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* is his discussion of rhetoric (2. 8-9. 230-5). Analysis of this part of the work will serve as a suitable introduction to the entire treatise as a compendium or scholastic résumé, which is the focal point of this discussion.

For Apuleius moral philosophy, that is, ethics, is the knowledge of "by what means one can attain a happy life" (2. 1. 219). This notion derives from Aristotle rather than Plato and does not appear in Albinus. Happiness consists of choosing what is good. Of goods, there are two types, the one divine, the other human. The second category of goods consists of virtues of the mind: prudence, a sense of justice, moderation and fortitude, as in Plato's *Laws*, which Apuleius also cites in the *Apology*. Each of the virtues has two corresponding vices, the one of excess, the other of deficiency. This is fundamental Aristotelian doctrine, found also in Albinus, who does not, however, apply it in the same way as Apuleius. Dillon concludes:

> We can see what is being done here [viz. 2. 4. 226]. A selection of the vices listed in Book II of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is being fitted to the three parts of the Platonic soul. Of all this Albinus shows no knowledge.[101]

The next few chapters (2. 5-7) present one of the fuller and more systematic examples of résumé in the work. Apuleius here successfully combines material from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Plato's *Republic* in arranging justice, one of the "virtues of the mind," in categories and subdivisions. With only a perfunctory lexical rather than logical transition (*hinc*, "from here") he passes to the thematically unrelated topic of the two types of rhetoric. One of these "is the

---

[101] Dillon 1977: 330.

reflective study of goods, the tenacious [upholder] of justice"; the other is "the science of flattery, which seizes on the likeness of truth [but] in practice is applied without reason—for this is how I have translated *alogon tribên* ("irrational activity")—and which claims to be persuasive in matters that it is not capable of teaching" (2. 8. 231).

As Dillon might put it, we can see what Apuleius is doing here. The type of rhetoric that is a "tenacious [upholder] of justice" has been triggered in Apuleius' mind by his previous discussion of justice as one of the "virtues of the mind." This type of rhetoric, which is in fact dialectics, derives from Plato's *Republic*, and mention of it has triggered instinctive recollection of the other type of rhetoric, which Plato castigates in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus* and vividly relegates to the kitchen and the perfumery, as does Apuleius (2. 9. 233). Discussion of rhetoric then gives way to discussion of politics, which Plato called a virtue (2. 8. 231). Plato classified the two types of politics, legal and judicial, as professions (*disciplinas/technas*). Those who imitate these professions are, in Plato's colourful words, cooks, perfumers, lawyers and sophists, the four arts invented by flattery (Pl. *Grg*. 464c-465c = *Pl.* 2. 9. 233), which takes us back to the beginning of the excursus (*adulandi scientia*) but further away from the topic under discussion: classification of the "virtues of the mind." To this topic Apuleius returns abruptly at 2. 9. 234, and the discussion that follows reverts to the orderly scholastic résumé that prevailed before the excursus.[102]

The pattern of interrupted development, deviation and resumption, as though the deviation has not actually occurred, is one that we frequently encountered in the *Apology* and the *On the God of Socrates*. All three works also illustrate Apuleius' tendency to combine material from multiple sources. This feature, which in the *Apology* he promotes as one of the commendable qualities of his technical treatises, is perhaps most vividly illustrated in the *On Plato and His Doctrine* in the Greek phrase *alogon tribên*, where he has self-consciously combined one word from each of two Platonic dialogues (2. 8. 231).[103]

Valerius Maximus' nine-volume *vade mecum*, *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, offers a revealing statement of purpose: so that "the toil

---

[102] Cf. *Soc*. 15. 150-16. 156, where Apuleius tries, unsuccessfully, to combine the Roman cult of the dead with Greek demonology; see p. 203.

[103] Pl. *Grg*. 501 a and *Phdr*. 270 b.

of long research will be eliminated for those wishing to consult records." Apuleius is performing precisely that service for his son Faustinus:

> So that you will reflect on the fact that happiness derives above all from the definition of what is good I shall set out [for you] Plato's thoughts on the subject (2. 1. 219; see p. 211).

Heroic intellectual pilgrimages were one of the subjects recycled in handbooks and compendia (see p. 64). Apuleius' compendium may be explicitly directed to one person, but a wider circle of rhetorically trained readers would have appreciated his potted account of Pythagoras' and Plato's fused intellectual odysseys (see p. 64). Another feature of compendia, which I labelled earlier the *qui-primus* formula ("he-who-first"), has found its way into the *On Plato and His Doctrine*:

> Therefore, he [viz. Plato] assiduously studied dialectics, which had been discovered by Parmenides and Zeno..., so that he became the first to join the three branches of philosophy (1. 3. 187).

An issue that touches more directly on the value of the work as a scholastic survey of Platonic philosophy is Apuleius' promise to "improve" on his Greek models, whether they be Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle (*On the Universe*), the Greek version of the *Golden Ass* or Plato (see p. 69). Any number of examples could readily be provided but one is of particular interest because it highlights Apuleius' methods of compiling "scientific" research.

Chapters 13-17 of Book 1 outline Platonic doctrine on the composition of the human soul and body as expressed principally in the *Timaeus*. Both Apuleius and Albinus, basing their accounts closely on Plato, begin with his notion of the tripartite soul and pass from it to the senses. Unlike Albinus, Apuleius neglects to incorporate Plato's attendant doctrine that the gods created the human soul and body. His anthropology thus lacks the theological and cosmological significance with which Plato invests it.[104] As we shall soon see, Apuleius'

---

[104] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 275, n. 2. See, too, Dillon 1977: 327-8, who argues that Taurus may have been the source of this and subsequent deviations

omission also jeopardizes the value of his résumé as a compendium of Platonic doctrine. Apuleius' systematic equation of each of the four (or five) senses to one of the elements derives from Aristotle rather than from Plato and he continues to "improve" on the *Timaeus*.[105] In discussing the causes of disease Apuleius puts into Plato's mouth (*dicit*, 1. 17. 215) words not spoken (or written) by Plato. He cites three, rather than the two of the *Timaeus*, causes of disease to correspond with the three elements of the body, any imbalance of which leads to a swift demise of the living being. Redfors has shown that these triads are derived ultimately from Aristotle and that Apuleius is thus "improving" on Plato again.[106]

It is appropriate at this point to recall that in the *Apology* Apuleius invokes the "ancient philosophers" "Aristotle...and Theophrastus and Eudemus and Lyco and the rest of Plato's successors, who have left many books on the subject of the generation of animals and on their habits and on their anatomical characteristics and on all their distinctive characteristics" (36. 2-3). He also announces his intention, which the part of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* just discussed exemplifies, to provide in his future treatises what the ancient philosophers neglected to include and to correct their mistakes. We may question the results, but there is no doubt of Apuleius' determination to go beyond the narrow limits of Horace's despised *fidus interpres* and produce an "improved" compendium instead of a slavish résumé. Finally, Apuleius' deviation from the *Timaeus* was a conscious decision. The *Apology* shows that he was capable of accurately reproducing Platonic doctrine if that suited his purposes (49-50).

Both Apuleius and Albinus conclude their summaries of Plato's views on the composition of the human soul and body by reaffirming, as does Plato, the tripartition of the soul. However, Apuleius has omitted the theological and cosmological implications that give added significance to the doctrine in Plato (and Albinus), and his resumption

---

from the *Timaeus*.

[105] See Dillon 1977: 327 on *Pl*. 1. 16. 215 as an "improvement" on Pl. *Ti*. 77 c-d and 91 b-c; Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 276, n. 4 on the Aristotelian derivation.

[106] Redfors 1960: 22-3. Dillon 1977: 327 argues that Taurus may have been the intermediary for the Aristotelian intrusion.

of the subject is therefore discordantly clumsy (1. 18. 216). Dillon, whose principal concern at this point in his analysis is to sort out the various threads of direct and indirect sources for Apuleius' patchwork compilation, astutely remarks that the resumption is analogous to his repetitive resumption of the discussion of the previously outlined Platonic doctrine of *essentiae* (1. 9. 200 and 1. 6. 193). He concludes that Apuleius is "doggedly following a source work, and occasionally getting *his* lines crossed."[107]

This pattern of interruption and resumption is characteristic of both the *Apology* and the *On the God of Socrates*. They are the only two wholly extant works of Apuleius that he patently composed for oral presentation rather than to be read. Since the same pattern prevails in the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, which is explicitly aimed at a readership, it is legitimate to look for a general cause for the pattern. The most likely explanation is the rhetorical education of the period. It sanctioned and promoted the practice of emphasizing the particular to the neglect of systematic, coherent development. The result, as we have seen repeatedly, is discontinuity, as the topic of the moment takes precedence over the topic as a whole. This method of composition when combined with the equally prevalent practice, also a tenet of the rhetorical training of the period, of improving on models inevitably results in a distorted and uneven representation of the doctrines being summarized.

Without pretending to offer anything like the scrupulously detailed lexical and stylistic analysis of Redfors I conclude discussion of the *On Plato and His Doctrine* with a few examples of elements that it shares with other Apuleian works.[108] Verbal jingles and word-play are all the more notable by their rarity in this work, e. g. (of the moon) *circuli sui conpleto curriculo* (1. 10. 202) and *optare nos oportere* (2. 3. 223). The same is true of extravagantly figurative speech, as at 1. 13. 207, where the last and, literally, lowest part of the tripartite soul "occupies the lowest part of the body, a kind of tavern and dark latrine." I cannot think of another Latin writer who expresses Platonic doctrine in Plautine language: *Plato lucricupidinem* (2. 15. 241). Apuleius' persistent interest in the archaic Latin vocabulary of

---

[107] Dillon 1977: 328. Similarly, the first half of *Pl.* 2. 17. 244 repeats 2. 11. 236.

[108] Redfors 1960.

demonology is evident at 1. 11. 204-5. Less concretely, the second half of the work gradually becomes less systematic and takes on the tone of an impassioned sermon, as do the concluding chapters of *On the God of Socrates* and the *On the Universe*. At this point in the scholastic summary Apuleius incorporates the Stoic doctrine of the perfect sage, which is only adumbrated by Plato but which was later in the form *imitatio dei* ("likeness to god") to become a fundamental religious and ethical principle of Stoicism, Middle Platonism and other schools of philosophy during the Roman Imperial period.[109]

The Peri Hermeneias

I have already outlined what seem to me to be the relevant details of the *Peri Hermeneias* as a compendious adaptation of a Greek model or models (see p. 40).[110] Whether or not it is the continuation, that is, Book 3, of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, there is no doubt that it is an imperfectly fused amalgam of Peripatetic and non-Peripatetic sources. It is evident from the outset that no single scheme of formal logic is going to prevail. Chapters 1-6, for instance, are an unacknowledged paraphrase of Aristotle's treatise of the same name (4. 17a. 2-7, ed. Bekker). Within this Aristotelian framework, however, Apuleius includes the Roman authorities Lucius Sergius Plautus (a Stoic of the first century), Varro and Cicero and unnamed Greek authorities, of whom Aristotle is the source for the technical term *protasis* and the Stoics for the equivalent *axiôma*.[111] This kind of eclecticism is consistent with Apuleius' stated intention to "improve" on Aristotle by correcting his mistakes and by providing what he neglected to include (*Apol.* 36. 6). Also familiar from other Apuleian works is the overt determination to master Greek technical terms and to search out in earlier Latin writers their Latin equivalents. As elsewhere, he proudly displays the fruit of his linguistic research. The

---

[109] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 53 and, especially Moreschini 1966: 93-9. Cf. the eulogy of poverty at *Pl.* 1. 12. 207, which goes far beyond Platonic doctrine to encompass the Stoic-Cynic-inspired commonplaces repeatedly encountered in Apuleius.

[110] On the question of single or multiple sources see Lumpe 1982: 22-6, who pronounces a *non liquet*.

[111] Lumpe 1982: 27-9.

syllogism

> that Sergius calls "*effatum*," Varro "*proloquium*," Cicero "*enuntiatum*," the Greeks "*protasis*" and "*axiôma*," I in a word-for-word translation [call] "*protensio*" and "*rogamentum*"; less technically, however, it will be called "*propositio*".[112]

More generally, the pattern of compiling material from disparate, principally Greek technical treatises that characterizes the other three philosophical monographs is also evident in the *Peri Hermeneias*.[113] The framework is Aristotelian, derived principally from his *Topics*. However, Apuleius alters his syllogisms and adds five syllogisms from Theophrastus, sometimes with acknowledgement, sometimes without it.[114] He cites "Aristo of Alexandria and other, more recent Peripatetics" as sources at one point ((13. 213. 5-6, Moreschini [ed.] 1991); at another point he names Plato's *Theaetetus* as his source, including himself by name in the syllogism (4. 191. 16 and 18, Moreschini [ed.] 1991). He also acknowledges Stoics as sources, sometimes favourably, sometimes unfavourably.[115]

Comparison with Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* (16. 8) is useful in trying to recover the circumstances that underlie the patchwork methods of composition evident in the *Peri Hermeneias* (see p. 38). The impression that emerges is that of two enthusiastic but puzzled amateurs doing their best to combine the difficult and imperfectly understood lectures that they attended in Athens with equally confusing and even contradictory written treatises and attempting to produce a coherent amalgam from these divergent sources.

---

112 Lumpe 1982: discusses Apuleius' apparent innovation in the Latin terms of formal logic; see, e. g., pp. 29-30, on *quantitas* and *qualitas* for their Greek equivalents *posotês* and *poiotês* (*Log*. 3. 190. 17, Moreschini [ed.] 1991).

113 See Lumpe 1982: 22-6 and the sources recorded in the critical editions of Thomas (ed.) 1908 and Moreschini (ed.) 1991.

114 With acknowledgement: 11. 207. 23 and 13. 212. 13, Moreschini (ed.) 1991; without acknowledgement: 9. 203-4, Moreschini (ed.) 1991.

115 Favourably: e. g. 12. 209. 11, Moreschini (ed.) 1991; unfavourably: e. g. 7. 200. 16-7, Moreschini (ed.) 1991.

The On the Universe

The last of Apuleius' philosophical treatises to be considered is the *On the Universe.* Many of the issues that we have been considering such as adaptation as opposed to translation, the use of multiple sources, faithfulness to the meaning of the sources and Apuleius' understanding of Greek come into sharp focus in this work. Like Book 2 of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, Apuleius addresses the *On the Universe* to his son, *Faustine fili*, and there is no hint that it was ever intended for oral presentation. Instead, we have a loose Latin translation of an extant Greek work. Thus it is possible fruitfully to compare Apuleius' version with its model.[116] I shall be considering the treatise under three broad headings:

1) Contents, sources and development of argument.
2) Wilful modifications.
3) Accuracy of translation.

Genesis

The contents derive from the Greek work of the same title that Apuleius has adapted for his son, whose name he substitutes for that of Alexander the Great in the Greek original.[117] Philosophy alone, Apuleius instructs his son, is capable of probing the mysteries of the universe. Philosophy reveals to the divine human soul knowledge of the distant secrets of the universe just as prophets disclose divine mysteries to ordinary mortals. Thus at the outset Apuleius, unlike the author of the Greek model, combines natural science with divine revelation in anticipation of what he later calls the *caput...sermonis huius* ("the culmination...of this discourse"), namely, god (24. 341). He expresses pity for those who limit themselves to detailed descriptions of such banal things as city walls or rivers. If they had been able to contemplate the universe in its entirety, they would have

---

[116] Müller 1939 has meticulously compared the two works.

[117] On the Greek original, falsely attributed to Aristotle, see Moraux 1984: II, 47-82.

been convinced that the complete fusion of even its smallest components warranted their praise. He concludes the preface thus:

> Therefore, basing my work on the authority of Aristotle, the most astute and knowledgeable of philosophers, and Theophrastus, as much as my intelligence permits, I shall speak of the entire celestial system, and after comprehending its nature and function I shall explain why and how they are put into motion.

After misleadingly implying that what follows is an original undertaking within the framework of established Peripatetic cosmology, Apuleius proceeds to provide an adaptation of the pseudo-Aristotelian work that fluctuates between the style of a plodding, introductory textbook and that of a highly literate essay. The textbook style is evident, for instance, in the way he repeatedly concludes a topic with the equivalent of, "That topic has been fully explained," and in the systematic announcement of new topics.[118] The textbook style is also conspicuous in the repeated explanation that such-and-such is called this in Greek but that in Latin.[119] Acknowledged and unacknowledged references to such literary figures as Homer, Vergil, Lucretius, Cicero and Horace lend the flavour of polished essay to the scholastic survey.[120]

The predominantly scientific presentation of the first part of the adaptation, which sets out in dry, technical language the meteorology and geography of the Greek model, gradually gives way to a more colourful and fervent mode of expression when Apuleius expands on the principle of *concordia* (harmony) among the three elements of air, water and earth (19. 333). Müller remarks that this expanded treatment marks the beginning of the transition from the scientific part to the philosophical and theological parts of the adaptation.[121] As in the concluding parts of the *On the God of Socrates* and the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, Apuleius seems to warm to the subject and to write with

---

[118] E. g., *De mari satis dictum* ("Enough has been said about the sea") (7. 305); and, *Nunc nomina exsequemur regionesque ventorum* ("Now we shall investigate the names and regions of winds") (11. 312).

[119] E. g. *graece sunt nominati* (10. 310); *Atticorum lingua vocitantur* (10. 311); *quem Romana lingua favonium novit* (11. 313).

[120] E. g. 4. 295-97, 13. 319 and 14. 320.

[121] Müller 1939: 40-1.

more engaged fervour. In place of the colourless "opposite elements" of the Greek model he portrays *concordia* imposing peace on "divergent elements at war with one another"; and the flat, abstract "unifying cause of elements" becomes in Apuleius' paeon "the regulator of the universe." The rest of the treatise—*restat, quod caput est sermonis huius, ut super mundi rectore verba faciamus* ("It remains for me to speak of the regulator of the universe, which is the culmination of this discourse")—is devoted to the supreme place of the unmoved prime-mover, who is defined at the conclusion of the work in words taken from Plato's *Laws*:

> God...penetrates the beginning, end and middle of all things, illuminates them and is conveyed above them in his swift chariot.

Alterations to the Model

The wilful changes made by Apuleius to the Greek model range from minor stylistic embellishments to extensive alterations and additions that radically distort the philosophical integrity of the original. I previously reported the findings of Müller that almost 44 per cent of Apuleius' adaptation comprises accretions independent of the Greek original.[122] Müller also observes that Cicero took great liberties in his "translation" of Plato's *Timaeus* and speculates that this free-handed approach to translation must be representative of Roman rhetorical training. I tried to show previously that this was certainly true by the time of Apuleius (see p. 69). Cicero's free adaptations can be explained at least in part as a paedological necessity since he was introducing his compatriots to Greek philosophy.[123] By the time of the Roman Imperial period, however, Greek philosophy has become part of the standardized curriculum of Roman advanced education. The explanation of Apuleius' cavalier use of his Greek model is to be found, I believe, in what I previously labelled competitive imitation. This approach to models reigned in the schools of rhetoric during the Roman Imperial period in both the Greek and Roman worlds (see p. 69).

Apuleius warms to his subject when he passes from aridly technical and mechanical cosmology to the "personalized" governance of the

---

[122] Müller 1939: 133. See also p. 14 and Hijmans 1987: 399-403.
[123] Cic. *N. D.* 1. 4. 8 and *Tusc.* 2. 3. 6; Müller 1939: 134.

cosmos. In place of the impersonal notion of the coherence of the universe found in his model he provides a vivid portrayal of its dynamic regulator.[124] At the lowest end of the scale of wilful modification Apuleius has introduced the Roman writer Sallust as an (unnamed) authority (24. 343). At the other end of the gauge he has foisted on his model a scheme of a directly inaccessible god and intermediate demons. He sets out the same paradigm in the *On the God of Socrates*, the *Apology* and the *Florida* (see p. 182). It appears therefore to be one of his theological tenets.

As Regen shows, Apuleius paves the way for this interpolation when he states that "bards...have dared to aver...that not only thought but even eyes and ears and any sensible substance comprehend...[Jupiter's] presence" (24. 343). Apuleius' insistence on interjecting his favoured tenet of the supreme deity being comprehensible by reason alone rather than by the senses has replaced the fundamental distinction in the Greek model between the "being" and the "force" of god, only the latter of which is perceptible to humans. In place of the Greek author's concept of a "force" that is progressively de-elevated and eventually assimilated to the domain of mortal experience Apuleius formulates a rigid hierarchy in which the supreme god has created the gods of lower rank and the intermediate demons "who were born and made to fill the cosmos" (24. 343).[125]

This formulation addresses the concern of the interlocutor in the *On the God of Socrates* who expresses his anguish that a distant, inaccessible supreme god "who does not participate in human affairs" precludes the possibility of addressing prayers to, and receiving help from, that god (see p. 194). Apuleius reassures the interlocutor that "there are...certain divine powers that occupy the space in the atmosphere between the uppermost heights of heaven and the very depths of earth" and convey the prayers of mortals and the beneficence of god. He addresses the same concern in the *On the Universe*. If, he writes, we believe that god is present in everything and extends the force of his godhead to us, then the degree of benefit that we derive from god will vary with the degree of his distance from, or proximity to, us. It is better to suppose, rather, his argument continues, that the supreme power, "concentrated in its heavenly sanctuary," conveys

---

124 Regen 1971: 32-67.
125 Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 330.

"through itself and others" salvation alike to those who are most distant from it and those who are closest to it. The "others" are "those heavenly bodies" and "those next in rank to them" described previously as sharing in god's force in accordance with their proximity to it, that is, the celestial gods and demons familiar from the *On the God of Socrates*. Apuleius has substituted for the abstract neuters of the Greek original a "personified" hierarchy of supreme god, celestial gods and demons and in so doing has violated the integrity of his model.[126] Similarly, in substituting "god" for the "divine force" of the Greek model in the phrase *deum per omnia permeare*, which I paraphrased above as "god is present in everything," Apuleius "spoils the distinction between the nature and the force of god that is the object of all the development [in the source] and introduces an unfortunate contradiction."[127]

The most blatant example of Apuleius' wilful alteration of his Greek model occurs at 13. 318-14. 321. He appends here approximately two pages of the philosopher Favorinus' postprandial discussion of Vergil's reference to the wind named Iapyx (= Gel. 2. 22; see p. 32). Like the preface to the entire work, the introduction to this augmentation fails precisely to acknowledge the likely secondary source of the material, "However, Favorinus, a not undistinguished philosopher reports what follows on the subject of winds." Moreover, Apuleius' unthinking recycling of this material casts serious doubt on his judgment and knowledge of natural science. As the parts of Aulus Gellius' vignette omitted by Apuleius reveal, Favorinus' scientific treatise is in fact table-talk offered to his pupils at a private, informal dinner party. Postprandial diversion, however learned the speaker, is unlikely to qualify as rigorous scientific investigation. The material itself bears this out, being little more than a catalogue-raisonné of Greek and Latin lexical equivalents.

It is instructive to observe Gellius' reflections on the occasion on which Favorinus discoursed "at his own table" on the winds. Two impressions abide after the event. First, Favorinus spoke "with the most eloquent words and with cordiality and charm throughout his speech." Second, "the wind that blows from the direction of Gaul and that he [viz. Favorinus] says is called 'circium' Marcus Cato in the

---

[126] Regen 1971: 52-4.
[127] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 331.

Origines calls 'cercium,' not 'circium.'" Thus Gellius emphasizes style of presentation and lexical antiquarianism rather than scientific content. Apuleius anticipates that his Carthaginian listeners will evaluate the merits of his philosophical discourses in the same way (see p. 20). Also, both writers habitually look to the lexical authority of archaic Latin writers such as Cato (see p. 57). Finally, Gellius consults other authorities for classification and confirmation on a subject to which he has been introduced by a Greek mentor, as both he and Apuleius do in the case of formal logic (see p. 33).

As for Apuleius as an adapter, it appears that he has been so seduced, as Beaujeu puts it, by the erudite and especially the etymological details of Favorinus' post-prandial discourse that he has failed to observe or chosen to ignore that some of it contradicts what he has previously stated in his adaptation of his Greek model.[128] This tendency to focus on the particular to the neglect of the whole is a pattern that we have encountered repeatedly in other Apuleian works and is a direct result of the rhetorical education of the period.

Apuleius seems to have incorporated the material just discussed to suit his own preferences. He later adapts a substantial portion of his model to conform both to his own philosophical point of view and to the taste and experience of his Latin-speaking readers. In the course of developing the principle that god is the creator and stabilizer of the universe, he makes lavish use of analogies to affirm that it would be beneath the dignity of god to exercise direct control over the functioning of the universe. Like military commanders, senatorial leaders, civic administrators and estate managers, god delegates duties to subservient functionaries (25. 345-34. 365). He concludes:

> Finally, as a skipper is to a ship, a driver to a chariot, a lead singer to a chorus, law to a city, a commander to a city, just so is god to the universe (35. 365).

The use of analogies and most of the analogies themselves are consistent with the method of the Greek model. However, he has radically altered their application. As Beaujeu comments, "La différence entre les deux textes saute aux yeux."[129] Apuleius has

---

[128] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 323.

[129] Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 332.

"personalized" the impersonal "force" and incorporated this into his world-view of a transcendent god linked indirectly to mortals by intermediate demons.

Most of the other changes that Apuleius has made in chapters 25 to 34 comprise superficial stylistic embellishment and the substitution of Latin literary texture for the nap of the Greek model. This process becomes more pronounced starting in chapter 35. He here likens god the immovable prime-mover to a number of institutions and features of Roman life such as Roman magistrates, a Roman soldier collecting his ration of grain at the Minucian gate and the smells of Rome. Here, as he does later when he replaces the Homeric citations of the model with extracts from "the poet" Vergil's *Georgics* (36. 369), Apuleius is accommodating his Roman readers' cultural background without violating the integrity of the original (see p. 228).

Accuracy of Translation

The examples of alterations that I have cited, whether they alter the philosophical core or the style of presentation, all have one thing in common: they are wilful alterations. Errors in translation are an altogether different matter. Some of the apparent mistakes in translation may in fact be the result of variant readings in the manuscript(s) of the Greek work consulted by Apuleius. This could, for instance, be the case at 27. 352, where the translation "mundo equidem consentiunt" implies the Greek clause "they move in accordance with the movement of the universe" found in at least one of the Greek manuscripts instead of the phrase "harmoniously" that appears in the vast majority of the Greek manuscripts. The same is true at 28. 353, where either Apuleius has mistakenly translated the Greek word "pastures" as "laws" or, as is possible, his manuscript, like others, of the Greek work had the Greek word "laws".

Apuleius' ignorance of geography, which is demonstrable, seems to have contributed to the many flagrant mistakes that occur in his rendering of the geographical and meteorological parts of his Greek model.[130] Thus his lack of judgment in choosing to "improve" the Greek model with Favorinus' post-prandial discussion of the names of

---

[130] *Mun.* 5. 298 and following. Beaujeu (ed.) 1973 scrupulously signals the many errors in his commentary. See also Hijmans 1987: 406 and Redfors 1960: 14-6.

the winds may be rooted in ignorance (see p. 225). The many errors in translation signalled by Beaujeu at 10. 310 and 11. 314 underline this ignorance. Apuleius here reduces the highest principle (*spiritus*) of the Stoa to the breath of animals (10. 310).[131] It is more difficult to decide whether, as Redfors believes, Apuleius is guilty of an outright error at 29. 356 or whether, as Beaujeu argues, he has obscured the translation because of a desire to be less technical than the Greek model and because he has chosen to incorporate into his adaptation a passage from "the poet" Vergil's *Georgics*.[132] In any case, when one considers the full range of evidence amassed by Redfors, Müller and Beaujeu, one must conclude that the number of glaring mistakes in translation is unnerving in an author who claims to be fully bilingual and whose intellectual career is based principally on communicating Greek works in the Latin language to Western audiences and readers.[133]

Conclusions

Apuleius *sophisticus* and Apuleius *philosophus* are the same person. Belles-lettres and philosophy complement and play off each other in his two oratorical works, and the Platonist philosophical works promote the ideal of eloquent philosophy. With the exceptions of the *On the Universe* and the *Peri Hermeneias*, both of which have a principally Aristotelian lineage, the philosophical works function as discourses. They engage a "live" audience "interactively." This is true even of the *On Plato and His Doctrine*, a scholastic compendium of Platonist philosophy overtly addressed to one reader. It, too, is marked by the discontinuity of thought that marks the written products of second-century rhetorical training. As well, it is evident from the fold-out table at the end of Regen's book that Apuleius in the combined roles of philosopher and orator is preoccupied with articulating the same issues in both public roles.[134] He defines demons in the same words in the *Apology* (49. 2), the *On the God of Socrates* (6. 132), the *Florida*

---

[131] Redfors 1960: 14.
[132] Redfors 1960: 15, Beaujeu (ed.) 1973: 333.
[133] Redfors 1960: 13-8; Gersh 1986: I, 227-9.
[134] Regen 1971.

(10. 3) and the *On Plato and His Doctrine* (1. 11. 204); and natural science, physiology and biology are Peripatetic components of his intellectual preoccupations that appear in works as diverse as the *Apology*, the *On the Universe*, and the *On Plato and his Doctrine*. In both his philosophical and oratorical works he is equally conscious of the difficulty and obscurity of the philosophical subjects that he has undertaken to study and to explain (*Apol.* 38-9, *Pl.* 1. 9. 200) and equally self-conscious about the choice of vocabulary necessitated by their obscurity (*Soc.* 14. 150, *Plat.* 1. 9. 200, *Apol.* 38. 5). Like his Greek counterparts Dio Chrysostom and Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius chose the public forum of the speakers' platform rather than the classroom to promote Greek philosophical doctrines of the past to a mass audience.

CHAPTER SIX

FABULATOR LATINUS

Apuleius' best known work, the *Golden Ass*, raises a number of issues addressed in previous chapters: Greek sources, translation, adaptation and patchwork compilation. It is also the most thoroughly studied work in the Apuleian corpus. Accordingly, this chapter will be restricted to the issues just enumerated with one addition: the relationship of this Latin novel to the ancient Greek novel.[1]

Greek Sources

An important source of information for delineating the Greek origins of Apuleius' Latin adaptation are the various subscriptions contained in the manuscript known as F (Codex Laurentianus 68, 2). It served as the basis of all the extant manuscripts of the *Golden Ass* and during the period 395-7 was read and edited (*legi et emendavi*) by Sallustius both in Rome and in Constantinople. Whenever Sallustius refers to the novel by title he invariably cites it by the Greek title, the *Metamorphoses*, e. g.: "The end of Book 10 of the *Metamorphoses*. I, Sallustius, read and edited it profitably in Rome. The beginning of Book 11."[2] Thus the earliest known reference to the novel by title lends support to the likelihood of its Greek derivation.[3] As will be explained below, the Milesian affiliation that Apuleius assigns to the novel also implies Greek origins for the Latin adaptation.

---

[1] Sandy 1994. Bowie and Harrison 1993 provide an up-to-date survey and bibliographical guide to the ancient novel.

[2] *Methamorfoseon Libri X. Excipio. Ego Sallustius legi et emendavi Romae felix. Incipio Libri XI*, p. 266, ed. R. Helm (Leipzig: Teubner, 3rd ed., 1931); the dates and locations of Sallustius' editorial work derive from his subscrition at the end of Book 9, p. 236, ed. Helm. See also Rives 1994: 279, n. 17.

[3] Some thirty years later St. Augustine (*C. D.* 18. 18) uses the Latin title "*Asinus Aureus*" (*Golden Ass*); still later, in the fifth or sixth century, Fulgentius uses the two titles interchangeably.

Apuleius himself announces the Greek pedigree of the novel in the opening sentence and reaffirms it in the penultimate sentence of the first chapter. "'But I would like to stitch together for your benefit various tales written in the Milesian style that you favour,'" begins the novel. The dramatized narrator Lucius concludes the introduction to his stitched-together compilation in these words, "'We begin our Greekish story.'" As well, the narrator's emphatically Greek lineage reinforces that of the story and simultaneously bridges the divide between the two cultures of classical antiquity. A native of Greece with ties of kinship and education to its principal urban centres and the family of Plutarch, he worked hard in Rome to teach himself Latin. Apuleius likens this process of bridging the two linguistic cultures to a stunt rider jumping from one horse to another.

The adjective "Milesian" is not unambiguous, but its "made-in-Greece" implications are unmistakable. Aristides of Miletus was the author of a collection of novelle known in classical antiquity as *Milesiaca*, that is, *Milesian Tales*. Only one word of his collection of Greek tales survives, and the ten short surviving fragments of the Roman historian Sisenna's Latin translation of Aristides' work add nothing of value to attempts to reconstruct it.[4] Ancient references to the *Milesiaca* unanimously characterize it as vulgar, even obscene, which is difficult to reconcile with Apuleius' characterization of the honeyed tale of Cupid and Psyche as "Milesian" (4. 32. 6).[5] We may safely conclude, however, that the adjective "Milesian," however ambiguous, connotes at the very least a Greek component in the tone, style, structure or the contents of Apuleius' Latin adaptation.

The adjective "Graecanica," which I translated "Greekish" to avoid the architectural connotations that the word "Grecian" now has in English, in the words of Mason, "means something like 'adapted (into Latin) from Greek.'"[6] He cites for this interpretation the authority of the first-century B. C. Roman polymath Varro. In his *On the Latin Language* (10. 70-2) Varro distinguishes between the adjectives "Greek" and "Greekish." A Greek noun that retains its Greek declensional form in Latin is Greek; one that has been altered to conform to Latin morphology is Greekish.

---

[4] Scobie 1975: 66-7.

[5] Scobie 1975: 67.

[6] Mason 1978: 1.

Thus on the testimony of its author the *Golden Ass* has a Greek pedigree that includes bawdy Milesian tales and a "Greekish" story (*fabula Graecanica*) and has been altered in some way to suit its Latin setting. The Milesian component is known only by reputation. The *fabula Graecanica*, however, survives in an epitomized Greek version attributed in the manuscript tradition to Apuleius' contemporary Lucian. The Greek work that served as the basis of the extant epitome is known from the somewhat confused comparison of it with the epitome provided by Photius in the second half of the ninth century. It will be helpful to quote the relevant passages from Photius' account.[7]

> Read: the various volumes of Lucius of Patras' *Metamorphoses*.[8] He...strives excessively for the marvellous in his narrative and, one might say, is a second Lucian. The first two volumes have in any case been all but copied by Lucius from the work of Lucian known as *Lucius or the Ass*; or by Lucian from the books of Lucius. It seems more likely, as far as one can conjecture, that Lucian did the copying.... For Lucian has, as it were, winnowed out and stripped off from the broad expanse of Lucius' volumes what did not seem to him to be useful for his own goals. He has combined the rest, in the same words and syntax, into a single volume, calling what he has stripped away from that source *Lucius or the Ass*. Each writer's work is full of fictional inventions and obscene lewdness. Whereas Lucian, however, composed his work to mock and ridicule Greek superstition, as he does in his other works, Lucius seriously deems the transformations of persons into other persons and into animals and back again to be credible. He has incorporated all the other silly nonsense of old tales in his representation and has stitched this material together.

For our purposes it makes little difference whether Lucian or the otherwise unknown Lucius of Patras is the author of the original, unabridged version of the story or of its epitome. For the record, however, it is worth noting that most modern scholarship accepts Perry's arguments that Lucian was the author of the now lost *Metamorphoses* that served as the basis of the epitome *Lucius or the Ass* mistakenly attributed to Lucian in the manuscript tradition of his

---

[7] Henry (ed.) 1959-67: II, 103-4.

[8] I have intentionally chosen the neutral term "various" for the phrase "(*logoi*) *diaphoroi*"; other possibilities include "varied," "several" and "outstanding."

works.[9] It is, however, of critical importance to try to determine on which version of the story Apuleius based the *Golden Ass*. Again, Perry's views have prevailed.[10] There are instances of disrupted narrative progression in the epitome that remain intact in the *Golden Ass*. The only possible explanation, Perry argues, is that Apuleius modelled his version of the story directly on the (presumably) coherent narrative of the now lost Greek *Metamorphoses*.[11]

Even if Perry's hypothesis is correct, we are still left to reconcile Photius' confusing and contradictory account with the concrete reality of Apuleius' version. In the first place it is difficult to understand how an epitome that retains the words and syntax of the original could differ radically in tone from the model. However, Photius, who had the advantage of being able directly to compare the two Greek versions, insists that the epitome ridicules the naive belief in bodily transformations expressed in the Greek *Metamorphoses*. Second, the plurals of Photius' statement of "transformations of persons into other persons and into animals and back again" appear to overstate the circumstances of the *Golden Ass*. Its metamorphoses are restricted to the central character's transformation into an ass and back again into human form. Another difficulty in Photius' summary arises from our inability to interpret the exact meaning of the adjective "*diaphoroi*" (see Chapter Six, n. 8). Photius' later reference to "the broad expanse of Lucius' volumes" suggests a large collection of tales that the author, to quote Photius again, "stitched together." This may be reflected in Apuleius' first sentence, "'But I would like to stitch together for your benefit various tales written in the Milesian style that you favour.'" Still another issue raised by Photius' summary is the implication that only the first two volumes of the original Greek *Metamorphoses* contained accounts of bodily transformations and an ass. It is this material, according to Photius, that the epitomizer combined in a single volume entitled *Lucius or the Ass*. We have no way to determine the contents of "the broad expanse" of the remaining volumes that may have shaped Apuleius' adaptation.

---

[9] Perry 1967: 211-35.

[10] The issue is surveyed in Sandy 1994: 1518-21; add Kussl 1990.

[11] Sandy 1994: 1518-21 summarizes the arguments of Perry and others and describes various alternative hypotheses.

Adaptation of the Greek Model

Van Thiel's "synoptic" edition of the Greek epitome and Apuleius' version contains on facing pages the corresponding text of the two works.[12] It is easy to determine from this arrangement that Apuleius' version is fuller by a ratio of approximately five lines to one line of Greek text. It is impossible to compare the *Golden Ass* directly with its now lost Greek model. If Photius has represented the circumstances of the Greek *Metamorphoses* and its epitome accurately, however, it should be possible to compare the Latin text with "the same words and syntax" of the Greek model retained in the epitome.[13] The first few chapters of Book 2 of Apuleius' *Golden Ass* will serve as well as any for this purpose.[14]

At the beginning of Book 2 the central character Lucius awakes on the first morning of his visit to Thessaly. The country is celebrated throughout the world for the practice of magic, he reflects. Moreover, he realizes, he is in the very city, Hypata, where the disastrous consequence of magic occurred that his travelling companion Aristomenes narrated previously in the first of the many "stitched together" tales in the novel. Aristomenes' previously voiced explicit warning and the implicit warning of the tale of the danger in meddling with witchcraft and in becoming erotically involved with a witch serve only to inflame Lucius' desire to satisfy his curiosity regarding all aspects of witchcraft.[15] Thus the first chapter of Book 2 reaffirms Lucius' heedless determination directly to experience witchcraft at any cost. The consequences of that determination--transformation into an ass and hardships suffered at the hands of a series of owners--comprise the core of the novel.

In the Greek epitome the central character, also named Lucius, awakes after having dined on "a not excessively simple meal" and after

---

[12] Van Thiel 1971-2.

[13] Mason 1978: 4-5.

[14] Hijmans 1987: 403-6 provides detailed comparisons of *Met.* 3. 19-20 and 8. 27. 4 with the Greek model; see too Mason 1978: 4-6.

[15] Sandy 1974.

having drunk "sweet, aged wine" provided by his host Hipparchus. In Apuleius the host, who is named Milo, is caricatured as a miser and offers his guest a meal of starvation and endless chatter instead of food. In both accounts the character Lucius then leaves his host to search Hypata for marvellous evidence of witchcraft. Dazed but eager anticipation of the many manifestations of witchcraft that await him precedes Lucius' foray in Apuleius. He pictures them in his mind and enumerates the possibilities, most of which entail magical transformation of one form or species into another (2. 1). The catalogue begins:

> "There was nothing in that city that in my opinion was what it appeared to be. Rather, everything had been transformed into a different form by some demonic abracadabra."

It concludes, "'In a state of shock, or rather struck dumb by an excruciating longing....'"

This short passage, which has no equivalent in the Greek epitome, reinforces and anticipates themes and events that shape Lucius' behaviour and control the progression of the plot. For example, the theme that things are not what they appear to be in the magically charged atmosphere of Hypata is a prominent element of the first two inset tales of witchcraft (1. 5-19 and 2. 21-30).[16] Similarly, the feeling of simultaneous dread and attraction expressed in the quoted phrase "excruciating longing" is a recurrent and controlling component of Lucius' character throughout the novel but especially in the first three books.[17] The catalogue of eagerly anticipated manifestations of magic, the first part of which is quoted above, occupies eleven lines of text. The corresponding 3½ lines in the Greek epitome flatly recount the character Lucius' desire to discover a witch or to witness a wondrous event such as a person in flight or being transformed into stone.

The last two manifestations of magic that the Lucius of the Greek epitome anticipates have instructive parallels in Apuleius' version. "The person in flight" looks ahead in both versions to the goetic hostesses' magical ability to transform themselves into owls (*Asin.* 12, *Met.* 3. 21). In both versions the maid servants, immediately after

---

[16] Sandy 1972 and 1973.
[17] Sandy 1974: 237-9.

prolonged periods of graphically described sexual encounters with their mistresses' house guests, inform them that their mistresses are about to transform themselves into owls and urge the two young men to take the opportunity to witness the event. What they witness is essentially the same in both versions, as the Apuleian account alternates between translation and adaptation, concluding with translation when Apuleius' Lucius rubs his eyes to determine whether he is awake or has been dreaming (*Asin.* 13, *Met.* 3. 22. 2).

The second of the two anticipated magical manifestations enumerated in the Greek epitome, the transformation of a person into stone, does not actually materialize in that work. Petrified human beings and their opposite, ambulatory statues, appear in Apuleian Lucius' catalogue of anticipated magical marvels (2. 1). The events that precede the realized petrification in Apuleius are identical to the corresponding passage in the epitome. Each of the two Lucii meets in Hypata a distinguished woman closely associated with his mother (*Asin.* 4, *Met.* 2. 2). Each woman invites the young man to be her house guest, and each young man graciously declines the invitation, pleading reluctance to offend his current host (*Asin.* 4, *Met.* 2. 3. 5). Demureness sits more naturally on the lips of the Lucius of the Greek epitome. His host, in spite of his reputation of miserliness, provides his guest with a good meal and drink (*Asin.* 1, 3 and 4). The Apuleian host has the same reputation (1. 21. 5). In his version of the story, however, the would-be hostess does not reaffirm it as her equivalent does in the Greek epitome in spite of Lucius' insistence to the contrary (*Asin.* 3-4).

The major differences in the two accounts occur after the invitation has been issued and politely declined. In Apuleius, Lucius pays a short visit to the woman's house and there admires statues depicting the myth of Actaeon, which foreshadows Lucius' destiny: transformation into a quadruped because of excessive curiosity (2. 4).[18] The woman's response to Lucius' delight in the statuary underscores this intention, *Tua sunt...cuncta quae vides* ("'All that you see is yours'" [2. 5. 1]). On the innocent level intended by her, the meaning is something like, '"Make yourself at home.'" On another level, as the reader soon realizes, the apparently innocent words take on ominous associations when she cautions Lucius that his hostess is a witch who, among other

---

[18] Sandy 1973: 232.

things, transforms unco-operative lovers "'into stones, flock animals or another type of animal'" (2. 5. 7). In the Greek epitome the would-be hostess issues a similar warning about the goetic behaviour of Lucius' actual hostess; she too has exercised her magical powers to transform unco-operative lovers "'into beasts'" (*Asin.* 4). However, there is no mention of petrification and the proleptic statuary is absent. In other words Apuleius appears to have added a concrete warning of danger to the solely verbal warnings of the Greek epitome. Since the Greek narrative advances seamlessly from one episode to another in this part of the story without the kinds of inconsistencies and lapses that are elsewhere suggestive of epitomization, we can confidently conclude that the statuary is an Apuleian addition.

Other differences between the two versions in these parallel episodes are superficial. They usually take the form of more detailed embellishments in the Apuleian version. For instance the "numerous domestic staff" and the "abundant gold" that characterize the would-be hostess as "wealthy" in the Greek version are more fully elaborated by Apuleius:

> I saw a woman walking quickly and accompanied by numerous domestic staff members. The gold filigree of her jewellery and the gold threads woven into her clothing emphatically identified her as the chatelaine. An old man weighed down by years clung to her side. As soon as he caught sight of me he said, "By Hercules!, it's Lucius," and he kissed me and immediately whispered something into the woman's ear (*Asin.* 4, *Met.* 2. 2. 3-6).

A short time later in the Apuleian narrative Lucius is a dinner guest at the woman's house, where the "very flower of society" has gathered in large numbers because of her pre-eminent social position in the provincial town (2. 19. 1). We learned earlier that she is Lucius' aunt, his mother's sister. They are members of the distinguished family of Plutarch, the only social difference between the two women being that Lucius' mother has married into the Roman senatorial class (2. 3. 2-3).[19] These and other similar details, which have no counterpart in the Greek epitome, although not indispensable to the progression of the plot, are not gratuitous embellishments. They serve to underscore the

[19] Mason 1983.

great contrast between Lucius' inherited high social status and the depths to which he falls in his heedless quest to experience magic. In Book 11 the Isiac priest reaffirms the centrality of this theme of an otherwise noble person suffering because of a single major flaw in his character. He pronounces that in spite of his ancestry and education Lucius has reaped the rewards of his ill-fated curiosity (11. 15. 1).[20]

Two of the most substantial apparent accretions in the Apuleian version are the tale of Cupid and Psyche (4. 28-6. 24) and the intervention of the goddess Isis in Book 11. These two accretions alone represent approximately twenty-six per cent of the *Golden Ass*. Inclusion of the three tales of bungling robbers (4. 9-21) would raise the ratio to approximately thirty per cent. We cannot be certain, however that the tale of Cupid and Psyche and the robbers' tales, a farrago of shifting tone and subject that has come to be known as the "Charite-Komplex," are independent of the now lost Greek model.[21] The phrase "much talk at the cut-throats' carouse" in the epitome (21) may represent the remnants of tales of failed robberies; and the slightly later reference to the robbers' "bad luck" (22), of which there is no actual trace in the epitome, would make sense after accounts of failed attempted robberies. As well, the components that serve to launch the tale of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius exist in the epitomized Greek text: a frightened young female captive and a crone who, as in Apuleius, could have told the story to comfort the young woman. It is impossible to state with certainty, however, whether these components and those associated with the three robbers' tales are the vestiges of fully developed similar episodes excised from the original Greek work by the epitomizer or whether Apuleius has recognized and exploited their previously untapped narrative potential.

Book 11, the concluding book of the *Golden Ass*, appears to be a completely Apuleian accretion radically independent of both the Greek model and its word-for-word epitomization. The last master of the ass Lucius in the epitome is a wealthy resident of Thessalonica named Menecles. He decides to make the ass a feature act in a public spectacle after witnessing it having sexual intercourse with a wealthy woman. In both extant versions the ass is to fornicate publicly with a convicted murderess (*Asin*. 46-53, *Met*. 10. 13-23 and 34). In the

---

[20] Sandy 1974.

[21] Sandy 1994: 1532-3.

Greek epitome the ass takes advantage of an opportunity to eat rose petals and thereby regains his human form, as the witch's maid servant promised (*Asin.* 14 and 54). The story then concludes with the wealthy woman's violent expression of her disappointment that her former bestial lover has sloughed off his large penis along with the rest of his outward asinine attributes (*Asin.* 56). In Apuleius' version the ass Lucius takes advantage of an opportunity to escape from the theatre where he is to fornicate publicly with the convicted murderess. He then seeks refuge at an isolated part of the seashore and prays to the goddess Isis to grant him peace and relief from his cruel suffering and to restore him to his former self (*Met.* 10. 34-11. 2). The religiously charged atmosphere of this part of the *Golden Ass* and the rest of Book 11 is completely alien to the wry cynicism of the epitome.

The Ancient Novel

It should not come as a surprise at this point to realize that Apuleius has freely adapted the Greek model of the *Golden Ass*. Like other Latin authors and as above all in his philosophical treatises, he viewed his Greek models as starting points rather than fixed limits. In addition to the Greek model on which he directly based his free Latin adaptation, other Greek novels antedated and coincided in time with the *Golden Ass*. The mid-second century appears to have been the *Blütezeit* of the Greek novel.[22] I am not aware of any convincing arguments that Apuleius imitated any Greek novel other than the now lost *Metamorphoses*.[23] As is the case with the oratorical works, however, it is instructive to compare selected examples of the use made of the common stock of literary resources by Apuleius and the Greek novelists.[24]

To anticipate, my conclusion will be that the *Golden Ass* comprises an often bewildering mixture of comic and serious elements and in this

---

22 Sandy 1994: 1514.

23 Sandy 1994: 1515-8. As noted in Chapter One, Perry 1927 argues that Apuleius' *Hermagoras*, which is known only from the few phrases quoted by later grammarians (Beaujeu 1973: 171-2), was a novel. If it was, Apuleius may have employed Greek novelistic techniques in it, but there is not enough information to decide either issue.

24 Fuller details and bibliography in Sandy 1994.

respect spans the two broadly defined types of Greek prose fiction. Before undertaking the comparison I shall provide only the most basic orientation because two recent international conferences on the ancient novel have inspired several studies of ancient prose fiction in recent years.[25]

Five extant examples comprise the so-called ideal ancient Greek novels. These five works span a period of four to five centuries, from Chariton in the first century B. C. or A. D. to Heliodorus in the fourth century. Xenophon of Ephesus, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* and Achilles Tatius for reasons of varying credibility are usually assigned to the second century.[26] Incomplete novels, known through the summaries of the ninth-century patriarch Photius or through papyrus fragments discovered and published during approximately the past 100 years, enlarge the base of comparison.[27]

The general heading "ideal Greek novel" is often subdivided into two categories: pre-sophistic and sophistic. In this scheme the term "pre-sophistic" applies to the naively sentimental plots contrived above all by Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus. In this type of novel love reigns supreme. Chariton's novel begins:

> I, Chariton of Aphrodisias, the secretary of the lawyer Athenagoras, shall describe in detail a sentimental love affair that occurred in Syracuse.

It ends with the heroine Callirhoe's prayer of thanks that she has been reunited with her husband Chaereas:

> "Thank you, Aphrodite," she said, "for you have shown me Chaereas again in Syracuse, where I while still unmarried saw him through your bidding. I do not blame you, my lady, for what I have suffered. These sufferings had been pre-ordained for me. I pray that you will never separate me from Chaereas but that you grant us a happy life and simultaneous death."

Both stories proceed from love at first sight to anguished surrender to it, forced separation and attendant misfortunes, reunion and finally the promise of divinely sanctioned, everlasting happiness in marriage.

---

[25] Bowie and Harrison 1993 for bibliography.
[26] Sandy 1994: 1514.
[27] Sandy 1994a: 130-45.

The sophistic type of ancient Greek novel takes its qualifier from the heightened interest in rhetoric associated with the Second Sophistic. Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus are usually assigned to this category. They share a tendency to combine idealized, sentimental love with wry sophistication, often to the detriment of the former.[28] Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* does not fit either subdivision, remaining delightfully *sui generis*.

This scheme is admittedly oversimplified, but for our immediate purposes some such generalization as Photius' description of the "normal" ancient Greek novel can serve as a working definition:

> The "wanderings, love affairs, capture, and dangers" experienced by the characters in the *Wonders beyond Thule* of Antonius Diogenes, "the father of fictional narratives," "seem to have been the models of the romances" of Iamblichus, Achilles Tatius, Heliodorus and other writers of ancient Greek novels. Iamblichus, Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus "set for themselves almost the same goal in presenting their love stories."[29]

No complete examples of the other broad category of ancient Greek prose fiction survive. Until the recent publication of two fragmentary Greek picaresque novels the sole example of vulgar, sometimes comic realism in Greek fictional narrative was the previously discussed epitome of the Greek *Metamorphoses*.[30] Until that time the existence of Petronius' *Satyricon* and Apuleius' *Golden Ass* suggested that only Latin authors specialized in farcical vulgarity.[31] We now know that Greek prose narrative spans the full range of themes and tone that extends from the cloying sentimentality and predictable plots of Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus through Heliodorus' sophisticated wit and self-conscious manipulation of narrative and the bizarre combination of sentimentality and slap-stick in Achilles Tatius to the unremittingly coarse farce of recently published fragmentary Greek picaresque novels. Much of this widely varied Greek literary activity was taking place and existed as a backdrop at the time Apuleius was drawing material from at least one Greek fictional prose source for his

---

[28] Anderson 1982.

[29] The phrases in quotation marks are taken from my translation in Reardon (ed.) 1989: 782 and 787; see also Sandy 1994a: 141-2.

[30] Henrichs 1972 and Parsons 1971.

[31] Sandy 1994a: 139-41.

equally variegated *Golden Ass*.

Extremes of tone--the mixture of dirt and deity--have been a major obstacle to understanding Apuleius' intentions in the *Golden Ass*.[32] For some critics the polar extremes as represented by ten books of *variae fabulae* stitched together for the promised amusement of readers incongruously juxtaposed with the religious resolution provided by Book 11 are proof that Apuleius was unwilling or unable to develop a thematically coherent novel. For other critics, beginning as early as the elder Beroaldus' commentary on the *Golden Ass* in 1500, the coarse elements combined with the soteriological conclusion of the work function as a kind of parable:

> Verily under the wrap of this transformation [of Lucius into an ass] is taxed the life of mortal man, when as we suffer our mindes so to bee drowned in sensual lusts of the flesh, and the beastly pleasure thereof...that we lose wholly the use of reason and vertue....So can we never be restored to the right figure of ourselves, except we eat the sweet Rose of reason and vertue.[33]

The issue to try to decide in the rest of this chapter is where the variable *Golden Ass* fits in the equally diverse configurations of ancient prose fiction. A sketch of the social settings in a few examples of ancient Greek and Latin prose fiction will illustrate the difficulty of placing the *Golden Ass* in a neatly defined niche.

The central characters in the canonical ancient Greek novels occupy prominent places in society. The heroine in Chariton's novel is the daughter of Hermocrates, a historically attested leader in the successful Sicilian resistance to the Athenian expedition at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Her eventual husband is the son of the historically attested Ariston, who as a statesman and military commander was second only to Hermocrates. The hero and heroine first see and fall in love with each other at a public religious festival in honour of the goddess Aphrodite. Although not historically attested members of the ruling class, the central characters in Xenophon of Ephesus' novel enjoy distinguished pedigrees. The hero Habrocomes' parents are

---

[32] Sandy 1994: 1524-30.

[33] Quoted from the preface of W. Adlington's English translation of the *Golden Ass* (1566). Adlington has taken this interpretation without acknowledgement from Beroaldus; see Sandy 1978: 123.

among the most important people of Ephesus, and the heroine Anthia is chosen to lead the girls of her community in the procession of the goddess Artemis. The two young people first see each other there and immediately fall in love. Prominent, historically attested military and political figures of the past are also the principal characters in the fragmentary ancient Greek novels *Ninus and Semeriamis* and *Metiochus and Parthenope*.[34] In Heliodorus the heroine Chariclea is the daughter of the king and queen of Ethiopia. Her beloved Theagenes traces his descent from Achilles. They meet for the first time and, reluctantly but immediately, fall in love with each other at the quadrennial Pythian Games in Delphi, where each of them is the leader of a national procession. In short, the principal characters of the mainline ancient Greek novels are public figures and their love is initiated and even celebrated publicly at religious festivals.

The central character in Apuleius' novel boasts of being related to the famous Plutarch and his nephew the philosopher Sextus (1. 2. 1), and his aunt Byrrhena hosts a party for the *flos ipse civitatis* (the very flower of society) of the provincial town Hypata (2. 19. 1).[35] His aristocratic birthright is repeatedly acknowledged in the story.[36] In spite of this inherited social ascendency Lucius has a passionate love affair with his host's maidservant. He initiates it in the kitchen instead of at a public religious festival, where love is first experienced by the heroes and heroines of the conventional ancient Greek novels. Lucius' alienation from the refined behaviour expected of a person of his social standing is also evident in one of his meetings with his aunt. She enumerates the public amenities available to tourists and business travellers alike in Hypata (2. 19. 5-6). In the extant ancient Greek novels this would serve as the occasion for a detailed description of an exotic city such as Alexandria.[37] Lucius, however, turns the conversation away from high society to the hidden underbelly of the Thessalian town, to its witches, grave robbers and necromantic hags (2. 20. 1-3).

The closest parallel in ancient Greek prose fiction to this kind of slumming occurs in the papyrus fragments of Lollianus' *Phoenician*

---

[34] Sandy 1994a: 135-9.
[35] Sandy 1994: 1532, Dowden 1994: 428-9.
[36] E. g. 3. 11. 1, 3. 15. 4 and 11. 15. 1.
[37] Examples in Sandy 1994: 1532.

Story.[38] The first of the three major fragments, labelled A 2 recto by the editor and comprising thirty-four lines, the first four and the last thirteen of which yield at best only isolated words, follows twenty-one lacunose lines that describe a group of people dancing. Two of these people, Glaucetes and Persis, also appear in fragment A 2 recto. Persis is described there as waiting in a hidden room for an unnamed man. Female servants persuade him to join her. He has with her his first experience of sex and is generously rewarded for the loss of his virginity. Persis first offers him gold jewellery, which he refuses. She then orders her steward Glaucetes to bring and count out 2 000 drachmas, presumably for the man. The unnamed man is almost certainly Androtimus. He is the named first-person narrator of the major fragments B 1 recto and verso, where Persis and Glaucetes again appear, and for that reason seems most likely to be the first-person, dramatized narrator of the fragment just outlined.

Fragment B 1 recounts the atrocities committed by a gang of robbers. They kill a boy known to Androtimus, and after cutting out his heart they grill it and apportion it among themselves in a grisly ritual of pledging allegiance to one another.[39] Before making their escape by disguising themselves in the clothes of their murdered victims the robbers engage in singing, dancing and sexual intercourse with women in the presence of Androtimus.

Both Androtimus in the Greek picaresque novel and Lucius in Apuleius' *Golden Ass* are sexually diffident. Androtimus has his first sexual experience with Persis after her servants have persuaded him to join her. The maidservant Photis scorns Lucius as a schoolboy in erotic matters (2. 10. 2), and he describes himself as a novice:

> "In any case you for your part would not appear to be unskilled or inexperienced in these matters. I know this and clearly sense it since you hold me, who have always otherwise scorned the embraces of women of quality, a bound and fettered willing slave to your flashing eyes, rosy cheeks, glittering hair, parted lips and scented breasts" (3. 19. 5).

Androtimus is paid for his sexual initiation. For Lucius, sex is a commodity cynically to be traded for information about the magical practices of his hostess. Lucius has sex with his hosts' maidservant

---

[38] Henrichs 1972, Sandy 1979, Jones 1980, Winkler 1980.

[39] Sandy 1979: 369-71, Winkler 1980: 166-73.

Photis because his ethical compunctions will not allow him to violate their marriage bed in his otherwise heedless desire to experience the magical practices of the chatelaine. As he says to himself:

> "Dismiss your childish fears, be calculating and go directly to business, avoid entanglement in a love affair with your hostess, show religious respect for the bed of your good host Milo and strive to captivate the servant girl Photis" (2. 6. 6).

Thus in both novels love is a brokered commodity instead of being the idealized romantic love of the canonical ancient Greek novels.[40] The women by whom the young male central characters are introduced to sex both play the role of *praeceptor amoris*. Photis' skill and experience are analogous to Persis' "school of (love)."[41] In a sense, Photis is an innocent participant in the transaction; her only payment, we are led to believe, is satisfaction of her habitual sexual desires. Persis, however, appears to belong to a rich literary tradition of courtesans with hearts of gold. In classical antiquity slaves regularly bore geographically derived names such as Persis, "the Persian woman." Since, however, Persis herself has a steward and female servants, it seems more likely that she belongs instead to the class of former slave women usually called in this context *hetairai* or courtesans, that is, professional companions, whose names often end in "-is." They make their appearance in Greek literature as early as Achilles' captive concubine Briseïs in the *Iliad* and continue in Menander (Thaïs), Terence (Thaïs) and Petronius (Chrysis), are best exemplified in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans* and most relevantly by the "companionable" maidservant Photis in the *Golden Ass*.[42] Lucius can lay claim to distinguished family ties. Too little of Androtimus' background survives in the fragments to warrant any such assessment. However, his name is documented for freeborn Greek males, and this sets him apart from the probably servile and almost

---

[40] Henrichs 1972: 118, Sandy 1979: 373.

[41] Fragment A 2 recto, line 25. The phrases "school of (love)," or "payment for instruction (in love)" or "instruction (in love)" are all possible, depending on whether the Greek word for school/teacher's fee or the Greek word for instruction is to be read; cf. Jones 1980: 244.

[42] Henrichs 1972: 107.

certainly whorish status of Persis.[43]

Both men in the end pay a high price for their involvement with women of lower social status.[44] Some time after Androtimus has had sex with Persis, he is captured by a gang of savage criminals and becomes an unwilling witness to their orgy of drinking, gluttony, murder, cannibalism and sex. In our last glimpse of the outlaws they appear to be attempting to escape by disguising themselves (B 1 verso). In Apuleius, Lucius, after he has been transformed into an ass because of Photis' incompetence or perfidy, is pressed into service as a pack animal by a gang of robbers. They take him to their cave where he witnesses their raucous carouse (4. 8. 4-5). As in the fragmentary Greek work, they pledge allegiance to their comrades-in-arms (*commilitonum* [4. 22. 1]) and, again as in the *Phoenicica*, fall asleep. In the middle of the night some of them disguise themselves as ghosts and hurriedly set out on a kidnapping expedition (4. 22. 5). In the *Phoenicica* eleven of the outlaws, after their even less restrained debauch and in the middle of the night, disguise themselves in the clothing of their murdered victims.

The *Golden Ass* and fragment B 1 of Lollianus' *Phoenician Story* contain unmistakable parallels in narrative sequence and social milieu.[45] However, I believe that it would be a mistake to claim a derivative connection between the two sets of parallel events and characters. Art imitates life: socially mismatched couples do have sex; money does change hands for sex; outlaws do behave savagely; criminals do engage in unlawful activity under cover of darkness and resort to disguises. My intention, rather, has been to try to find a place for the *Golden Ass* on the continuum of social milieu represented in the prose fiction of classical antiquity. At one end of the scale stands the extreme vulgarity of a work such as the *Phoenicica*. The extreme of refined high-mindedness at the other end of the scale includes Heliodorus' *Ethiopian Story*. The *Golden Ass* occupies a place

---

[43] Henrichs 1972: 118.

[44] The truncated narrative of the *Phoenicica* does not allow us to determine whether the disastrous consequences are of the propter-hoc or the post-hoc variety. Some critics interpret the clause *ad serviles delapsus voluptates* ("having fallen into slavish pleasures") addressed to Lucius by the priest of Isis as condemnation of Lucius' sexual involvement with a slave (*Met.* 11. 15. 1); cf. Sandy 1974.

[45] Sandy 1979: 369-73, Jones 1980: 248-9, Winkler 1980: 165.

somewhere on the middle of the scale, as it lurches from criminal low life and cynically calculated sex with the housemaid to a divine epiphany.

The literary texture of the *Golden Ass* affords another opportunity to make concrete comparisons between Apuleius' and other authors' use of the narrative resources of extended prose fiction.[46] As I explained in Chapter Two, both classical cultures of the Roman Imperial period practised what I there called the Cult of the Past, that is, reliance on earlier authorities and canons of approved models of imitation. This preoccupation with the past expresses itself in many ways. It ranges from free adaptations such as the *Golden Ass* itself to patchwork compilations such as the *Peri Hermeneias*. It also fosters the incorporation of the words and phrases of models in order either to lend something of the prestige and authority of the source to the new host or to undercut the events of the new host by contrasting them with the unsullied forebears.

The incorporation of elements from the ancient stage displays a striking instance of the varied motives to be found in the *Golden Ass*. It alternates between the austere dignity of Greek tragedy and the coarse farce of sensuously staged Roman mime. The typical ancient Greek novels regularly invoke dramatic metaphors and themes derived from the Athenian tragic stage.[47] Their attitude towards the earlier form is without exception reverential. The intention appears to be to align the new literary form with its established predecessors and to grace it with their dignity and decor. Petronius' *Satyricon*, the fragmentary Latin novel with which the *Golden Ass* is most frequently compared, consistently invokes the tarnished image of Roman mime as part of Petronius' strategy to undermine the puffed-up posturing of its degenerate characters.[48]

Once again, the *Golden Ass* lurches between the two extremes, represented in this instance by the ancient Greek novels and the Latin *Satyricon*. Ennobling literary decor is evident in Apuleius' use of the messenger of the Greek tragic stage to announce the tragedy of Charite (8. 1. 2-3). It is more difficult to assess his intentions in developing an

---

[46] Sandy 1994: 1540-9 for fuller discussion and bibliography; add Krabbe 1989: 123-49.

[47] Sandy 1994: 1540-3.

[48] Sandy 1974a, Finkelpearl 1991: 227-31.

elaborately staged and sensuously costumed mime as the launching pad for the ass Lucius' physical and religious (re)conversion (10. 29-35). It stands in sharp contrast to the unadorned simplicity of the spectacle that performs the same narrative function in the Greek epitome (53). The titillating sensuality of the mime staged by Apuleius actually undermines the thematic impetus of the narrative at this point. At the beginning of the episode the ass Lucius recoils from the prospect of his role in the staged spectacle of public fornication with a condemned murderess (10. 29. 1). By the end of this chapter he is contentedly grazing as he delights in catching welcome glimpses through an open gate of the acts that are to serve as the prelude to his previously dreaded humiliation. Lucius' hypocritical pretence of moral outrage is unmasked by his delight in the very thing that he, along with countless moralists of the time, has condemned.[49]

Another instance of this sort of apparent incongruity occurs a short time later in the same episode. As the ass Lucius watches the salacious mime "The Judgment of Paris" being performed, he steps off the page of the novel directly to address the reader in a denunciation of the venality of judges based in part on Plato's *Apology* (41 b, *Met.* 10. 33). He then pulls himself up short and in words inspired by Plautus' comedy *Pseudolus* concedes the absurdity of a philosophizing ass (10. 33. 4).[50] There is more involved here than just the apparent ineptitude of indiscriminately mingling Plato and Plautus. Apuleius has fully exploited the sumptuous spectacle of obscene popular entertainment that outraged the moralists of the time while attempting to hide behind the philosopher's cloak, as he accuses the false philosophers of Carthage of doing (*Fl.* 9. 9).

Thus the conventional ancient Greek novels consistently align themselves with the prestige of Greek tragedy. Petronius is equally consistent in exploiting the disgraced reputation of mime in order to discredit his characters' hypocritical moral posturing. Apuleius tries to have it both ways: as in the Carthaginian theatre, there is room on the stage of the *Golden Ass* for mimic, comic and tragic actors and for the philosopher (*Fl.* 18. 4 and 5. 2).

---

[49] Finkelpearl 1991: 231-2. Zimmerman-de Graaf 1993 interprets the apparent narrative incongruity as Apuleius' intentional manipulation of shifting narrative perspectives.

[50] Sandy 1978: 123.

With some notable exceptions, a few of which will be discussed later, Apuleius rarely develops and sustains literary imitation beyond isolated phrases. His customary practice is evident in the character Aristomenes' account of his friend Socrates' fatal encounter with the witch Meroë. As the two travelling companions exchange witty banter Socrates suddenly

> "drew a tortured gasp from the depths of his heart and beat his forehead violently with his right hand. 'Poor me!,' he said. 'While I was pursuing the pleasure of a famous gladiatorial spectacle...'" (1. 7. 5).

The first half of the quoted statement echoes a critical passage in Vergil's *Aeneid* (2. 288), where the ghost of Hector appears to Aeneas and urges him to flee the imminent destruction of Troy. The only deviation from the Vergilian phrase is the substitution of *suspiritum* for *gemitus* ("gasp") and the addition of the adjective *cruciabilem* ("tortured"). Both words are Plautine. Thus in the midst of witty banter and jokes and as Socrates speaks of his pursuit of popular pleasures a portentous Vergilian phrase overlaid with verbal associations of the Roman comic stage intrudes. The pastiche continues. Socrates elevates the libidinous witch Meroë to the mythical level of Medea (1. 10. 2). She likens herself to Calypso deserted by Odysseus (1. 12. 6), and she performs her "'sepulchral rites'" at a trench in imitation of Odysseus in the *nekyia* (Book 11) of the *Odyssey* (1. 10. 3).

Apuleius' use of literary allusion is far more complex than appears to be the case in any of the Greek novels or in the examples discussed above, which derive from the end of the scale that includes pastiche and unitegrated literary reminiscence. It also extends to the other end of the scale. One finds here subtleties worthy of Alexandrian writers and their Roman disciples in the Augustan period and what would now be called intertextuality.[51] Apuleius' allusions to Plato and Greek tragedy in the *Golden Ass* provide interesting examples of his multifarious procedures.

The second chapter of the novel appears to signal its philosophical bias. The narrator credits the distinction of his mother's Thessalian

---

[51] Finkelpearl 1990: 333-47 identifies a wide range of approaches to Vergil used by Apuleius in part of the tale of Cupid and Psyche.

family to the Platonist and essayist Plutarch and his nephew, the Platonic philosopher Sextus. Plutarch was in fact well known to be a native of Chaeronea in Boeotia. Apuleius' wilful dislocation of him to Thessaly appears all the more to underscore an intentional design. This design appears to be confirmed by the first inset tale. Its principal character is named Socrates. Readers of the Roman Imperial period would instinctively think of Plato's *Phaedrus* when the Apuleian Socrates and his companion sit down next to a plane tree (Apul. *Met.* 1. 18. 8, Pl. *Phdr.* 229 a). The river that they go to for a drink of water would just as surely remind readers of the plane-tree-shaded river Ilissus featured in the same Platonic dialogue. In an instant, however, Platonic reminiscence appears to give way to pastiche or even farce when the Apuleian Socrates drops dead on the bank of the river, the victim of the libidinous witch Meroë, whom he has offended.[52] The balance now seems to be weighted at the Petronian end of the scale. He, too, knows Plato and knows how to turn a plane-tree-shaded *dignus amore locus* into a setting for the farcical debasement of idealized love and to direct coarse jokes based on the *Socratica fides* of Plato's *Symposium* against the sexual impotency of the character Encolpius (131. 8-132. 1).

On other occasions Apuleius appears to rely on his readers' familiarity with Plato to provide the seemingly disparate tales with a thematic note that resonates throughout the novel. The theme of Roman forensic rhetoric, for instance, emerges from the prologue and contributes to the imposition of Latin concerns on the *fabula Graecanica*.[53] Instead of becoming a priest of Isis at the end of the novel, as the reader might anticipate on the basis of the fervent religious trajectory of Book 11, Lucius becomes a professional lawyer in Rome. Between these book-ends of Roman law there are episodes involving forensic rhetoric and the related theme of justice that recall Plato's *Apology*, where natural justice and institutional authority are pitted against each other. In the context of the ass-Lucius' dreaded public copulation with a woman who, like Apuleius himself in his *Apology*, has been condemned by a combination of individual outrage and enraged public opinion (10. 28. 3), the ass-Lucius denounces venal

52 Anderson 1982: 80; see, too, Trapp 1990.

53 Elsom 1985: 152-3; I am indebted to her for what follows. The theme of Latin forensic rhetoric: *exotici ac forensis sermonis* (1. 1. 5).

judges and the injustice of Socrates' trial (10. 33. 3-4). The spectacle that the bestial copulation is to crown includes the performance of the mime "The Judgment of Paris," which the ass-Lucius cites as the original example of injustice (10. 33. 1). As in Plato's account of Socrates' trial (*Ap*. 41 b), the two named legendary victims of unjust trials are Palamedes and Ajax. Elsom astutely observes that in some versions of the legends associated with Ajax he insanely imagines that his persecutors Odysseus and Agamemnon are sheep. She is able in this way to account for the seemingly gratuitous details of the witch Meroë transforming a lawyer into a ram (1. 9. 4) and the ass-Lucius apostrophising venal lawyers as *forensia pecora* (10. 33. 1).[54]

In still another trial scene Apuleius appears to rely on literary reminiscence to give his story an added dimension of meaning.[55] In the "Phaedra" trial at the beginning of Book 10 a dead boy, presumed to have been killed by his step-brother, has actually been killed by his mother, whose intended victim was the step-son. The "dead" boy is revived when a doctor announces that he gave the boy a sleeping draught rather than the poison ordered by the Phaedra character. This tale, unlike the previous trial story, highlights the power of justice in the face of mob violence (10. 6. 4-7. 1). Apuleius introduces the story as a tragedy rather than a light comedy (*fabula*), and it does in fact parallel stage representations of the legend of Phaedra closely enough to signal the significant differences: the innocent victim does not actually die, "Phaedra" is condemned in a court of law and the truth is not revealed too late to avert a tragedy.

The step-son is to be tried in accordance with the procedures of the Athenian Areopagus (10. 7. 2). This is a tragedy, readers have been told (10. 2. 7), and they will surely recall the most famous literary trial involving domestic homicide in that august setting, Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. The legendary trial serves to provide an opportunity for justice and forensic rhetoric to resolve the differences between conflicting religious systems and thus contributes to the religious resolution of the novel.[56]

---

[54] Elsom 1985: 153.
[55] Elsom 1985: 154-5.
[56] Elsom 1985: 155.

Conclusions

Trained in the rhetorical doctrine of *mimesis*, Apuleius could not in his account of Psyche's trip to the Underworld avoid the model of Book 6 of the *Aeneid*, just as Vergil could not overlook the model of Homer's *nekyia*.[57] Steeped in Platonist philosophy, Apuleius could not in a fable involving characters named Love (Cupid) and Soul (Psyche) ignore such Platonic models as the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, both of which lay at the core of second-century *paideia*.[58] This does not occasion surprise. What distinguishes Apuleius in the *Golden Ass* from other Greek and Latin writers of the Roman Imperial period, including the novelists, is his bewildering mingling of literary *mimesis* and pastiche. Heliodorus, for instance, is consistent in basing the broad lines of the plot, several episodes and even the genealogy of one of the characters on Homeric epic. Petronius consistently undermines the hypocritical posturing of his characters by contrasting it with the unsullied paradigms. Apuleius combines Platonic farce and Plautine tragedy.

---

[57] Finkelpearl 1990: 333-47.
[58] De Lacy 1974, Trapp 1990.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations for periodicals and reference works are those of *L'Année philologique*. In addition *ANRW* = *Aufstieg und und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. W. Haase and H. Temporini (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972-). Part II, volume 34. 2 of *ANRW* (1994) contains several relevant articles. Unfortunately, this volume appeared too late for me to take account of them. I list them below preceded by the symbol *.

Anderson G. 1982, *Eros Sophistes: Ancient Novelists at Play*, American Classical Studies, No. 9 (Chico, California: Scholars).

—— 1982a, "Lucian: a Sophist's Sophist," *YCS* 27: 61-92.

—— 1986, *Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century A. D.* (London: Croom Helm).

—— 1990, "The Second Sophistic: Some Problems of Perspective," in *Antonine Literature*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Clarendon), 91-110.

—— 1993, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London: Routledge).

*—— 1994, "Aulus Gellius: A Miscellanist and his World," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.

Audollent A. 1901, *Carthage romaine*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, No. 84 (Paris: Fontemoing).

Axelson B. 1952, "Akzentuierender Klauselrhythmus bei Apuleius. Bemerkungen zu den Schriften De Platone und De mundo," *Vetenskaps- Societetens i Lund årsbok* (Lund) 5-20.

*Bajoni M. 1994, "Aspetti linguistici e letterari del 'De mundo' di Apuleio," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.

Baldwin B. 1975, *Studies in Aulus Gellius* (Lawrence: Coronado).

—— 1976, "Athenaeus and His Work," *Acta Classica* 19: 21-42.

Barigazzi A. (ed.), 1966 *Favorino di Arelate: Opere*, Testi greci e latini con commento filologico, No. 4 (Florence: Felice le Monier).

—— 1993, "Favorino di Arelate," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 1.

Barnes T. 1971, *Tertulian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford: Oxford University).

Barra G. 1961-2, "Il valore e il significato del 'De Deo Socratis' di Apuleio," *Annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia* (Università di Napoli) 9: 67-119.

Bartsch S. 1989, *Decoding the Ancient Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University).

Beaujeu J. (ed.) 1973, *Apulée: Opuscules philosophiques...et fragments*, Collection des universités de France (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1973).

—— 1975, "Sérieux et frivolité au IIe siècle de notre ère: Apulée," *BAGB* 34: 83-97.

Behr C. 1981, *P. Aelius Aristides: The Complete Works* (Leiden: Brill). 2 volumes.

Birley A. 1988, *The African Emperor: Septimius Severus* (London: Batsford).

Blatt F. 1938, "Remarques sur l'histoire des traductions latines," *C&M* 1: 217-46.

Bompaire J. 1958, *Lucien écrivain*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, No. 190 (Paris: de Boccard).

Boulanger A. 1923, *Aelius Aristide...*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, No. 126 (Paris: Boccard).

Bowersock G. 1969, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon).

Bowie E. 1982, "The Importance of Sophists," *YCS* 27: 29-59.

Bowie E. and Harrison S. 1993, "The Romance of the Novel," *JRS* 83: 159-78.

Branham R. 1985, "Introducing a Sophist: Lucian's Prologues," *TAPA* 115: 237-43.

Brock S. 1979, "Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity," *GRBS* 20: 69-87.

Brugnoli G. (ed.) 1963, *C. Suetonius I: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* (Teubner: Leipzig, 2nd ed.).

Burgess T. 1902, *Epideictic Literature* (reprinted New York: Garland, 1987).

Callanan C. and Bertini Malgarini A. 1986, "Übersehene Favorin-Fragmente aus einer oxforder Handschrift," *RhM* 129: 170-84.

Callebat L. 1968, *Sermo Cotidianus dans les Métamorphoses d'Apulée* (Caen: Ozanne).

Camp J. 1989, "The Philosophical Schools of Roman Athens," in *The Greek Renaissance in the Roman Empire*, Institute of Classical Studies, Bulletin Supplement, No. 55, ed. S. Walker and A. Cameron (London: University of London).

Carratello U. 1963, "Apuleio morí nel 163-164?," *GIF* 16: 97-110.

Champlin E. 1980, *Fronto and Antonine Rome* (Cambridge: Harvard University).

Charles-Picard G. 1959, *La civilisation de l'Afrique romaine* (Paris: Plon).

Collart P. 1932, "Favorinus d'Arles," *BAGB* 34: 23-31.

D'Alton J. 1931, *Roman Literary Theory and Practice* (reprinted New York: Russell & Russell, 1962).

De' Conno R. 1958-59, "Posizione e significato dei *Florida* nell' opera di Apuleio," *Annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia* (Università di Napoli) 8: 57-76.

De Lacy P. 1974, "Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A. D.," in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. G. Bowersock (University Park, Pennsylvania: American Philological Association), 4-10.

Dillon J. 1977, *The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B. C. to A. D. 220* (London: Duckworth).

Dowden K. 1994, "The Roman Audience of *The Golden Ass*," in J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University).

Duff J. 1960, *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age* (London: Ernest Benn).

Elsom H. 1985, *Apuleius and the Writing of Fiction and Philosophy in the Second Century AD* (Ph. D. thesis, Cambridge University).

Festugière A.-J. 1944-54, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris: Lecoffre). 4 volumes.

Finkelpearl E. 1990, "Psyche, Aeneas, and an Ass, Apuleius *Metamorphoses* 6. 10-6. 21," *TAPA* 120: 333-47.

—— 1991, "The Judgment of Lucius: Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 10. 29-34," *CA* 10: 221-36.

Fowden G. 1986, *The Egyptian Hermes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).

Fraenkel E. 1957, *Horace* (Oxford: Oxford University).

Gatscha F. 1898, "Quaestionum Apuleianarum Capita Tria," *Dissertationes Vindobonenses* 6 (reprinted Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1970): 140-90.

Gersch S. 1986, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*,

Publications in Medieval Studies, No. 23. 1-2 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame). 2 volumes.

Glucker J. 1978, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, Hypomnemata: Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihren Nachleben, No. 56 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht).

Gsell S. 1920, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, IV (Paris: Hachette).

—— 1922, *Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie* (Paris: Honoré Champion). 2 volumes.

Guey J. 1951, "Au théâtre de Leptis Magna: Le proconsulat de Lollianus Avitus et la date de l'*Apologie* d'Apulée," *REL* 29: 307-17.

Gulick C. (ed.) 1927, *Athenaeus: The Deipnosophists*, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann). 6 volumes.

Habicht C. 1985, *Pausanias' Guide to Greece*, Sather Classical Lectures, No. 50 (Berkeley: University of California).

Haines C. (ed.) 1919, *The Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University). 2 volumes.

Halliwell S. 1994, "Philosophy and Rhetoric," in I. Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: Routledge).

Helm R. 1955, "Apuleius' Apologie--ein Meisterwerk der zweiten Sophistic," *Das Altertum* 1: 86-108.

Henrichs A. 1972, *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos*, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, No. 14 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt).

Henry R. (ed.) 1959-67, *Photius: Bibliothèque*, Collection des universités de France (Paris: Societé des éditions "Les Belles Lettres"). 8 volumes.

Hesky R. 1904, "Zur Abfassungszeit der Metamorphosen des Apuleius," *WS* 26: 71-80.

Hijmans B. Jr. 1987, "Apuleius, Philosophus Platonicus," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 36. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).

*—— 1994, "Apuleius Orator: 'Pro se de Magia' and 'Florida,'" in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.

Hillyard B. 1981, *Plutarch: "De Audiendo." A Text and Commentary*, Monographs in Classical Studies, ed. W. R. Connor (New York: Arno).

Hobein H. (ed.) 1910, *Maximi Tyrii Philosophumena* (Leipzig: Teubner).

Hock R. and O'Neil E. (ed.) 1986, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric. Volume I. The "Progymnasmata,"* Texts and Translations, No. 27, Graeco-Roman Religious Series, No. 9 (Atlanta: Scholars).

Holford-Strevens L. 1977, "Towards a Chronology of Aulus Gellius," *Latomus* 36: 93-109.

—— 1988, *Aulus Gellius* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina).

Horsfall N. 1979, "Doctus Sermones Utriusque Linguae?," *CNV* 28: 79-95.

—— 1982, "Allecto and natura: a pattern of allusion in Apuleius," *LCM* 7. 3: 41.

Householder F. 1941, *Quotation and Allusion in Lucian* (Morningside Heights, New York: King's Head).

Jocelyn H. 1989, "Studies in the Indirect Tradition of Plautus' *Pseudolus*. III The 'Archaising Movement'...," *BICS*, Supplement 51: 57-72.

Jones C. 1972, "Two Enemies of Lucian," *GRBS* 13: 475-87.

—— 1974, "The Reliability of Philostratus," in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University Park, Pennsylvania: American Philological

Association), 11-16.

—— 1980, "Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* and Lollianus' *Phoinikika*," *Phoenix* 34: 243-54.

Kennedy G. 1974, "The Sophists As Declaimers," in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. G. Bowersock (University Park, Pennsylvania: American Philological Association), 17-22.

—— 1972, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: Princeton University).

Kenney E. (ed.) 1990, *Apuleius: Cupid & Psyche* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).

Kindstrand J. 1973, *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, No. 7 (Uppsala: Kåwe).

Koniaris G. 1982, "On Maximus of Tyre: *Zetemata* (I)," *CA* 1: 87-121.

—— 1983, "On Maximus of Tyre: *Zetemata* (II)," *CA* 2: 212-50.

Kotula T. 1969, "*Utraque lingua eruditi*: Une page relative à l'histoire de l'éducation dans l'Afrique romaine," in *Hommages à Marcel Renard*, Collections Latomus, No. 102 (Brussels), II, 386-92.

Krabbe J. 1989, *The Metamorphoses of Apuleius*, American University Studies: Series 17, Classical Languages and Literature, No. 9 (New York: Lang).

Krings V. 1991, "Les lettres grecques à Carthage," in *Phoinikeia Grammata*, Collection d'études classiques, No. 6 (Namur: Société des études classiques), 649-68.

Kussl R. 1990, "Die Metamorphosen des 'Lukios von Patrai': Untersuchungen zu Phot. Bibl. 129," *RhM* 133: 379-88.

Londey D. and Johanson C. 1987, *The Logic of Apuleius*, Philosophia Antiqua, No. 47 (Leiden: Brill).

Lumpe A. 1982, *Die Logik des Pseudo-Apuleius* (Augsburg: Seitz).

MacMullen R. 1966, "Provincial Languages in the Roman Empire," *AJP* 87: 1-14.

—— 1967, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University).

Marache R. 1952, *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du goût archaïsant au IIe siècle de notre ère* (thesis, University of Paris, 1949; reprinted Rennes: Imprimerie "Les Nouvelles").

Marshall A. 1976, "Literary Resources and Creative Writing at Rome," *Phoenix* 30: 252-64.

Mason H. 1978, "Fabula Graecanica: Apuleius and His Greek Sources," in *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*, ed. B. L. Hijmans Jr. and R. Th. van der Paardt (Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis).

—— 1983, "The Distinction of Lucius in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Phoenix* 37: 135-43.

*—— 1994, "Greek and Latin Versions of the Ass-Story," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.

Mattiaci S. 1986, "Apuleio e i poeti latini arcaici," in *Munus Amicitiae: Scritti in memoria di Alessandro Ronconi* (Florence: Felice le Monnier), II, 159-200.

Mensching E. (ed.) 1963, *Favorin von Arelate: Memorabilien und Omnigena Historia*, Texte und Kommentare, No. 3 (Berlin: de Gruyter), volume I.

Millar F. 1968, "Local Culture in the Roman Empire: Libyan, Punic and Latin in Roman Africa," *JRS* 58: 126-34.

Moles J. 1978, "The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom," *JHS* 98: 79-100.

Moraux P. 1984, *Der Aristotelismus bein den Griechen: von Andronikos bis Alexander*

von *Aphrodisias* (Berlin: de Gruyter), volume II.
Moreschini C. 1966, *Studi sul "De Dogmate Platonis" di Apuleio* (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi).
—— 1978, *Apuleio e il Platonismo* (Florence: Olschki).
—— (ed.) 1991, *Apuleius: De Philosophia Libri*, Apulei Platonici Madaurnesis: Opera Quae Supersunt, III (Stuttgart: Teubner).
Mortley R. 1972, "Apuleius and Platonic Theology," *AJP* 93: 584-90.
Mras K. 1949, "Die *prolalia* bei den griechischen Schriftstellern," *WS* 64 (1949) 71-81.
Müller S. 1939, *Das Verhältnis von Apuleius De Mundo zu seiner Vorlage*, Philologus, Supplementband 32, Heft 2 (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung).
Nesselrath H. 1990, "Lucian's Introductions," in *Antonine Literature*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Clarendon), 111-40.
Oberhelman S. and Hall R. 1984, "A New Statistical Analysis of Accentual Prose Rhythms in Imperial Latin Authors," *CP* 79: 114-30.
O'Brien M. 1991, "Apuleius and the Concept of a Philosophical Rhetoric," *Hermathena* 151: 39-50.
Opeku F. 1974, *A Commentary with Introduction on the Florida of Apuleius* (Ph. D. thesis, University of London).
Parsons P. 1971, "A Greek *Satyricon*?," *BICS* 18: 53-68.
Pavis d'Escurac H. 1974, "Pour une étude sociale de l'*Apologie* d'Apulée," *Antiquités classiques* 8: 89-101.
Pease A. 1926, "Things without Honor," *CP* 21: 27-42.
Perry B. 1927, "On Apuleius' Hermagoras," *AJP* 48: 263-6.
—— 1967, *The Ancient Romances*, Sather Classical Lectures, No. 37 (Berkeley: University of California).
Poncelet R. 1957, *Cicéron: traducteur de Platon* (Paris: Boccard).
Portogalli B. 1963, "Sulle fonti della concezione teologica e demonologica di Apuleio," *Studi classici e orientali* 12: 227-41.
Reardon B. 1971, *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C.*, Annales littéraires de l'Université de Nantes, No. 3 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres).
—— (ed.) 1989, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley: University of California).
Redfors J. 1960, *Echtheitskritische Untersuchung der apuleischen Schriften De Platone und De mundo* (Lund: Bloms).
Reedy J. (trans.) (1991), *The Platonic Doctrines of Albinus* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Phanes).
Regen F. 1971, *Apuleius philosophus Platonicus: Untersuchungen zur Apologie (De magia) und zu De mundo*, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, No. 10 (Berlin: de Gruyter).
Rives J. 1994, "The Priesthood of Apuleius," *AJP* 115: 273-90.
Roberts W. (ed.) 1901, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).
—— 1910, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Literary Composition* (London: Macmillan).
Robertson D. (ed.) 1940, *Apulée: Les Métamorphoses*, Collection des universités de France (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," reprinted 1965). 3 volumes.
Rolfe J. (ed.) 1927-8, *Aulus Gellius: Attic Nights*, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heineman). 3 volumes.

Rudd N. 1966, *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).
Russell D. 1983, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).
—— 1990, "Introduction: Greek and Latin in Antonine Literature," in *Antonine Literature*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Clarendon).
Russell D. and Wilson N. (ed.) 1981, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: Clarendon).
Sandy G. 1972, "Knowledge and Curiosity in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Latomus* 31: 179-83.
—— 1973, "Foreshadowing and Suspense in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *CJ* 68: 232-5.
—— 1974, "*Serviles Voluptates* in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Phoenix* 28: 234-44.
—— 1974a, "*Scaenica Petroniana*," *TAPA* 104: 329-46.
—— 1979, "Notes on Lollianus' *Phoenicica*," *AJP* 100: 367-76.
—— 1982, "Characterization and Philosophical Decor in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*," *TAPA* 112: 141-67.
—— 1982a, *Heliodorus*, Twayne's World Author Series, No. 647 (Boston: Twayne).
—— 1993, "West Meets East: Western Students in Athens in the Mid-Second Century A. D.," *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 5: 163-74.
—— 1994, "Apuleius' 'Metamorphoses' and the Ancient Novel," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter).
—— 1994a, "New Pages of Greek Fiction," in J. Morgan and R. Stoneman (ed.), *Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context* (London: Routledge).
Sazrmach M. 1985, *Maximos von Tyros: Eine literarische Monographie* (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika).
Scholfield A. (ed.) 1958, *Aelian: On the Characteristics of Animals*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University). 3 volumes.
Scobie A. 1975, *Apuleius Metamorphoses (Asinus Aureus) I: A Commentary*, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, No. 54 (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain).
Soury G. 1923, *La démonologie de Plutarque* (dissertation, University of Paris; Paris: Société d'édition "Les belles lettres").
*Soverini P. 1994, "Aspetti e problemi delle teorie retoriche frontoniane," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.
Spengel L. von (ed.) 1853-6, *Rhetores Graeci* (reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966). 3 volumes.
Steinmetz P. 1982, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Literatur des zweiten Jahrhunderts nach Christ Geburt*, Palingenesia: Monographien und Teste zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, No. 16 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner).
Stock A. 1911, *De Prolaliarum Usu Rhetorico* (dissertation, Albertus Universität, Königsberg).
Sullivan M. 1967, *Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources and Influence of Apuleius' Peri Hermeneias* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing).
Summers R. 1972, "Apuleius Juridicus," *Historia* 21: 120-26.
—— 1973, "A Note on the Date of the Golden Ass," *AJP* 94: 375-84.
Swain S. 1991, "The Reliability of Philostratus's *Lives of the Sophists*," *CA* 10: 148-63.
Syme R. 1959, "Proconsuls d'Afrique sous Antonin le Pieux," *REA* 61: 310-19.
Tatum J. 1979, *Apuleius and the Golden Ass* (Ithaca: Cornell University).
Thomas P. 1900, "Remarques critiques sur les oeuvres philosophiques d'Apulée,"

Bulletins de l'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et de beaux-arts de Belgique: 499-512.

—— (ed.) 1908, *De Philosophia Libri*, Apulei Platonici Madaurensis Opera Quae Supersunt, III (reprinted Stuttgart: Teubner, 1970).

Trapp M. 1990, "Plato's *Phaedrus* in Second-Century Greek Literature," in *Antonine Literature*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford: Clarendon): 141-73.

Usener H. and Radermacher L. (ed.) 1904-29, *Dionysius Halicarnaseus. Quae Exstant*, VI, Opuscula II (Stuttgart: Teubner).

Vallette P. 1908, *L'Apologie d'Apulée* (Paris: Klincksieck).

—— (ed.) 1924, *Apulée: Apologie [et] Florides*, Collection des universités de France (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres").

Van Thiel H. 1971-2, *Der Eselsroman*, Zetemata, No. 54 (Munich: Beck). 2 volumes.

Van Groningen B. 1965, "General Literary Tendencies in the Second Century A. D.," *Mnemosyne* 18: 45-56.

*Vessey D. 1994, "Aulus Gellius and the Cult of the Past," in *ANRW*, Part II, Volume 34. 2.

Vössing K. 1993, "Carthagine," in G. Cambiano (ed.), *Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica*, (Rome: Salerno): I, 2, pp. 769-89.

Wallace-Hadrill A. 1983, *Suetonius* (London: Duckworth).

Winkler J. 1980, "Lollianos and the Desperadoes," *JHS* 100: 155-81.

Winter T. 1969, "The Publication of Apuleius' *Apology*," *TAPA* 100: 607-12.

Yoder E. 1938, "A Second-Century Classical Scholar," *CJ* 33: 280-94.

Zimmerman-de Graaf M. 1993, "Narrative Judgment and Reader Response in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* 10, 29-34: The Pantomime of the Judgment of Paris," *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 5: 143-61.

GENERAL INDEX

Academy 19, 23, 25-6, 28, 187, 191, 195, 199
Accius 50, 57, 182
adaptations 12-3, 15-6, 23, 37-8, 61, 71, 121, 153, 188, 211, 219, 221-4, 230-1, 233-4, 236, 239, 247
Aemilianus 2, 6, 8, 11, 23-4, 108, 131, 133, 136, 140-1, 146, 160
Aesculapius 2, 5, 8, 10, 18, 36, 142, 144, 146, 152, 193
Africa 1, 3, 7, 9-10, 12, 17-8, 21-2, 28, 33, 36, 61, 129, 142, 144, 146, 152, 175
Albinus 2, 27, 139, 188, 212-4, 216-7
Alexander "Peloplato" 148, 167
Alexander the Great 42, 48, 54, 63, 65, 68, 83-4, 120, 166, 221
Antoninus Pius 1, 6, 41, 148
Apuleius
  Asclepius 38, 175, 185
  Astronomica 91
  Epitome of Histories 37
  Herbal 38, 185
  Hermagoras 38, 239
  Ludicra 36-7
  Medical Questions 37
  On Agriculture 37
  On Proverbs 37
  On Trees 37, 91
  Phaedo 37-8
  Republic 37
archaizing 51-2, 56-7, 87
Aristippus 81, 99, 153, 189, 191
Aristotle 13, 16, 18, 21, 23-4, 30, 34-5, 37, 40, 60, 68, 70-1, 86, 141, 177, 180, 191, 199, 209, 214, 216-7
Aurelius, Marcus 6, 9, 41, 50, 71, 174

bilingualism 9-11, 15-6, 18, 36, 107, 147, 192-3, 228
book shops 43, 61

canons, literary 40, 50, 53-5, 58-9, 63, 68, 73, 75, 87, 242, 245, 247
Carthage 1, 4, 5, 7-10, 16-20, 21-2, 26, 28-9, 32-3, 61, 67, 89, 119, 129, 160-4, 172, 176, 187, 192, 226, 248
Cato, Marcus 46, 50-2, 57, 84, 225-6
Chariton 240-2
chreiai 82, 120
Cicero 14, 21-2, 33-4, 37, 46, 51-2, 57-8, 60, 71-3, 75, 84, 121, 177, 203,219-20, 222-3
commonplace books 59, 85, 179
compendia 59, 64, 71-3, 76, 85, 88-9, 128, 179, 211, 214, 216-7, 228
compilations 37-8, 41, 47, 49, 74-7, 86, 88, 140, 218, 230-1, 247
controversiae 66-7, 109, 137
Crates 5, 58, 65-6, 68, 79-80, 84, 123, 137, 153
Cynics 24, 36, 58, 65, 75, 79-80, 84, 106, 109-10, 113-4, 116, 119, 123, 127, 133, 136-7, 146, 149, 153, 166, 169, 219

declamation 31, 111, 135, 145-6, 148, 150, 166, 171, 193
demons 14, 101-4, 113, 140, 144, 153, 181-3, 188, 191, 193, 195-209, 224-5, 227-8
demonology 113, 115, 183, 193, 195-6, 198, 200, 202-3, 207, 215, 219
Demosthenes 29, 45, 48-9, 54-5, 134-5, 175, 208
dialectics 4-5, 8, 33-4, 39-40, 73, 81, 92, 134, 188, 215-6
diatribes 93, 100, 113, 115, 137, 144, 205, 207
Didymus 74-6
Diogenes, Antonius 241
Diogenes the Cynic 19, 36, 62, 65-8, 77, 79-81, 84, 99, 100, 109-11, 114, 116, 123-4, 127, 133, 136-7, 183, 189, 205, 207, 241

ekphraseis 155, 167-8
Empedocles 5, 123, 140
encomia 151, 154, 164, 166-7, 170
Ennius 21, 31, 35, 50-2, 56-7, 87, 89, 102, 104
Epicharmus 5
epideictic oratory 63, 91, 130, 144, 146-50, 170, 172, 180, 182-3
epilepsy 24, 87, 141
epitomes 15, 27, 37, 68, 72, 77, 85, 188, 212, 232-9, 241, 248
Eubulides 134, 175
Eudemus 13, 23, 217

Faustinus 4-5, 211, 216
"firsts," theme of 78, 132
forensic oratory 130, 146, 150, 171-2, 180, 250-1
Fronto
  Encomium of Neglect 167
  Encomium of Smoke and Dust 167

gratiarum actio 129, 152, 160
Greek novels, ancient 239, 241-3, 245, 247-9

(H)adrianus 156-7
handbooks 63, 72, 81, 84, 216
Heliodorus 25, 240-1, 243, 252

Hermogenes 157
Herodes Atticus 22, 27, 32, 60, 72, 148-9, 153
Hippias 83-4, 107, 120, 153
Hippodromus 164, 167
Homer 11-2, 15, 21, 30, 40, 56, 58-9, 66, 75, 80, 89, 94-5, 106, 121, 124, 127, 132, 137, 177-9, 196, 200, 206-7, 209, 222
Horace 51-2, 56, 58, 111-4, 116, 127-8, 205, 222

Iamblichus 241
ichthyology 5, 11, 23-4, 30, 36-7, 52, 87, 147, 180
improvisation 101, 149, 189
inner worth, theme of 114-7, 119-20, 128, 183, 205, 207
intermediate divine powers 182, 194-5

Laberius 50, 52, 57
laliai 62-4, 154, 159, 162, 166, 191
libraries 18, 33-4, 43, 60-1, 100, 159, 191-2, 208, 211
"live" presentations 158-60, 166, 178, 180, 188-90, 192, 205, 207-8, 211, 228
loci communes 66, 109, 122, 146
Lollianus 143
Lucius of Patras 232
Lucretius 14, 21, 46, 50, 52, 56-7, 189, 200, 209, 222
Lyco 13, 23, 217

Madauros 6-7, 9, 16, 22
magic 1, 5-6, 61, 129-30, 139-41, 156, 174, 180-1, 195, 234-5, 237
Maximus, Claudius 1, 11, 21, 104, 129, 131, 133, 141, 175
Metiochus and Parthenope 243
Middle Platonism 194, 219
Milesian tales 230-3
mime 19, 159, 247-8, 251
mimesis 68-9, 145, 179, 211, 252
miscellanies 41, 44, 74, 76-7, 79, 89-90, 128
mock-encomia 166-7

Naevius 50-1, 57
Ninus and Semeriamis 243

Oea 1-4, 8, 10-2, 23, 142, 144, 187
Orfitus, Scipio 3, 36, 162, 163

Pamphila 76-7
Pamphilus of Alexandria 74
Parmenides 81, 216
Philemon 59, 67, 82, 145, 160
Phillip of Opunta 195, 200
philosophical discourse 20, 29, 32, 89, 98-9, 101, 119, 176, 226
Phoenician Story 243, 246
Plato 4-5, 8, 12, 14, 20-1, 23-9, 32, 35-7, 39-40, 46, 49, 55-6, 59, 65-6, 68, 71-2, 81, 83-4, 93, 102, 104, 133-4, 140-2, 145, 148, 168, 170, 173, 175-8, 180-1, 184-8, 190-5, 197-9, 202, 204, 207-8, 210-19, 221-2, 228-9, 248-50
Platonica familia 25, 183
Platonism 22-3, 27, 93, 188, 194, 199, 212, 219
Platonists 22-5, 66, 174, 178, 181, 184, 187, 190, 193-4, 198, 200-2, 213, 228, 249, 252
Plautus 21, 50-1, 53, 56-7, 106, 180, 200, 209, 218-9, 248-9, 252
Polemo 45, 149, 162
Pollux 49
Pontianus 2-3
poverty, theme of 24, 38, 66-7, 84-5, 99, 106, 123, 136-7, 146, 219
Proclus of Naucratis 60, 164, 167
progymnasmata 157
(pro)laliai 62-3, 152-4, 159-60, 166, 168, 191
Protagoras 17, 33, 62, 67, 81-2, 153
Pudens 8, 24, 134, 137
Pudentilla 3, 12, 108
pulpit oratory 66, 111, 183, 205
Pythagoras 8, 26-8, 39, 44-6, 62-5, 67, 78-81, 93-4, 100, 106, 120, 132, 140, 146-7, 152-3, 156, 158, 168, 183-4, 197-8, 204, 207, 209

qui-primus, theme of 80, 216

Sabrata 1, 56, 68, 87, 109, 129, 147, 183-4
Sallust 46, 50-2, 56-7, 224
scholasticism 4, 27, 38, 40, 53, 62, 66, 90, 93, 109-10, 114, 119, 123, 127, 129, 140, 145-6, 150, 163, 183, 205, 211, 213-6, 219, 222, 228
School of Gaius 27, 188, 212
Second Sophistic 22, 32, 42, 56, 67, 90, 93, 100, 127, 129, 143, 145, 149, 153-5, 158, 167, 170-2, 190, 205, 208-10, 240
Septimius Severus 9, 139
Sergius 33, 219-20
Severianus 1, 107, 153, 164
Sextus 27, 243, 249
Sisenna 57
Socrates 5, 7, 10, 14, 18, 45, 56, 59, 66, 83, 93, 99, 100, 106, 113, 115, 123, 133-5, 137, 144-5, 147, 153, 159-60, 170, 173, 181-3, 185-6, 188-94, 196-202,204-11, 215, 218-9, 222, 224-5, 228, 249-50
sophists 1, 5, 8, 33, 42-3, 45-6, 48-9, 59-60, 67, 81, 83, 87, 90-3, 99-102, 107, 118, 120, 123, 130, 134, 138,

140, 142-6, 148-58, 161-4, 166, 169-70, 173-5, 191, 206, 208, 215
Speusippus 195
syllogisms 7, 33-4, 40, 46, 78, 98, 150, 220

"talk," the 116-7, 154-5, 160, 162
Tatius, Achilles 240-1
Taurus 27-30, 32, 35, 45, 175, 187, 208, 213, 216-7
technical terms 35, 52, 63, 189, 211, 219
Thales 17, 82
Theocritus 11, 56
tragedy 5, 140, 247-9, 251, 252
translations 15-6, 28-9, 33-5, 37-8, 57, 69-71, 79, 93, 100, 105, 114, 124, 126, 188-9, 194, 205, 212, 220-1, 223, 227-8, 230-1, 236, 241-2

Varro 33, 34, 45, 57, 141, 203, 219-20, 231
Vergil 15, 21, 40, 45-6, 51-2, 56-8, 133, 182, 189, 200, 209, 222, 249, 252
Verus, Lucius 6

Xenocrates 195-7, 201
Xenophon 5, 47, 54, 100, 240-2
Xenophon of Ephesus 242

Zeno 36, 66, 81-2, 132-3, 147, 216
Zoroaster 140, 147, 184

INDEX OF PASSAGES

Aelian
On Providence 67

NA
1. 12. 6: 249
5. 27: 86
epilogue: 74
praef.: 74

Apuleius
Apol.
1. 3: 130
3. 4: 131
3. 5: 130, 145
4: 80
4. 1: 11, 131, 147, 174
4. 7: 132
4. 8: 132
4. 10-13: 132
5. 6: 132
5. 7 132
6. 3: 5, 36
7. 1: 132
7. 7: 132
8. 6-7: 132
9: 5
9. 1: 104, 130, 133
9. 11: 62, 81
9. 12 and 14: 37
9. 27-8: 6
9. 3: 133
9. 5: 23
9. 9-12: 133
10: 23
10. 1-5: 133
10. 6: 7, 23, 130, 133
12. 1: 104
12. 6: 52
13. 1: 31, 52, 104, 133
13. 2: 133
13. 3: 56
13. 3-4: 105, 131, 134
13. 5: 134
13. 5-16: 139
15. 1-2: 134
15. 10: 130, 176, 188
15. 11: 134
15. 12-5: 134
15. 4 and 7: 134
15. 9: 29, 175
16: 136
16. 1: 134
16. 10: 130
16. 10-13: 6
16. 2-6: 135
16. 6: 82, 135
16. 7: 135, 209
16. 7 and 10: 6
17: 66
17. 1: 136
17. 1-2: 137
17. 6: 24, 137
17-22: 84
17-23: 66
17-8: 190
18. 1: 24
18. 2: 24
18. 7-8: 137
18. 9: 136
19. 2: 21
20. 1: 66, 85, 88
20. 1-2: 67, 109
20. 2: 66
20. 4: 174
22: 23, 146
22. 1: 24
22. 5: 12, 58
22. 7: 24, 66, 109, 111
22. 7-8: 62
22. 8-10: 111
22. 9: 137
23. 2: 3-4, 23
23. 5: 130
24: 7
24. 10: 11
25. 10: 21
25. 10-11: 12
25. 2: 131, 136
25. 5: 139
25. 8: 139
25. 9: 141, 147
25. 9-26: 184
26. 5: 147
26. 6: 140
27. 1: 6, 11, 140
27. 2: 146
27. 9: 2
28. 1: 111
28. 1 and 3: 140
28. 2: 140
29. 1: 140
30: 56
30. 11: 11-2
31. 2: 81
31. 5-9: 58
31. 7: 59
33. 5-34. 3: 36
36: 23, 31
36. 2-3: 217
36. 3: 24, 30
36. 3-5: 87
36. 3-8: 13, 36
36. 5: 21, 30
36. 6: 72, 74, 219
36-8: 5, 37
37: 140
38: 129
38. 1: 21
38. 5: 14, 36, 53, 74, 229
38. 7-8: 11
38-9: 229
39: 56
39. 1: 24
39. 12: 52, 56
40. 1: 104
40. 1: 104
40. 5, 9 and 11: 88
40. 6 and 10: 86

40. 9: 87
41. 4: 18, 21, 61, 86, 105, 140, 192
41. 6-7: 37, 87
42. 1: 141
42. 5: 141
42-51: 180
43. 1: 141, 195
43. 2: 181, 183
48. 11-12: 141
48. 13: 21
48-51: 181
48-52: 184
49. 1: 24
49. 2: 228
49-50: 141, 217
51. 1: 21
51. 2: 147
51. 8: 181
52. 3: 3
53. 2: 141
53. 2-4: 141
53-6: 141
53-63: 144
55: 129
55. 1-2: 105, 141
55. 8: 142
55. 8-9: 8, 184
55. 10: 2-3, 142, 176, 188
55. 10-12: 5
55. 11: 142
55. 11-2: 8, 36
55. 12: 142
56. 2: 146
57-60: 142
59. 2: 1
61-3: 7
64. 1: 25
64. 3: 142
64. 3-4: 25
64. 4: 21
64. 5: 81
64. 5-6: 25
64. 8: 194
64-5: 142
65. 8: 21, 26, 56, 145, 177
66. 1: 142
67. 2: 142
68. 1: 142
70: 129
70. 3: 2
72. 3: 2, 8, 23, 26
72. 4: 2
73. 2: 4, 176, 188
73. 2-3: 2
73. 9: 2
76-7: 2
78. 4-5: 142
79. 1: 61
80: 129
80. 3: 143
82. 2: 12
83. 1: 12
85. 2: 1, 6
86. 3: 176
87. 4: 12
87. 5: 12
87-8: 109
88. 7: 105, 108, 143
89: 2
89. 5: 2
91. 2: 192
91. 3: 21
91. 8: 108
92-3: 108
94: 129
94. 3: 2
94. 6: 21
94. 7-95. 6: 143
95. 1: 143
95. 5: 143
95. 7-8: 143
95. 5: 52
96: 129
97. 1: 2
98. 6: and 8 12
98. 8: 12
102. 3: 143
103. 4: 145

Fl.
2: 106, 183
2. 2: 183
3: 63, 167
4: 63, 118
5: 19, 155, 159, 176, 182
5. 2: 102, 248
6: 86, 147, 155, 157-8, 167, 184
6. 1: 184
6. 6: 86
7: 64, 83, 120, 165
7. 2: and 8 86
7. 6: 86
7. 9-10: 152, 176
9: 19, 106, 120, 159, 164
9. 1-29: 102
9. 1-3: 165
9. 13: 129
9. 15: 83, 153
9. 15-23: 147
9. 2: 83
9. 29: 5
9. 3: 83
9. 37: 1
9. 4: 176
9. 40: 6
9. 7: 176
9. 7-8: 28, 29, 32, 52, 188
9. 7-9: 20
9. 9: 83, 119, 153, 159, 165, 176, 183, 248
10: 182-3
10. 1: 182
10. 3: 182, 195, 228
12: 147, 164-5, 167-8
13: 119, 152, 164, 168
14: 62, 84, 146-7, 153
15: 62-3, 65, 120, 146, 152-3, 156, 158, 167-8, 184
15. 6-27 147
15. 12: 147, 184
15. 13: 62, 81
15. 14: 81

15. 14-5: 147
15. 14-21: 8
15. 16: 81
15. 17: 63
15. 19: 82
15. 20: 81
15. 22-6: 184
15. 23-5: 26
15. 26: 26, 28, 184
16: 7, 63, 149, 160-1
16. 29: 161
16. 36-7: 2
16. 38: 8
16. 40: 8
16. 47-8: 129
16. 6: 82
17: 1, 67, 152, 161, 163-4, 168
17. 1-2: 162
17. 4: 3, 8, 184
17. 11-7: 163
17. 13: 163
17. 17: 63
17. 18: 36, 163
17. 18-9: 163
17. 19: 162
18: 10, 36, 82, 147, 152, 163, 193
18. 1: 188
18. 1-2: 17
18. 4: 248
18. 4-5: 192
18. 8-9: 18, 61
18. 9: 159, 192
18. 14 and 16: 5
18. 15: 4, 7-8, 26, 33
18. 15 and 42: 26
18. 15-6: 17
18. 16: 4, 9
18. 18: 151, 175
18. 18-35: 147
18. 19: 153
18. 19-29: 33
18. 20: 81
18. 30: 82
18. 36-40: 17
18. 38: 8
18. 42: 19
19: 157
19. 1: 82
20: 187
20. 4: 4, 8, 26, 31, 34, 184
20. 4-6: 5, 176
20. 9-10: 18, 102
21. 4: 52
22: 84, 146, 183
23: 183

Log.
1. 189. 9-190. 1: 70
1. 190. 5-8: 33
3. 190. 17: 220
4. 191. 16 and 18: 220
4. 192. 11: 7
7. 200. 16-7: 220
7. 200. 9-10: 34
9. 203-4: 220
11. 207. 23: 220
12. 209. 11: 220
13. 212. 13: 220
13. 213. 5-6: 220
14: 153

Met.
1. 1. 5: 250
1. 5-19: 235
1. 6. 2: 2
1. 7. 5: 249
1. 9. 4: 251
1. 10. 2: 249
1. 10. 3: 249
1. 18. 8: 250
1. 21. 5: 236
1. 22. 4: 7
2. 1: 235-6
2. 2: 236
2. 2. 3-6: 237
2. 3. 2-3: 237
2. 3. 5: 236
2. 4: 236
2. 5. 1: 236
2. 5. 7: 236
2. 6. 6: 245
2. 10. 2: 244
2. 11. 3: 7
2. 19. 1: 237, 243
2. 19. 5-6: 243
2. 20. 1-3: 243
2. 21-30: 235
2. 28: 157
3. 11. 1: 243
3. 15. 4: 243
3. 19. 5: 244
3. 19-20: 234
3. 21: 235
3. 22. 2: 236
3. 29. 2-3: 6
4. 8. 4-5: 246
4. 9-21: 238
4. 22. 1: 246
4. 22. 5: 246
4. 28-6. 24: 238
4. 32. 6: 231
7. 6. 2: 6
7. 7. 4: 6
8. 1. 2-3: 247
8. 27. 4: 234
9. 41. 6: 6
9. 42. 1: 6
10. 2. 7: 251
10. 6. 4-7. 1: 251
10. 7. 2: 251
10. 13-23: 238
10. 34: 238
10. 28. 3: 250
10. 29. 1: 248
10. 29-35: 247
10. 33: 248
10. 33. 1: 251
10. 33. 3-4: 250
10. 33. 4: 56, 248
10. 34-11. 2: 239
11. 15. 1: 238, 243, 246
11. 25: 194
11. 27. 9: 6-7

Mun.
2. 289: 35

4. 295-7: 222
5. 298: 227
7. 305: 222
10. 310: 222, 228
10. 311: 222
11. 312: 222
11. 313: 222
11. 314: 228
13. 318-14. 321: 3, 15, 32, 225
13. 319: 189, 222
14. 320: 222
17. 327: 8
19. 333: 222
23. 340: 140
24. 341: 121, 221
24. 343: 224
25. 343: 14
25. 345-26. 349: 121
25. 345-34. 365: 226
26. 348: 140
27. 352: 227
28. 352: 121
28. 353: 227
29. 355: 121
29. 356: 228
30. 357: 121
31. 359: 121
32. 361: 121
33. 362-3: 59
33. 363: 56
35. 365: 122, 226
35. 366-8: 15
36. 369: 15, 227

Pl.
1. 1. 180-2: 191
1. 1. 182-3: 191
1. 2. 185: 173
1. 3. 186-1. 4. 189: 8
1. 3. 186-7: 65, 184
1. 3. 187: 39, 8-2, 213, 216
1. 3. 187-8: 208
1. 3. 188: 20-1, 24
1. 4. 189: 39, 213
1. 5. 190: 212
1. 5. 191-2: 213
1. 6. 193: 218
1. 8. 196: 212
1. 9. 199: 212
1. 9. 200: 14, 53, 218, 229
1. 10. 202: 218
1. 11. 204: 228
1. 11. 204-5: 219
1. 12. 206: 203
1. 12. 207: 219
1. 13. 207: 218
1. 16. 215: 217
1. 17. 215: 217
1. 18. 216: 218
2. 1. 219: 211-2, 214, 216
2. 3. 223: 218
2. 4. 226: 214
2. 5-7: 214
2. 7. 229: 189
2. 8. 231: 151, 175, 215
2. 8-9. 230-5: 214
2. 9. 233: 215
2. 9. 234: 215
2. 11. 236 218
2. 15. 241: 180, 218
2. 17. 244: 218

Soc.
praef. 4: 149
1. 116: 182
1. 117: 209
2. 121-3. 126: 102
3. 121: 56
3. 122: 183
3. 123: 198
3. 124: 198, 208
3. 125: 102, 188, 208
3. 126: 209
4. 127: 183
4. 127-8: 210
4. 128: 198
4. 128-9: 199
4. 128-9: 194
5. 120-30: 194
5. 129: 153, 188
5. 129-32: 201
5. 130: 210
5. 131: 56
6. 132: 188, 192, 194, 198, 228
6. 132-3: 195
6. 133: 160, 183, 189, 198
6. 133-4: 197
7. 135-7: 211-2
7. 135-6: 103
7. 137: 199
8. 138: 199, 209
9. 140: 200
10. 141: 153
11. 145: 59, 101, 160, 181, 189, 196, 210
12. 145: 181, 201
12. 146: 209
12. 146-13. 148: 197
13. 148: 201
14. 148-9: 210
14. 149-50: 104, 209
14. 150: 101, 104, 160, 188, 202, 229
15. 150: 193, 202
15. 150-16. 156: 215
15. 151: 210
15. 151-4: 189
15. 152: 14, 54
15. 152-3: 209
15. 152-3 and 151: 209
15. 153-4: 209
15. 154: 210
16. 154: 197
16. 155: 160, 182
16. 156: 204
17. 157: 191, 206
17. 158: 188, 205
20. 166: 113, 153, 160, 188, 196, 200, 205
20. 166-7: 209
20. 167: 204
20-1. 167: 201, 204
21. 167 ad finem: 113, 183

21. 168: 114
22. 171: 115
22. 172: 115
23. 173-4: 115
23. 175: 207
24. 177-8: 200

Aristides, Aelius
3. 663-94: 166
3. 672: 150
27. 8: 58
30. 19: 59
32. 9-10: 89
38: 152
41: 152
42: 152
50. 91: 130, 143
51. 38: 149

Aristotle
HA 2. 507 a. 16-20: 86

Mu.
397 b. 27: 14
4. 17a. 2-7: 219

Rhet. 1354 a: 177

Arrian
Epict.
2. 19. 5: 82
3. 23. 17: 174

Athenaeus
1. 1 a-b: 75
1. 3 a-b: 60
3. 97 c: 75
5. 190-91: 59
5. 214 d-e: 60
9. 390 c: 86

Augustine, St.
C. D.
18. 18: 230
4. 2: 185
8. 12: 24, 174
8. 13: 190
8. 14-18: 185
9. 3-13: 185

Confessions
1. 13. 2: 9
1. 14. 23: 9
2. 3. 5-6: 9
3. 1. 1: 9
3. 4. 7: 9
4.16. 28: 9

Contra Litteras Petiliani
2. 38. 91: 9

Ep.
138. 19: 4, 8

On the Trinity
3, proem. 1: 10

Cassiodorus
De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum 3. 569 d: 39

Catullus 68. 31-2: 60

Choricus
Dialexis 21: 166

Cicero
Att. 4. 4 a: 60

De Orat.
1. 44. 195: 60
1. 155: 71
3. 15-9: 177
3. 26. 104: 122
3. 58-61: 177

Div. 1. 19. 37: 121

Fam. 7. 28. 2: 60

Fin. 3.15: 15

N. D. 1. 4. 8: 223

Opt. Gen. 14: 15

Q. fr. 3. 4. 5: 60

Tusc.
2.1: 31
2. 2. 6: 60
2. 3. 6: 223

Dio Chrysostom
2. 20: 59
6: 166
7: 154
12: 151, 161, 164, 190, 191
12. 13: 151
12. 15: 152
12. 5: 169
13: 153
18. 13: 145
21. 11: 64
21. 17: 59
23: 153
25: 198
30. 8: 59
32: 169
32. 61: 118
35. 1-2: 152
36: 177, 190
42: 152
49. 11: 118
52: 161
54: 153
57. 18: 59
60. 10: 145
64. 18: 110
72: 166

Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Dem. 55-7: 55

Din. 8: 68

Orat. Vett.
praef.: 53
1. 1. 7: 53

Pomp. 3: 68

Th.
1: 54, 68
51: 55

Favorinus
On Exile: 122-6, 178-9

[Dio Chrysostom]
Or. 37:
67, 91, 149, 152, 161
37. 26: 161
37. 43: 135

Fronto
I, 2: 174
I, 4: 21, 50
I, 5: 57
I, 7: 52
I, 122: 51
I, 286-8: 174
I, 289: 175
II, 4: 50
II, 52-3: 50
II, 66: 175
II, 67: 174
II, 71: 174
II, 78: 50
II, 82: 71
II, 112-3: 50

Gellius, Aulus
praef.
23: 74
12: 43
2-3: 44, 51
1. 3. 27: 46
1. 9: 27
1. 10: 47
1. 15. 17-8: 46
1. 15. 18: 57
1. 21: 46
1. 21. :5 52
1. 26: 30
2. 3. 5: 61
2. 5: 32, 46
2. 12. 5-6: 46
2. 22: 32, 46, 225
2. 22. 3-23. 9: 15
2. 26: 51
2. 26. 7: 48
2. 26. 7 and 21-3: 46
3. 1: 46
3. 16-17.7: 81
4. 1: 47
4. 1. 19: 92
4. 15: 57
5. 4: 43
5. 4. 1: 61
5. 10: 33
5. 11: 33, 46
5. 12: 51
5. 15: 31
5. 15-6 56
6. 4: 51
6. 9. 3: 51
7. 10: 28
8. 2: 47
8. 8: 34-5, 71
8. 14: 47
9. 1: 51
9. 4: 43
9. 4. 1-5: 43, 61
9. 4. 12: 47
9. 8: 46, 85
9. 12. 4: 57
9. 13. 4: 51
9. 13. 5: 47
9. 14: 43
9. 14. 2-4: 57
9. 14. 3: 61
10. 3: 51
10. 3. 15: 51
10. 12. 9-10: 46
10. 19: 29
10. 21: 51, 57
10. 24. 5: 51
10. 25. 1: 43
10. 26. 9: 52
11. 3. 1: 44
11. 5. 1: 46
11. 16: 71
11. 17: 43
11. 17. 1: 61
12. 1: 46
12. 4. 3: 51
13. 20: 43
13. 20. 1: 61
13. 24: 85
13. 25: 46
13. 29: 51
14. 1. 2: 92
14. 2: 46
14. 6: 79, 86
15. 17: 77
15. 23: 77
15. 24: 55
15. 26: 34
16. :3 46
16. 5. 7: 51
16. 8: 33, 211, 220
16. 8. 15-7: 34
16. 8. 2: 61
16. 8. 4: 34
16. 11. 3: 61
16. 19: 71
17. 2: 29
17. 10: 46
17. 12. 1: 92
17. 19: 46, 83
17. 20: 35, 71
18. 5. 11: 61
18. 7: 47, 80, 175
18. 10: 30
19. 3: 46
19. 6: 30
19. 7: 51
19. 8: 51
19. 8. 2: 57
19. 10: 51
20. 1: 46
20. 5: 35
20. 5. 13: 71

Heliodorus
Ethiopian Story
6. 14-5: 157

Herodotus

1. 23 71

Historia Augusta
"Clodius Albinus"
12: 141
12. 12: 2

"Hadrian" 16. 10: 92

Homer
Il. 1. 198: 200, 206

Od. 20. 18: 125

Horace
Ars
133: 15
268-9: 68

Ep. 2. 2. 60: 111

S. 1. 1. 19: 113
1. 1. 68: 115
1. 1 108: 112

Jerome, St.
Letters 57: 15

Juvenal
7. 148: 22
14. 311-4: 65

Laërtius, Diogenes
2. 1: 78
2. 11: 78, 80
2. 20: 78
3. 24: 78, 81
3. 48: 78
4. 67. 10: 19
5. 9: 78
6. 27: 80
8. 12: 78-9
8. 47: 78-9
8. 83: 78
9. 23: 78, 81

Libanius
Ep. 405: 142

Lucian
Alex. 47: 72

Apol. 15: 155

Asin.
1, 3-4: 236
3-4: 236
4: 236-7
12: 235
13: 236
14 and 54: 238
21: 238
22: 238
46-53: 238
53: 248
56: 239

Bacch.:
155, 158, 160, 168

Bis Acc. 27-8: 155

Dom.: 169

Electr. 6: 155

Harm.: 155

Herc. 155, 160, 168

Herod. 7-8: 155, 158

Hist. Conscr. 34: 55

Ind.
26: 60
27: 55

Lex. 22: 55

Rh.Pr.
1: 138
9 and 17: 55
18: 138
20: 138, 149

Salt. 57: 157

Somn.
10: 48
11: 155
13: 48

Zeux. 1:
155, 158-9

Macrobius
praef. 2: 73
praef. 5: 71

Martial
4. 53. 3: 24

Maximus of Tyre
1. 1 a-d: 123
1. 1 c: 59
1. 4. a-c: 114
1. 5 e-i: 113
1. 7: 164
4. 8 d: 59
7. 6: 101
8: 188, 197
8. 1: 205
8. 5: 200
8. 6: 201
8. 7: 206
9: 188, 197, 206
9. 7: 144
14. 8: 195
15: 112
15. 1 a-e: 113
16: 105
25: 120
26: 110
26. 2 f: 110
32 109-10
32. 9 a: 110
36. 6: 65

Maximus, Valerius
4. 2. 4: 65

4. 4: 66
8. 7. 2-3: 65
8. 11. 2: 64

Menander Rhetor
333-44. 14: 152
391. 10-18: 152
391. 13-6: 163
391. 15: 149
391. 19-28: 154
391. 29-392. 9: 163
392. 9-14: 154
393. 3-4: 156
394. 13-30: 163
394. 24-6: 163
394. 29-31: 154

Musonius
fragment 49 h: 174

Ovid
Pont. 4. 2. 29-30: 60

Tr.
1. 1. 105-6 60
1. 17. 19-20 60
3. 14. 37-8 60

Petronius
1-6 150
2. 4-5 and 9: 55
48. 4-6: 139
48. 5: 67
131. 8-132. 1: 250

Philo Judaeus
De Abrahamo 127: 198
De Decalogo 32-6: 198

Philostratus
VA 26-7: 157

VS
480: 22
481: 67
484: 173
486: 22, 151
488: 145
489: 22, 45, 173
490: 60
490-1: 162
491: 46
509: 149, 190
516: 130
530: 149
532-3: 149
535: 142
538: 149
539: 60
543: 145
555: 144
565: 72
570-6: 148
574: 63, 149, 167
577: 157
578-9: 142
579: 129
587: 156
592: 49
594: 49
604: 60
617: 164
624: 43

Plato
Ap.
41 b: 248, 251

Epin. 984-5: 202

Grg.
464c-465c: 215
484 c: 31
501 a: 215

Phdr.
229 a: 250
270 b: 215

Symp. 203 a 2: 194

Ti.
77 c-d: 217
90 d: 197
91 b-c: 217

Plautus
Poen. 112: 10

Pliny
Nat.
praef. 17: 72
praef. 22: 72
7. 2. 9-12: 61
18. 22: 18
18. 22-3: 61

Pliny
Ep.
3. 5: 73
7. 9: 69

Plutarch
Cic. 24. 6. 873: 28

On Isis and Osiris
25. 360 d: 196-7
361 b: 202

On Listening to Lectures
45 f-46 a: 163

On the Genius of Socrates
580 c: 200
593 d: 204

On the Obsolence of Oracles 417 a: 201

Quaest. Conv.
1. 164: 59

Sull. 26. 1: 60

Pseudo-Aristotle
On Marvellous Things Heard 842 a. 15-6: 86

Quintilian

Decl.
10. 1. 59: 55
12. 10. 19, 23 and 65: 55

Inst.
1. 4. 3: 54
1. 8. 18-21: 76
1. 8. 19-21: 157
1. 9. 3: 82
2. 1. 11: 131
2. 1. 8-11: 171
2. 4. 30-1: 171
2. 4. 30-31: 136
2. 4. 41: 171
4. 3. 2-3: 171
4. 3. 4-6: 131, 144, 172
9. 4. 127: 117
10. 1. 54: 54
10. 1. 58: 54
10. 1. 59: 54
10. 1. 75: 54
10. 2. 1: 69
10. 3. 17: 75
10. 5. 11: 70
10. 5. 4: 69
10. 5. 5: 69
11. 3. 68: 135
12. 10. 4-6: 54
12. 10. 7-9: 54

Seneca
Contr.
9. praef. 2: 171

Seneca
Cons. ad Helv. (*Dial.*)
11. 4-7: 66
12. 6. 1: 139

De Ira (*Dial.*)
2. 36. 1: 135

Ep.
33. 7: 82, 119
33. 7-11: 84
52: 176
52. 9: 176, 188
78. 16: 114
80. 2-3: 114
80. 7-8: 116
80. 9: 115
84. 3: 115
84. 5: 71
87. 40: 139
88. 5-8: 80
88. 37: 76
108. 6: 174
108. 8-11: 88
108. 23: 22, 88, 177
108. 36: 88

Nat.
1. 17. 4: 135
1. 17. 9-10: 136

Sidonius Apollinaris
Epistles
2. 9. 5: 37

Strabo
13. 1. 54: 60
13. 614: 22

Suetonius
Gram.
6: 175
10: 57
10: 75
10. 7: 52
26. 1: 71
30. 3: 49

Tacitus
Ag. 4: 31

Dial.
2. 32: 56

Varro
L. 10. 70-2: 231